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Abstract 
The study examines an aspect of indigenous Nigerian entrepreneurship, 'cusing on the cross- 
'-fo 
border trade in South-Western Nigeria. 
An almost total ignorance of how the traders go about their business, coupled with an 
unwelcoming trading environment, appear to have caused the antipathy of policy planners, 
and dearth of academic research in the area. The dearth of research is of particular concern 
here hence the need to "go back to basics", as it were, and focus the research in the first 
instance, on what the trade is in fact all about. The study focuses therefore on a descriptive 
analysis of the cross-border trade itself as an indigenous exporting activity, in particular the 
role of the small businesses who, in numerical terms at least, dominate the trade. It is 
expected that this will lead to future, more sector and area-specific studies on the subject. 
The cross-border trade takes place in an environment of illegality, corruption, and an 
unstable local economy, which makes trading conditions difficult, and would ordinarily seem 
to prevent traders from exercising their enterprise other than for mere survival on the 
economic fringes. Policy planners are also quick to argue that the trade is merely a 
smugglers' arena that contributes nothing to national development and in fact needs to be 
eliminated in aid of the development process. These reinforce the development literature 
which envisages only a limited role for indigenous entrepreneurship in economic 
development. 
The findings in this study however suggest another interpretation. It is argued that the trading 
environment as it is in fact provides opportunities which seem to have encouraged the 
emergence of an entrepreneurial class, and that though largely invisible, greater capital 
accumulation than is usu, 111y thought appears to be taking place, suggesting a more significant 
role for indigenous entrepreneurs in the development process. 
I 
Between chapters I and 5, a case is presented for why existing trade and development 
theories have only a limited application to the development process- in less developed 
countries like Nigeria. Chapters 6 and 7 introduce the surveys which indicate the 
performance and strategy of a sample of producers and traders. Subsequently relying mainly, 
but not exclusively on anthropological ly-oriented material, the study focuses, in chapters 8 
and 9, on die actors and activities in three cross-border trade routes, exploring the ways in 
which the traders relate to one another and to other participants in the trade. Further attention 
is paid to die ways in which the trade survives, evolves and develops, in spite of considerable 
environmental difficulties. While the study does not dispute that there are several smugglers 
and other Iaw-breakers in the cross-border trade traffic, it' argues further that considerable 
legitimate, but unrecorded trade goes on across the borders by several dedicated producers 
and traders. Certain theoretical implications arising from the study are discussed as areas for 
further study, while other, more practical recommendations, are suggested to policy planners, 
which may be beneficial both to them and to the traders in the future developments of the 
trade. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY. ""'*- -- 
1.1 An Overview Of The Study. 
This study is primarily about an aspect of the entrepreneurship process in South- 
Western Nigeria - the cross-border export trade engaged in by traders and other actors' 
across West Africa. 
Received knowledge teaches that the small firms who, in numerical terms, dominate 
private African enterprise, have little or no impact on national economic development. In 
Nigeria's case for instance, they are construed as predominantly inward-looking businesses 
that do not carry out any exporting, as evidenced for instance by Nigeria's published trade 
figures. In the course of this study, I will'argue that hypotheses such as these fail to capture 
the complexity and vibra'ncy (as well as the potential) of this trade. Involvement in the West 
African cross-border trade is very much a feature of indigenous Nigerian entrepreneurship. 
It sustains an entrepreneurial class, thus contributing to the country's economic development 
and, and is capable of being developed into a more efficient export activity. It is however 
being ignored as such by policy planners and academics, who have been quick to dismiss, 
and indeed condemn die cross-border trade as being virtually constituted of smuggling activities2. 
' "Actor", for the purposes of this study, refers to any person or persons who may be 
viewed as a distinct part of the social process. Examples would be entrepreneurs, customers, 
suppliers, government officials, and so forth. 
2 See for example the speeches of General Ibrahim Babangida (Nigerian Head of State 
1985-93) on West African integration, reproduced in Nwachukwu (1991). cf. Eleazu (1989); 
Ajiboye (1990), Yahaya (1992). 
1.2 Significance Of The Study. 
Inspite of the many references amongst the small business research and policy 
community on the importance of entrepreneurship and small enterprise development to wealth 
and job creation in developing countrieS3, there-have been few theoretical insights post- 
dating the 1970s on how entrepreneurship enhances the development process in Less 
developed countries (LDCs). Leys (1996) for instance, in a substantial "stock-taking" of the 
state of development theory contains no chapter or substantial section on debates concerning 
the role of entrepreneurship/enterprise development in the development process. This 
marginalisation of the sub ect may symtomise the fact that the entrepreneurship/small j 
business community has yet to contextualize its research in the wider debates on 
development, and this is one of the things that. this study seeks to do. 
Furthen-nore, the study makes the point that much more legitimate trade than is 
thought appears to be taking place across West Africa's borders, and that the major 
hinderance to the growt4 and contribution of. the trýde to regional GDP has more to do with 
a lack of an environment in which to blossom, than to a lack of enterprise in the population, 
or the "nefarious" activities of smugglers. 
This is not an entirely new hypothesis. In recent times, there have been several 
statements made along the lines of 
3 Page & Steel (1984); Haasbrock (1996); Fadeyi (1991); Marsden (1990); Petrof 
(1980). 
' In this study, the terms "less developed", "underdeveloped", and "developing", 
where they refer to countries (and economics, in particular) are being used interchangeably. 
In the same vein. the terms "developed", "advanced", and "industrialized" are used 
i lite I-clia ligeably. 
1) 
"The volume of Nigeria's exports to other West African countries is enormous... 
Sadly the official channels hardly benefit from this trade which goes instead through 
market women (mammies), who know how to beat the syst&W, 's, 
and 
"World Bank projections of booming non-oil exports [from Nigeria] have not been 
realised. There was a short-lived post-devaluation boom with recorded non-oil exports 
reaching $613 million in 1988, but by 1994, they had collapsed to $244 million. 
Given high levels of unofficial cross-border trade, this is certainly an under- 
estimate" . 
However, statements such as these are generally not developed further, and tend to 
be treated as not much more than anecdotal asides. Lack of adequate knowledge about the 
mechanics of the cross-border trade seems to be one of the main reasons why its 
contributions to national employment and invisible balance of payments are often ignored, 
or otherwise unacknowledged. This study hopes to contribute to the filling of this gap in 
particular, and to the evolving knowledge on West African intra-regional trade in general. 
Academically, it attempts to provide development economists, as well as social and 
economic anthropologists with material for further study relating to the ways in which sub- 
saharan Africans, and Nigerians in particular, order an aspect of their economic behaviour, 
an objective considered in certain quaters in development studies to be in short supply', 
hence its interdisciplinary approach. It is also hoped that it will be of interest to Nigerian 
West Africa (28/5 - 3/6/90, p. 887). 
Financial Times (London) 26/5/95, section 3, pp 3-4. 
' In Hill (1971), one of only a small number of such studies, an aspect of the cross- 
border trade between Nigerian traders and migrant farmers from the Niger Republic is given 
a brief mention as part of a wider study of the grains trade in Northern Nigeria. See also 
Business In ECOWAS vol. 5, No. 9 24/9/91, pp. 34-35; African Guardian vol. 4, no. 6 
13/2/89, pp. 19-26; The Guardian (Lagos) 14/2/94, P. 11, which all indicate that steady cross- 
border trade also takes place, not only as Polly Hill states above, but also between Nigeria's 
eastern states and Cameroun. 
' See Hill (1986: xi). 
3 
policy planners in the formulation of export policies and guidelines for Nigerian firms, 
especially those wishing to trade in West Africa. To that extent, it may be considered to be 
policy driven. 
1.3 Background To The Research Problem 
"Nigeria is a nation of traders", as the popular local saying goes. A tour of any part 
of the country is indicative of this well-eamed reputation. One is as likely to find buyers and 
sellers in warehouses and other outlets belonging to manufacturers' representatives as one is 
to find them in purpose-built markets, street-comers, residential buildings, schools and 
offices, air and seaports, on fannlands, alongside rivers - literally everywhere. People trade 
out of modem shops or stalls, from either purpose-built or make-shift market stalls, out of 
their homes, in schools, along motorways - almost anywhere. They sell anything: There are 
books, arts and crafts, pre-recorded music, power generators, clothes, all kinds of fruits and 
food, various electrical/qlectronic parts, palm produce, coal, manufactured plastic products, 
used cars and car engines and a great deal of other products. It is not unusual to even find 
people representing producers of farm produce such as cocoa, rubber, wood or livestock in 
air or seaports. Hawkers of all kinds of goods from home security equipment to fresh and 
cooked foods, household necessities, and even luxury items such as jewellery, perfumes and 
the like, can be found selling their products in traffic, in markets, or'direct to people in their 
hornes. There also abound carpenters, makers of cement blocks and other building materials, 
bakers, vehicle assemblers, dress makers and designers, auto mechanics, and so forth. Quite 
apart from these are the more "modern" firms of all sizes, including multi-national 
enterprises (NINEs), which seemingly exist quite comfortably alongside the more 
4 
"traditional" fonnats described above. 
This picture is true of both rural and urban centres in Nigýýia, with rather more 
general relevance to the latter. The channels described above combine in a complex, vibrant, 
but often misunderstood network of production and distribution of goods and services within, 
and to a considerable extent, beyond Nigeria. 
I have found scenes like these repeated in several parts of West Africa in the course 
of my fieldwork. On my field-trips which were mostly by road, I witnessed an astonishing 
amount of commercial activities going on at various border locations. Although much of 
the cross-border trade traffic originates from, or seems destined for Nigeria, the trade keeps 
many businesses busy right across West Africa, and provides several entrepreneurial 
opportunities which in varying degrees, many traders are willing and able to exploit. 
For the purposes of this study, and for want of a better terin, I will refer to this 
process as "indigenous economics"9, and to the pa'rticipants in this trade, to the extent that 
they live in and are primarily operationally based in'the area of study, as "indigenous 
entrepreneurs"". Indigenous economics, here, is distinguished from "mainstream" (or 
classical) economics not so much in fundamental beliefs or theory, but mainly as a matter 
of approach. For instance, in any given situation, the factors which may require further study 
or research in a less developed economy like Nigeria's may be different from those of the 
more developed economies of Western Europe. So, while the economic behaviour of both 
' This term has been borrowed from Polly Hill's Sonte Characteristics Of Indigenous 
West African Economic Enterprise (1 963a). 
"' This term Ims been simikirly borrowed from E. 0 Akeredolu-Ale's Private Foreign 
hivestment Am/ The Untler(levelopment Of huligetious Entrepreneurship In Nigeria (1976). 
5 
the (indigenous) Nigerian entrepreneur and his" British counterpart can be described as 
"rational" and "responsive", what constitutes rationality or responsiypness in their individual 
circumstances may not necessarily be the same. 
It has been argued that (what I term) indigenous economics drifted from mainstream 
economics during the hundred-odd years of EuroPe's colonization of Africa; the argument 
being that 
"during the brief colonial period, economists were concerned with the point of contact 
between West African and European economies, with the economic relationship 
between the metropolitan country and the colony. This led them to concentrate nearly 
all their attention on... acts of exportation and importation, rather than indigenous 
systems of internal distribution"", 
including the "lateral" intra-regional export and import trade going on between various West 
African communities. According to Hopkins (1973), this has not merely been an academic 
omission. Policy makers, over a considerable period, have been just as guilty. He writes 
thus: 
"[The indigenous] economy was largely ignored by the colonial administration 
because it was nqV, on the whole, an important source of public revenue, and it was 
also neglected by the expatriate commercial firms, which chose to concentrate on the 
staples of the import and export trade. Oddly enough, the very success of the African 
distributive system, which transferred goods and services with unobtrusive efficiency, 
seems to have confirmed the low priority accorded by expatriates to internal trade. 
Had indigenous channels proved inadequate, serious shortages would have occurred; 
the administration would have had to intervene; reports would have been written; and 
scholars would probably have become interested in the subject at an earlier date. In 
fact, it was not until the 1950s that economists discovered the existence of internal 
(West African regional) trade... 1113 . 
11 In this thesis, the pronouns "he/his/him" have been used (except where a text is 
being reproduced) to represent entrepreneurs in general, only as a matter of convenience. It 
is not intended to eliminate female entrepreneurs from the scope of the thesis. It is in fact 
recognized that in certain instances, female entrepreneurship may require further, special 
research. 
12 Hill (1970: 4). cf. Schultz (1964: 6); Wallerstein (1973). 
11 Hopkins (1973: 244). Brackets mine. 
6 
It is a situation that unfortunately continues to underpin this area of development 
thought in present times and contributes significantly to the dearth -of., ýýficial and academic 
interest in the area. 
Hill (1970: 4-5) goes further to say that 
"in insisting on the narrow scope of conventional economics in regions such as West 
Africa, I am not exaggerating. We are all far more ignorant than we are 
knowledgeable. From Dakar to Cameroun, there is very little systemized knowledge 
relating to the economic organization of internal trade in West African foodstuffs and 
raw materials... " 
She calls for an "alternative analysis" involving far more "anthropologically oriented 
material"", by which she means the carrying out of detailed field studies involving the 
questioning and observing of individuals while they are at work. From these, patterns of 
standardized economic behaviour, amid the diversity of African life, may be discerned. 
Economists may then use this information to. design, and operationalize their tests, using 
standard statistical means. 
Hopkins identifieý further policy-level benefits to be had from a more "hands on" 
I 
research approach. In Ws words 
"This shift of emphasis may have beneficial academic consequences if it encourages 
, academics to leave the air-conditioned corridors of power and venture into the farms 
and markets. It may also have some practical use if it reminds those who formulate 
policy and exercise authority that the skills and energies of ordinary Africans are 
11 This theme is taken up again in a fuller discussion on the methodology in chapter 
6. in criticising the seeming unreliability of officially published data (upon which an 
increasing number of government and international agency forecasts were being made) in the 
fiace or observable contrary evidence, many other writers on post- independent African trade 
and consumerism advocate much the same thing. Farnsworth (1961: 192), and Hill (1970: 10) 
contain illustrations or such data unreliability from Ghana, showing it is not a new, or 
localised problem, and Hill (1986) dedicates an entire chapter (chapter 3) to the subject, 
criticising ftirther the complacent attitude of international institutions and economists in 
accepting without question, obviously "bad official statistics" as basis for 
analysis. 
7 
probably the continent's greatest assets"". 
I believe there is a need to regard economic behaviour-and development in less 
developed economies as "different" from those of more developed economies, and so 
requiring recognition and study in their own right", rather than "different" in the modernist 
sense that less developed countries are in certain hierarchical stages of development from 
where they will, or should work towards what obtains in the industrialized economies of the 
west". To disregard this would, in effect, be likening the people and economy of a country 
to a laboratory situation where variables are open to control and manipulation. 
The aid agencies and development economists who championed the modernist view- 
point" favoured central planning and tight government controls over the allocation and use 
of resources for the attainment of sustained economic development, partly due, as Marsden 
(1990: 1) reports, to a belief that there was a scarcity of entrepreneurs in Africa. The 
opposing views of some writers to the effect thýt there is sufficient entrepreneurship in 
Africa, and that any blame for their relatively minimal impact on overall economic 
development must be puýt on the restrictive practices of African governments", or incorrect 
statistical records2l were firmly in the minority. 
15 Hopkins (1973: 296). 
16 as hi ,s been done by Hill (1963a)(1970); Schultz (1964). Collier (1991) also more 
or less makes the same point in his critique of the thinking behind the World Bank's (1989) 
proposed development strategies for sub-saharan Africa. 
17 a view implicitly favoured by development economists such as Geiger & Armstrong 
(1964) a generation ago, and which, in certain quaters, persists. cf Marsden (1990). This 
issue is explored further in an examination of modernization ideas in chapter 3. 
IN see for instance United nations (1976), and Steel (1979), respectively 
" Batier (1976). 
211 Hill (1963a-, 1970). 
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There is no denying that improvements are necessary in the economic fabric of LDCs 
before sustained development can occur, but the point is nevertheless stressed that existing 
ideas on the path that the transformation of LDCs ought to take are somýtimes clouded by 
an improper understanding of the inherent development practices and attitudes already 
entrenched in various indigenous LDC populations. 
In the 1970s, Nigeria and many other parts of Africa enjoyed annual growths of 7% - 
10% in GDp2l, but this was accompanied by widespread economic mismanagement and 
political instability'. As it was fairly obvious that this growth owed much more to high 
mineral and commodity prices than to investment and output growth, the structuralist model 
of economic growth envisaged by orthodox development theory came under increasing 
criticism, and in its stead arose a new emphasis, or at any rate, a new rhetoric, on a self- 
reliant approach to develoPment. 
The 1980s witnessed a drastic reduction in'the earning power of Nigeria and other 
subsaliaran African countries. This, added to increasing evii1ence of public sector inefficiency 
I. 
resulted in a further teappraisal of development strategies. By the mid-1980s, the 
International monetary fund (IMF) had commended various policies of economic 
liberalization including subsidy withdrawal, privatization, currency devaluation, and so forth 
to most parts of subsallaran Africa as part of a structural adjustment programme (SAP). 
Pressure was put on them to embrace free enterprise and jettison "state" capitalism. The 
World Bank (1989; 1991) has argued to this end, first, that entrepreneurs are the most 
realistic source or new jobs to satisfy a labour force expected to grow to around 600 million 
by the year 2020; and second that only entrepreneurs' collective initiative can ensure dint the 
21 IMF (1975). 
22 See I'Millier-Brick fed. ] (1978). 
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long-term demand for low-cost products and services will be met. 
I do not intend to argue that governmental intervention -apd decision making in 
commerce are unnecessary and undesirous. Indeed, it will be shown that in certain instances, 
governmental intervention is a most desirable option. However, certain other contributions 
are, or can be made by private enterprise which are not likely to be forthcoming, as Geiger 
& Annstrong (1964: 13) put it "... either at all, or as soon, or to as great an extent... " if 
reliance is placed solely, or even mainly on governmental decision making. 
Although the argument now seems settled that entrepreneurship and free markets have 
a major role to play in Africa's economic development, differing views remain as to which 
types of entrepreneurs can best, or most effectively, achieve this. The activities of indigenous 
entrepreneurs are usually divided into two sectors. They are known by a variety of names, 
the most common of which are "modem" and "informal" sectors23. 
The modem sector is generally viewed as including enterprises that operate within 
official regulations, while the informal sector is seen as that under which enterprises carry 
on business outside official regulations2l, usually meaning the avoidance of tax paymen0l. 
23 Some authors take the view that any differentiation by size and characteristics is 
inevitably arbitrary, and to that extent must be rejected. See Breman (1976); Page & Steel 
(1984: 9-13). 
21 Page (1979); Marsden (1990); Shaw (1991). Although individually small in size, 
"informal" enterprises provide the bulk of African employment in manufacturing, services 
and commerce (Page & Steel 1984: 6). The conventional characteristics of the informal sector 
- adopted in this study - include case of entry, small (or micro) scale of operation, the use 
of labour intensive and adaptive technology, an unregulated but competitive market, low 
fixed costs, mobility, and other like characteristics. See further Hart (1973); Majumdar 
(1980); Claninier (1987); Oyeneye (1981); Haasbrock (1996). 
25 It has also been said to include the avoidance of the banking system (Roitman 
1990: 681). although most of those respondents to the survey in this study, who to all intents 
may be classed in the informal sector, do in fact operate bank accounts. What about 59% of 
theni fail to do however, according to the survey, is register their businesses either under the 
Registration of Business Names Act, or the Companies Decree. As for the avoidance of 
10 
The activities of the informal sector (in which a significant proportion of private 
enterprises operate) are "unofficial" and are therefore unmeasured and unrecorded. There is, 
in addition, a tendency to dismiss them as illegal, and not contributing to economic 
development. However, a great deal of the economic activities that I witnessed in the 
commercial centres that I studied were not inherently illegal, although several transactions 
were concluded with tax avoidance in mind. The informal sector also does not enjoy as much 
independence or autonomy ftom the state as is sometimes thoughf26. Many cross-border 
traders that I spoke to in Nigeria, who would fall within the ambit of the informal sector, for 
instance rent their shops in "above-board" arrangements from the government; their exports 
and imports pass through official channels (there is much less need now, than at anytime in 
the past century for such goods to be carried through the bushes on the trader's head, which 
is the oft-porimyed image of the cross-border trader); And most duty and tax evasion is done 
with the connivance of the public officials in char&. Both sectors feed off one another to a 
greater extent than is often thought, or acknowledged. 
Professional opinion about the sector is mixed. In the interviews I conducted, bankers, 
academics and public officials were more likely to describe firms in this sector as "economic 
duties other than direct taxes, observable evidence in the present study indicates that 
enterprises in the informal sector are not significantly more likely to do this than their 
modern sector counterparts. It is trite knowledge in Nigeria that not many people outside die 
ambit of those employed directly or indirectly by the government, or by firms registered 
under the Companies Decree pay income tax. Even then, several registered firms are in their 
own case involved in a continuous game of wits centred around their non-payment of other 
taxes 
including value added tax (VAT) (cf. Financial Guardian [Lagos] 14/2/94, p. 5) and 
contributions to the National Housing Fund 
(NI-IF) (cf. Business Tinics [Lagos) 21/3/94, pp. 1,13). 
2o cr. MaeGaffey (1987). 
parasites"", while managers in manufacturing and trading firms were generally slightly 
more generous in their assessment of the sectors, particularly when it came to describing 
informal enterprises engaged purely in trading activities. 
The importance of both sectors is well acknowledged by African governmentS28, 
even if such is not quite borne out in practice by the governments' implementation of their 
economic policies. 
Within the two sectors are a myriad of firm sizes. There generally is considerable 
interdependence amongst firms of all sizes. As such, the data and discussion extends to firms 
of all sizes, aldiough the entrepreneurs that this study is primarily concerned with are owner- 
managers of relatively small-scale enterprises (SSES)29. I do however hesitate to use the 
term "SSE" in any broad sense because "small" is a relative term, apart from which it has 
been used to mean so many different things as to render it imprecise for analytical purposes, 
unless specifically defined for the *context in which it is being used. 
In Nigeria, as in many other places, what is meant by "SSE" depends on the peculiar 
I. 
needs of the author, or ifi the case of governments, of public policies. Different departments 
adopt different definitions. Thus, die Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Nigerian Export 
and Import Bank (NEXIM), the National Economic Recovery Fund (NERFUND), and the 
Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture 
27 a summation of various uncomplimentary terms used to describe the sector. 
21 The Organization of African Unity's Lagos Plan of Action (OAU 1982, cited in 
Page & Steel 1984: 1) for instance specifically urges "creating a network of small and 
medium scale industries as well as actively promoting and encouraging the informal sector" 
as the cornerstone of its plan for industrial development and job creation. cf. Article 50 of 
the revised ECOWAS Treaty signed in Abuja, Nigeria in 1993 dealing with the promotion 
ofinter-regional trade. 
The ternis "enterprise", "firin" and "company" are used interchangeably. 
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(NACCIMA), among others, all have different definitions for SSEs". The main 
determinants in Nigeria are size of capital investments, value of annual turnover, and number 
of paid employees. However, apart from the usual differences in interpietation given by 
different industrial sectors, which is considered acceptable in most economies, in the 
particular case of Nigeria, hyper-inflation and massive fluctuation in the exchange rate of the 
Nairall have occasioned substantial inconsistencies in the weight one accords investments 
and turnover in defining a small-scale enterprise. It is unrealistic in Nigeria's present 
economic climate, as it has been since about 1990, to expect monetary figures (such as the 
replacement value of production machinery) from one year to bear close resemblance to 
figures from die neX02. In Nigeria these figures are continually expanded in the official 
definitions to take account of inflationary trends. I will illustrate these with the following 
examples: 
The CBN's Monetary Policy Circular number 22 of 1988 defined SSEs as enterprises 
30 This is not a PLuliarly Nigerian situation. In Malaysia, for instance, the Co- 
ordinating Council for Pevelopment of Small Scýle Industries (CCDSI), the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, and the Industrial Co-ordinating Act of 1975 have capitalized SSEs at 
M$250,000; M$500,000andM$2.5 million respectively ([US$1.00=M$2.5] CheePengLim 
1992: 9-10). Similarly, an SSE in Singapore is one which employs fewer than 50 workers per 
shift, while the figure may go up to 99 workers in the Philippines. A "small" manufacturing 
firm may employ up to 20 people in South Korea, 200 in the U. K, and 300 in Japan. The 
contrasts are virtually endless. 
31 The Naira ("N", divided into 100 kobo) is the currency of Nigeria. El officially 
exchanged for N32 during the course of the fieldwork for this study, but informally, El 
exchanged for an average of N75 over the same period. See further chapter 8, although there 
are relevant references to this issue throughout the study. 
I-' I witnessed price increases of about 30-200% on most consurner goods during the 
eight montlis that my fieldwork lasted. Inflation, according to die government stood at about 
45% for the period, while the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) 
estimated it to be about 80% for the same period (MAN 1994). See also Business Concord 
(Lagos) 4/l/94, p. 12, and Financial Guardian (Lagos) 31/1/94, p. 14, for illustrations of 
banks and other firms, on (lie one hand struggling with decreased patronage (or unit sales), 
while simultaneously reporting increases in "profits" of up to 300%. 
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in which total investment (including land and working capital) did not exceed N500,000 
and/or the turnover did not exceed N5 million. Following persisteq and sharp devaluation 
of the Naira, the investment and turnover figures were, in 1990, increased to N5 million and 
N25 million respectively. The investment figures were raised further still, to N10 million, 
in 1993". 
A note of caution must therefore be sounded about the use of investment and turnover 
figures in arriving at a working definition of SSEs for the purposes of this study. Numbers 
employed, as a category, although by no means immune, is far less susceptible to the kind 
of effect that inflation has upon investment and turnover. Furthermore, it is a convenient 
criterion of research which can be readily compared across different industrial sectors and 
countries. The definition ought nevertheless to include some barriers to entry in order to rule 
out illegal and unskilled activities. 
A broad working definition of SSEs, for 'the purposes of this study, is therefore 
suggested as follows: 
I. 
Privately owned independent enterprises: engaged in legitimate profit-oriented 
activities involvibg barriers to entry in the form of physical capital, and which, for 
this purpose, employ between one and fifty persons". 
33 This situation bruises the ego of several indigenous entrepreneurs. In particular, 
several of the more well-to-do respondents during the pilot stage of the fieldwork were 
incensed when it became apparent that their businesses were by definition "small". They 
believed that having worked hard for a number of years to build businesses that earned, in 
some cases, millions of Naira each year, and provided employment for several people, they 
no longer saw their businesses as small, and did not wish them to be regarded as such simply 
because the Naira was in trouble. For the actual study then, I had to ensure that direct 
references to firm sizes were, as far as possible, omitted. 
31 1 have selected these figures for use here because they are the same ones used by 
the Small Industries Section of the Federal Ministry of Trade (Federal Ministry of Trade and 
Industries [1980]. Federal Office of Statistics [1991; 1993a]). Several academics have also 
adopted these figures for use both within, and outside Nigeria (Aluko et al [1972]; Orimalade 
& Ubogu [jeds. ) 1984]; Osha [1989]; Page [1979] Page & Steel [1984]; Marsden & Belot 
[19871; Marsden [1990]), although some, like Marsden (op. cit. ) put an upper limit of forty 
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This definition includes the so-called "artisanal", "cottage", or "micro" enterprises which 
employ between one and nine persons". 
A small scale enterprise, in whatever sector, is not necessarily su6sistence-oriented. 
Although petty traders dominate the cross-border trade, and more generally, the informal 
sector in numerical terms, the activities of more lucrative enterprises, and those with the 
potential or ambition to do so must not be ignored. To put this in perspective, about 30% of 
the respondents to the survey for this study reported an annual turnover of Nl rnillioný' or 
more. 
1.4 The Entrepreneurship/Small Business Interface. 
There is a tendency among many writers, as well as in everyday usage to equate 
entrepreneurship with small business ownership. Indeed, "the entrepreneur is often defined 
nine on these figures. 
11 By extension, medium and large scale enterprises will inclu& those that employ 
between fifty one and three hundred, and more than three hundred persons, respectively (cf. 
Marsden 1990: 5). 
31 The dilemma however is what this figure means in hard currency, for analytical 
purposes, given the volatility of the Naira exchange rate, referred to earlier. Adejoro (1995) 
argues 
that a currency ought always to be a reflection of its domestic value, and rightly points out 
that this has not been die case with the Nigerian Naira, a currency that is virtually under 
constant revaluation of its exchange value. I will illustrate this with the following: NI million 
would have exchanged for about $1.4 million in the regulated exchange rate system operated 
in 1985. In the deregulated system in operation in 1992 & 1993, the same amount would 
have excliangged for about $55,000, and $23,000 respectively. Under the fixed exchange rate 
system which Nigeria reverted to in 1994, it would have then risen to $45,000 before falling 
back to about $20,000 in the re-deregulated system of 1995 (see African Concord 24/l/94, 
p. 16 , The News 14/11/94, TNB 8-9, for a review of the patlis of the Naira's rates vis-a-vis 
the American dollar from 1987 to 1994). 
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as one who starts his own, new and small business"". Just as often however, the point has 
been made that not every new small business represents entrepreneurship, and that some of 
the world's largest enterprises are in fact among the most entreprene daVI. This interface 
is a source of continuing debate in entrepreneurship research. 
The overlapping of entrepreneurship with other enterprise concepts such as "owner- 
manager 11 , as well as the sometimes fuzzy distinctions made between entrepreneurship and 
"small finn/enterprise/business" or such other units, more often than not create further 
grounds for debate or confusion in entrepreneurship research. The connotations vary from 
country to country, and even within the same country, as shown earlier, may well vary 
between sectors. It is also quite possible that within the same sector, a firm which is "small" 
by capitalization may not be deemed small by virtue of numbers employed. 
The Bolton reporO', published in the U. K in 1971 gives three essential 
characteristics which any "small firm" ought to possess. 
i) By definition, such firm's share of the market ought to be small. 
It must be managed by its owner(s), who must do so in a personalized way, 
as opposed to a formalized management structure. 
It must be independent in that it does not form part of a larger enterprise and that the 
owner-manager(s) must be free from outside control in taking principal decisions. 
Although this was not the stated intention of the Bolton report, it has virtually become 
31 Drucker (1986: 35). 
31 Drucker's examples here include Marks & Spencer (from the U. K), and also 
General Electric and McDonalds (from the USA). 
" Report Of The Committee Of Inquiry On Small Firms, Cmnd. 4811 (1971: 1) John 
Bolton - Chairman: cited in Sease & Goffee (1982: 40-42). 
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standard practice, in following the report, for writers to identify management structures and 
practices as the key distinguishing factors between entrepreneurs and small business owners. 
According to Carland et al (1984: 358) for instance, 
"An entrepreneur is an individual who establishes and manages a business for 
the principal purposes of profit and growth... is characterized principally by 
innovative behaviour and will employ strategic management practices in the 
business... The principal goals of an entrepreneurial venture are profitability 
and growth, and the business is characterized by innovative strategic 
practices " 
Whereas, 
"A small business owner is an individual who establishes and manages a 
business for the principal purpose of ftirthering personal goals. The business 
must be a primary source of income and will consume the majority of one's 
time and resources. The owner perceives the business as an extension of his 
or her personality, intricately bound with family needs and desires... A small 
business venture is any business that is independently owned and operated, not 
dominant in its field, and does not engage in any new marketing or innovative 
practices"O. 
Although these definitions -are supposed to highlight dissimilarities between the two 
concepts, in practice, they actually end up suggesting m6re similarities than they probably 
intend. For instance, the'Carland definitions suggest that only small business owners set up 
businesses to pursue personal goals. However illustrations abound around the world of 
entrepreneurs who establish entrepreneurial ventures for such reasons 41 . 
They also conclusively link the desire for profitability only with entrepreneurship and 
40 cf. Cliell et al (1985: 5); Loucks (1988: 4); Hebert & Link (1988: 155). 
11 To pick two rather extreme examples, Soichiro Honda had already realized his 
dream of building and marketing what was arguably tile world's leading motor-cycle brand, 
when lie tried his hand at repeating his success in the motor-car industry. This was done with 
equally impressive results. Similarly, Moshood Abiola was already one of Nigeria's most 
successful entrepreneurs when lie began to publish a newspaper ("The National Concord"), 
initially as a vehicle for his own political views. In the process of doing this, die newspaper 
publishing house (Concord Press of Nigeria) expanded to become, prior to its year-long 
proscription by the Federal Government of Nigeria in 1994, Africa's largest private print 
media organization. 
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the desire for independence only with small businesses. They suggest further that only the 
small business owner, as opposed to the entrepreneur, will spend the. 1ýa ority of his te on im 
the business venture. These are not totally reconcilable with all known interpretations of 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Finally, they may also be held to suggest that the entrepreneurial 
venture is not normally the entrepreneur's primary source of income. This statement however 
can only be true where the venture in question is not a going concern. 
This, and many other entrepreneurship theories/conceptualizations: appear to be 
modelled on large private enterprises. Many were developed within the context of post- 
second world war economic growth, and so forth. In all these cases, certain assumptions 
were made about the fabric of the economy. However, these assumptions, concerning 
minimum economic infrastructure or industrial base, as is discussed further in chapter 2, do 
not exist uniformly around the world. Certainly in LDCs, they do not exist in the same form 
that they do in the more industrialized countries of ihe world. Because of these, a deficiency 
in local private capital, technical knowledge, skill and sometimes even desire exists, affecting 
the numbers and types6f enterprises established. Even where established, the deficiencies 
mentioned above frequently force entrepreneurs in LDCs to set their sights much lower than 
they might otherwise have done. For instance, the firm might be smaller, or employ less 
advanced machinery than an equivalent firm in the developed world may employ, and so 
have a lower output. This may result in what is termed entrepreneurial in LDCs not being 
seen to be so in the more industrialized parts of the world. 
It is not unusual, especially in LDCs, for "SSE" owners to see their role as 
entrepreneurial, and be regarded as such by academics and otherS12. Indeed both terms are 
12 Akeredolti-Ale (1976); Orinialade & Ubogu feds. ] (1984). 
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often used interchangeably. The Schumpeterian concept of innovationý', so often used in 
more industrialized countries to distinguish between entrepreneurs and small business owners, 
is more broadly conceived to include the improvisation of local inputs in place of, or in 
addition to production and distribution formats imported from elsewhere. Some writers are 
in fact prepared to dispense with the Schumpeterian concept of innovation altogether in 
conceiving of entrepreneurship in LDCs". The entrepreneurial umbrella is, in any case, 
ultimately much wider. For instance, some of the people who have been described as 
entrepreneurs include the following: 
A school teacher who purchased and sold imported clothing to her students and fellow 
members of staff on the side (Nigeria); 
A lady who set up a handicraft workshop in embroidery, basketry, weaving and 
scarving. Three assistants were employed in the workshop (Mauritius); and 
A lady who made handkerchiefs at home f6r sale to family and friends (India)". 
A universal definition of entrepreneurship- is obviously not easily arrived at. The 
following though, does seem clear about it: 
An entrepreneurial venture may be one which has been established or acquired; It may 
be a sole venture or a partnership with one or more others, and it may be managed solely 
43 as described in Schumpeter (1934: 66). 
11 See Ray (1988: 6). 
I-'Conimonwealth Secretariat (1988: 173-88; 263-70). McClelland (1961: 65) also notes 
that "nearly every household in most [developing] societies engages in some entrepreneurial 
activity", and so for the purposes of his study has to distinguish between full-time 
entrepreneurs (those who obtain at least 75 % of their income from entrepreneurial activities), 
and others. Casson (1982: 1) suggests that even in an industrialized economy, selling pocket 
calculators via mail 
order, or running a small boutique are entrepreneurial ventures. 
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or severally. It is not however enough to describe an entrepreneur merely as one who 
exploits those opportunities which present themselves. An entrepreneur also has to actively 
search for exploitable opportunities with the aim of obtaining for "profit'46 ,a higher yield 
from the resources he possesses, or is capable of possessing. To do this, he must be capable 
of taking decisions that show originality of idea, or at least an original adaptation of an 
exist gi ea. 
In the present study, seven fmns (labelled cases 1-7) have been selected for in-depth 
study". Three of them are owner-managed trading firms, while the remaining four are 
manufacturing firms of varying sizes and export orientations, two of which are owner- 
managed. The senior managers in the last two are minority shareholders in their firms. They 
are fairly indicative of the rest of the sample population". Even where it can be argued that 
not every one of the seven subjects has a management style that is formally 
"entrepreneurial", they can be said to have shown entrepreneurial drive in the formation of 
their businesses (cases 1& 4), in distribution (cases 2& 3) or in production (cases 5 -7). In 
addition, all earn just about all of their incomes from their commercial activities. In any case, 
despite their varying SiZeS49' they all pursue an expansive (as opposed to subsistence) 
economic policy within their businesses. They extract value from their environment, creating 
or accumulating wealth by spotting or matching opportunities with available or mobilized 
resources, and so fall within the more pragmatic definitions of entrepreneurship favoured in 
defined here as any reward, material or otherwise, that the entrepreneur may seek. 
11 See further chapter 7 (section 7.5). 
18 See chapter 6 (section 6.5) for further details. 
"I Case I is a sole proprietorship employing just the owner, while case 7 is a multi- 
national enterprise employing in excess of 1,000 people. Most of the respondent firms 
however will, following the SSE definition employed in this study, be termed "small". 
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particular by social anthropologists". 
Perhaps rather than perpetuate the contrasts between entrepreneurship and SSE 
ownership, a way forward may lie in recognizing first that a small'? irm-may also be an 
entrepreneurial one, and that a large scale enterprise is not necessarily entrepreneurial. It is 
the firm's operational objectives, rather than its size or such other fonnalized structure, that 
ought to decide whether or not the firin is entrepreneurial in nature. Then, one would need 
to distinguish, not so much between an entrepreneurial firm and a small firm, but between 
an entrepreneurial firm and a non-entrepreneurial one. Within the ambit of the 
entrepreneurial, or non-entrepreneurial firm, one may then distinguish further between 
smaller firms and bigger firms. 
1.5 The Objects Of Study And The Research Problem. 
The background provided in sections 1.3 and 1.4 above reveal the central objects of 
study to be Nigerian enttýpreneurs operating on a small scale, in particular those export- Z 
oriented ones who are already, or are in the process of exploiting opportunities provided by 
the West African cross-border trade. It is the persistence that the participants in the trade 
demonstrate in the development of the market, despite considerable political and 
environmental difficulties that has fuelled my interest in carrying out this study. 
It is something of a paradox that Nigeria, like many other African countries, has 
comparative advantage in the supply of laboUr"; A significant proportion of this labour 
5" Barth (1963); cf. Rosa & Bowes (1990: 4-6); Long & Long ([eds. ] 1992). 
11 Marsden (1990). 
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tends to be supplied informally to the firms that require themý'; These firms are mostly 
small or artisanal53 ; And several of them are involved in various. exporting activitieS54 
Ordinarily then, it would appear that SSEs in Nigeria (including those in thý informal sector) 
ought to be making significant contributions to exporting activities, and to economic 
development in general. But, going by recorded patterns of trade and other published 
development material, this is not so. Indigenous entrepreneurship is thus deemed to have 
failed, particularly on the exporting front. Entrepreneurs are seen as lacking in enterprise 
skills and exercising all their enterprise just to survive". 
This study focuses on the cross-border trade with the Republic of Benin, and other 
West African countries, which is but one aspect of Nigerian exporting, to present an 
alternative argument. It suggests that the Nigerian trading environment, although permeated 
by illegality and corruption on a number of fronts, by its very nature provides circumstances 
and opportunities for a number of actors which are 'translated into commercial activities that 
result in significant capital accumulation. 
1.6 Ainis Of The Study. 
The background research on entrepreneurship theories, export trade and related issues 
lias, within the context of the cross-border trade, suggested a number of fundamental 
questions worthy of study: 
Oyeneye (1981). 
Dozie & Bickersteth (1993). 
KinseY (1988). 
tie Soto (1989). 
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(a) How great is the trade (where, value, e. t. c)? 
(b) Why do some people engage in it, and others do not? 
(C) How does it operate (practices, procedure)? 
(d) Why do some people thrive doing it, and others do not? 
(e) What is the overall impact of this trade on the economy (such as invisible 
contributions to balance of payments)? 
(f) What are the implications of this trade for theories on trade and development? 
The cross-border trade has hitherto not been widely studied as a significant part of 
Nigerian entrepreneurship. Because so little is known about the nature of the trade, and 
because it can act as a foundation or framework for further studies on the trade, and possibly 
the development process in (African) LDCs, I will, in the present study, focus on issue "C", 
above. That is, the central aim of this study will be an analysis of the cross-border trade 
itself, as engaged in by SSEs (its most numerous participants). Under this central aim are two 
specific sub-aims: 
(i) A study of the' mechanics of the trade. This will include: 
an examination of the actors, routes, and activities involved in the trade 
* how entrepreneurs become involved in the trade; 
* entrepreneurs' strategies for dealing with other social actors who may be involved 
in the trade. 
(ii) An attempt to identify and discuss the wider social structures or situations 
(environmental issues) that make cross-border trading the selected option of those who are 
involved in the practice. This will centre around, among others, the discussion of the 
following issues: 
the artificiality of political boundaries in West Africa 
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* the unsuitability of certain export rules and regulations in Nigeria 
* the incomplete penetration of the said rules and regulations-,., 
* the infonnal nature of the trade 
Secondly, in studying the trade, I intend to explore how existing theories explain the 
behaviour of firms in the trade. These explanations fall into four divisions. They are 
* perspectives from trade theory 
* perspectives from development theory 
* perspectives from entrepreneurship theory 
* historical (cultural) perspectives 
These explanations are primarily discussed in the early part of the study, and they are used 
as a framework for the later discussions in the study. 
Thirdly, the study aims in conclusion to make some preliminary suggestions on 
practical ways in which the trading activities of Nigerian manufacturers and traders involved 
in cross-border tradingon the one hand, and of these two sectors and the government on the 
other hand, can be more effectively integrated to their mutual advantage. 
These objectives, except as specified in the second aim above, are realized in various 
chapters of die thesis. 
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1.7 Field Particulars, And Other Limitations Of The Study. 
Nigeria is a most complex country. Its estimated 1990 population of 111.5 milliod' 
is made up of more than two hundred and fifty ethnic-linguistic groupS57 . However its 
complexity goes beyond that. It is presently a federation of thirty states (see map 1), with 
more than five hundred local government areas between them". Sixteen of these states 
directly border other countries, as map 1 indicates below. 
1" 
51 Federal Office of Statistics (1993). The official 1991 census figure of 88.5 million 
has already been disputed by several groups in the country, and is for the most part ignored 
in practice as a true representation of the nation's population. All of Nigeria's eleven 
attempts at a national census since 1863 have been disputed, although the 1963 figure of 55 
million remains the basis of most current estimates as the "least unacceptable" census so far. 
An annual growth rate of 2.5 - 3.5% has been assumed ever since. The World Bank (1991) 
estimated Nigeria's population at 98.9 million in 1989. 
51 Federal Ministry of Information and Culture (FMIC [1991: 3]). 
" Nigeria has, since the conclusion of this study, been divided further into a total of 
thirty six states. 
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However, given the available time and resources, it was decided to limit the 
geographical coverage of the field study. First, for financial, -Iogiýtic, and convenience 
reasons, the fieldwork itself has physically extended to the southern parts of four of the 
sixteen member countries of ECOWAS" (that is, Nigeria, the Republic of Benin, Togo and 
Ghana), this being considered a manageable number, although data is obtained on all the 
countries. 
I. 
-11 See Map 2. "ECOWAS" stands for the Economic Community of West African 
States. Its formation and objectives are briefly discussed in chapter 5. 
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Map 2: Map Of West Africa Showing The Economic Community Of West African 
States. 
't: ) a 
28 
Nigeria is the primary research location, and here, field activities have been focused 
on two border states in Southwestern Nigeria - Lagos and Ogun, Withý. additional work carried N.. - - 
out in Oyo state. More prominence has been given to the city of Lagos as a research 
location. Several reasons account for this. Although since 1991 no longer Nigeria's capital 
city, it remains by far the busiest commercial centre in the country (indeed in all of West 
Africa), with 68 % of all the nation's external trade reported as taking place there'. It is 
also one of Nigeria's best served cities in infrastructural terins and provides relatively easy 
access to the other fieldwork locations in the study. The area of study also includes the 
country's two busiest cross-border trade centres of Seme (in Lagos State) and Idi-Iroko (in 
Ogun State). The political/commercial centres of Cotonou (Republic of Benin), Lome (Togo), 
and Accra (Ghana) make up the other primary research locations. 
The subjects being studied have been selected from the manufacturing and distribution 
sectors, being the ones primarily affected by the objectives of this study, and it is to these 
sectors that most of the discussion in this stud refers. ly 
The fieldwork look place between. Dpceimber 1993 and August 1994. It was a I 
politically grim time, not only in Nigeria, but also in the Republic oCBenin, where there 
were protests and demonstrations against the incumbent President Soglo and his wife, as well 
as in Ghana and Togo, where there were intennittent border clashes between the two 
countries' border communities. This heightened political tension between the two countries, 
and made crossing their borders, each time a tense affair. Although I did not personally have 
to, according to some traders, since about 1991, an increasing number of traders travelling 
on southern routes from Ivory Coast and beyond, have had to go up to the north of Ghana 
before being able to cross into Togo in relative safety, before continuing their journey into 
" Nigeria Business Directory 1992/93 (1993). 
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the Republic of Benin and Nigeria. 
In Nigeria's case, it had become obvious, following the annulment of the June 1993 
presidential election by the then military regime, that the country was heading for a period 
of political turbulence. It was therefore no great surprise that Nigeria had two enforced 
changes of goverment in the second half of 1993 alone. The present government has itself 
existed amidst rumours of coups and counter coups". 
At several points in 1994, Nigeria was in a near-anarchic state. The country reeled 
from among others, the following: 
(i) Several court cases instituted mainly by pro-democracy groups, challenging the legality 
of the goverrunent. 
(ii) Acts of civil disobedience and public demonstrations against the government, organized 
largely by the said groups. I strayed, or in other ways found myself in the middle of some 
of the demonstrations. 
(iii) An openly hostile press and population made increasingly so by the trial for treason and 
subsequent imprisonment of the acclaimed winner of the 1993 presidential election, Chief 
Moshood Abiola, who had in June 1994, unilaterally declared himself "President". The 
ftirore in the press led to the proscription of three national newspapers ("The Punch", 
"National Concord", and "The Guardian") during the duration of the field study, in each 
case, for periods eventually in excess of a year. 
11 The last officially acknowledged coup attempt is alleged to have occurred in 1995. 
See Newswatch (Vol. 21, No. 13 27/3/95) and Tell (No. 43 23/10/95) for an account of the 
alleged plot, and the trial of its suspected plotters. 
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(iv) Successive strikes by teachers, students, local government employees, market traders, 
medical personnel, transporters, at least six state governments'- workers' unions, a dock 
workers' union, a bankers' union, an electricity workers' union, two air traffic workers' 
unions, and two oil workers' unions. The duration of the strikes lasted from snap twenty four 
hour strikes (market traders) to a drawn-out strike in excess of ten weeks (dock workers). 
(v) Looting, arson, and several violent clashes between different ethnic groups, and also 
between groups of police and other armed personnel on the one hand, and angry civilians on 
the other hand. While these had occurred sporadically throughout the year, they intensified 
greatly after Chief Abiola's proclamation in June 1994.1 witnessed several such occurrences 
in various parts of Lagos, Ogun and Oyo states. 
Expectedly, Nigeria's political circumstances at this period impacted on my field 
activities, but not quite as much as I had feared. The case studies were not badly affected. 
Having said that, threeof the seven case respondents (cases 2,3 & 5) were, because of their 
location, directly vulnerable to the violence of the disturbances. Although all the owner- 
managers had at various times mentioned that the political situation would reduce their 
turnovers and profits for the year, none of their day-to-day activities (going to work, opening 
up die business, attracting and attending to customers, and so forth) seemed to be 
significantly affected until about a week or two into the oil workers strike in July 1994. 
Before that, they largely took die disturbances in their stride. If there were any local 
disturbances, they would close their shops, offices or factories for, perhaps an hour, while 
it lasted. We would sometimes gather at vantage points, and I would be regaled with stories 
of how things had been much worse in the aftermath of the election annulment in 1993. 
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The questionnaire surveys were however more greatly affected. The surveys in Alaba 
International Market, and the border town of Idi-Iroko, mainly because of their distances 
from my base had taken the longest to set up2. By the time the last kt of questionnaires 
were due for return in July 1994, the political situation had taken a worse turn and general 
movements were restricted. By the time I was finally able to get to my collators' bases in 
August, they had fled, along with many other traders, to their hometowns in Eastern Nigeria. 
Thus I lost contact with them. As the crises continued to rapidly degenerate, I reasoned with 
myself that there was little else to be gained data-wise by remaining in Nigeria other than the 
outstanding questionnaires, and so I left Nigeria without receiving some of the questionnaires 
from those two locations. It affected the traders' survey more than it did the manufacturers' 
survey. In all, ten manufacturers' (12.5 % of total) and twenty three traders' (23.23 % of 
total) questionnaires eventually proved unrecoverable. 
Furthermore, I started the field-study with ten case studies, including six traders. 
However, three of them lost their shops when, about six weeks into the study, they were 
demolished on the state *governor's orders in"' April 1994. The local council was deemed 
wrong to have built and let out shops in thiat part of the market. Two of the three traders 
were unable to continue with the study, and another-joined them in May, when he lost his 
mother in Eastern Nigeria. I finished the study with the remaining seven. 
I From my base, Alaba market was a fifty mile round trip, and Idi-Iroko was a hundred 
and twenty mile round trip. See chapter 6 for further details. 
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1.8 Structure Of The Thesis. 
The study is presented in three parts. The first part is essentially an examination of 
various theories of economic development, as they apply in particular to LDCs. The theories 
discussed appear to reinforce the orthodox view on indigenous entrepreneurship in places like 
Nigeria as having little to do with the development process. 
The second part may be regarded as a form of "anti-thesis" to the first. It proceeds 
from the view that the trade and development theories discussed in part one are inconsistent 
with historical accounts of Nigeria's patterns of trade, and would appear to have altogether 
ignored or perhaps misinterpreted the effect on development of indigenous entrepreneurship. 
The third part presents and discusses the methodology, findings and conclusions of 
the study. 
The individual chapter breakdown follows below. 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction. 
This chapter introduces the thesis by contextualizing the study, and describing the 
research problem and the purpose of the study. 
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Chapter 2: 
The Applicability Of International Trade And Export Behaviour' Theories To Export- 
Oriented Small And Medium Enterprises In Less Developed Couakies. 
The chapter examines theories that offer explanations for the export behaviour of 
firms and discusses their applicability to SMEs (being the primary focus of this study) in 
developing countries, with particular reference to Nigeria. 
Chapter 3: 
Modernization And Structural Dependency Theories. 
The chapter is in two parts, and both, from different approaches, examine theories 
that seek to explain the development or transformation of less advanced economies into more 
advanced ones. Further attention is paid on their, limitations in explaining the Nigerian 
context. It is argued, to. this end, in the chapte'r* that both approaches are not adequately able 
to take account of internally generated change factors, and subsequently relate them to the 
development process. 
Chapter 4: 
The Analysis Of Differential Action By Entrepreneurs. 
The chapter presents an examination of certain theories of entrepreneurship, focusing 
on various attempts to explain differential action by entrepreneurs, and how this can be used 
to present an alternative view of the trade process. It concludes by examining how the 
existing theories might explain the entrepreneurship process in the cross-border trade. 
34 
Chapter 5: 
Indigenous Nigerian Trade And Its Relevance To Export Trade Across Modern National 
Boundaries. 
The chapter traces the path of Nigeria's involvement in internal and external trade 
from the earliest recorded times (about 1,000 B. C) up to present times, exploring the role 
of indigenous entrepreneurs in this process. Particular attention is paid to the development 
of the country's exchange economy in the period since it came into full socio-economic 
contact with the rest of the world via the colonization era of the mid-nineteenth century, with 
further attention paid to the period since 1975, when Nigeria signed the ECOWAS treaty. 
Chapter 6: 
Research Methodology. 
The chapter discusses the application of the major primary and secondary data 
I 
collection techniques emýloyed in this study, , paying further attention to the advantages and 
limitations of each technique. It also attempts to make a case for a flexible approach to 
research design. 
Chapter 7: 
Analysis Of Findings (1): A Report On The Questionnaire Survey. 
The chapter is in two parts. The first part reports directly on the purpose and findings 
of the questionnaire survey, and the face-to-face interviews which were employed as back-up 
for clarification purposes. The second part very briefly lists the seven firms which are the 
I subjects of the case studies that provide much of the insights on which the discussion of the 
data is based. More detailed information on the firms are provided in Appendix A to the 
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study. 
Chapter 8: 
Analysis Of Findings (II): The Mechanics Of The Cross-Border Trade. 
The chapter represents the central discussion of the findings of the study. It presents 
as a case study, a description of the cross-border trade routes out of Nigeria covered by this 
study. This description extends to the local actors and activities routinely connected or 
involved with the trade, and attempts to weave this elements together into a composite picture 
of the mechanics of the cross-border trade. It also examines the constraints under which 
cross-border traders carry on their businesses, their response to the constraints as well as the 
traders' strategies for dealing with other sociql actors. 
Chapter 9: 
Summaries, ConclusiRns, Reflections And Recommendations. 
The chapter summarizes the entire thesis, attempts to present a working model of the 
mechanics of the cross-border trade, makes certain policy 
recommendations and suggests areas and approaches for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATION&T40WE AND 
EXPORT BEHAVIOUR TI]EORIES TO EXPORT-61UENMD 
SMALL AND MEDIUM SCALE ENTERPRISES IN LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. 
2.1 Introduction 
In introducing the study in chapter 1, small scale entrepreneurs engaged in the West 
African cross-border export trade were identified as the primary objects of study. The aim 
in the present chapter is to examine how well orthodox trade theory explains the export 
behaviour of such firms. 
An examination of most governments' international trade policies will reveal that these 
policies are based on principles which can be traced back to aspects of International Trade 
Theory (ITT). The mqdels constructed under'thý theory' help to explain what might be 
competitively produced in a given location. Understanding the models alid their rationale can 
lielp firms anticipate, understand and analyze public policies on exporting and international 
business. They are well documented in the literature64. 
ITT generally examines issues as they affect countries as individual units. Thus, its 
I Included here are Adam Smith's original advocacy of the liberalization of trade as the 
most efficient allocation of economic resources, * now well known within the context of 
international trade theory as the "doctrine of absolute advantage", and David Ricardo's 
refinement (and extension) of Smith's arguments, now referred to as the doctrine of 
comparative advantage. Other, later models, operating to fill further analytical gaps in ITT 
include the factor proportion theory and the product life cycle theory of international trade. 
' See for histance Dliolakia & Dliolakia (1994); Vernon-Wortzel & Wortzel (1991); 
Prasch (1995); Daniels & Radebaugh (1989: 126-151); Albaum et al (1989: 26-32). 
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objectives centre around the answering of questions like "Why and how do countries trade 
instead of aiming at self sufficiency? ", "What are the benefits of i1iiernaqonal trade and how 
do they come about? ", "How are the benefits of trade shared between trading nations? ", 
"What are the effects on trade of government intervention? ", and other related questions. 
However, in practice, most of the actual trading activities that ITT examines are in 
fact carried out by individual firms (which may range from sole proprietorships to big 
MNEs) from country to country'. This may seem a rather obvious point to make, but it 
raises all sorts of questions on issues like employment levels, income distribution, welfare 
provisions, and the effects that these may have on trade. ITT does not typically address 
issues such as these. ITT is also, for the most part, unable to explain the internationalization 
of such firms. Partly in order to address issues such as these, a body of theories have arisen 
which specifically offer a conceptualization of the export behaviour of individual firins. 
These theories are relatively recent areas of thought and so, comparatively less has been 
written about them than I 
ITT. Because they consider motives and strategies of trade, and not 
economic arguments per se, concepts of desire, . 'risk and uncertainty feature strongly in them. 
The theories are presented in two parts: the first set of theories consider why firms 
export while the second consider the internalization process itself. These issues, like ITT, 
-ire well documented in the literature. However, my main interest in them, and consequently, 
the main discussion in this chapter is centred around the applicability of the theories to SMEs 
(which are the primary objects of study in this thesis) in LDCs (and in particular, Nigeria, 
as the primary research location). 
ki cr. Prasch (1995: 427-428). 
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2.2 Why Do Firms Export? 
Most writers are in agreement as to the reasons why firms embark on export 
activities'. These include responding to unsolicited external orders, the method by which 
a large number of firms begin their internationalization process. Other reasons include 
managerial desire, which in the case of a small firm may sometimes mean a single person 
as happened with case 5, whose founder had already taken steps to establish an international 
trading company, even before formally deciding on what to trade 01. Some other firms 
become involved in exporting simply to achieve production economies in advertising, 
distribution or other areas, as tends to be true of several MNEs, including Cocacola or 
Mcdonalds, both of whom, to a considerable extent, standardize such functions across the 
world. Other firms go into exporting simply wishing to minimize their risk, believing that 
if they spread their markets across several countries, the risk of vulnerability to individual 
national socio-political or economic policies, whiclý can detrimentally affect the exporters is 
reduced. Thus when th& Nigerian subsidiary of British Petroleum was nationalised in 1978 
by the Nigerian government, the parent company simply turned its attention to the rest of its 
world wide operations. Some firms are literally forced into exporting because of the small 
size of their home market. This is apparently the case with Volvo and other firms in Sweden 
and other Scandinavian countries. Other reasons cited in the literature include extending the 
sales of seasonal products, die development of a unique product, and taking advantage of 
government stimulation measures. 
66 See for instance Albaum et al (1989: 35-41); Terpstra (1987: 10-11); Paliwoda 
(1986: 10-13); Daniels & Radebaugh (1989: 145-146). 
0 See appendix A, case 5, for ftirther details. 
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A common assumption underpinning these comments is that all exporters have both 
the desire and resources to seek, or at least respond to external orders. The commentators 
also tend to attribute export behaviour to neat, pre-planned and sophisticýted motives when 
in fact, the reality oe macro-economic environment in LDCs means that real life cases 
point to much more basic and self-serving reasons that are not so easily compartmentalised. 
When, for instance, a firm like case 6 processes and packages gari (cassava meal), or elubo 
(yam flour meal) for sale, it does so in the full knowledge that there is little local demand 
for those products in the form that it makes them, but that there is demand for them mainly 
from Nigerians living abroad. Although the finn itself does negligible direct exporting, it is 
quite aware that the "distributors" who purchase pre-packed gari, elubo, and such other 
foodstuffs ostensibly for the Nigerian market, invariably export them to various parts of the 
world. The agents that do carry out this form of exporting" do it mainly for the returns, 
and not to achieve scale economies, nor to dispose of excess capacity, nor even to take 
advantage of any special inducements by overseas 'states. They generally do not establish 
III 
overseas sales offices and invariably use infon-nal exporting channels, although over time, 
they may develop "special" relationships with certain customers. 
2.3 Stages In The Internationalization Of Firms 
Just as commentators generally agree on the reasons for the internationalization of 
firms, so their models of the internationalization process tend to be similar in form, if not 
in content. Whether it is Johnson & Valilne's (1977) "increasing commitment" model from 
" Such as cases 2&3. 
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Sweden", or Bilkey & Tesar's (1981) "mixture of classification criteria" model from the 
USA", the general idea seems to be of a pre-planned, incremental and strategically 
executed involvement in exporting which, as the firm becomes more cornihitted to exporting, 
ultimately leads to direct foreign investment7l. 
From their review of several studies, including the four-stage export activity model 
of Pavord & Bogart (1977), the three-stage export involvement model of Cavusgil (1984), 
the Johanson & Vahlne / Bilkey & Tesar studies (op cit), and their case history of electro-X, 
a Danish manufacturer of electrical automation equipment, Gerald Albaurn and his colleagues 
conclude that "the decision to go international is a gradual process that can be subdivided", 
in this case, into a five-stage export involvement model". The stages are: 
(i) Stage One: Sporadic Export Involvement 
(ii) Stage Two: Experimental Export Involvement 
(iii) Stage Three: Foreign Market Expansion 
(iv) Stage Four: Deýeloprnent Of Overseas Sales Branches 
(v) Stage Five: Foreign Market Consolidation. 
61 in which the authors see the internationalization process as a somewhat cyclical one 
in which the knowledge of, and commitment to foreign markets affect both commitment 
decisions and the way in which current business activities are carried out, and these in turn 
change market knowledge and commitment. See Johanson & Vahlne (1977: 26-27). 
70 which leads the authors to envisage the internationalization process as a rather 
hierarchical one in which a firm develops a mechanism for a rational progression from one 
stage of readiness and ability to export, to the next. See Bilkey & Tesar (1981: 95-96). 
71 cf. Albaum et al (1989: 33). In their own case, the authors describe the 
internationalization process as being made up of a number of discrete managerial decisions 
that take place over a period of time to reflect the firm's changing strategic focus. 
72 Albatim et al (1989: 42). cf. Cateora's (1993: 18-19) five-stage "international marketing 
involvement" model. 
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Swedený', or Bilkey & Tesar's (1981) "mixture of classification criteria" model from the 
USA71, the general idea seems to be of a pre-planned, incremeiltaL and strategically 
executed involvement in exporting which, as the fmn becomes more committed to exporting, 
ultimately leads to direct foreign investmenf7l. 
From their review of several studies, inciuding the four-stage export activity model 
of Pavord & Bogart (1977), the three-stage export involvement model of Cavusgil (1984), 
the Johanson & Vahlne / Bilkey & Tesar studies (op cit), and their case history of electro-X, 
a Danish manufacturer of electrical automation equipment, Gerald Albaurn and his colleagues 
conclude that "the decision to go international is a gradual process that can be subdivided", 
in this case, into a five-stage export involvement model 72 . The stages are: 
Stage One: Sporadic Export Involvem6nt 
(ii) Stage Two: Experimental Export Involvemqnt . 
(iii) Stage Three: Fo. reign Market Expansi6'n 
(iv) Stage Four: Dev'elopment Of Overseas Sales Branches 
(v) Stage Five: Foreign Market Consolidation. 
11 in which the authors see the internationalization process as a somewhat cyclical one 
in which the knowledge of, and commitment to foreign markets affect both commitment 
decisions and the way in which current business activities are carried out, and these in turn 
change market knowledge and commitment. See Johanson & Vahlne (1977: 26-27). 
70 which leads the authors to envisage the internationalization process as a rather 
hierarchical one in which a firm develops a mechanism for a rational progression from one 
stage of readiness and ability to export, to the next. See Bilkey & Tesar (1981: 95-96). 
71 cf. Albaum et al (1989: 33). In their own case, the authors describe the 
internationalization process as being made up of a number of discrete managerial decisions 
that take place over a period of time to reflect the firm's changing strategic focus. 
`2 Albaurn et al (1989: 42). cf. Cateora's (1993: 18-19) five-stage "international marketing 
involvement" model. 
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markets. 
2.3.4 Development Of Overseas Sales Branches 
Any firm that gets to this stage would norrhally expect to face an increasingly intense 
competitive environment especially if it is only a small firm. producing a similar line of 
products as established home country firms, or MNEs. But the firm would by now be 
committed to international marketing and would have to respond to the trading environment, 
whether in the role of aggressor (to increase its market share), or defender (to maintain its 
market share). It would invest directly in its foreign markets either by establishing sales 
branches to seek customers, handle distributions, and increase its profile, or by establishing 
an overseas production plant to satisfy the local demand in its larger external markets. It may 
do away with sales agents who do not exclusively represent the finn's interest. 
2.3.5 Foreign Market Consolidation 
In this final stage, the firm would have become a true NINE, although not necessarily 
in the mode of Ford or McDonalds. In spite of what is sometimes thought, it is enough at 
this stage, as Kotler (1988: 379) suggests, for the firm to have established a commercial 
centre in a manageable number of countries. It need not have production plants in more than 
one country (usually the home country) but must be in a position to compete favourably with 
the firms that do, after taking into consideration any trade barriers that may exist in the host 
country. 
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2.4 An Examination Of The Stage Process 
The internationalization process as presented above is a gradual and deliberate 
process. Even at the frenetic pace at which modem trade takes place it has been known to 
take as long as thirty years to get from stage one to stage five7l. 
The process may in fact be seen as commencing even before the fulfilment of 
unsolicited export orders. This is because it is not every entrepreneur with a product to sell 
nor every manufacturer which can satisfy an overseas customer in terms of the substance, 
volume and packaging specifications of the customer, along with the delivery deadlines. To 
illustrate, just under two thirds of the finns in the survey carried out for this study that 
claimed to have received unsolicited export orders also indicated that they had not always 
been able to fulfil such orders. One major reason for this was their inability to meet the 
overseas buyers' product specifications. An internationalizing firm therefore needs to have 
more than a mere awareness and interest in overseas markets in order to exploit such. In 
particular, it requires the ability and willingn6ss t6 adapt the product mix to meet overseas 
orders. This, then, ought to be the starting point of the internationalization process because 
where the product mix is a factor, it is usually those firms that have the above ingredients 
in place that can adequately meet the terms of an overseas order and go on to compete 
successfully in international markets. This applies to all sizes of businesses in both developed 
and developing countries. 
Secondly, the Albaum model appears to assume that given enough time all exporting 
firms will progress from stage one to stage five. This however does not seem to have 
considered in any real sense, the issue of middlemen, and other small trading companies 
" Albauni et al (1989: 48). 
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whose major objective is to note which products are available for sale and attempt to find 
either a local or foreign buyer for these products. Even in some iýdirstria_lized countries, the 
availability of an extensive customer data base and modem communication equipment like 
fax machines and video-phones mean that some of these traders (or brokers) can actually 
give a product demonstration to an overseas prospect without leaving their offices, and thus 
the incentive of physical internationalization is lost. In less developed economies, the function 
of the trader/middleman is somewhat different in that most of the goods available for export 
tend to be primary agricultural products, industrial raw materials, and manufactured goods 
comprising relatively low technological inputs. The actual producers usually lack the time, 
or more frequently, the resources to transport the product to the sea or airport (or such other 
location) from where they are taken abroad. This section of the distribution chain is therefore 
often left to the entrepreneur who obtains relevant information, or arranges labour, vehicles 
and vessels as may be needed. Although the international market for developing countries' 
primary produce is verymuch a buyers' market, the entrepreneurs, on the whole, seem to 
be able to sell as much as the producers can pr6dude, no matter that they often have to accept 
whatever conditions are imposed on a sale by overseas buyers. In the final analysis, there is 
frequently no incentive for the entrepreneur to internationalize his operations beyond what 
is described in Albaum et al (1989) as the initial stage of responding to unsolicited export 
orders. 
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2.5 Do The Theories Apply? 
The existing theories on international trade and exporting (and by extension, direct 
foreign investment)" have, especially in the period since World War II undergone extensive 
reviews and refinements and have thus become impressive bodies of literature. It should be 
remembered that when Adam Smith wrote what was to become the doctrine of absolute 
advantage in 1776, factors of production were fixed at land, labour, and capital. The 
economic variables tested on the doctrine (and related theories) have since increased to 
include resources as diverse as entrepreneurial skills, technology, marketing know-how, 
managerial commitment and so forth, while contributors to trade theory now include 
academics from fields as different as international law, economics, politics, history and 
marketing. This has made for increased lateral thinking, and interesting interdisciplinary 
literature on the subject. 
Some theorists nevertheless argue that international trade theories still need 
"extending" or "replacing" to account for recýnt'empirical failures". Others concede that 
not many of the existing international trade theories specifically discuss the cases of small 
firms and/or LDCs, although others, still, then go on to suggest that the theories ought to 
be transferable as they are, first from big businesses to small businesses and from developed 
countries to developing countries, usually because of the writers' deterministic assumption 
that all small firms aim to become large, and that a "developing country" is one which is 
I" See for example Robuck & Simmonds (1989: 41-49). 
" See for instance Lindert (1986: 43). 
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developing in the sense of moving towards the contemporary situation in the developed 
world, but is some stages behind. They conclude therefore that wtr was applicable in - 6d evp 
the developed country at an earlier stage of development would be applicable to a developing 
country at a similar stage'. 
This somewhat naive view does not hold'in practise. The problem with a lot of the 
theories which have been considered in this chapter is not so much that they do not explain 
exporting behaviour at all, but the sweeping generalizations that they tend to find in the 
literature. Sometimes, even the most cursory historical examination of development processes 
in certain parts of the world will reveal that the so-called "developing countries" are 
developing in a vastly different enviromnent to that which industrialized countries develop 
in. This is the background of my examination of the applicability of internationalization 
arguments to the situation in LDCs. The argument is presented below in six parts. 
(i) In terms of marketing systems and developments, there is a relatively high degree of 
heterogenous groupings of developing countries against the relative homogeneity of 
developed, largely western countries. For instance, in a classification of the countries of 
the world according to their income levels, Hagen (1986: 6-8) arrived at six different groups 
of "developing" countries. The World Bank (1995), in a similar classification, arrived at 
four. In their own classification by national trade policy of forty-one different developing 
countries, Albaurn et al (1989) also found four different kinds. Situations such as these, I 
believe, account for the different levels of visibility to the trade theorists of the developing 
16 See Kaynak (1982: 235-237); Conners et al (1985: 27-44). The theories that seek to 
explain the structural transformation of less developed, into fully developed countries in this 
nianner are examined in greater detail next, in chapter 3. 
77 cf. Carter (1986: 111). DeWalt (1979: 8-9); Kinsey (1988: 14). 
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world. At one extreme, much is known about the strongly outward-oriented developing 
economies7' such as Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore, '; khil. e_almost nothing is 
known about the marketing systems in the strongly inward-oriented economieS79 of countries 
like Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Tanzania. A country like Nigeria may enjoy relative visibility 
of its oil sector, where about 90% of all new foreign investment in the country has, for 
several years been concentrated', but the same cannot be said of its manufacturing or 
agricultural sectors, which employ a greater number of Nigerians than the oil sector, and 
whose contributions to national GDP are rising more quickly than that of oil. By lumping 
together the vastly different production and trading systems of these countries in the trade 
theories, the theorists may be said to have lost the ability to analytically relate the necessarily 
different micro-processes in these countries to those of the rest of the world and so cannot 
claim to have a truly universal -picture of how global trade takes place. 
Macro economic disorders in developing countries which are almost non-existent in I 
the developed world mean trade conditions are different. International trade theories, as 
envisaged in the developed economies are based on a premise of-economic variables 
remaining stable. The developing world, especially the lower income countries of these 
group, have rarely enjoyed this. Currency valuation, inflation, interest rates, competitiveness 
" defined for this purpose as economies where policies are not biased in favour of local 
production (nor necessarily in favour of export production). 
" defined For this purpose as economies where policy is biased in favour of import- 
substitution. 
8(l Financial Times (London) 26/5/95, section 3, p 3. 
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and such other factors fluctuate wildly in these countries". Small firms in these countries 
tend to be the most vulnerable to these problems. The cost of capital-, tq them can suddenly 
skyrocket and literally bankrupt them. Economic historians tend to blame these situations 
squarely on mismanagement and policy errors, but this assertion is at best only partially true. 
The relatively weak economies of developing countries have suffered significant shocks, 
many of them external and beyond domestic control, especially since the end of World War 
1J, which have bred chaos for business enterprises in such areas. The rise and fall of oil 
prices, the progressive replacement of several LDC raw material exports (such as cotton and 
rubber) by synthetic substitutes, coupled with the inevitable falling prices for these same 
exports, the rise in international interest rates, significant growth immediately followed by 
economic stagnation, hyper inflation, unemployment, and ambitious industrialization 
programmes funded by crippling public sector borrowing have all combined to create a 
vicious cycle of foreign debt and socio-economic stagnation which have made a nonsense of 
the theories which assume free trade taking place in conducive business environments. One 
outcome of this situation is that business enterpHsds in such'places tend to be more interested 
in short-term ventures. Expenditure on research and development, -promotion, process 
technology, and enterprise skills development are not therefore as dedicated in many 
developing countries as they tend to be in developed ones. Strategies, where they exist, tend 
to be more short-term", which means that export behaviour theories, due to their tendency 
to look to die long-term, will generally only have a limited application in those places. 
81 Certain illustrations of these may be found in Commonwealth Secretariat (1990: 125- 
126). Some of these issues are considered further in chapters 7&8. 
82 None of the respondents to my survey of manufacturing and trading firms in South- 
Western Nigeria was able to say it carried out any formal long-term (Le five years or more) 
production and marketing planning. 
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(iii) Following from (ii) above, and encouraged by the policies and published data of the 
governments of developing countries, international trade theorists- ýropqund theories that do 
not recognise the role of small scale private sector traders who in the developed world would 
exist alongside the MNEs (in an admittedly much-diminished role), and in most of the 
developing world, exist in a much more visible role, alongside the cooperatives, commodity 
trade boards and other public marketing parastatals. They tend to be dismissed as parasites 
but this is not always the case. Many of them promote sales and search for new products. 
In developing countries especially, they have consistently proved vital in the distribution of 
products from the primary producers to the consumers, whether or not such consumer is in 
the home country. The entrepreneurial trader continues to be visible and important in 
Nigerian non-oil exports, for instance, and although the trader may have been more important 
to international trade in the developed world's past than he is now, firins like case 5 and case 
6, and the more traditional trading conglomerates like the United Africa Company (UAC) 
and John Holt Limited continue to play a major role in the trade between Nigerian primary 
producers and end users, as well as between', * th6se, and producers and end users outside 
Nigeria, particularly in industrialized countries. These firms have -developed a unique 
competence and structure to help them maximize their operations but their roles are not 
recognised in the international trade theories examined. 
The common reason given for ignoring traders is that they are perceived as 
contributing nothing to the value of products made. However, as Kinsey argues, traders in 
developing countries "... are often a considerable and undervalued source of marketing 
entrepreneurship... Despite difficult conditions in which to work, they have provided 
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essential services to producers and consumers at no direct cost to the public purse"". They 
may take many forms - hawkers, distributors, processors, stall b6ldex§, and so forth - but 
they hold the system together. In Nigeria for instance, they have helped stimulate rural 
development by the establishment of marketing channels in rural areas, they have helped 
provide jobs for transporters and port personnel, they have stimulated packaging, storage and 
grading industries, and they have literally handed several farmers export markets and 
financial assistance to enter these markets. Even in some developed countries, they still have 
a role in packaging, processing and grading products for export, as well as providing 
relatively quick consumer feed back to manufacturers. 
Sometimes, the findings of international trade theories in developed countries are 
markedly different when contextualized in LDCs. I will briefly consider, as an example, the 
factor proportion theory of Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, developed in 1933 as an 
extension of Ricardo's doctrine of comparative advantage. The theory essentially states that 
differences in international factor endowments &xplain differences in international factor 
costs, and ultimately a nation's ability to effectively produce certain products. Therefore a 
country will specialize in the production and export of any commodity that uses large 
amounts of relatively abundant production factors and import those commodities that require 
the use of large quantities of production factors that are in relatively scarce domestic supply. 
Thus, a country with an abundant supply of people in relation to land, other things being 
equal, ought to specialize in the production of products in which technology permits die use 
of minimum space per person. If die Heckscher-Ohlin factor proportion theory were applied 
83 Kinsey (1988: 266). cf. Epstein's (1982) study of urban food marketing in Papua New 
Guinea, or Hill's (1971) study of the grains trade in Northern Nigeria. 
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to LDCs, the conclusion should be that these countries enjoy a cost advantage over developed 
countries in the production of commodities that make abundant usý'GQýbour as a factor of 
production. They ought therefore to be the most efficient production and export bases for 
these products. However, this is not always the case in practice. Agro-based products are, 
for example, more labour intensive than most other products. A large proportion of 
developing countries have a higher population density than developed countries, and a 
predominantly agro-allied economic base. Yet, they still import a significant number of agro- 
based products from the developed world, and in the case of those agricultural products 
which are available in both developing and developed countries such as wheat in India and 
USA respectively, production volumes are higher and costs are lower in the USA than in 
India. Anomalies such as these attack the heart of the entire factor proportion theory. 
(V) International trade theories assume a total liberalization of trade, but in reality, few 
of the so-called "gains of trade" will be spread in an increasingly tariff-ridden global 
marketplace. MoreoverS this assumption is als6 limited by governmental intervention which 
exists in one form or another in most countries of the world. However, it is usually in 
developing countries where one finds the most direct interference, usually as a result of the 
governments' desire to manipulate available economic resources toward their individual 
industrialization goals'". Market forces are not flierefore allowed to play the sort of central 
11 One might then argue that government interference is concentrated in the so-called 
"modern sector" with the informal sector (in which a high proportion of the private labour 
force is employed) largely left alone. This is however not always quite the case. In Nigeria 
For instance, the government's attitude to the informal sector is more accurately described 
as ambivalent. On the one hand, their activities are seemingly tolerated, largely because they 
are seen as job providers, and "incentives" are offered for these firms to graduate into the 
modern sector, while on the other hand, the government also seems to seek their elimination 
via constant police/armed forces raids. See further, chapters 7 and 8, in this study. 
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role which the trade theories envisage, and which they do play in most of the developed 
world". Where there is no free trade or competition, it is the"Small firm that is first 
squeezed out. In a less developed country like Nigeria therefore, small firms tend to commit 
most of their resources to retaining their niche in the market and frequently cannot grow in 
the strategic manner envisaged by the internationalization process models. 
(vi) Other frail assumptions which can be noted in ITT have to do with the trading 
environment. First, ITT does not seem to have fully come to terms with the effect that MNEs 
have, as a block, on international trade. They may not be many, compared to the total 
number of businesses, but they possess much more power". Some of these firms are able 
to supply their own capital, technology and even components or raw materials for a range 
of products that they make in a range of countries. 
It is also usually assumed that exporters in developing countries have as much 
infrastructural support, particularly information on, and access to foreign markets as their 
counterparts in developed countries, and that'the amount'of investment required to serve 
foreign market is always available. Even if this were to be largely true of developed 
countries, the same cannot be said of developing countries where, for instance, the electronic 
and print media cannot yet be relied on as suitable advertisement outlets because of their 
I'-' One illustration of this is Nigeria's structural adjustment programme (SAP), ongoing 
since 1986, which was intended to liberalise Nigeria's economy and trade. It has however 
had to endure a chequered implementation history, and was in fact effectively abandoned in 
1994 when, in the budget of that year, the government reassumed centralised control of 
certain key economic sectors like die exchange rate and interest rates, with predictably 
unsatisfactory results. A new partially decentralised system was introduced in the 1995 
budget, consolidated further in the 1996 budget, but with the state retaining control of most 
of the economy's key sectors and institutions. 
86 cf. Kinsey (1988: 297); Kotler (1988: 378). 
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limited availability and high cost; And access to finance, especially foreign exchange, is still 
beyond the reach of several would-be exporters. Telecommunicafiork, ýquipment, although 
increasingly available, is still underdeveloped, and even where operational, cannot as yet be 
relied on to give sustained, reliable service. 
All of these serve as a check on an uncritical acceptance of the universal validity of 
ITT. 
Although ITT shapes much business thinking and strategy, in order to find wider 
generalizability, it needs to move away from over-simplifying global trade conditions. 
Theorists, for instance, need to extend the scope of the theories to include a special 
consideration of the situation in developing countries having regard to their different 
characteristics, and recognize the fact that economic variables are significantly less settled 
in LDCs. One way of achieving this would be to ground the analyses in a fuller 
understanding of the economic history of LDCs, focusing for example, on the way policies 
and outcomes have developed in the LDCs under study. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have focused mainly on a discussion of the theories on export 
behaviour of individual finns, in particular as they affect SMEs in Nigeria and other LDCs. 
What appears to be the case with Nigerian firms is that internationalization is 
something that takes place almost always on an ad-hoc basis. In the case of the trading firms, 
many of the owner-managers of the export-oriented ones have no wish for their firms to 
grow into MNE size, but will readily take foreign sales and purchasing opportunities as they 
see them. The firms that have successfully done this for years (such as case 3) do not plan 
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to open overseas branches in the way envisaged by ITT. Yet, the forages of firms like these 
into the exporting/intemationalization arena, as we shall come to see, -arq. more regular, even 
routinized, than the term "sporadic" would explain. It is not enough therefore to say they are 
merely in the process of transition from "stage one" (from where they would be expected to 
graduate into other stages). The situation with many manufacturing firms hardly fits into the 
stages model either. Although an increasing number of firms, such as case 6, are producing 
goods for export, they tend not to be so directly involved in the actual transfer of goods to 
end users via export channels, this function usually being taken over by export traders, which 
sometimes gives the impression that local manufacturing firms are not involved in export 
trading. 
Lastly, I have also offered my opinion on how export behaviour theories might be 
made more applicable to the type of export-oriented firms who are the subject of this study. 
There is not much controversy in the literature about why and how firms embark on the 
internationalization process, but on closer examination, given the purpose of this chapter, I 
have argued that the theories are perhaps less keneralizable than as usually presented. Most 
of the points I make in this regard centre around the fact that the LDCs are developing in a 
vastly different environment from that which industrialized countries develop in. 
This forms the basis of the next chapter, in which I aim to examine the theories that explain 
underdevelopment and the transformation of LDCs into more advanced ones, with Nigeria 
as case in point. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MODERNIZATION AND STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCY 
TI]EORIES. 
3.1 Introduction. 
I 
One of the major limitations of the classical international trade theories examined in 
the previous chapter is of their assumption of equality of the partners in trade, and even 
where, as in the doctrine of comparative advantage, a semblance of unequal exchange is 
allowed for the greater good, as it were, there is the underlying assumption that 
specialization in a relatively competitive product will result in a less endowed partner 
achieving equality of status with the better endowed partner. Global economic history 
however has not borne this out. Certainly, -a patteni of unequal exchange exists in 
international trade. Furtýermore (and partly as a result of this), capital accumulation occurs 
in different parts of the world at different rates, and although there is far less concurrence 
as to how it actually began, or its early development 87 , this has been the case for several 
centuries. 
In any case, by the sixteenth century, there was already a steady flow of international 
trade in existence. Also, considerably greater accumulation of capital had occurred in Europe 
than elsewhere in the world and the desire for fresh markets and investment outlets 
internationalized the accumulation process". Eventually trade relations were supplanted by 
" Arndt (1987: 10). 
8' Munro (1976: 9-11); Lenin (1969). 
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colonial relations. It was during this time that a series of statistical studies of emergent Asian 
industrialization were published, apparently motivated by fears of easteqý'competition'9. As 
more of these studies were carried out, it became possible to quantify and compare 
international living standards. 
Karl Marx, in Capital is reported as being the first to aim explicitly at a theory of 
4 
economic development, and one at that, which encompassed the social consequences of 
economic development9o. In common with the thinking of his time, his image of non- 
European countries was one of undifferentiated backwardness. He expressed concern at the 
"mystery and unchangeableness" of such societies. Development, he believed, could only 
come about through the expansion and diffusion of western capitalism, although he appeared 
ambivalent about capitalism itself, expressing in one breath about it as "refined exploitation", 
and then as a "historical advance and a necessary developmehtal factor in the economic 
evolution of society". Marx's influence on subsequent "marxist "-oriented writers was, apart 
from his criticism of the, exploitativeness of capitalism, his interpretation of the underlying 
social relations in capitalist societies as dominated by class wars, and his prediction of an 
ultimately revolution-inspired victory for socialism over capitalism in the war of ideologies. 
Colonies continued to serve as mere outposts for western economies well into the 
interwar years9l. However during World War II, colonial economic development, spurred 
by a wave of public and professional moral idealism, became a matter of central concern for 
die countries that colonized them, who incidentally, were beginning their own 
transformations from individually wealthy countries to regional and trading blocks of wealthy 
" Arndt (1987: 34). 
11 Marx (1848), cited in Arndt (1987: 37); cf. Onyenielukwe (1974: 3-4). 
91 discussed further in chapter 5, in this study. 
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countries. 
In the immediate post-war years, international development ofgankýtions, such as the 
UN and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and in particular, some of 
their officials including Gunnar Myrdal, Raul Prebisch and others, attempted to grapple with 
the problem of transforming LDCs, both in theory -and in practise. This resulted in a great 
deal of inter-disciplinary literature, many of which are still being applied, analyzed and 
revised in present times. 
In this spirit, then, this chapter will examine theories that seek to provide explanations 
for the underdevelopment of less developed economies, and their transformation into more 
developed ones. Although broad attention is paid to the literature, further attention is paid 
to the Nigerian situation (usually by way of illustrations) in light of these theories. 
The first part of the chapter examines ideas that achieved prominence in the 1950s 
(collectively grouped under "modernization theory") while the second part examines theories 
that achieved prominence towards the end of the fo Ilowing decade. 
Nonnan Long provides an incisive. suiumary of the central ideas in both these 
theories: 
"Modernization theory visualizes development in terms of a progressive movement 
towards technologically and institutionally more complex and integrated forms of 
"modem" society... [while] On the other hand, [dependency theory stresses] the 
exploitative nature of these processes, attributing them to the inherent expansionist 
tendency of world capitalism, and to its constant need to open up new markets, 
increase the level of surplus extraction and accumulate capital"" 
My aim here is to explore the central ideas of these theories as they relate to the issue of the 
transformation of underdeveloped areas. In order to achieve this within the scope of this 
chapter, one must necessarily be selective with the literature, given its volume, which 
"2 Long (1992a: 18-19), brackets mine. 
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Cristobal Kay' has likened to being confronted with the tower of Babel. 
3.2 Modernization Theory 
In ordinary tenns, modernization is, in my opinion, a process of change to a situation 
or position which corresponds with, or is compatible to the contemporary stage of human 
advancement. Modernization ideas for the explanation of the development process became 
prevalent at about the end of World War H, and appear to have been derived from inductive 
generalizations of certain aspects of the past of industrialized western economies. The theory 
itself appears to have risen out of theoretical debates about the development of "peasant" 
economics and cultures94, and is based on an analysis of such concepts as structural 
differentiation, the traditional/modem dichotomy, the rural-urban continuum, and the 
perceived cultural "obstacles" or pre-requisites to development. 
"Modernization" ýn the classical model has been defined as a "total" transformation 
of a "traditional" or prelmodern society into the types of technology and associated social 
organization that characterize the "advanced", economically prosperous, and relatively 
politically stable nations of the western world". The modernization process, then, is thought 
of as the process of social change or transformation that accompanies economic development. 
Mabogunje (1980: 38) following Lemer (1968) has put it thus 
"Modernization is the process of social change in which development is the economic 
11 Kay (1989: 125-126). 
I See for instance Foster (1962: 52-53) who attempts to explain underdevelopment as a 
natural feature of peasant culture, brought about by factors including an inherent resistance 
to change and an inability to co-open, te. 
4). j Moore (1963: 89). 
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component. Modernization produces the social environment in which rising output per 
head is effectively incorporated. For effective incorporation, the heads that produce 
(and consume) rising output must understand and accept the-new rules of the game 
deeply enough to improve their own behaviour and to diffuse it'throughout their 
society... [which] entails nothing less than reshaping and resharing of all social values 
such as power, respect, rectitude, affection, well-being, skill and enlightenment". 
Economic development, for this purpose, is defined broadly as a sustainable increase in 
living standards'. According to Smelser (1963), economic development takes place in the 
following four listed ways: 
(a) The modernization of technology, that is, the application of scientific knowledge, as 
opposed to "traditionalized techniques" to problem solving' 
(b) The commercialization of agriculture, in particular, the move from subsistence to cash- 
cropping, and the development of wage labour in the agricultural sector". 
(c) The Industrialization process, described broadly here as the sustained use of machine 
power for production purposes", and 
(d) Urbanization, that is the transition from farm and. village settlements towards the growth 
I- 
S 
96 World Bank (1991: 31); Kinsey (1988: 14); Robuck & Simmonds (1989: 482). cf. 
Adedeji (1989: 276) "The human condition is the only final measure of development". This 
is a new emphasis on the human aspect of development. Previously, the definition ("increase 
in output per head") was somewhat index-linked, as the Mabogunje definition above, and the 
classical modernization models of Smelser (1963) and Moore (1963) indicate. But as has been 
pointed out by Onyemelukwe (1974: 98-99) and others, index-linked definitions are often 
misleading as the mineral reserves which constitute the wealth of most African LDCs are 
independent of the populations of those countries eveA though they are linked in the 
definition. The more "advanced" African LDCs, relying exclusively on die index-linked 
criteria, then tend to be those with relatively large mineral resources and small populations. 
97 see further Katzin (1964: 179-198); Kamark (1967: 166-184); Mabogunje (1980: 199- 
220). 
9H see ftirther Stinclicombe (1965: 184-196). 
99 see ftirther Moore (1963: 89-112); IMF (1975: 298-304). 
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of large urban centres". 
The processes of economic development listed above may occur.,. simultaneously or, 
(as is usually more likely, ) at different rates. For instance, the "commercialization to of 
agriculture in Nigeria from about the 1860s was not accompanied by industrialization, neither 
was the urbanization of Kano, Katsina and other places in Northern Nigeria earlier in the 
century accompanied by, or the result of their industrialization". 
In Smelser's model, economic development "modernizes" the social structure of 
"traditional" societies in two ways: 
The first is what he calls "structural differentiation". This occurs as more specialized 
social units (such as wage labour) are formed to sustain new economic activities (such as 
cash-cropping)'O'. 
The second is an integration (or reintegration) process as differentiated social 
structures are united on a new basis'13. 
The modernization. process, like the economic development which it accompanies, is 
often an uneven one. 'According to Eisenstadt ý1970: 25), different start-up points and 
100 see further Gugler & Flanagan (1978); Mabogurije (1980: 151-198). 
"I See Ek-undare (1973). 
102 cf. Wilson & Wilson (1945: 101-102). 
103 cf. Moore (1964). These two points are at the heart of the modernization theory, and 
have been echoed in various ways by several other writers. such as Wilson & Wilson (1945); 
Moore (1963); Nash (1958); Hoselitz (1960), Eisenstadt (1970) and Mazrui (1972). 
According to Hoselitz for example, an underdeveloped country, in order to be "modernized" 
into a developed one will undergo a structural shift of "functionally diffuse" economic roles 
(which are closely associated with political, family or religious roles) to "functionally 
specific" economic roles in which one does what one has to do irrespective of one's other 
societal roles. Such a restructuring is brought about by a process of differentiation of the kind 
described by Snielser. Similarly, in Wilson & Wilson's (1945: 95-98) view, modernization 
involves extensive social and geographical mobility, resulting in a breakdown of traditional 
11imily patterns of production from which a new functional individualism arises. 
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populations, resources and abilities affect the modernization process. This may be true of 
societies in which modernization ideas have been externally imposedý an-d either because of 
a lack of resources or other reasons, it is not thoroughly diffused to the whole society. Such 
a situation could lead to opposition and social conflict which could be inimical to the process, 
as happened in Eastern Nigeria for example, when. new development tax levies led to the 
unprecedented Aba womens' tax riots of 1929". 
Other writers have therefore theorized that in order to be made sustainable, 
modernization ought to be institutionalized, such as happened in Japan at about the end of 
the nineteenth century when, to support their push for industrialization, Japanese elites were 
able to obtain the support of the peasantry because the traditional culture imposed a duty on 
the peasantry to support the elites, a situation that made the industrialization process in Japan 
a relatively smooth one'01. Traditional views on. rights and appropriate behaviour have also 
been instrumental in the resolution of industrial and other conflicts". The 
"institutionalization of mqdemization" will only occur, according to Eisenstadt (1966: 45) 
when 
"[the modernizing or newly modernized society becomes] capable of dealing with 
new, changing problems and of absorbing within its central instifutional sphere, new 
social groups and strata with their problems and demands" 
In other words, the society ought to be able to adapt itself to dealing with any socio-political 
problems, which its new or reinvented identity might occasion. 
11 The riots are described in greater detail in Crowder (1978). cf. Gluckman (1955). 
Wilson & Wilson (1945) also describe Christian converts opposition to teachings on 
monogamy among the Nyakyusa people of Tanzania during their fieldwork there in 1934- 
1938. 
11 Geertz (1973: 52). cf. Japan's Long March in "Tile Economist" (1/10 - 7/10/94: 92- 
96). 
"I World Bank (1991: 40). 
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3.3 Analytical Limitations Of Modernization Theory. 
Transforming the structure of a society, particularly a multi-ethnic/cultural one as one 
is likely to find in a place like Nigeria and many other parts of Africa and Asia, involves, 
for this very reason, greater areas of complexity than the mere transfer of modes of 
production. Most "obstacles" to modernization policies can be traced back to the "pre- 
modem" society's opposition to such policies, or even if such policies have been externally 
imposed, the society has then gone and adapted them for implementation in another way to 
suit their own ends. 
While it is recognised that some countries are obviously more "advanced", 
"industrialized" or "developed" than others, and that the modernization process is essentially 
the means by which a less developed country will be transformed into a more developed one, 
modernization theory itself sometimes fails to graspthe fact of the complexity of the so-called 
"traditional" societies. Intuition suggests that some members of the traditional society will 
resist transformation and instead seek to maintain the status quo, while other members in that 
society seek to change it, either by creating conditions for change, or adopting (adapting) 
externally generated conditions for change. A major limitation of modernization theory then 
is its inability to adequately incorporate such local variations into the process of 
transformation, perhaps because inspire of contrary claims, modernization models are 
patently ahistorical, and perhaps also because the models tend to be over-influenced by 
increasingly abstract quantifiable development indices such as per capita income, capital 
formation and savings and investment gaps. It is not enough to dismiss the variations as 
anomalies. This, from an analytical perspective, is the main crux of my examination of the 
limitations of the theory, and is presented below: 
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First, modernization theory liberally extrapolates from an understanding of the 
modernization process as it occurred in post-industrial revolution Western Europe'07 . It 
then formulates simple, unilinear models for third world development, aibhg the lines of what 
appears to have happened in Western European capitalist countries. This is ethnocentric"'. 
The models are largely irrelevant to understanding the social processes occurring in many 
of today's developing countries whose socio-historical and contemporary circumstances, as 
I argued in chapter 2, are different from those experienced by the developed countries. In 
the case of sub-saharan Africa for instance, modernization theory does not analytically allow 
for differential local responses to change processes, as expressed for instance through 
indigenous entrepreneurship (I shall presently return to this point), or a flourishing informal 
sector (seeing as the latter especially does not contribute to official "output per head" figures) 
which are a historically grounded part of the region's commerce and whose contribution to 
regional GDP is, according to the World Bank (1989) set to increase by 12% (to 47%) by 
2020. Were one to apply modernization theory to the African situation as it is, the conclusion 
C 
would be that indigendýs entrepreneurship, froXn which so much was expected in the 
departing colonialists' modernization drives of the 1950s", has failed. Its application has 
101 Smelser's (1963) modernization model was in fact an extension of an earlier study he 
had done (1959) on the change process that accompanied the Western European Industrial 
revolution. 
"I This criticism is perhaps more easily justifiable in the case of the classical model of, 
say, Smelser (1963) than the more flexible one of Eisenstadt (1966) who qualifies his model 
by adding the "institutionalization" factor, although as Long (1977b: 27) has noted, 
Eisenstadt's terminology (and I might add, his choice of illustrations) in fact give his 
underlying ethnocentrism away. 
" cf. Fieldhouse (1986). 
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led some economists to conclude that Africa does not have enough entrepreneurs' 10, and 
those carrying it on are lacking in basic entrepreneurial skills"'. Yet, it seems that such 
a view is perhaps more evidential of the inability of modernization theory . Io look beyond the 
structural arguments into the micro-processes that make them up"'. Hagen (1971: 125) 
makes much the same point when he talks about the inadequacy of merely transplanting 
productive enterprises, processes, and management methods from the West to LDCs. 
This is not to say that some structural "differentiation" and "integration" are 
unnecessary tools of social change, but it appears that the conceptual framework of this 
particular approach does not go far enough. Modernization theory appears to assume that the 
characteristics of "traditional" and "advanced" societies can be isolated and identified (They 
would need to be, before they can be differentiated). Yet, experience shows that in virtually 
every society (and particularly in urban centres) one is likely to find elements of both 
differentiated and undifferentiated relationships and institutions. This was certainly my 
experience in the course of this study. I regularly came across firms in the modem sector 
C 
which, with their acquiticence or encouragement, are serviced, usually by much smaller 
firms or persons (such as farmers or labourers) who employ family labour, or take on the 
children of friends and relatives as informal apprentices, all for little or no wages. Similar 
110 See Geiger & Armstrong (1964); Steel (1979). It is only in the last decade that this 
view appears to have been empirically challenged. See Marsden (1990). 
"I Harris (1971); Kilby (1969). These skills are often interpreted in terms of formal 
education, although as I have argued elsewhere (Fadahunsi 1996), the precise links between 
formal education and entrepreneurship are arguably not necessarily clear-cut. A study in 
Accra, Ghana in fact revealed that increased formal education in a part of the town actually 
reduced business and trading activities in that location (See Robertson 1984). 
112 cf. Long (1968; 1977b); Adedeji (1.989). Economic liberalization, coupled with 
political reform to allow individuals far more freedom to express their creativity now feature 
much more strongly in world bank proposals for sustained recovery in sub-saharan Africa 
(see World Bank 1995: 73-75). 
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examples abound in the Nigerian industrial set-up, especially among the smaller firms that 
dominate the trading end of the set-up. 
Should there then be a full or partial differentiation for "modeihization" to occur? If 
it is the former, then the modernization approach is fundamentally inadequate for not even 
the western ideal on which it is modelled ultimately supports it. If it is the latter, then the 
theory still needs to state how much of it in fact constitutes modernization. The theory 
therefore needs to be made much clearer in terms of the types of institutions and relationships 
which need to be differentiated and integrated, although whether this can in fact be achieved 
seems to be a separate matter for discussion. 
Secondly, and following from the first, the ethnocentricity of the classical models, and 
their inadequate understanding of historical processes lead them to plot a path for LDCs' 
modernization which bears little resemblance, in spite of contrary claims, to previously 
documented modernization processes. The Europeqn industrial revolution which provides the 
basis for the modernization models of Neil Sraelser, Wilbert Moore and others was an 
I- internal, self-generating ' process and a process of slow accumulation, but the models 
prescribed for LDCs is expected to be generated by external forces such as direct foreign 
investments, colonialism, and other "big push" forces. The models do not show how the 
internal (traditional) system self-generates influences or actors who contribute to determining 
outcomes, particularly on a regional, national or even international scale. In particular, they 
do not seem to have taken cognisance of how such processes have occurred in the history 
of the LDCs in question (I am concerned here in particular with Africa). Ignoring the 
workings of the internal system in this way relegates local actors to a passive or similarly 
inconsequential role in the social and economic development process, but as Long (1968: 8-9; 
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1992a)"I has noted, no theory of economic development is complete if it does not 
recognize the calculating or entrepreneurial abilities of the people in the society. 
Thirdly, modemization theory appears to assume that for m8demization to occur, 
LDCs' traditional structures will be replaced by a more differentiated structure which will 
cause the breakdown of "old" (or pre-modem) structures because both of these structures are 
always in conflict and are mutually exclusivel'ý. Available empirical indications however 
reveal otherwise. Not only is this assumption not true for Japan", it is not true either for 
the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of South East Asia (such as South Korea, Singapore 
and Malaysia) nor is it true for India, Pakistan, and several North African and Middle 
Eastern countries also presently undergoing rapid industrialization without a significant 
differentiation of existing social processes. 
In Nigeria's case, both differentiated and undifferentiated relationships co-exist in a 
loosely dualist structure"'. Despite increasing ipdustrialization, traditional religious and 
political arrangements continue to flourish, as do other social arrangements, such as family 
113 cf. Moennan (1968); Salisbury (1970). 
"I Moore (1963). 
I's Hirschmeier (1971). cf. Long (1977b: 66-70); Geertz (1973: 52). 
116 1 use this term in its broad, general sense, and not within the particular meaning of 
the theory of economic dualism which envisages the independent existence in LDCs of two 
radically different sectors - one a relatively small, modern, capitalist and market-oriented 
sector, and the other a relatively large, traditional, agrarian and subsistence sector. The 
theory conceptualizes modernization as taking place, when production factors (and 
the modem sector accompanying social structures) are diffused to the traditional sector from 
(Higgins 1962: 99-115; Myint 1980: 67-69; Jorgenson 1970: 320-348). This is only partially 
true, but even more importantly, many of the assumptions of die theory, such as 
independence of the sectors, "disguised unemployment" in the traditional sector, and the 
social dimension of the diffusion of production values, are questionable. They are largely 
open to the same criticism of determinism as classical modernization models. See also Frank 
(1969) and Kofi. (1980: 252-283) for a marxist-oriented critique of the theory of economic 
dualism. 
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apprenticeships, extended family obligations, and so forth, as I witnessed during my 
fieldwork. These co-exist with more "modem" or formal commercial arrangements and there 
is a high degree of interdependence between them. Perhaps a more addurate description of 
what takes place is that some "traditional" societies are able to adapt their existing situations 
to changing social conditions (Japan is an obvious example). As Long (1977b: 30) argues, 
many of these so-called "traditional values" are already congruent with development. It is 
therefore incorrect to conclude, as modernization models tend to do, when confronted with 
a so-called "non-capitalist" society, that where differentiated structures have failed to 
"totally" replace pre-existing ones, the "modernization" of such a society has failed, or such 
a society is an anomaly, or merely in transition. 
These misconceptions, in my view, have largely arisen as a result of an inadequate 
understanding, on the part of the original theorists, of the socio-economic history of LDCs, 
leading the theorists to draw too much from the e, xperiences of the now advanced nations, 
and may also be due to the fact that the theory enjoyed. a renaissance in the 1950s as an 
ideological extension of'the cold war"', in 'a period of increasing polarization of ideas 
between the capitalist and communist worlds. Whatever the reason may be, the structural 
differentiation model is criticised, not only for giving primacy to the effects of exogenous 
factors in promoting or analyzing social change in LDCs, but also for using "ideal type" 
traditional and advanced societies as tools for analysis, and over-emphasising the uniformity 
of their internal reception to change. 
In its present form, I believe the theory is perhap's best useful as a model to make 
post-hoc statements about structural changes which have already occurred, as opposed to 
being used as a predictive tool. In Nigeria's case for instance, the theory could be useful for 
"I See Vandergeest (1988); Arndt (1987); Leys (1996). 
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analyzing the consumption dimension of the industrialization programmes embarked upon by 
various Nigerian governments since the end of World War II, or of the federal goverment 
since independence in 1960"'. However, in its present form, for as ýdhg as it continues to 
aim at broad predictive generalizations, it will have the problem of explaining the rather 
substantial exceptions to the theory. 
Modernization theory, or at any rate its practice, is not dead. It is a simple, and easy- 
to-apply paradigm which suits a variety of interests"', in particular governments and aid 
agencies. Not only are the world bank's recommendations for the development of LDCs 
firmly rooted in the modernization paradigm'20 , it continues, along with other international 
development organizations, to ftind research and projects that have the modernization idea 
as their bedrock. Some of this latter research has however resulted in recent rationalizations 
of some of the assumptions of modernization 121 . 
Perhaps more progress would be made if rpsearchers recognize the heterogeneity of 
the various populations that they study, and are prepared to build it into their analyses that 
this affects the rate at which modernization programmes are accepted and implemented in 
"I Eleazu's (1989: 21-22) discussion of Nigeria's continued import-substitution strategy 
of industrialization since independence may be interpreted in this way, although this was not 
the author's stated intention. 
"I Mabogunje (1980: 28-29). 
120 See for instance World Bank (1995: 5-8). 
12 1 For instance, following the relative failure of several programmes applied from these 
assumptions (such as "Operation Feed the Nation" and the "Green Revolution" in Nigeria in 
the late 1970s to early 1980s), the idea of a centralized diffusion of production technologies 
as the method of commercializing agriculture appears to be tentatively giving way to 
providing access to such technologies coupled with a measure of land reform (an idea 
previously put forward by Shultz 1964), as a method of promoting "induced innovation" in 
the agricultural sector of traditional societies. See also World Bank (1991); Vandergeest 
(1988). 
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various parts of the world. 
Another way forward in the development of modernization ideas is what Mazrui 
(1972: 297) calls the modernization of "motivational patterns and soail stratification" which 
takes into account the facilitation of a greater level of economic individualism, the facilitation 
of a horizontal division of labour among developing countries'22, and the facilitation of 
mobility in the international system of stratieication. Such an approach, in my view, 
essentially calls for trading unions among groups of LDCs, a readiness by the world at large 
to recognise and reward "progress" by such countries, and a preparedness by (African) LDCs 
to lessen their kinship and such other uneconomic loads which tend to mop up a degree of 
their economic surpluses. 
3.4 Dependency Theory. 
"Dependence is a conditioning situation iii which the economies of one group of 
countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship 
of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and 
the world trading *system becomes a de'pendent relationship when some countries can 
expand their self impulsion while others, being in a dependent position can only 
expand as a reflection of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative 
effects on their immediate developments"" 
Although I will refer on a number of occasions to a "dependency theory", what is in 
fact commonly known as the dependency theory is not a single theory at all, but a complex 
network of part socio-economic models and assumptions, and part historical documentation, 
whose central theme is that the trade and development opportunities open to the world's 
LDCs are curtailed by the limited scope allotted to them as peripheral units within die 
122 cf. Adedeji (1989: 264-265). 
123 Cardoso ([1970] cited in Palma [1981: 47]) 
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intemational capitalist system. 
The dependency arguments achieved prominence during the late 1960s as it became 
increasingly clear that after concerted "modernization" policies and ýi6grammes in the third 
world following World War II, subsistence-oriented and other non-capitalist fornis of 
production were not undergoing universal transformation. Mineral extraction may have 
created new wealth for countries like Nigeria, babon and Ivory Coast" in the 1950s and 
1960s, but in practice, it had not eliminated traditional institutions or modes of production 
nor had it significantly increased the relatively low rates of technological productivity. 
Dependency theorists felt this was because low productivity was not so much a problem that 
capitalism was needed to eliminate, as the actual result of the sustained penetration of 
capitalism in LDCs which had already destroyed the "natural" economies of traditional 
societies by the time colonialists began implementing modernization ideas after World War 
11124. 
The inspiration for the theory was mainly. provided during the 1950s under the 
umbrella of the Economic Commission for Laiin America (ECLA), led by the Argentinean 
economist, Raul Prebiscli. The ECLA's conclu'sions, in line with its subject of inquiry at the 
time, absolved individual Latin American ministers of blame for the se'vere fiscal problems 
being suffered by Latin American countries during that time, and instead blamed the 
background of the problems on external factors over which the ministers had no control. 
In arguing for a limited protectionist policy to accelerate the industrialization of Latin 
America, Prebisch conceived of a world economic order ifi which a small "centre" (or core) 
of industrialized countries were the only places from which the rest of the world (that is, the 
124 a point Sarnir Amin illustrates with his explanation of the ruination of Indian and 
Egyptian craftsmen (see Amin 1974: 142-159). 
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"periphery") could obtain the necessary inputs to pursue rapid industrialization goals. In that 
way, the periphery was dependent on the core"; And as Paul Baran (1957: 28) added, the 
industrialization of LDCs was "profoundly inimical to the dominant intbrests of the advanced 
capitalist centres" because the latter provided the former with raw materials and investment 
outlets for their technology and capital. These arguments can be summarized as follows: 
The underdevelopment of Latin America, Prebisch argued, was due to its reliance on 
exports of primary products, the prices of which were determined in the world's financial 
capitals of Western Europe and North America, especially the USA. These latter countries 
invariably fixed conunodity prices that suited their own needs. This then led to terins of trade 
which from the point of view of Latin America, fluctuated in the short term, and deteriorated 
in the long tenn. There was therefore inadequate capital to develop a viable local industrial 
sector. This situation precipitated a dependence on foreign manufactures which the Latin 
American governments sought to reduce by pursuing policies of import substitution and rapid 
industrialization. 
Expectedly, thesp policies resulted iý a reduction of the imports of some basic 
consumer goods such 'as basic electronic -g6ods, clothing and some household effects. 
However, these same policies subsequently created a new kind of-dependence on the 
importation of fuel, capital equipment, certain intermediate products, and reversing 
established trends, food. The inadequacy of local finance to procure these imports meant a 
greater reliance on MNEs which had the ability and willingness to provide the capital to 
finance the required imports, and the technological know-how to implement them. The 
MNEs, as suppliers of capital and technology, not only operated in oligopolistic, or even 
monopolistic environments, but ensured that supply inelasticities, and consequently their own 
12-' See Prebisch (1984). 
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incomes were always safeguarded. The effect of these on Latin American economies was 
hyper-inflation, foreign exchange shortages and social unrest. 
Prebisch was essentially concerned with reducing the emerging-high income elasticity 
of demand at the periphery for manufactures from the centre. This influenced the policy 
recommendations that followed from his theoretical analyses. Thus, among the solutions 
proposed by ECLA were : removal of protectionism at the centre, the institution of limited 
protectionism at the periphery, curtailing the dominant role of MNEs by encouraging (for 
a period at least) import substitution at the periphery, and the establishment of a Latin 
American Common Market. 
It was however Frank (1969) who set out to examine the theoretical implications of 
these for the meaning of structural underdevelopment at the local and national level. 
Proceeding from Baran's analysis, he rejects outright the modernist view that LDCs 
traditionally exist in dualistic economic systems"', mainly on the ground that such a 
conclusion views the major obstacles to socio-economic development in terms of the interplay 
between these two sectoFs when it ought in fact to be viewing it in terms of a "metropolitan - 
satellite" relationship In which the industrialized countries are the metropolitan centres who 
dominate the satellites (LDCs) and ascribe peripheral roles to them- in the international 
economic order. His model of this "metropolitan - satellite" relationship is premised upon 
'ta... chain of metropolises and satellites, which runs from the world metropolis down 
to the hacienda or rural merchants who are satellites of the local commercial 
metropolitan centre but who in turn have peasants as their satellites. If we take a 
photograph of the world as a whole, we get a whole series of such constellations of 
metropolises and satellites. "121 
12' The theory of economic dualism has previously been briefly mentioned in this 
chapter. Frank (1969: 146) rejects it for being "factually erroneous and theoretically 
inadequate and misleading". 
121 Frailk (1969: 146-147). 
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Each connection between the satellite and metropolis is in general a channel through 
which the centre appropriates part of the economic surplus of the satellites"'. Dependency 
is perpetuated in this way. This is accompanied by a concentrdtion of socio-political 
resources in the metropolis and, especially at the national level, by an increasing tendency 
towards centralization (and ultimately militarization)"'. Dependency thus creates an 
increasing polarization in the inequality of incomýs, first between international centres and 
peripheries, then even more acutely, between local centres and peripheries where the local 
bourgeoisie resorts to various forms of coercive regimes to perpetuate their control of 
production factors"O. The higher the degree of metropolitan - satellite relationships, the 
more dependent the satellite bourgeoisie becomes linked to, and dependent on the 
metropolis"'. 
These analyses lead Frank to several conclusions which are summarized below: 
Since satellites operate merely as an arm of the metropolis, the weakening of such a 
relationship would necessarily depend, not on the impulsion of the satellites, but on the 
metropolis. It follows tlýerefbre that satellites Cannot by themselves sustain an autonomous 
pattern of developmeW If they attempt to A6 Sol the development will either result in a 
12' Frank (1969: 20). 
121 Frank (1981: 260-264). 
131 Frank (1969: 150; 1981: 188). Frank cites a number of third world examples to back 
this view, and in the case of Nigeria, makes an example of the Trade Dispute (essential 
services) Decree of 1977 which effectively banned workers' rights to strike, reduced the 
numbers of approved trade unions and reserved power in the government to appoint their 
general secretaries. See further Frank (1981: 206-207). 
"I Frank (1969: 149-150). 
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return to a subsistence-based economyI12 ("passive capitalist involution") or at best, a kind 
of development severely limited in scope"' ("active capitalist involution"). The dominant 
rural class is well integrated with urban elites and together, they constiibte, a ruling class as 
control of the means of primary production allows them to discriminate against the rest of 
the population not only in production and trade, but also, ultimately in socio-political and 
cultural matters. The national ruling class is in turn. dependent on the foreign bourgeoisie 
which controls investment capital and commodity markets. 
In Frank's view, as more capitalism cannot be used to eliminate the structural 
problems created by capitalism, the solution to the domination is necessarily political. He 
argues that the "top - down" discrimination creates social disaffection, and will continue to 
heighten political tension until in a socialist revolution, the regional and national bourgeoisie 
is overthrown, and the dependency chain is broken"'. This is the only alternative to 
underdevelopment. 
3.5 Analytical Limitatiofis Of Dependency Theory 
To most observers, there is a significant gulf, certainly in econorffic and technological 
terms between LDCs and industrialized countries, and applying dependency arguments to the 
sub-saharan African case for instance provides attractive arguments linking the trans-atlantic 
132 Amin (1974: 289-290) cites examples from Senegal and North-East Brazil in agreement 
with this point. 
"I In this way Frank sought to explain die nature of die industrialization drives of Latin 
American countries - Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, after 1929 (Frank 1969: 149). According 
to Amin (1974: 371-372), this can also be used to explain attempts at industrialization in 
certain African countries, including Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Kenya. 
" Frank (1969: 3,11,150). cf. Amin (1974: 389-390); Kay (1989: 72-75). 
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slave trade, the subsequent colonization of the region, and the industrialization programmes 
that accompanied the region's decolonization, to its present-day situation of relative 
underdevelopment 135 . Dependency arguments therefore tend to find Widesplead acceptance, 
both in analysis and application, in Nigerian (and indeed African) development literature 136 
although some cautionary voices such as Ubogu (1984) remain. 
The dependency theory (especially as conitructed by Frank) has been criticised on 
several fronts, from Frank's conceptualization of "development" and "underdevelopment" 137 
to his political leanings"'. Several of the more frivolous criticisms appear to have taken 
away, as Palma (1981: 44,46)1" rueftilly notes, from Frank's. important criticism of 
modernist ideas on "dualism" in LDCs, and the volume of research his work has inspired. 
Thus the point of my critique is not to deny that most LDCs exist in a dependent state but 
to argue that dependency approaches to the understanding of underdevelopment are, in their 
present mode, analytically inadequate for this purpose. Frank's (and others) dependency 
"I See for example, Rodney (1972); Munro (1976); Yansane (1980); Zeleza (1993). 
These issues are explordd in chapter 5 as part 'Of A wider examination of issues in Nigeria's 
economic history. .%..: . 
136 See for example Mabogunje (1980: 42-50); Ogwu & Olaniyan ([eds. ] 1989); 
Akeredolu-Ale (1976); Oyaide (1984); Onimode (1980); Ajakaiye'(1985). 
137 Palma (1981: 45-46), following Laclau (1971). 
138 Frank believed that a great part of Laclau's (and others such as Emmanuel, Marini, 
and Torres) criticisms of his analysis of pre-capitalist modes of production in Latin America 
were based on a reformulation of the questions he was trying to answer, which necessarily 
affected their analyses, and on a wrong assumption that he was a marxist (Frank- 1984: 264). 
Marxist scholars generally criticised both modernization and dependency theorists for various 
theoretical and empirical failures (Kofi 1980; Kay 1989; Palma 1981) but have not been 
given a specific mention in this chapter as their analyses, in emphasising the external 
appropriation of local surpluses and a political solution to such problems, are similar in form 
to much of dependency theory, the main difference being that ensuring class struggles are 
made a fundamental issue. 
131) ef Seers (1981: 15-16). 
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arguments have been empirically examined, and aspects of them have been found to be 
methodologically wanting"O, the main argument being that although Frank provides useful 
insights to the theory of structural underdevelopment, his model is uldinately too simplistic, 
reductionist and deterministic to satisfactorily explain the apparent variations and complexities 
in metropolitan - satellite relationships. I will attempt to explain this through two of Frank's 
assumptions. 
First, Frank assumes that the development of capitalism necessarily eliminates 
"traditional" non-capitalist modes of production"'. However, it is doubted in some quarters 
whether pre-colonial modes of production can be described as non-capitaliSt142 . Even 
"I See for instance Long & Roberts' (1984) study in Peru to discover the effects of the 
integration of a rural "satellite" into the world economy. cf. OHear (1987) and Milewski 
(1981) for (less intensive) Nigerian variations . My critique of Frank's model has these 
studies and my own observations during my fieldwork in Nigeria as its main empirical base. 
Long (1977b) also describes other Peruvian studies which, like his work with Bryan Roberts, 
are dependency-inspired, such as Mar et al (1969), and Coder (in Mar et al 1969). 
"I In developing this point, Frank criticised certain modernist conceptualizations of 
economic dualism, which. I referred to earlier. I 
However, he goes on to admit that feudalism 
(in Latin America) prd-dates, is penetrated by, and then co-exists with international 
capitalism, but that thiq is only possible beca. useLatin American feudalism is inherently 
capitalistic in nature. He however regards this as an exception. Normally, in his view, the 
latter would eliminate the former. This view has been consistently criticised by Utin 
American writers (see Kay 1989: 157-159 for a review of such criticisms). One must agree 
that empirical support for Frank's view is hard to come by. In Nigeria's case, Frank's views 
would appear to find no support either in much of the literature. For instance although 
Ek-undare (1973) apparently concedes that prior to colonization, the society was feudal in 
nature, lie however argues further that nonetheless, the Nigerian economy, such as it were, 
was already practising what he calls "competitive capitalism", a fact which he believes made 
it relatively easy for the British colonialists to practice a system of indirect rule in Nigeria 
which ultimately, though unwittingly, helped ensure that existing modes of production were 
not altogether eliminated. See also Milewski (1981: 111-il2) who similarly concludes that 
initial European penetration in Nigeria did not significantly affect pre-existing modes of 
production. This eventually happened with colonization. But the resulting division of labour 
did not lead to die elimination of pre-existing modes of production but a co-existence in 
which the old was subservient and dependent on the new. 
112 Ekundare (1973), in my view, persuasively makes the point that the that the fact that 
the pre-colonial economy was "pre-modern" and "subsistence-oriented" does not mean it 
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among those writers who share the view that traditional modes of production were non- 
capitalist, the prevailing argument seems to be that the international development of 
capitalism, in some areas, far from eliminating traditional modes o'fprqguction, unwittingly 
contributed to their perpetuation". This, in a sense, is what happened in the trans-atlantic 
slave trade, where slave traders purported to help transform the modes of production in the 
societies from which they obtained their slaves-, while at the same time purchasing into 
slavery overseas, the same young persons who could have helped carry out the 
transformation. But as "modem" capitalist production modes were imposed through 
colonialism anyway, in' the final analysis then, capitalist, and non-capitalist modes of 
production came to co-exist. Indeed, this is one of the major conclusions of the Peruvian 
study by Long & Roberts (1984) of a rural region closely linked to a foreign-owned mining 
firm, showing how local people adapt to an enclave economy. 
Similar conclusion can be drawn from O'Hear's (1987) study of the craft industry in 
a Central Nigerian Region. In it, she attempts to show how craftsmen and women in Ilorin, 
early in the twentieth ceUtury (and continuing -to present times), struggled to recover from 
losses occasioned by restrictive colonial trade 'regulations, 'and competition from European 
imports, to retain, and in some instances, increase their share'of the market in the regional 
must then be regarded as non-capitalist. He argues at p. 384 that "The fact that the indigenous 
social and economic systems of the country were based largely on the extended family 
systems tended to give the impression that Nigerians were 'natural socialists'. This 
impression [however has... ] no economic foundation. In a developing country, where the 
process of division of labour and exchange had not been fully entrenched into the economic 
system, a reliance on subsistence production, which is the main economic characteristic of 
the extended family system, was inevitable... While the main motive for production in this 
subsistence economy was to satisfy individual wants, surplus production over and above the 
subsistence level often formed the nucleus of an exchange system - either barter or money 
exchange" (Brackets mine). 
143 Long ([1977b], following Wolpe (1972), and Dupre & Rey (1973). 
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metropolitan centres of Lagos and Ibadan. This was done, not by abandoning their crafts in 
favour of trade in imported textiles which seemed to be getting popular at the time (and also 
had the government's support), but by adapting their production and tran'toKtation practices 
to make themselves more competitive. 
Both studies also indicate that labour and capital were, and continue to be routinely 
recruited through several extended family (usually no wage), patron-client (usually low wage) 
and other traditional ("non-capitalist") production modes'44 . 
The weakness in Frank's analysis, according to Long (1977b) is that he analyzes 
development issues from an "exchange" point of view, rather than a "modes of production" 
point of view"'. Put differently, Norman Long means that the former point of view allows 
Frank to see the development of capitalism merely in terms of the fact of European - Third 
World commercial contacts, while the latter would have provided another insight which 
would permit a clearer look at how, (or if) local processes respond to foreign domination, 
whether or not they survive, and how they do it., Frank's method is what gives him a 
distorted view of history', and consequently weakens his analysis. 
Secondly, Frank's. view of a chain of relationships pre-supposes that metropolitan - 
satellite relationships are linear or hierarchical, with each sud-ceeding metropolis 
appropriating the economic surplus of the satellite below it. There is however, an important 
omission in this analysis. Metropolitan exploitation is no doubt a feature of the global 
economy, as history has shown time and again"', but again with Frank focusing on the 
144 cf. Hill (1971: 310-312). 
145 cf. Long & Roberts (1984). Hill ([1970] referred to earlier in chapter 1), where she 
explains tile drifting apart of "indigenous" and "mainstream" economics, may also be used 
to interpret Frank's argument in this way. 
14' Amin (1974); Zeleza (1993); Curtin (1969); Rodney (1972). 
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point of contact between external capitalists and the local economy, and his resultant failure 
to fully grasp local processes, his model is unable to explain those actors who do bypass their 
allotted roles, or in significant other ways, such as co-operation as 6pposed to confrontation 
with the metropolis or the expression of rebellion via innovative behaviour"', do not 
conform to the hierarchical model constructed by Frank. 
The Long & Roberts (1984) Peruvian study is a case in point. In it, the authors show 
how a set of rural villages maintain direct socio-economic links with the national capital of 
Lima, about 250 miles away, while maintaining minimal contact with the much nearer 
regional city and commercial centre of Huancayo, which, were one to apply Frank's model, 
they ought to have much closer economic ties with. Hill's studies of the grains trade in 
Northern Nigeria (1971), and migrant cocoa farmers in Ghana (1963b) as well as other 
studies (referred to earlier) such as O'Hear (1987) and Milewski (1981), and indeed the 
present study (as chapter 8 illustrates) all suggest a series of accumulation processes as well 
as regional link-ages more complex than simple dependency theories can explain. 
The complexity of the linkages would also suggest a rebuttal of the assumption that 
rural development, particularly in national satellites, is conditional upon the development of 
the metropolitan centre. This is at best only partially true as it presupposes that local people 
are unable to develop their own immediate and perhaps regional areas. Yet in Eastern 
Nigeria, towns like Onitsha, Enugu, Owerri, Urnuahia and Aba have developed in precisely 
this manner, with significant overall impact on twentieth century commerce in Eastern 
Nigeria, which extends well beyond this into the political arena"'. 
147 
cf. Hagen (1964; 1971; 1986). 
148 such as influencing indigenous demands for own state governments in the federal 
Nigerian set-up, rewarded for instance, in the case of Urnuahia by the creation of Abia state 
(with Urnuahia as the capital) in 1991. 
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Frank's dependency model therefore, although recognized for its contribution to the 
understanding of the impediments to economic development and social change, ought to be 
viewed in the light of the qualifications discussed above. Its groundhig-in. history enables it 
to offer valuable insight to certain issues in structural dependency, but its deductionist 
approach then leads it to over-stress the uniformity of local responses to external domination. 
It is for this that it has been mainly criticised in this chapter. 
3.6 Conclusion. 
Modernization and structural dependency theories have been discussed here together 
because of their paradigmatic similarities"'. Although they represent different ideological 
traditions, one (modernization) espousing the "trickle-down" effect of development, and the 
other (dependency) viewing development essentially as a process of domination and 
exploitation of peripheral societies, they nevertheless contain a major point of analytic 
convergence, which is that both analyze issiles of development and social change as 
emanating from centresof power in a "top-doWn'; /interven'tionist manner. 
Their implications for entrepreneurship are also similar. Under modernization theory, 
the assumption is that people in LDCs are "backward" and lacking in basic entrepreneurial 
skills and so need to be encouraged and taught how to be entrepreneurs. Under dependency 
theory, the assumption is that people are conditioned to serve the needs of exploitative 
capitalists, and therefore lack entrepreneurial skills. In both cases, no significant role is seen 
for local economic and socio-cultural heterogeneity under which indigenous entrepreneurship 
"I See Hewitt de Alcantara (1984: 2-7) for a discussion of the waxing and waning of 
paradignis in social sciences. 
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can flourish. Yet, such heterogeneity is precisely what helps micro-enterprises in particular 
survive and contribute to macro-development processes. At the vilryJqast, the manner of 
development of activities such as the cross-border trade provide substantial exceptions to 
existing theories on development and social change in Africa, and possibly, one suspects, 
LDCs in general. 
The trade, seen in a development context, then raises the question that if indeed cross- 
border trading is a continuation of an existing indigenous trading system, is it then an 
inherently backward system, or a parallel system that pre-exists more modem (and formal) 
methods of exporting, but nevertheless has adapted over the years to social change? I shall 
return to this issue in chapter 9, after a consideration of the mechanics of the trade. 
In any case, neither modernization nor dependency theory is fully able to establish 
an analytical link between this fonn of indigenous entrepreneurship and the African 
development process, and indeed to relate these to change and development on a global scale. 
In applying the orthodox thinking to the cross; -border trade, the theories would merely be 
able to see it as a function of the trading coniacts between indigenous traders and traders 
from other parts of the world. Yet this would be an incomplete explanation, first because on 
a micro-level, it is unable to explain indigenous trade patterns, and secondly, because it has 
little historical grounding as full contact of the indigenous economy with the global trading 
system only occurred with the colonization of Africa in the nineteenth century, and intra- 
regional trade and development had already been on-going for several centuries before 
this"". This suggests that indigenou's entrepreneurship has survived these time periods, 
influencing patterns of change, but these have not featured much in development debates. 
Entrepreneurs have primarily achieved this by generating entrepreneurial choices and taking 
"" Zeleza (1993). 
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decisions that impinge on the change process. 
These two issues shall form the basis of the next two chaýwrs. 
_ 
First, in the next 
chapter, I aim to explore how entrepreneurship theory has attempted to explain such 
differential action amongst entrepreneurs, before going on to examine the historical 
dimension in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MHE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENTIAL ACTION BY 
ENTREPRENEURS. 
4.1 Introduction. 
In the trade and development theories referred to in chapters 2 and 3, development was seen 
in terms of the gradual accumulation of "physical" capital. Eventually, later development 
models began to acknowledge the importance of the "human" capital, which co-ordinates the 
operations of the other resources, as a resource in itself. This resource is entrepreneurship. 
In the preface to the book "Innovation and Entrepreneurship", Peter Drucker describes 
entrepreneurship as "neither a science nor an art. It is a practice""'. Marris & Somerset 
(1971: 1) have, in the same vein, described it as a '. quality in economic life whose influence 
is easy to recognise but hard to define, and harder -still to place in economic theory". The 
authors are not side-steýping the issue. Academics have been struggling to arrive at a 
generally accepted definition of entrepreneurship for decades, and as we shall see below, 
even now, it continues to evolve according to various writers' disciplinary backgrounds and 
perceptions of present-day realities. These are well documented in the literature"', and it 
is not intended to enter into this particular debate here. Many other writers recognize the 
apparent futility of providing an exhaustive definition for the term"'. Some of the writers 
"I Drucker (1986: 10). 
152 included here are the works of the original theorists, including Cantillon, 
Menger, Marshall, Say, Knight, and others. See further Bisht et al [eds]. (1989); 
Drucker (1986); W. Long (1983); McMullan & W. Long (1984). 
153 Rosa & Bowes (1990) cite several examples in illustration of this. 
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who do choose to jump in the fray, as it were, define it in terms of business ownership or 
new ventures; Others as a function of personal risk, while yet dtliersyiew it as a function 
of innovation, and other fbims of creative and/or opportunistic behaviour. 
Adam Smith may have overlooked entrepreneurship as a factor of production in The 
Wealth of Nations, but a consideration of the history of international economic development 
shows the role that entrepreneurship has played in stimulating economic growth all over the 
world. 
Still, there exist disparities in international economic development, and even within 
individual countries, disparities exist in regional or community development. It is recognized 
that several factors may be responsible for this, but certainly one to which inadequate 
attention is sometimes paid is the differential response to social change / opportunities 
exhibited by the entrepreneurial population. Understanding how and why differential response 
takes place can go a long way to explaining why some people succeed while others fail at 
entrepreneurship, which is in turn important ýo the wider study of economic development. 
Proposed in this chapter therefore is. aff examination of some of the more established 
theories of entrepreneurship, in particular as they explain entrepreneurial choice (differential 
response/action), under the broad headings of Economic (or rational actor) theories; 
Psychological (or personality) theories, and Sociological theories. 
Essentially, an economic model will tend to perceive entrepreneurship as a function 
of a fully rational or optimum matching of resources to opportunities; A psychological model 
will tend to view entrepreneurship as an end product of certain personality traits, while a 
sociological model will tend to view entrepreneurship as a component of a dynamic social 
process. 
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4.2 Economic Models. 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Economists were the earliest substantial contributors to the study of entrepreneurship. 
They still offer the most widely used definitions of entrepreneurship, and have been 
particularly important in advancing the knowledge on the contribution of entrepreneurship 
to economic development. Essentially, economic models take the view that any person who 
has a clear vision of what he wants and the necessary information, ought to then scan the 
market, select the niche that will maximize his returns and in so doing, become an 
entrepreneur. 
It was however Joseph Schumpeter who expounded on the model and went on to 
become the architect of the theory of economic development in which the entrepreneur was 
the central character. Schumpeter saw real development in a society as a process generated 
within that society by, forces co-ordinated by ihe actual members of that society. His 
entrepreneur facilitates economic development by disturbing the economic status quo through 
"innovations". This ability to innovate is the key distinguishing factor between the 
entrepreneur and oflier business managers. Innovation need not occur from the employment 
of new resources; A "new combination" of existing resources will suffice. The new 
combination could suffice in any of five different cases which are listed below: 
"(i) The introduction of a new good... or of a new quality of a good. 
(ii) The introduction of a new method of production, that is, one not yet tested by 
experience in the branch of manufacture concerned... 
(iii) The opening of a new market... which the particular branch of the country in 
question has not previously entered, whether or not this market existed before. 
(iv) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials... irrespective of 
whether this source already exists... 
(v) The carrying out of the new organization of any industry like the creation of a 
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monopoly position... or the breaking up of a monopoly position"154. 
The occurrence of these new combinations was predicateitqgon two assumptions. 
First, the new combinations will be carried out each time by new firms, who will commence 
production alongside the existing firms, who presumably, would still be employing the now 
"old" combinations. They would eventually be weeded out as they become less competitive. 
In this way, Schumpeter sought to explain entrepreneurial choice and the demise of certain 
firms. Secondly, the "new combination" of resources must necessarily draw on existing 
production means such as unemployed worlanen, unsold raw materials and so forth, and 
recombine them to make them more productive. This, he felt, was the very essence of 
economic development. 
From his innovation/new combination analysis, Schumpeter surmised as follows: 
"The carrying out of new combinations we call enterprise; the individuals 
whose function it is to carry them out we-call entrepreneurs""'. . 
Schumpeter discussed, almost in passing, what sort of person an entrepreneur would 
C 
be"', and how this Would affect entrepreneuriAl choice. This was taken up by later 
economists who theorized on entrepreneurship, among the most notable of whom is Israel 
Kirzner, who in fact developed a market and price theory that incorporated the entrepreneur. 
Kirzner's entrepreneur is similar to that of Schumpeter's in many ways. However, whereas 
Schumpeter asserts that the entrepreneur's primary effect on the market is to create 
disequilibrium in the market by shifting the curves of cost and revenue which face him, 
Kirzner's entrepreneur has an equilibrating effect on the market, not by himself shifting the 
Schumpeter (1934: 66). 
Schumpeter (1934: 74-75). 
This point is taken up again in section 4.3, in the discussion of psychological 
models. 
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said curves, but by noticing that they have in fact shifted. Hence his emphasis on knowledge 
as the entrepreneur's distinguishing feature. 
The entrepreneur's knowledge is the trump card which gives him a unique perception 
of how to get the best value from an available, or discoverable resource. As he expresses it 
"... the elusive notion of entrepreneurihip is... not so much the substantive 
knowledge of market data as alertness, the knowledge of where to find market 
data" 157 . 
It is the knowledge so obtained that enables the entrepreneur to differentiate his activities as 
in discovering where to obtain resources more cheaply, sell products at higher returns, which 
innovations will prove most fruitful, and so forth. 
4.2.2 The Analysis Of Differential Action. 
If one proceeds upon the assumption that the abili! y to make, and stand by decisions, 
lies at the heart of entrepreneurship, it may thch be argued that orthodox economic models, 
in tending to gloss bver this particular factor, depersonalize decision making in 
entrepreneurs. They tend to match resources to opportunities with no particular consideration 
of the factor that carries out the actual or physical matching. 
The classical models of Smith and Ricardo, for instance, assume that all the 
information required for the optimization of resources is readily available. This, of course, 
is not how it is in practice. Other social actors considerably shape the availability and 
processing of information available to the entrepreneur. Having said these, some of the more 
relatively recent economic models have become more accommodating of variables which 
conceive of the entrepreneur in not quite so heroic terms. From these, arguments on 
I" Kirzner (1973: 67). 
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differential action by entrepreneurs may be inferred. One such model is Leibenstein's X- 
efficiency theory. 
Leibenstein's X-efficiency theory was originally developed in 1966 for the analysis 
of resource allocation in firms"'. Briefly, X-efficiency is the degree of inefficiency in the 
utility of a given finn's resources"'. It arises when the firm's resources are used in a less 
than optimal manner or when they are not used at all. Entrepreneurship, Leibenstein argued, 
is the way by which firms counter X-efficiency. 
Leibenstein's contribution to the differential action debate is based mainlY on his 
understanding of the concepts of rationality and efficiency among business managers"O. He 
departed from the neo-classical models on two major fronts: 
First, although he accepted the orthodox view that decision makers can be fully 
rational in their problem solving, and can always identify the choices which will maximize 
returns on their resource investment, he however qualified this (relying on McClelland 
[1961]) by arguing furt4er that personality chafacteristics, or more specifically, the attitudes 
of different individualsý affect the way they-actually exploit available opportunities. 
Leibenstein's second major point of departure is the now widely held notion that a 
firm is composed of different individuals (in this case, employees) who may each have 
different ideas of what the firm's objectives ought to be. In such a situation, each of the 
firm's members can be expected to be working hard towards the fulfilment of their individual 
perception of the firm's objectives. The firm therefore pulls in too many directions at once 
and becomes inefficient. It requires the efforts of an entrepreneurial employer via a series 
158 Leibenstein (1968: 75). 
" Casson (1982: 364). 
" Leibenstein (1978). cf. J. Martin (1978: 273-274). 
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of bargaining and negotiations with the other firm members to make them maintain or 
increase their individual efforts, as may be required, toward the achievqpent of the firm's 
central objectives. 
If X-efficiency persists in certain firms, it creates opportunities for more efficient 
entrepreneurs, who can better respond to change; to fill the resulting gap in the market. 
Leibenstein's arguments thus provide, not only an explanation for differential entrepreneurial 
action, but also ultimately for the demise of certain firms and business cycles in general. 
However, Leibenstein appears to have an exaggerated view of the incompatibility of 
his arguments with those of the neo-classical school. Leibenstein appears to believe that his 
model "derationalizes" the decision maker (i. e. the entrepreneur), but the concept of the 
"rational economic man" simply implies consistent behaviour, and not necessarily the 
demonstration of genius. Both Leibenstein's and the neo-classical entrePreneur can be said 
to act quite rationally, given the enviromnents that they operate in, although the Leibenstein 
environment may be described as the more practical one. 
One of the reasons which has traditionailly' made it difficult for some economists to 
theorize on differential entrepreneurial action is the fact that firms within the same industry 
have always seemed, in the long run, to manage to maintain an oligopolistic competition or 
stability. Perhaps this is why the theory of the entrepreneurial firm, as opposed to the theory 
of the entrepreneur, appears to be relatively little researched. The neo-classical models, 
particularly, do not appear to have much to say on the subject, save for mathematical 
variations of assumptions about perfect market competition. In Andrews' (1964) theory of 
competition between firms, lie argues that the reason why oligopolistic competition is 
maintained in the long run is because manufacturers are willing to forego short-run profit in 
other to maintain or increase long-term customer goodwill, rather than amending price and 
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output to maximize short-run profit, a move which may place long-term goodwill at risk. 
This presumably raises the barriers into this oligopolistic circle too high for competitors, and 
they are forced to either operate on a small or marginal scale, or even to abandon the market 
altogether. In this way, differential action is exhibited by finns within and outside the 
oligopolistic circle. However, Andrews' theorý on competition between firms may be 
described as being too inward-looking in assuming that factors affecting differential action 
are mainly internal to the firms. Not to relate entrepreneurial choice to the wider social 
environment suggests an overly restrictive view of the entrepreneurial process. 
A limiting factor in Andrews' theory was the facelessness of the entrepreneur, who 
is afterall, a catalyst of the competitive process. In Andrews' theory, competition is 
postulated as arising as resources were matched to opportunities in, possibly novel ways, 
without any real recognition accorded to the agent (i. e. the entrepreneur) whose foresight or ID 
knowledge of market data stimulates the competitive propess in the first place. An attempt 
to plug this gap can be inferred from Penrose'ý behaviourial theory of the firm. 
In Penrose's vitw, the growth and subsequent competitiveness of a firm is dependent 
on how well die creation and use of information is maintained in the -firm. It is up to the 
entrepreneurs who run the firm to achieve this. However, 
"Entrepreneurial services are contrasted with managerial services, which relate to 
the execution of entrepreneurial ideas and proposals and to the supervision of 
existing operations. The same individuals may, and more often than not probably do, 
provide both types of services to the firm"I". 
In their entrepreneurial capacity, the firm's managers are expected to have "a psychological 
predisposition... to take a chance in the hope of gain, and, in particular, to commit effort and 
"I Penrose (1959: 32). 
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resources to speculative activity""'. 
This quality is equated with driving ambition or versatilitý, --ano. not competency or 
hard work. All the aforementioned qualities are characteristic of good businessmen but while 
the last two qualities may describe those businessmen who want to establish and run a fairly 
stable business, the first two qualities are more characteristic of those who aim to become 
"empire-builders ". Their judgement of economic choices/decisions will therefore tend to vary 
slightly from what other business managers may perceive'61. 
To take this argument further, it is probable that some firms will grow to become 
large concerns while others remain small. Intuition suggests that a firm cannot possibly 
exploit every single opportunity it encounters in its business life. Large and small firms may 
then co-exist with the smaller firms acting as feeder firms for inputs of the larger firms, or 
as suppliers of differentiated products or services to complement those being made by larger 
finns. 
Von Hayek's coiAtribution to the knowledge about differential entrepreneurial action 
also stems, like Leibenstein, from his disagreement with classical economists' assumptions 
of market equilibrium in the long term. He subscribes to the classical -opinion that market 
equilibrium is achievable. However, in orthodox economics, such a situation rules out the 
need for the entrepreneurial function, since all businessmen will have the same knowledge 
and make the same decisions in similar circumstances'14. In reality though, business 
managers view change within the context of their perceived future expectations, and make 
11 Penrose (1959: 33). 
11 Penrose (1959: 40). 
Kirzner (1979: 109-Ilt). cf. Casson (1982: 367). 
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different judgements therefrom"'. 
Kirzner subscribes to much the same views on market equilibriýim as Von Hayek. 
He, as mentioned earlier, argues further that the degree of alertness to conditions of market 
disequilibrium is the key distinguishing factor between entrepreneurs'66. Entrepreneurs, 
then, are those who will procure at lower prices hnd sell at higher prices. They can thereby 
change the market price (which will be continually adjusted towards equilibrium) while the 
rest of the population change their purchase behaviour in the light of the newly quoted price. 
Kirzner's view of the entrepreneur as an equilibrating force contrasts sharply with 
that of Schumpeter, whose Yiew of entrepreneurship, as discussed earlier, proceeds from aI 
state of equilibrium, which the entrepreneur disturbs by a series of economic 
innovations"'. 
Neither Kirzner nor Schumpeter's analysis elaborated on the "special aptitudes" or 
"skills" which enable entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities in different ways, although they 
both recognized that thelse were necessary. 
In Schumpeterks case, the difficulty may lie in the fact that his emphasis is on a 
narrow view of the carrying out of "new combinations" of "innovations", rather than an 
operational definition broad enough to include variables which explain why certain 
individuals pursue certain ventures in favour of others, such as "lateral" in favour of 
"longitudinal" exporting. 
Similarly, Kirzner's concept of alertness to entrepreneurial opportunities does not 
165 Von Hayek (1949: 41; 1939: 16-18). 
166 "Disequilibrium" here is considered to be the emergence of more than one price 
for economically equivalent items. 
10 Scliumpeter (1934: 64; 1964: 77-78). 
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pursue this matter. It is difficult for his theory to incorporate differential action by 
entrepreneurs because in his view, the entrepreneurial function eýds-once an exploitable 
opportunity has been spotted. 
"Entrepreneurial profit opportunities exist where people do not know what 
it is that they do not know, and do not know that they do not know it... If 
people know that'a gap needs to be filldd, and that it is worthwhile to fill 
it, the task is no longer entrepreneurial. It can be handled by competent 
managers through routine production methods" 168 . 
Such a view removes most management practices and the building up of firms or 
markets from the entrepreneurial function, and to that extent, restricts the scope for 
differential action by entrepreneurs. 
The theories and analyses presented above have not been presented in a chronological 
order but may, to a certain extent be viewed as such. More specifically, they may be viewed 
in tenns of one taking off where the previous one left off. 
Leibenstein's theory, for instance, describes the enviromnent in which the 
entrepreneur operates., Jt is the inefficiencies in the environment that provides the 
opportunities which entrepreneurs exploit. Vo'fi Hayek poin . ts out that entrepreneurs, like the 
rest of the population, are not always concerned with mechanical maximization of resources. 
They make those choices which in their particular circumstances suit them the best, and 
therefore tend to react differently to similar sets of circumstances. Both Kirzner and 
Schumpeter recognize this, albeit from different viewpoints, but neither of their theories 
leaves much room for differential entrepreneurial action because the entrepreneurial function 
is deemed over once the opportunity is spotted, or innovation completed, respectively. 
However according to the theory of growth of the firm, and competition amongst firms 
16' Kirzner (1982: 273,275). 
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offered by Penrose"' and Andrews, respectively, it takes specialist entrepreneurial skills 
to continue to manage a firm well after it has been established. 
4.2.3 Analytic Limitations Of Economic Models. 
The classical economic models discussed above show that economists are primarily 
function-oriented in their view of the entrepreneur. Virtually every one of the definitions, 
descriptions and theorization on the entrepreneur sees him in the light of how he influences 
events around him. Factors which in turn influence the aspiring entrepreneur are not 
discussed in any great detail and tend to appear merely incidental to the wider economic 
arguments. The models may then be said to present a static account of how differential 
response by entrepreneurs can. affect overall economic development. These accounts are 
given a pseudo-dynamic image by the mere introduction of ad-hoc assumptions about 
adjustment lags. The usual argument is that the s6cio-political and economic structures in 
certain societies make týern more quickly receptive to change than others. This apparently 
is why some societies are more developed than others. Accounts of this sort, far from 
unravelling the mysteries of differential entrepreneurial action, merely point to the inability 
of neo-classical economics to adequately theorize on the competitive process. 
The models appear to assume that as many entrepreneurs as come into contact with 
opportunities and resources will exploit them. There is an, 11most total rejection, or ignorance 
of the effect of macro socio-political structures, or even the entrepreneur's own personality 
on his ability to obtain and process relevant infortuation necessary for the exploitation of 
opportunities. 
1`9 See also the behaviourial theory of the firm of Cycrt & March (1963). 
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If these were so, it ought to mean that in the cross-border trade for instance, all the 
micro-enterprises employing essentially the same methods to tradi'in.. §imilar goods in the 
same environment ought to be making similar returns, but the findings indicate a disparity 
of returns that economic models per se are not able to explain. Any one of these factors may 
result in the aspiring entrepreneur misunderstanding the market signals or becoming 
otherwise unable to take advantage of them, not optimally linking opportunities and resources 
in the market or searching for information but limiting himself only to the information which 
can be easily obtained, or in any other way making a less than optimum use of market data. 
The way in which entrepreneurs obtain and exploit information is considerably shaped by 
other players in the environment such as family, friends, co-workers, employers, employees, 
and so forth. The economic models are not quite able to weave this into their theories, and 
yet to omit this would leave the entrepreneur in the impossible situation of rejecting all social 
contact. 
N 
4.3 Psychological Models 
4.3.1 Introduction. 
Psychological theories on entrepreneurship have arisen as part of research activity 
which has continued for most of the twentieth century in which writers (who are not 
necessarily psychologists) have sought to explain patterns of world economic development 
in terms of discrete personality characteristics of individuals who exercise control over 
production factors in certain regions of the world. These theories state that special or unique 
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traits or characteristics will make certain people prone to establishing business enterprises, 
and subsequently succeeding as entrepreneurs. The term "entrepreneur,. ký ften defined more 
broadly by researchers in this aspect of entrepreneurship than those seeking an economic 
interpretation of the term. For instance, McClelland (1961: 65) merely describes the 
entrepreneur as "someone who exercises control over the means of production and produces 
more than he can consume in order to sell (or exchange) it for individual (or household) 
income". Accordingly, an entrepreneur need not just be a manufacturer or other producer, 
but could well be a trader, independent artisan, or service provider. It has even been written 
in other personality-based conceptualizations of entrepreneurship that anyone who purchases 
or inherits an existing business with an intention to expand it is an entrepreneur". 
Even before psychological models of entrepreneurship became widespread, 
economists had begun to make. tentative enqýiries in that direction. Schumpeter (1934) 
believed for instance that the entrepreneur's source of motivation is not merely profit, but 
also the desire to found a. private dynasty, the will to succeed and conquer for the sake of 
success itself, and the joy of creating something* out of one's energy and ingenuity. An 
entrepreneur has an insatiable craving for hedonistic satisfaction, he wrote, and will only 
retire when his strength is physically spent". In his critique of Keynesian investment 
theory, David Wright (1958) asserts that economic models are unable to predict the 
investment pattern of certain "bull-headed" entrepreneurs, whosejudgmental decisions always 
appear to go against the norm. He illustrates his argument with the story of a brewer who, 
having studied the market, decides to build an extra brewery in the face of falling sectoral 
sales. Such an act would be considered irrational at the time, but as McClelland (1961: 14) 
Chell et al (1991: 3). 
Schunipeter (1934: 92). 
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writes, 
"We are accustomed to looking at [innovations] from the pb-intpf view of 
their subsequent history. If the invention proved an economic success, we 
almost unconsciously assume that the promotion of the invention was 
economically justifiable on rational grounds at the time ... [However, ] it was 
only the simultaneous irrational efforts of many people that ultimately 
justified the enterprise of some of them""'. 
Not all writers who have conimented on the psychology of the entrepreneur are in 
favour of searching for individual traits. Such writers are more in favour, it seems, of 
searching for entrepreneurs in situations rather than in personalities. Drucker, for instance, 
having declared that entrepreneurship need not be limited to the economic sphere but could 
be extended to other fields such as industrial relations, education and health-care, went on 
to argue that 
"Entrepreneurship... is not a personality trait; In thirty years, I have seen 
people of the most diverse personalities and temperaments perform well in 
entrepreneurial challenges... everyone who can face up to decision making 
can learn to be an entrepreneur and to behave entrepreneurially. 
Entrepreneurship then is a behaviour ratheý than a personality trait"". 
Nevertheless, search for entrepreneurial traits continues to be carried out by 
many theorists, not least among whom are many acknowledged "entrepreneurs" themselves. 
Indeed, some of the most fascinating and controversial work, on entrepreneurship have 
emanated from this aspect of its study. 
Analyses of the entrepreneur have literally revealed dozens of "traits", especially 
within the last half century, some of which will be discussed later on in the chapter. The 
sheer number of published traits may be due in part to differences in operational definitions 
of "entrepreneur" or methodological differences, 
172 emphasis mine. 
173 Drucker (1986: 40). cr. McClelland (1961: 206). 
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For instance, Alan Bartlett, himself a "Schumpeterian" entrepreneur, posits the 
following characteristics of archetypal entrepreneurs: 
i) All entrepreneurs desire to climb higher. This ambition is a driving force 
early on in the career of the entrepreneur but ultimately proves self- 
destructive. 
ii) Entrepreneurs have singleness of purpose, which can, "dependent upon the 
view taken by the observer ... be known as rutWessness, perseverance, 
determination, a one track mind or even limited capacity"". Bartlett 
argues that this must be viewed as a pragmatic, rather than a cynical trait 
in entrepreneurs. 
iii) Entrepreneurs tend not to have a great deal of fonnal education. Very few 
of them will have been to university. This results in a deprivation/inferiority 
complex which ftirther motivates the entrepreneur to succeed in business. 
iv) Entrepreneurs aFe objective enough , in their market analysis to identify 
opportunities e4rlier than most people and' therefore take advantage of them 
more quickly. 
Y) Entrepreneurs search for information rather than advice. 
vi) Entrepreneurs tend to select employees who are competent, but compliant. 
They discourage employee initiative, and according to Bartlett, this is the 
reason for the entrepreneur's success as well as. the ultimate cause of his 
failure. 
Although Bartlett concedes that there is no such person as the archetypal 
entrepreneur, he presents a "personality profile" of such a person, were lie to exist: He 
"' Bartlett (1988: 7-8). 
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would enjoy a physique which enables him to work hard; He would be an introvert, 
sometimes pretending to be an extrovert; He would be "self-centr6d-,.. se-If-opinionated and 
self-contained"; He would desire absolute independence; He could be "generously selfish" 
and "ruthlessly charming... an actor of consummate skill". 
Many of the traits discussed in Bartleff's analysis have also been identified by a 
number of other theorists on entrepreneurship. However, although Bartlett makes a number 
of references to the "entrepreneur", he does not attempt a formal, or even working definition 
of entrepreneur, against which it would have been possible to measure Bartlett's set of 
personality traits. Secondly, there is no reference to any survey of entrepreneurs, especially 
the ultra-successftil kind who, it is presumed from his choice of illustrations, are being 
discussed by Bartlett. None of the case studies in the book contains information from which 
psychological characteristics of the kind discussed by Bartlett might be gleaned. 
In his tribute to the entrepreneurial economies. of Japan and the U. S. A, George 
Gilder, an American eco, nomist, haying reyiew. ed some of the more prominent entrepreneurial 
success stories of those countries concluded that his subjects tended to be optimistic, 
religious, pragmatic, dedicated, bull-headed, defiant, tenacious and creative 175 . 
From his case studies, Gilder concluded that to be. successful, an entrepreneur needs 
to have the following personality tm, its: 
i) He needs to build up his finn. from scratch. This gives him "a dynamic and 
integrated Yiew of his company and a realistic Yiew of enterprise". 
ii) He must develop a scepticism towards settled expertise. This will free him 
to make sound decisions in an uncertain market place. This way, lie would 
not be trying to understand an existing market situation, but creating a new 
"I Gilder (1985: 254-258). 
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one, which he would be master of. 
iii) He must be willing to understand and accept the risk of 
failure and learn from it176. 
iv) He must seek money chiefly to perform his role in his community's 
economic growth, which is productive reinvestment. 
Other studies have identified even more personal characteristics. Brockhaus & 
Horowitz (1986: 33) report a finding of eleven personality traits which are the need to control 
and direct, self confidence, a sense of urgency, good health, comprehensive awareness, 
realism, superior conceptual ability, a need for status, an objective approach to interpersonal 
relations, emotional stability, and an attraction to challenge rather than risk. 
4.3.2 The Analysis Of Differential Action 
There are virtually as many personality traits as there are writers on the subject. 
.11 
Most writers have identified different kinds a. nd. -nuMbers of traits, but certain themes can be 
identified in each of their works. Perhaps it is these more general themes that writers like 
Drucker and McClelland have in mind when they advocate a theoretical analysis of 
entrepreneurial role (as opposed to statits) requirements. That is what is being attempted in 
the next three subsections. 
For the purposes of examining how psycholog! cal models address the issue of 
differential entrepreneurial behaviour, the three themes or dimensions of personality 
"I Gilder (1985: 178) quotes Soichiro Honda as saying "... success can be achie 
, 
ved 
only through repeated failure and introspection. In fact, success represents I% of your 
work which results from the 99% that is called failure". 
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characteristics isolated by Chell. et al. will be adopted here'77. They are the need for 
achievement, locus of control and risk-taking propensity. These three'-havp been selected for 
the purposes of this chapter, mainly because many of the individual traits or characteristics 
listed earlier come under their general heading, and secondly, under these general headings, 
the conflicts in evidence and opinions can be befter highlighted. 
4.3.2.1 Need For Achievement. 
David McClelland's seminal work on the impact of achievement motivation has for 
long been perhaps the leading authority on the study of this aspect of entrepreneurship. He 
proceeded upon the assumption that "the presumed mechanism by which n achievement level 
translates itself into economic'growth is the -entrepreneurial class", and on the Freudian 
principle that motives, generally, are neither rational in themselves, nor can they be 
rationally inferred from, subsequent action. 
He followed Sthumpeter (and Weber"') in arguing that the entrepreneur is central 
to any region's economic development, but that his motivation is not exclusively profit- 
driven. He believed that certain non-economic factors which influence entrepreneurs, and 
consequently, economic development were taken for granted by economists, but deserved 
further understanding. Such factors include the will to develop, propensity to save and invest, 
political stability, rapid flow of knowledge, and so forth"'. He argued that these factors 
were psychological variables hence his interest in the personality of the entrepreneur. 
177 see Cliell et al (1991: 37) 
"I in particular, Weber (1947; 1949). 
"' McClelland (1961: 11-12). 
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Drawing upon a substantial body of empirical findings, many of them his own, but 
also including those of Atkinson (1958), French (1955), and . 'Win,. terbottom (1953), 
McClelland hypothesized that the key to entrepreneurial behaviour lies in achievement 
motivation, that is, the greater the need for achievement (n ach) is in any community, the 
greater the number of people who behave in*an entrepreneurial way will be, with a 
corresponding impact on the economic development of that community. "Need for 
AcWevement" was defined as 
"a desire to do well, not so much for the sake of social recognition or prestige, but 
for the sake of an inner feeling of personal accomplishment""'. 
Following a series of tests carried out in several countries"', McClelland concludes 
that such people tend to possess the following attributes": 
They are moderate risk takers as a function of skill, that is, they undertake 
a level of risk which they are confident their skill can substantially reduce. 
They are decisive persons, and take individ6l responsibility for their 
1. C decisions. Theý do not respond positively to suggestions from others as to 
what they should think or believe. Achievement satisfaction comes from 
having launched a successftil initiative. 
iii) They are physically energetic people who will work harder than other 
people when there is a chance that personal efforts will make a difference 
" McClelland (1971: 10). cf. McClelland (1ý61: 43), and Levine (1966: 12) who 
defines the term as . ", a latent disposition to compete with a standard of excellence, and 
involves both a persistent desire for such competition and an emotional concern with 
it". 
"I These are described in full in McClelland (1961: 61-106). In repeating the tests in 
various locations, some changes deemed necessary were made to the test subjects and 
contents. 
11 for a full discussion of these attributes, see McClelland (1961: 207-239; 1987). 
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in the outcome. 
iv) They perforra better in situations in which there is a con6fete. feedback as 
to how well they are performing, such as money returns. 
V) They are able to anticipate future possibilities, and plan for them 
accordingly. In doing this, they will prefer to work with an expert, rather 
than a friend to solve a problem. 
So then, how do people who -behave in an entrepreneurial way actually end up 
occupying the status of entrepreneur? According to McClelland (1961: 239-241), they could 
choose to, or feel forced to do so, in following their role models, usually their fathers. 
However, it would not matter how they get into entrepreneurship, because once there, their 
high n ach would ensure that they perform well. 
Secondly, they could simply drift into or "find" themselves in entrepreneurship 
because they discover that the world of enterprise requires those characteristics that they 
possess. This may have been found out after having tried out other professions. 
Thirdly, they could consciously choose a business career because they perceive at 
the outset that business involves the kind of risk which challenges them. They feel "cut out" 
to succeed in that world. 
Even though McClelland recognizes that society does not tend to make it easy for 
persons with high n ach to enter business, lie believes that 
"there is a built-in mechanism which tends to bias occupational choice 
towards business among [persons] with high n achievement... we would 
expect that those with lower n achievement... would tend to be weeded out 
of managerial positions, leaving the n achievement level in such positions 
higher than in other occupations". 
11 McClelland (1961: 259). Brackets mine. 
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McClelland's conclusions are important, stimulating and, if not entirely persuasive, 
have certainly inspired a great deal of research. It ought to be noted 'that he does not, in any 
case (as has sometimes been written)", claim that achievement motivation is the prime 
factor in economic development. He merely asserts its presence, although in the preface to 
The Achieving Society's, he is quite immodest about its universality. 
He asserts that a rise in the n ach of a given community immediately precedes a 
period of economic growth in that community. This assertion is not without merit, and some 
evidence of this, as he says, may exist in the case of countries like Germany, Brazil and the 
USA. This assertion is however impossible to test empirically to any great level. Leibenstein 
(1987) has also noted on this point that perhaps McClelland's arguments might have been 
couched in overly macro-tenns. 
Some of his other conclusions also - ultimately appear to be too simplistic and 
reductionist with respect to distinguishing entrepreneurs from the general population, and 
especially in distinguishing between different ýntrepreneurs. Although on the one hand, one 
might perceive that eritrepreneurs have a -higher achievement motivation than people in 
general, and that achievement motivation can be changed or developed in adults through 
formal training"', it has been shown that non-business managers can be just as highly 
"I See for instance Bruce (1984). 
11 McClelland (1961: ix). 
"I McClelland (1971: 122) cf. Leibenstein (1987: 195-196). Nafziger (1988: 130) 
however argues, based on his own Indian studies, that in at least three instances, a 
programme of n ach acquisition may not be appropriate for expanding entrepreneurial 
capabilities in adults. First, he says that in a society with limited resource availability, 
persons with a high need for co-operation will tend to produce more than persons with 
high n ach. Secondly, persons with high n ach are more likely to be counter-productive 
in a society that places restraints on their decision-making, such as in "socialist"- 
oriented countries. Thirdly, high n ach is less applicable in explaining entrepreneurial 
behaviour in a society where the extended family is the basic unit of production or 
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motivated to achieve as entrepreneurs". Intuition suggests further that it is not a uniquely 
entrepreneurial trait to be hard-working, to desire feedback for one's gctions, or even to take 
responsibility for one's decisions. To identify these in entrepreneurs may not therefore 
advance entrepreneurship theory as such. 
The methodological link between high n ach and entrepreneurship appears somewhat 
weak. Tests generally reveal that most small businesses are by their own standards, 
successful"', and this subjective feeling of success may contribute to their high n ach 
rather than the reverse, which McClelland maintains. It has also been demonstrated on a 
number of occasions that where respondents are aware that their performances will be 
evaluated, as was the case with the Thematic Apperception Tests (TATs) in McClelland's 
studies, they produce significantly greater levels of n ach than when they are not"' 
The link- between children's stories (McClelland measured n ach in young children 
in this way), subsequent achievement motivation, and the decision to become an entrepreneur 
also appears somewhat weak in parts"O. In Robert Levine's study of achievement 
motivation among Niqrian school children., he conducts a largely similar test to 
McClelland's, and hypothesizes that of the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Ibos 
will have the largest proportion of people with high n ach, followed by the Yoruba, and then 
enterprise. 
"I Brockhaus & Horowitz (1986: 27). 
"I This has been the case in the present study. cf. Brock-haus & Horowitz 
(1986: 27). 
I" Levine (1966: 13); Nafziger (1988: 130-131). 
" McClelland himself, at (1961: 79), appears to advocate some caution regardin .g 
their erfectiveness. 
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the Hausa-Fulani"'. He appears, however, to suggest in his conclusions that religion (of 
Nigeria's three largest ethnic groups, the Ibos have the highest conc&fitrzation of christians in 
Nigeria, followed by the Yorubas, and lastly the largely moslem North), more than a desire 
for independence, is the central indicator of whether a Nigerian child has a high, or low n 
ach, and his subsequent entrepreneurial behaviout". 
Some of McClelland's other arguments, not least the one that a "built-in mechanism" 
exists in society, which tends to push high achievers in directions of business cannot be 
empirically substantiated, and reveals a possible lack of understanding of how society 
impinges on the supply or development of entrepreneurs 191. It is still probably more likely 
in Nigeria, for example (as it well could in certain other parts of the world), that "high 
achievers" will choose to become professional specialists, or be head-hunted into top public 
sector jobs". The assertion that the high n ach in entrepreneurs will always enable them 
to anticipate future trends and act accordingly"', while no doubt applicable in certain 
instances, does not hold, in all types of entrepreneur. 
On the issue of hchievement motivation, Bartlett states that entrepreneurs suffer from 
inferiority complex which they seek to remove by achieving success in-business. He argues 
"I Levine (1966: 41). 
192 
cf. Colien (1969). 
193 cf. Eisenstadt (1963: 423) "McClelland does not fully recognize that n 
, achievement develops within a certain societal context and may decline if this context 
changes. But lie seems to assume that once n achievement is there within a certain part 
of the population, it will work out its influence without being greatly influenced by the 
social context within which it operates". 
" See Akeredolu-Ale (1976: 109). 
" McClelland (1961: 237-238). 
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further that entrepreneurs discourage employee initiative'91, presumably because they desire 
all resulting accolades for themselves. Neither point has been shown. to describe all, or even 
a substantial proportion of entrepreneurs. 
4.3.2.2 Locus Of Control 
It has long been hypothesized that individuals who have a high need for achievement 
also tend to have a higher degree of self-belief than the rest of the population". However 
it was Rotter (1966) who formally developed the locus of control theory. He identified two 
categories of locus of control which he defined as follows: 
"When a reinforcement. is perceived by the subject as following some action 
of his own but not being entirely contingent upon his action, then in our 
culture, it is typically perceived as the result of luck, chance, fate, as under 
the control of others, or as unpredictable because of the great complexity 
of the forces surrounding him. When the event is interpreted in this way by 
an individual, %ýe have labelled this"a belief in external control. If the 
person perceives that the event is contingent upon his own behaviour, or his 
own permanent characteristics, we have termed this a belief in internal 
control""'. 
From this, the argument is advanced that persons with high need for achievement 
tend also to have higher internal locus of control than the rest of the population, and that 
entrepreneurship was a common factor to both n ach and internal locus of control, thus 
11 Bartlett (1988: 7-10). 
" See for example McClelland (1961: 230) where lie contends that in order for a 
man to get any achievement satisfaction, lie must retain some individual freedom and 
responsibility from generating and choosing among courses of action, although lie need 
not work solely for himself in order to do this. 
198 Rotter (1966: 1); (1975: 57), emphasis added. 
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creating a link between locus of control and entrepreneurship"'. However, empirical tests 
have not always arrived at conclusions which consistently and unequivocally link the 
possession of an internal locus of control to entrepreneurial behaviour, and the methodology 
appears, on occasions, flawed. The following examples illustrate these points: 
First, Berlew's (1975) test, in which he surveyed practising entrepreneurs, and 
Borland's (1974) test, which she carried out among students at an American University who 
stated an intention to become entrepreneurs both arrived at conclusions which broadly 
affirmed the locus of control /n ach connection stated above, although Borland's test 
indicated further that this conclusion only seemed to apply where the entrepreneurs-to-be also 
had a low n achievement, that is, among those who had low n ach, those with higher internal 
locus were found to have higher expectations than others of starting their own companies. 
She found that among those hopefuls who possessed high n ach, their locus of control scale 
made no difference to their expectations of starting a company. In fact, the variable that 
seemed to matter the most among the students was a desire to emulate their role models, who 
were usually their fathers. From here on, the evidence is* conflicting. 
I. I' In Hull et al's '(1980) test, over 300, entrepreneurs and non entrepreneurs were 
surveyed, and locus of control was found not to affect entrepreneurial behaviour in any way. 
Brockhaus & Nord (1979) also concluded that locus of control does not significantly differ 
between business owners and managers, although in a further analysis of the same survey, 
Brockhaus (1980) added that it does differ between successful and unsuccessful 
entrepreneurs. The fonner have a higher internal locus of control than the latter. 
As a methodological approach, Furnham (1986) discovered that the locus of control 
test as applied to entrepreneurs, or entrepreneurs-to-be was not acceptable as an objective and 
I" Gilad (1982); Ward (1993). 
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generic test because not only did peoples' response to the test vary according to sex, age, 
income or voting behaviour, the test necessarily elicited varying- respZýnses in different 
settings such as religion, health and education. This is not a surprising conclusion in view 
of the fact that people generally tend to attribute achievements or success to their personal 
efforts, and therefore intuition suggests that more successful people will tend to have a 
"higher internal locus of control" than less successful people. Rotter's locus of control 
"questionnaire" is itself an exercise which does not fully lend itself to all known forms of 
entrepreneurial activity, neither does it conclusively distinguish entrepreneurial action from 
that of the rest of the population. 
Secondly, it is also arguable that the locus of control test is not a wholly accurate 
predictor of successful, from unsuccessful entrepreneurs because a given entrepreneur will 
tend to respond differently to the test depending upon the situation that his firm is in at the 
time of testing. 
4.3.2.3 Risk-Taking Propensity. 
Entrepreneurs' attitude to risk is one of the most discussed entrepreneurial "traits". 
That entrepreneurship involves a measure of risk is not disputed by most academics (and 
entrepreneurs themselves), although the extent to which attitude to risk taking permeates 
entrepreneurial behaviour continues to be the subject of much debate. Neither academic 
opinion nor empirical tests appears categorically able to say just how attitude to risk affects 
differential action in entrepreneurs, if at all. 
The earliest economists to discuss entrepreneurship, such as Cantillon and Knight, 
as noted at the beginning of the chapter, in fact viewed entrepreneurship primarily as a 
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function of risk taking. Even more latter-day writers like Gilder and Bartlett attach a lot of 
importance to the risk element in entrepreneurship; a fact which, in each case, appears to 
have been influenced by their choices of case studies. In his conclusions, Gilder talks at 
length about the "inexorable reality of risk" that entrepreneurs constantly work under, and 
emphasizes that theirs is a life of "productive risks" caused by their constant desire to bring 
about economic development through change? ". Bartlett (1988: 30) in fact refers to risk 
taking as both "essential and laudable" aspects of entrepreneurial action, arguing that only 
those entrepreneurs willing and able to take on risks of marketing a new product or service 
are likely to be successful in the long term. Separate studies by Colton & Uddell (1976), Hoy 
& Carland (1983), and Hull et al (1980) have gone as far as concluding that creativity and 
attitude to risk are much better indicators of differential entrepreneurial action than 
I 
achievement motivation and locus of control. 
At the other end of the continuum, neither Schumpeter (1934) nor Drucker (1986) 
view attitude to risk as ex laining entrepreneurial behaviour. According to Schumpeter, this 
. 1p I 
is because the risk of failure of a venture nqvCr fýlls on the entrepreneur per se. It cannot 
therefore be viewed as affecting his performance. Such risk would only fall on the owner of 
production factors, or the owner of the money capital used to obtain these factors. The 
entrepreneur can thus only be affected if he takes on both roles simultaneouSly201. Drucker 
does not totally discount the effect of attitude to risk on entrepreneurial behaviour, but he 
argues that while it is true that people who are averse to risk are unlikely to make "good" 
entrepreneurs, (in entrepreneur need not possess a different attitude to risk from that of any 
2" Gilder (1985: 254-255); cf. Kirzner (1973: 78); Ray (1988: 4). 
2()' Schumpeter (1934: 75). 
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other person engaged in economic activity". In his opinion, 
"Of course innovation is risky. But so is stepping into the aar-tq drive to the 
supermarket for a loaf of bread. All economic activity is by defffiltion "high 
risk"... The innovators that I know are successful to the extent to which 
they define risks and conflne them... Successful innovators are conservative. 
They have to be. They are not risk-focused, they are opportunity- 
focused". " 
Among those writers who have actually carried out empirical tests on the 
entrepreneur's risk taking propensity, the picture is no clearer. While Hull et al (1980) 
surveyed potential entrepreneurs and discovered that they had a higher risk-taking propensity 
than the general population, Brockhaus (1980) surveyed new entrepreneurs and managers, 
and discovered there was no significant difference in the risk taking propensity of new 
entrepreneurs and new managers, as well as between these two groups, and the general 
population. 
From his n ach analysis, McClelland discovered that when there are no facts to 
estimate future performances by, high n ach subjects tend, because of their self-confidence 
I*I. " to rate their chances of success as higher than'low n ach subjects, but there is no difference 
between high and low n ach subjects when past performance already indicates what future 
trends will be2'. Furthermore, since high n ach subjects will only choose to perform tasks 
that they perceive themselves challenged by, but able to do2O5, and since entrepreneurs will 
invariably have high n ach, it follows that entrepreneurs' risk taking be viewed as "moderate" 
or "calculated", inasmuch as it exists, but is not a gamble. Those whose attitude to risk 
202 it [All economic activity involves] the commitment of present resources to future 
expectations, and that means to uncertainty and risk" Drucker (1986: 40) 
203 Drucker (1986: 161-162). 
21 McClelland (1961: 222). 
211 McClelland (1961: 211-212). 
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cannot be defined as moderate are not entrepreneurs as such. They are more likely to be 
"traditional" businessmen (n ach too low) or gamblers (n ach too high), 
IBoth 
Rotter (1966) 
and Berlew (1975) have supported this view in the case of persons with internal locus of 
control. 
In summary then, although the evidence may pull in several ways, it does appear that 
entrepreneurs view risk taking as a necessary part of their business, but it is their ability to 
take certain business decisions, and have the total self-belief to stand by them that make their 
risks, at least in their own view, appear no more than moderate, or calculated. 
4.3.3 Analytic Limitations Of The Psychological Theories. 
Psychological (personality) models have contributed much to the understanding of 
the minds of entrepreneurs. However, as mentioned throughout the discussion, empirical 
evidence does not actually conclusively show. all the traits as being strongly (or exclusively) 
associated with entrepreneurship. Several tests, such as the Hull et al test on risk taking 
propensity (referred to earlier), appear to suffer from selection bias. They generally survey 
successful entrepreneurs and then more or less attribute opposite characteristics to 
unsuccessful ones. For instance in the survey reported earlier in this chapter as Brockhaus 
& Nord (1979), and Brockhaus (1980) on the effect of locus of control and risk-taking 
propensity on entrepreneurship, not enough tests appear to have been made to discover why 
the "control" group, who owned businesses in 1975, no longer owned them in 1978. It 
seemed safe to regard them as "unsuccessful" entrepreneurs simply because they no longer 
owiled the businesses. 
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Secondly opinion and survey results fluctuate far too much for risk taking propensity 
to be declared a settled way to distinguish between entrepreneurs and noj'l-entrepreneurs, and 
between different kinds of entrepreneur. In fact, in certain regards, it may be viewed as a 
non-issue. Calculated risks are taken everyday by the general population in health, education, 
marriage, purchase, sports, investments and virtually every facet of life. It is therefore 
questionable that it should continue to be used as a distinguishing feature of entrepreneurship. 
Besides, where used, concepts of "low", "high" and "moderate" risks are ambiguously 
defined or not at a11206. The concept ought to be operationalized for whatever purpose it 
is being used. Evaluation of risk is conceived differently anyway in different parts of the 
world, or even among persons of different ages or stations in life within the same 
geographical areas. In the present study, the respondents were almost equally split when 
asked to consider their own risk-taking propensity. Furthennore, risk tended to be identified 
in particular instances, as opposed to whole ventures. 
From a more broadly social point of yiew, many of the characteristics attributed to 
entrepreneurs make them appear to be a deviant, maverick or even machiavellian group of 
people. They have been described in the most extremist terms. KirZner, sees them as 
possessing the "ultimate" kind of knowledge; Bartlett believes they are "supreme egoists", 
while Gilder surmises the entrepreneurial role almost in messianic terms. 
It therefore needs to be asked whether entrepreneurs (and entrepreneurs-to-be) 
possess these qualities to the exclusion of other professionds (or profess ionals- in-waiting) and 
the general population, because this is what the theorists suggest. However, the empirical 
evidence on the subject is still too weak to be of any general acceptance. 
2" The only one of these concepts McClelland defines is at p. 212, where he 
describes "moderate risk" as something with "one chance in three of succeeding". 
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4.4 Sociological Models. 
4.4.1 Introduction. 
In explaining why explanations of entrepreneurship ought to view entrepreneurial 
behaviour in its social context, Aldrich & Zinuner have written that 
"People are limited by bounded rationality, suffer from limited or biased 
information and poor communication, and are subject to processes of social 
influence and reconstruction of reality. Hence comprehensive explanations 
of entrepreneurship must include the... social relationships through which 
people obtain information, resources and social support"207. 
Sociological models of entrepreneurship thus are those which view entrepreneurship as 
embedded in patterns of continuing social actions and relations. They also make differential 
action an issue from the outset. Relating enwepreneurship to the environment in this way 
accords prominence to environmental variables in a way not achieved by economic or 
psychological models"'. Sociological models Fecognize the interaction of chance, necessity 
and purpose in entrepreneurship, which are. manifest either as facilitators or constraints on 
entrepreneurial behaviour. 
The term "entrepreneurship" is given its broadest interpretation here. Barth (1963: 1) 
for instance, is quite prepared to see the entrepreneur merely as "someone who takes the 
initiative in administering resources, and pursues an expansive economic policy". Long 
2" Aldrich & Zimmer (1986: 11). 
211 Hagen (1971) for instance links innovative behaviour to a "withdrawal of status 
respect" from those who previously had it as of right. Briefly, in his analysis, sons of 
the second to fourth generations of the displaced class, driven by a desire to prove 
themselves, and rebel against the group disparaging them will rebel against die latter's 
traditional values and turn to innovation and other forms of creative behaviour. 
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(1977b: 197) adopts this viewpoint, while Nafziger (1969: 26), in his study of Nigerian 
entrepreneurship describes the entrepreneur as someone "with the principal responsibility for. 
making the decision about the level of capital stock". 
Certain sociological theories, such as those formulated under what one might call the 
"group approach" have been criticized as "oversocialized". These are those which posit that 
certain national, racial, cultural or religious groups of people possess certain beliefs, values, 
traditions or abilities which predispose their success in business ventures. However, this set 
of theories are virtually impossible to empirically test, nor are they, in any real sense, able 
to address the issue of differential entrepreneurial behaviour shown by different social groups 
or subgroups within the same cultural or national setting2O9. If any of the aforementioned 
groups or subgroups display any semblance of group characteristics, it is probably only when 
they are in a migrant mode, in which case they may have the moral or economic support of 
one another to count upoO'. Tentative examples -of this may be found in the case of the 
Indian community in Britain, the Jewish community in America, or the Ibo community in 
Western Nigeria. Even'this argument has to be ýautiously advanced as the evidence in its 
favour is scant, and by no means conclusive. 
Other (relatively recent) sociological theories of entrepreneurship will be briefly 
examined under the "Network" approach and. "Actor-oriented" approach. 
Long & Roberts (1984: 14-15). 
210 See for example the "solidarity hypothesis" of Young (1971). Cohen (1969) also 
advances this argument in his study of Hausa migrants in Madan, and other towns in 
Western Nigeria. cf. Nafziger (1988: 137-138). 
116 
4.4.2 The Analysis Of Differential Action 
4.4.2.1 The Network Approach 
Entrepreneurship is viewed, here, as an end product of social actions which may 
have occurred by chance, necessity or on purpose. Theories under the network approach 
posit then that the central factor in entrepreneurship development are the relationships that 
exist between aspiring entrepreneurs, resources and opportunities. These relationships must 
be continuous in order for the entrepreneurial character to be retained. 
For the purposes of this argument, Aldrich & Zimmer take the view that the creation 
of entrepreneurial ventures takes place as a result of a continuous operation of the following 
four processes: Variation, Selection, Retention and Diffusion. Variation simply is the creation 
of a new enterprise, irrespective of whether the opportunities and resources presented 
themselves by chance, diligence or any other way. Selecrion criteria are then used by the up 
and running enterprises"to acquire resources in the environment. The criteria selected by the 
more successful enterprises will tend to be the ones that businesses in general will adopt in 
that envirom-nent. The retention process occurs over time, and is the sum total of the 
competence that all enterprises in a given environment exhibit to exploit the resources of that 
environment. A diffusion of competencies will then occur (also over time) between existing 
and new enterprises, or between existing enterprises as employees leave to join rival firms 
or start new businesses, or in any other way. 
The element of uncertainty or risk is introduced because for any number of reasons 
such as hostility, unwillingness to learn or pay for competence/experience, or even pure 
oversight, not all variations are diffused. This then creates new situations in the environment 
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which may manifest themselves as opportunities and/or resources for someone else who may 
otherwise not have had them. And so the cycle goes on. The duth(IFý have labelled this 
argument the "Population Perspective". 
Every environment represents a unique opportunity and resource pool. Opportunity 
structures within them usually are "diverse, uncertain and imperfectly received""'. Success 
therefore comes to those enterprises that are better able to adapt to it or help shape it. 
The starting point for most network theorists is a relation between two individuals, 
but this may be extended to include any number of entrepreneurs, customers, suppliers, 
creditors, chambers of commerce, trade associations, and so forth in any number of 
combinations, so long as these were part of the original entrepreneur's "action set 11212. It 
may even take place on an international leve1213 . The number of possible relations or 
networks therefore becomes virtually endless, although the effectiveness of the networks (as 
measured by its density"', reachability115, and centrality"') frequently depends on the 
individuals that make up 
I 
the network. The extýnt and depth of an entrepreneur's network has 
211 Aldrich & Zimmer (1986: 10). 
211 defined in Hansen (1995) as members of the entrepreneur's total networks who 
shared the entrepreneur's intentionality by contributing information and other resources 
to the entrepreneur's start-up. 
213 Ray (1988: 9-10). 
211 The absolute number of present ties compared to the potential number (Aldrich 
& Zimmer 1986). 
2 11 The presence of a path between any two persons in a given network (Tavers & 
Milgrain 1979). 
21' The number of persons in a given network that a focal person can reach, and the 
total distance from a focal person to all other persons (Freeman 1979). 
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been shown to be statistically significant to his firm's subsequent growO 17 . 
At the local level, aspiring entrepreneurs, because of comm- bn--interests, tend to forin 
business coalitions, if such coalitions are thought to be beneficial to any aspect of the 
individual businesses that make up the coalition, such as in purchasing. The coalitions may 
also form the initial markets for the individual businesses, and consequently, a base from 
which the benefitting enterprise can launch a growth strategy. If enough such coalitions exist 
at a system level, for instance in an ethnic group, then that group has an opportunity to 
develop an advantage over outsiders. Actual economic development will then be conditional 
upon the group's ability to exploit its given opportunity. 
4.4.2.1.1 Analytic Limitations Of The Network Approach 
The "population perspective", according to its authors makes minimal assumptions 
about the human abilitý. to process information, and about the personal characteristics of 
individual entrepreneurs. It rejects the "group approach" as deterministic and oversocialized, 
although it appears to lean that way itself because the population perspective suggests 
ultimately that communities as a whole are capable of developing an entrepreneurial 
nature218. 
2" Hansen (1995). One might then be tempted to assume that the more successful 
entrepreneurs will tend to be the more widely connected ones, but other research 
indicates that this is not necessarily so, and that the importance or necessity of formal 
networks might in fact be an over-stated concept (Blackburn et al 1990). 
211 Hagen's theory (1964) suggests for instance that all "underdeveloped" countries 
will achieve economic growth in this way, although lie does not put a time frame on it. 
119 
4.4.2.2 The Actor-Oriented Approach. 
The actor-oriented approach to the study of entrepreneurship has its origins in Cyert 
& March's behaviourial -theory of the finn (1963) which was developed to explain 
organizational decision making in business . enterprises, particularly large ones'19. 
Essentially, the theory states that a firrn consists of individuals with sometimes conflicting 
interests. Therefore, the firm's goals will normally be established by a bargaining process 
between the members. The firm's objectives will change over time in response to changes 
in the market, which must occur, and which will always demand fresh negotiations. This is 
how the concept of uncertainty is introduced. Thus, a firm will respond to, rather than try 
to predict uncertainty in the market, and will achieve this by its members bargaining or 
negotiating with themselves and with competitors to establish routine procedures and market 
conditions. 
The relevance of this to anthropologists who have adopted the actor-oriented 
approach in studying entrepreneurship is the emphasis on bargaining (both within and around 
die firm), information (the search for which is a corollary of the bargaining process), and 
standard operating procedures (as a way of limiting uncertainty). 
In applying the Cyert & March model to entrepreneurship, there is an implicit 
assumption of rationality in the actions of entrepreneurs. However, due mainly to differing 
personal objectives, individual actors are seen as having different and often incompatible 
conceptions of reality and consequent strategies. The conflicts are resolved by a continuous 
process of negotiation and accommodation, hence the perception of social actors, more than, 
but not excluding socio-econornic or political structures, as ultimately being at the centre of 
219 cf. Long (1977b: 107-108). 
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economic development"'. This is because entrepreneurs are not passive recipients of 
opportunities, "but active participants who process information and, strategize their dealings 
1,121 with various local actors as well as with outside institutions and personnel . In this way, 
entrepreneurs can actually shape, or at least influence the sort of opportunities that arise in 
their locality, whether or not the local economy is dominated by, or is dependent on an 
external economy. 
The models of entrepreneurship constructed under the actor-oriented approach 
include the following: 
(i) The transactional models, which are those that identify the kinds of transactions that 
occur between entrepreneurs, and between entrepreneurs and their enviromnents'. Such 
a model envisages a community as being consisted of a pool of socio-economic opportunities 
and systems (or "spheres") of exchange that is liable to be exploited entrepreneurially by 
someone who constructs "bridging transactions" between different spheres in which 
discrepancies exist in tiie value attached to certain goods, services or other activity. The 
transactions may ultimately result in a redefinition of existing values, or in the formulation 
of new ones. 
11 This does not mean that for methodological purposes, conventional primary and 
secondary data collection techniques are rejected per se. What is does reject is ultimate 
reliance on simple empiricist research practice and in its stead favours a more open- 
ended and ethnographic one which places greater importance on understanding the life- 
world of the researched. See further section 6.4 below. 
221 Long (1992b: 21). cf. Greenfield & Strickon (1979). 
222 See Barth (1963) for various illustrations, and Caulkins (1988) for how this idea 
might be extended theoretically to analyzing transactions across corporate bodies. 
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(ii) The interractionist models, in which entrepreneurial opportunities are seen as the 
outcome of a series of interpersonal relationships between social actork over a period of time 
which frequently (but not necessarily) transcends institutional barrierS223 . Typically, the 
process starts with relatively minor transactions requiring little trust between the parties, 
eventually building up, if successftil, to substantial transactions. 
(iii) The decision-making models, which have as their starting point, the view that 
whether it is in establishing a particular entrepreneurial activity, or in managing such an 
activity, decision-making is at the heart of entrepreneurial behaviour. The model is 
constructed by focusing on a situation in which an entrepreneur has to choose between a 
range of mutually exclusive decisions that have probable outcomes, and analyzing why 
certain choices are selected over others". 
4.4.2.2.1 Analytical Limitations Of The Actor-Oriented Approach 
The actor-oriented approach rejects modernization and dependency approaches to 
explaining differential entrepreneurial behaviour as overly linear and deterministic. As I 
argued in chapter 3, neither approach accords indigenous entrepreneurs any great abilities 
as facilitators of change and development. Development is chiefly construed in externalist 
terms in both approaches, with entrepreneurs tending to be seen as mere passive recipients 
221 Long (1977a) provides an example. In it, lie tries to show how two separate 
small-scale businessmen in Central Peru extract entrepreneurial values from affinal 
relationships developed as a result of their marriages, but which eventually are broken 
down and reconstructed into stronger ties using non-kinship normative criteria. 
221 See Mocrinan (1968), Long (1968); Greenfield & Strickon (1979). 
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of any resultant opportunities. Although such a view is not without merit, the actor-oriented 
approach recognizes that within this, there is a plethora of choices which entrepreneurs and 
other social actors may take, either to respond to change, or even to create a situation of 
change. Thus the approach provides a methodology for operationalizing differential 
entrepreneurial behaviour, which also takes a practical view of the entrepreneurs' social 
environment. On this point however, there ought to be some caution. 
First, the actor-oriented approach assumes (particularly under the decision making 
model) that the choices facing the entrepreneur are mutually exclusive, but this is not always 
the case, as entrepreneurs frequently have to take multiple decisions simultaneously. 
Secondly, the actor-oriented approach, perhaps because a large proportion of its 
contributors are anthropologists whose studies tend to be restricted to relatively small 
economic units like households or villages, appears to accord individual entrepreneurs too 
much independence of action and manipulative power, and not enough to the limitations, 
restrictions or checks sometimes provided by regionhl, national or even international 
structures that these units, especially in LDCs, are inevitably a part of". It is important 
to note that die everyday socio-political, cultural and ideological parameters, within which 
entrepreneurs operate may well affect their perception of, and ability to exploit their 
environment, and also the types of relationships or networks maintained, and choices made. 
An actor-oriented model can be made to be operational beyond the village level while 
still giving primacy to the entrepreneur's creativity if the setting (say a region or country) 
is viewed not so much as a static entity but a continuous one. The analysis can then focus 
on how social actors have responded, over a period, to changing circumstances, or influenced 
225 as illustrated for instance, by the Long & Roberts Peruvian study (1984) 
referred to earlier in chapter 3. 
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the formation of new ones. This of course implies a firm grasp of the history of the setting 
in question. An analysis of this nature provides a sound base -for,. examining differential 
response to change, and is not limited to micro-processes at the village level, but can be 
extended to analysis at the regional or national level (and possibly even beyond). 
In any case, it is within these qualifications of the actor-oriented approach that its 
strengths also lie, for no other approach to the study of entrepreneurship appears to have 
succeeded as much in linking the creativeness of entrepreneurs to the realities of their 
enviromnent. 
4.5 Conclusion. 
At the start of this chapter, Entrepreneurship was described both as a "practice" and 
as a "quality", albeit one that can be learnt. Since then, I have carried out a review of some 
of those theories which have attempted to describe how, and why certain people are more 
likely than others act entrepreneurially, or to expl6it entrepreneurial opportunities differently 
from others. 
I elected to examine the concept of entrepreneurship under three broad headings 
partly for convenience reasons, and partly because they represent some of more fascinating, 
and better researched aspects of entrepreneurship. In the particular case of the sociological 
theories, the population perspective and actor-oriented approach are relatively recent 
developments in entrepreneurship research. They also underline the fact that contributors to 
the understanding of entrepreneurship are increasingly to be found outside the traditional 
anibit of economics and management, a fact that has helped stimulate lateral thinking on the 
subject, and shown the inadequacy of most models, by themselves, to theorise on differential 
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entrepreneurial behaviour. 
In allowing for entrepreneurial choice, entrepreneurship theories may be seen on the 
one hand as analytically tempering the universal passiveness alluded to indigenous 
entrepreneurs under modernization and dependency theories. On the other hand however, the 
"blanket" explanations of some of the models of the entrepreneurial role in the trade and 
development process frequently leave them open to much the same criticism. Some, like the 
economic models, have to have much of their arguments on entrepreneurial choice inferred 
ftom other arguments as it is not an issue that they typically concern themselves with. 
The psychological models do not suffer as much in this regard but their reductionist 
approach frequently leaves them ascribing personal characteristics to entrepreneurs that do 
not unequivocally distinguish them from the general population, nor from one another. 
Sociological models recognise that an entrepreneur does not exist in isolation. He 
is only part of a wider social process that includes customers, creditors, suppliers, customs 
officials, co-operatives, and so forth. It is in this social process that the entrepreneur will find 
both his opportunities pd his obstacles. In. the le , ss structured world of infonnal enterprise 
where many of the research objects in this study operate, the_ importance of the 
entrepreneur's ability to manipulate such environmental variables to his competitive 
advantage (and the necessity for a methodology able to study this in practice) cannot be over- 
eniphasised. 
In the sociological framework therefore, it is up. to the entrepreneur's abilities as a 
decision-maker to select his preferred opportunities and remove, or negotiate his way around 
his obstacles. This is essentially what the cross-border traders are all about, and this is how 
the trade continues to survive and evolve despite considerable environmental difficulties. The 
trade is not a new development either. It has been evolving and been a part of the 
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development process in much the same manner for several centuries. In the next chapter, I 
will attempt to trace, historically, Nigeria's trading patterns, focusing on external trading 
patterns, and how indigenous entrepreneurs have reacted to, or in certain cases, influenced 
the patterns of change. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INDIGENOUS NIGERIAN TRADE AND ITS I&LEVANCE 
TO EXPORT TRADE ACROSS MODERN NATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES. 
4.1 Introduction 
In the discussion on various theories of economic development examined between 
chapters 2 and 4,1 argued that some of the analytical limitations of those theories have to 
do with a lack, or inadequate understanding of historical processes in the LDCs to which they 
are supposed to apply. It is this historical process that I intend to address in the present 
chapter, with regard to Nigeria. -Proposed in the chapter therefore is an historical examination 
of the development of indigenous Nigerian trading patterns. 
The chapter aims. to show that local and foreign trade have been an integral part of 
Nigerian entrepreneurship for several centuries'; and that colonialism, and later, the discovery 
of oil effectively redirected the flow of Nigeria's external trade, -hampering, but not 
eliminating indigenous patterns of trade. 
As much as is practicable, local and foreign trade will be discussed separately but this 
will not always be possible because as will be demonstrated, local trade, particularly after 
colonization, has frequently proven to be no more than a segment of a wider chain of events 
which culminates in foreign trade. 
In order to accentuate the different characteristics of trade in different periods in 
Nigeria's history, the main body of this chapter has been divided to cover five socio- 
economically distinctive time periods. They are: 
127 
(a) The Pre-Colonial Period (Before 1860) 
(b) The Early Colonial Period (1860-1910) 
(c) The Late Colonial Period (1910-1960) 
(d) The Early Post-Colonial Period (1960-1975), and 
Ife" The Present Times (1975 to date) 
5.2 The Pre-Colonial Period (Before 1860) 
5.2.1 Local Trade 
Indigenous specialized 'Nigerian trade* had certainly evolved before the nineteenth 
century when the colonial programme began. Before thi, s, the communities now known as 
Nigeria, like several oflýer regions, may be said to have had a mainly subsistence domestic 
economy. The societi6s were largely agrarian, and the usual unit of production was the 
household. The products available for exchange therefore were those that represented excess 
production over and above the subsistence level. Trade was initially limited to foodstuff but 
soon extended to barter for different goods like soaps and textiles. Trade only took place 
among geographically proximate communities because the traded products could only be 
transported on the human head. Eventually, closer 'community ties resulted in the 
development of an early type exchange economy by the establishment of local "market days" 
at fixed intervals, usually weekly, in different villages in various districts or chiefdoms. 
These were large markets sometimes attracting up to 15,000 people from several 
128 
communitiei", and still survive in various forms to present times in Nigeria. Soon, some 
villages developed specialized markets, and traders and customers"Ilike knew on which 
market days, and in which villages they could obtain certain kinds of products. 
In order to ease the pressure on individuals and increase the volume of trade, the 
donkey was introduced into Nigeria from the Western Sudan to transport market produce 
from the household to the market place. It eased the pressure on individuals and increased 
the Yolume of trade. The donkey was cheap to obtain and maintain, but traders found it 
difficult to load, apart from which the donkey has a legendary dislike of water. It had to be 
carried across the many streams and rivers of Southern Nigeria, and became wholly unfit to 
carry goods in the rairP. Because it frequently rained in southern Nigeria from April to 
October, the donkey was only of limited use. In Northern Nigeria, there was less of this 
problem because of the drier climate, but there was an additional danger caused by Tsetse 
flies which stung, and sometimes killed the donkeysý. The. net effect of this was that until the 
British merchants took qontrol of the Nigeriadýývaterways in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
practice of transportinegoods to the market-by carrying them on the head was still the most 
widely used, and continues to be used in the certain Nigerian commufflities. Transportation 
by waterways was used fairly extensively in Southern Nigeria and in the northern area around 
the river Benue in Central Nigeria. But people who lived further north had to travel several 
miles on foot to get to the rivers so that the goods that tended to be traded in were still 
frequently limited to the amount that could be carried on die head. This made slave 
22' Ogunrenli (1980: 100). cf. Sender & Smith (1986: 6-9). 
22' Ogunreilli (1980: 104-105); Munro (1976: 27). 
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acquisition an important part of the early exchange process"'. 
Barter was the usual unit of exchange and so conversationi'-didý not have to extend 
beyond minimum levels. However, where haggling was to take place barter proved quite 
cumbersome, and along with the transportation problem described earlier, these were the 
major problems of the early exchange economy in Nigeria. 
It would seem that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, extensive 
infrastructures for the furtherance of intra-regional trade were already in existence"'. 
Certainly, the "caravan" trading system, whereby a company of traders, usually, but not 
exclusively womeO', travelled from their bases to a target location, picking up along the 
way other traders as well as soldiers on the lookout for fireanns, had already been developed 
to an advanced state. Goods and traders from various regions of the world were involved. 
As W. H Clarke, the nineteenth century British missionary/explorer records it 
"The trade in native produce and art keeps up continual intercommunication between 
the several adjacent towns, the one inter-changing its abundance of one article for that 
of another. Thus. on those smaller routes may be seen caravans of fifties passing 
almost daily froill one town to another' acting as the branches of the great reservoir 
of tia de... a network of trade is carrie to a distance of hundreds of miles, with an 
energy and perseverance scarcely compatible with a tropical people... Hundreds and 
thousands of people are thus engaged in the carrying trade... -Not infrequently the 
articles from the Mediterranean and the Western coast may be seen in close 
proximity, and the productions of the four quatres of the globe within a circumference 
whose diameter may be measured by a few yards... a correct idea of the extent of the 
trade may be found in the imposing numbers that stretch over several miles in 
length"211. 
228 It is reported that at the time, female slaves were each required to carry about 80 Ibs, 
and their male counterparts, about 120 Ibs of produce per trading trip (See Folayan 1980: 90). 
221 See Falola (1991). 
211 These women, as described in some detail by Hopkins (1973), were traders in their 
own right, and not wives or concubines of other travelling traders. 
211 Clarke, Trcivels And Erplot-ations In Yonibalawl, 1854-1858 (1858), cited in Falola 
(1991: 111). According to Falola (1991: 119), various historical sources suggest estimates of 
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By 1860, the local economy was growing rapidly as trade volumes increased due to 
an increased international exposure. Foreign merchants from Noilh-.. Africa and Europe 
introduced currency such as the cowrie, which became the most widely accepted currency. 
Other largely regional currency included iron bars, manilla, brass rods, salt and cotton 
stripsP'. 
Although most of the population were farmers, some industries sprang up, their 
location being mainly dictated by geographical factors. For instance, along the coastal areas 
of Southern Nigeria, canoe building industries developed and these helped establish small 
scale fishing industries along the Nigerian coast line. Local fibres were used to make fishing 
nets. In the northern parts of Nigeria, cotton manufacturing industries began to evolve. The 
finished product was sold to cloth weavers among the Yorubas of Western Nigeria who 
developed a special cloth dyeing industry, using vegetable dyes derived from certain local 
plants. The cloth was soaked in the dye, and then dried before it was resold all over Western 
and Southern Nigeria. In all regions of Nigdfia there were fledgling mining industries in 
gold, iron, tin and salt. " The mines stretched from Ijebu-Ode and Ilorin in the west, to Bida 
in the north, to Awka in the east, covering in the process, a combined distance of more than 
a thousand miles. The mined products, and the products of the coastal trade centres of places 
like Dahomey, Porto Novo (both in present-day Republic of Benin) and Badagry (such as 
corals and tobacco), went through trade routes stretching northwards from Badagry on the 
coast, through Ilaro, Iseyin, Shaki, and through to Old Oyo. From Oyo, where those 
products would be joined by the staple exports of the old Oyo empire such as native cloth, 
palm-oil, pepper and slaves, they would be sold on to the Hausa-Fulani traders from Kano 
up to 4,000 for each group of carayan traders. 
232 Ektindare (1973: 46-49). 
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and other parts of Northern Nigeria". With the eventual destruction of Old Oyo's imperial 
might in the 1830s, other locations such as Abeokuta and Ibadan be-dýmejnore important and 
powerful as regional trade centres. To the south, Lagos, Badagry and Porto Novo continued 
to serve as important gateways to the coastal trade with European traders. The fine timbers 
of Southern Nigeria encouraged wood carving and sculpting industries. The sculptures and 
like products were mostly exchanged as gifts between well-to-do people and are still to be 
found in museums around the world. The so-called "Sokoto Reds", which were actually 
domesticated farm animals to be found in North-Eastern Nigeria, were famous for their fine 
skin and provided the leather which was one of the staple products of the trans-saharan trade 
for several centuries. Finally, there were flourishing brewing industries in the South, first 
in palm-wine, tapped from palm trees and only sold in the locality, and a strong wine brewed 
from kolanuts. This was sold in Southern Nigeria and across West Africa. Other industries, 
mainly in Dastern Nigeria, also existed in household furniture, agricultural tools, war 
implements, and so fordiP4. 
5.2.2 Foreign Trade 
Trade between Nigeria and the rest of the world before colonization can be grouped 
as follows: 
, a) The Tra, ns-Saharan Trade (mostly with North Africa) - 
b) Tile Coastal Trade (mostly with Europe) 
c) The Intra-West African Commodity Trade. 
211 See Folayan (1980: 83-87). 
Afigbo (1980). 
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5.2.2.1 The Trans-Saharan Trade 
Nigeria's earliest recorded regular export trade appears to have been with North 
Africa. It may have started as early as 1000 B. C, during which time the desert crossing took 
place on oxen or horse-drawn carriageS235. Otl; er sources also report that sporadic trade 
with Carthaginians was in existence from about the fifth century B. C by a barter process 
called the "dumb trade" because it involved trade transactions by a form of sign language due 
to the language barrier". The trade with North Africa would appear, in any case, to have 
been well established by the eighth century A. D . 
There were three major desert trade routes in existence by the eighth century and two 
of the three southern termini were in areas which are part of present-day Nigeria. The routes 
were: 
(i) the Taghaza - Timbuktu route in the West. The Soilthern terminus of this route is in 
present-day Mali. 
(ii) The Ghadames - Air route to Hausa in th6 centre. This in present times would roughly 
translate to a route from Algeria/Tunisia in the north to North-Central -Nigeria (and further 
westwards) in the south. 
(iii) The Fezzan - Kawar route to Bornu in die East. In present times this would mean that 
the route extended from Libya/Egypt in the North to the Lake Chad area between present-day 
Chad Republic, and North-Eastern Nigeria. 
The trans-saharan trade took place under tortuous conditions as traders frequently got 
caught in the middle of desert skirmishes between Romans, Carthaginians and the desert 
235 See Hopkins (1973: 79-80). 
211 See further Ektindare (1973: 21). 
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Nomads. They were sometimes attacked by pockets of soldiers from any of the warring 
sides, and if they survived these, they also had to contend with sand-sorms and other natural 
disasters. The journey, if successful, took from two to twelve months depending on the 
problems faced by the traders. This factor limited the amount and type of goods that could 
be traded on any one trip and contributed to the gasual nature of the trans-saharan trade for 
several centuries. 
However, the pace of the trans-saharan trade quickened from about the third century 
A. D. with the introduction of the camel, which could carry a lot more goods than a human 
being, and could travel for several days without food or water. The time taken to cross the 
Sahara desert was now reduced to an average of about six weeks. Camel traders travelled as 
far south as the Niger River"', in the middle-belt of present-day Nigeria"'. By the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a sophisticated exchange economy had evolved in both 
North and West Africa. Towns like Kano, Katsina and Zaria in Northern Nigeria had grown 
to become important commercial centres with highly cosmopolitan populations. Kano's 
population for example, was recorded by the expl6rer Barth in 1824 to be about 40,000 and 
this included significant numbers of merchants from Libya, Morocco and Ghana 211. The 
desire to maximize profits resulted in a trade of products that were mostly of small bulk and 
high intrinsic value. This was fairly typical of world trade at a time when relatively 
rudimentary transport technology made it uneconomical to trade in distant locations in several 
items of mass consumption. Thus, West African exports included slaves, gold and other 
preciOLIS metals, ostrich feathers, ivory, kolanuts, honey, incense, soap, tobacco, rice, dried 
237 IvIcillasoux (1971: 17). 
238 representing in some cases, in extra three hundred miles' journey. See Map 1. 
2"' Rundare (1973: 28). 
134 
fish and raw leather. Southbound goods from North Africa included manufactured iron tools, 
garments, spices and perfumes, cotton, salt, copper, beads, swords, 'h-. Orses, arabic books and 
certain food stuffs such as wheat, nuts and dried grapesý'O. Several West African exports 
were in-turn re-exported from North Africa to Europe by Arab merchants, just as a lot of 
the products which the Arabs eventually sold to West African traders were originally 
imported from Europe. Such products included cotton from England, silks from France and 
glass beads from Italy. 
There is no historical evidence of regular trade between West Africa and Southern 
Africa other than that in cowrie shells (which served as currency in British West Africa) 
between West African kingdoms and states that are now part of Namibia and other parts of 
South-West Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There does not appear to 
have been any significant trade incentives between the two regions. Indeed, what evidence 
there is points instead to sporadic direct trade betwe, en Sopalia and Ethiopia on the one hand, 
and Egypt, Yemen, China and Indonesia on the other hand; And more settled trade in gold, 
slaves, perfumes and silk between Eastern ana Southern Africa on the one hand, and India 
and the Persian Gulf on the other hand 241 
The growth of the trans-saharan was a vital catalyst in the development of intra-West 
African trade but its influence on world trade, having already suffering a setback with the 
conquering of the Songhai Empire (mostly in present-day Mali) by the Moroccan army in 
1591, was dn, stically cut in die nineteenth century242 , and by the beginning of the twentieth 
century, it had virtually disappeared from the world trade map. The immediate reason for 
2111 Wickins (1981: 148-149). 
Wickins (1981: 174-177). 
242 See SeCtio,, S 5.3 and 5.4, below. 
135 
this included competition from European merchant firms who were financing the building of 
roads and railways in the interior of West Africa thereby diverfing,. týe away from the 
North. This made transportation to European vessels on the coast a far more attractive 
proposition to traders than the long trek through the savanna regions of Northern Nigeria and 
the rest of the Central Sudan. Also, the West African empires which participated in the 
desert trade were increasingly having to defend themselves, not only against internal 
uprisings, but also against invasions from Moroccan imperialists from the North, who wanted 
to control the gold and slaves markets, and spread Islam. 
5.2.2.2 The Coastal Trade 
Prior to the colonization, and subsequent partition of Africa in the 1880s, most of the 
coastal export trade from Nigeria and other parts of West Africa was already taking place 
with Portugal and Britairk. 
It appears that'sporadic trade existed ibetween traders in the Niger Delta area of Mid- 
Western Nigeria and Portuguese sea-merchants as early as the fifteenth century. Initially, the 
Portuguese were content to obtain their gold coin currency from Moroccan traders but 
became aware from about 1415 that the Moroccan gold was in fact obtained from further 
south across the Sahara Desert. The Portuguese traders, in order to cut out the Arab 
middlemen and bypass the troublesome trans-saharan trade routes, sailed around Africa and 
by 1442, were already carrying on trade across the west coast of Africa. The Portuguese 
progressed steadily across the coast and into the interior of present-day Liberia, Senegal, 
Gambia, Sierra-Leone and the Cape Verde Islands, purchasing relatively small quantities of 
salt, gold, slaves, ivory, pepper, hides, wood and beeswax. In return, they sold silk and wool 
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to the Africans, especially those on the coast who then mixed these with locally grown cotton 
to make garments for resale on mainland West Africe". 
A desire for greater quantities of gold led the Portuguese further westward across 
West Africa and between 1471 and 1482, they arrived in present-day South-Westem Nigeria. 
Here, they traded in much the same goods but *found the organization of trade was quite 
diffeient from their earlier experiences. They were barred from progressing further into the 
interior by the Yoruba and Benin kingdoms who were anxious to protect their own local 
economies. There was already a thriving trade in slaves and kolanut between these kingdoms 
and other West African states, and especially with Northern Nigeria from where the goods 
were re-exported to North Africa and Europe. In 1485 the Portuguese established a trading 
post (or "entreport") at the coastal town of Ugholo, near present-day Benin City in Mid- 
Western Nigeri2'. Here they obtained large 4uantities of pepper and ivory, and sold beads 
and cloth. They did not find the expected gold and therefore concentrated on obtaining slaves 
for re-export to the miqes of the Gold Coast 6resent-day Ghana) where large quantities of 
gold had been discovered and were being min'ed. 
By the start of the sixteenth century, there was a huge demand f&r cheap labour in the 
plantation of Europe and South America and from then on until the early nineteenth century, 
British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, and to a lesser extent, Spanish, Danish, and Swedish 
vessels purchased little else but slaves from West Africa. Up to eleven million Africans are 
estimated to have been sold in this way211. The main destinations for the slaves were the 
plantations of the USA, West Indies, Cuba and Brazil, although many of them also ended up 
211 See further Wickins (1981: 158-160). 
2" Ekundare (1973: 24-25). 
211 See Curtin (1969); Wickins (1981: 166); Hopkins (1973: 101-103). 
137 
in domestic service in various parts of the world. In return, the slave purchasers mainly sold 
guns, gunpowder, rum, gin, textile, gum and copper bars. The domilfation of the transatlantic 
slave trade in indigenous enterprise, by redirecting the flow of trade towards the coast, not 
only stunted the development of trade in other areas, it effectively destroyed the existing 
export trade via the desert routes to the North. In 1807, the slave trade was abolished in 
England.. but was still carried on in a clandestine manner for most of the nineteenth 
century (and in some cases, beyond), therefore it continued to have a negative effect on other 
fonns of trade for that period. 
By 1860, the European demand for slaves had given way to an equally frenetic 
demand for palm produce. Although the virtual halting of the slave trade had hurt the African 
ruling classes, entrepreneurs were quick to adjust to the new "legitimate" trade in agricultural 
produce"'. Palm oil, which was already an. important local commodity, subsequently 
became Nigeria's chief export commodity as well because of the demand for it in Europe for 
the manufacture of candles and soaps. Families, which were previously content to leave fresh 
I 
palm fruits to rot after obtaining enough for. farhily consumption all became involved in the 
trade. At a point in 1892, fifteen million trees were estimated to be in pr-oduction in Western 
246 or 1817, if one is to go by the proclamation of the "Treaty of Vienna" (Meillasoux 
(1971). See further Lovejoy & Hogendorn (1993) for an account of the jerky steps to end 
slavery in Northern Nigeria, extending well into the twentieth century. cf. Falola & Lovejoy 
ffeds. ] 1994) for a study of pawnship, in which a person could be held as collateral for a 
loan or debt. O'Hear (1994: 219) explains a pawning contract as follows: "A man lends 
money to another. He charges no interest in money - but until the capital is paid back, half 
the debtor's day's labour is for the benefit of the lender, and half at his own disposal". cf. 
Lovejoy & Hogendorn (1993: 264-267). It was a common practice in many parts of the world 
tip to the nineteenth century, but seems to have obtained a new importance in parts of Africa, 
Asia and Latin Arnerica, particularly after the official abolition of slavery. Ann O'Hear, 
Felix Ekeclii, and Judith Byfield, all contributors to Falola & Lovejoy (cited above), explain 
in their papers, the workings of the pawnship system in different parts of pre-colonial, and 
colonial Nigeria. 
2" IvIcillasoux (1971: 56-61). 
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Nigeria alone for the export markeOll. 
The West African palm export trade was unstable in the year-s"'foltowing the official 
slave trade abolition due to the effects of the unpredictable civil wars in West African states 
as communities battled one another to supply the clandestine slave market which, as 
mentioned earlier, existed for most of the ninetednth century. Thus, West African palm oil 
exports to Britain increased from 281,372 cwt (hundred weight) in 1838 to 343,449 cwt in 
1839 only to fall back to 315,458 cwt in 1840. Likewise, there was a rise from 414,570 cwt 
in 1844 to 500,833 cwt in 1845 which subsequently fell back to 360,452 in 1846 249 . The 
same was true of imports for that period. Other West African products being exported in 
appreciable quantities from the 1840s included raw cotton, mahogany, ginger, hides and 
pepper. British imports, in order to induce local interest were usually limited to luxury 
articles such as mirrors, toys, alcoholic drinks, 'guns and gunpowder. As with the Portuguese 
before them, the kingdoms of Oyo, Benin and the city states of Eastern Nigeria were hostile 
to any efforts of the British to trade directlyt-'with the interior of Nigeria. They acted as 
middlemen in such tradb and were able to resis*t attempts to cut their influence on the trade 
until towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
5.2.2.3 Intra-West African Trade 
Although much attention in die literature on pre-colonial West African commerce is 
focused on a combination of the trans-saharan desert trade with Arab merchants, and the 
coastal trade with Europeans, regular trade also existed between the regions of the present- 
211 Hopkins (1973: 126). cf Lugard ([1922] 1977: 17). 
2" Ektindare (1973: 51-52). 
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day West Africa. I will distinguish such as follows: 
(i) Trade in products which were not of the same internatioýhl-significance as gold, 
slaves or ivory. 
(ii) Trade between geographically close communities that occurred in commercial 
centres which did not directly participatý in international trade. 
Agriculture dominated this trade. Most of the area south of the river Niger across 
West Africa is arable and at the end of the seventeenth century, the explorer William Bosman 
in reported to have found a thriving indigenous local and export trade in millet, rice, yams, 
potatoes and palm oil among the Axim people in present-day Ghana'O. 
Early in the fifteenth century, Nupe traders from the middle belt of present-day 
Nigeria introduced the kolanut to consumers and merchants further north in Katsina in 
exchange for shea-butter, who' resold them to Arab merchants via the trans-saharan trade. 
The Nupe traders themselves purchased the kolanut from present-day Northern Ghana. By 
the early nineteenth ceiltury, kolanut had becOme the prime commodity across West Africa 
and following repeated attacks on Katsina between 1804 and 1807 (and less intensely, 
beyond) in thefiliad (Islamic holy war) of Uthman Dan Fodio, Kano, ývhich had been easily 
conquered, replaced Katsina as the major centre for the kola trade. It became the biggest and 
wealthiest city in Central Sudan and developed an economy so advanced that the explorers 
Denham and Clapperton are reported to have described it as the best regulated in Africa". 
Kano was fortunate to be surrounded by largely friendly neighbours. By 1851, Katsina, 
ravaged by war was almost in ruins while Kano had seized on its peace advantage to secure 
and increase its agricultural and industrial output. The area within a fifty mile radius of Kano 
2-" Wickins (1981: 154-155). 
211 Lovejoy (1980: 64-67). 
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was relatively densely populated and continuous cultivation of the land produced onion, 
pepper, tobacco, cassava and sugar-cane for export to North and Vý61t--Africa while millet 
and kolanut were the chief agricultural imports. At the same time, Kano had a craft industry 
unrivalled in African history, characterised by an extensive division of laboUr212. In 
addition, products not manufactured in, nor necessarily consumed in the Kano area were 
brought in for solely trade purposes such as plums, mangoes, asses, bullocks, horses, wheat, 
camels and pawpaw. This were all subject to a local trade tax. Trade practices were 
sophisticated enough to enforce a warranty system. If for instance, a trader discovered after 
leaving Kano that his goods were faulty, he could return them for a refund. All these 
combined to make the Hausa economy supported by the hegemony of Islam, and the wealth 
of Kano, one of the most developed in pre-colonial Africa. 
The kingdom of He (Western Nigeria), between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries 
exchanged slaves for Asante (Ghanaian) metal, with. whicb it made its celebrated bronzes and 
brasses, while Benin (M. id-Westem Nigeria) sold cotton goods to the Western Sudanese states 
in exchange for horses and copper, although ihe majority of its overall external trade was 
carried out with European traders on the coast253 
As mentioned earlier, the area now known as Cameroun westwards did not develop 
advanced local trading cultures because of the sparseness of the population relative to land, 
and consequently, the relatively long distances between communities. 
2-'2 See Lovejoy (1980). 
211 Wiekins (1981: 157-158). 
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5.3 The Early Colonial Period (1860-1910) 
5.3.1 The European Partition Of Africa. 
Much of Nigeria's current trade practices and patterns were laid in the colonial 
period. The early colonial period in this chapter is being limited to the years between 1860, 
when Britain created the colony of Lagos, and the eve of World War I. 
In the years immediately following 1860, the British were content to let the existing 
trading patterns continue partly because they did not wish to venture beyond the coast of 
Nigeria into the tropical interior for fear of perceived health risks, and partly because 
existing trade practices were not alien to them. They may not, in addition, have wished to 
get caught in the crossfire of the unpredictablb Yoruba civil wars which raged for much of 
the nineteenth century. This did not stop them from usiog the force of the gunboat to deal 
with troublesome coastal -communities which disrupted trade along the coast, and may explain 
why, following the deaat of Akitoye in Lagoi in 1851, Britain created the colony of Lagos 
but did not immediately venture northwards to Madan and other import-ant trading centres in 
southern Nigeria which were some way into the tropical forest". However, in the 
scramble for Africa which officially began with the Berlin conference of 1884, all caution 
was thrown to the wind as Britain sought to reassert its position as die world's leading 
economic and political power. This, along with the enduHng effects of the abolished slave 
trade contrived to alter the scope of Nigerian, and indeed, West African trade from the late 
nineteenth century onwards. 
21' Further details on the colonization of Lagos are contained in Rodney (1972), and 
Hopkins (1973). 
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The Leninist theory of imperial capitalism has often been used to explain the 
European scramble for the occupation and partition of Africa. Lenin believed that capitalist 
societies were inherently imperialist in nature. In criticising the ideas of Hobson, and of 
Kautsky on imperialism, he wrote in 1916 that 
"Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of 
monopolies and finance capital has estaýlished itself, in which the export of capital 
has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the 
international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe 
among the great capitalist powers has been completed... "11. 
This, in his view, is a necessary result of the international development of capitalism. 
Essentially, he argues that imperialism has both political and economic dimensions, and it 
is the latter, particularly as exhibited with the development of finance capital that gives rise 
to annexationist policies because in that way, accumulated finance can be made even more 
productive". Although comparatively little is known about the efforts of Africans 
themselves to assist or oppose the colonization aýd partition of the continent, when applied 
to the partition of Africa, the theory supports the view that the scramble was chiefly led by 
C 
economic motives. It works out roughly as follows: 
At about the end of the 1850s, France, Italy and Germany were beginning to join 
Britain as newly industrialized countries (NICs). As technological capabilities and confidence 
increased, production volumes boomed. The NICs needed raw materials to feed into their 
new machines and new markets to sell their increasing volumes of manufactured products to. 
Britain, for instance, was already exporting E2.3 million worth of goods per annum. to 
tropical Africa at about 1860, but there was a desire to increase this amount as it represented 
255 Lenin ([1916] 1969: 53). 
2-16 Lenin hypothesized further (at p. 55) that following the annexation of LDCs, the next 
stage of (lie imperialist process would be for the industrialized countries to turn their 
expansionist policies onto one another. 
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a mere 1.3 % of Britain's non European exports by value, . By the 1870s, the NICs of 
France, Italy and Germany were suffering from supply gluts. Iýiance and Germany in 
particular were needing to raise the capital to pay for their war with each other. They became 
the two most aggressive proponents of African partition. They increasingly saw Africa as a 
vast untapped reservoir of investment opportunifies, cheap production factors and markets. 
They were ready at this stage to compete with Britain for the expected gains to be made from 
trade with Africa. As Lord Lugard, the celebrated colonial administrator was to later write 
"Europe was impelled to the development of Africa primarily by the necessities of her 
own people... Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, 
and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane"2-58 . 
The Leninist theory has also been used to explain why the scramble did not commence 
until the 1880s despite the fact that its direct foundations were laid much earlier in the 
century, the argument being that up to that point, Britain was the sole industrial power with 
rqal political influence in Africa, and was content to ljmit this influence to an informal 
indirect rule for financial-and logistical reasons In the early days of the industrial revolution, 
the NICs were still abl'e to easily dispose of their products internally and therefore had no 
reason to took overseas. It was not until the late 1870s that they begaff to look to Africa as 
a possible raw material base and end market, and for that fact became wary of the pre- 
industrial transport system and multiple tolls, which were all contributing to "unnecessary" 
costs of trade in Africa". 
On closer examination however, it appears that the theory is, on some counts, at 
variance with the actual events of the nineteenth century European presence in Africa. 
2-11 Sanderson (1985: 100-101). 
2-" Lugard ([1922]1977: 17,19). 
251) cf. Hopkins (1973: 164-166). 
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Historical evidence shows that neither France nor Portugal waited until the 1880s to attempt 
the partitioning of Africa. In fact, as Sanderson (1985) describes, -. 
both countries made 
attempts to annex certain parts of Africa at various times between 1815 and 1857, and only 
the superior sea power of Britain prevented this from taking place on a wide scale. It seems 
rather more accurate to argue that there was not in. fact, in any broad sense, a pre-planned 
pattern to the partition process. This is certainly the impression created by Map 3, below, 
showing Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
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Alap 3: Africa (c. 1902) 
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It is a compelling argument that because there was no pattern to the partition, the 
scramble did not take place for purely strategic, and even less fbr-pu, ý economic reasons. 
It is important to understand this fact because it profoundly affected European policy on trade 
and development in Africa. It is also important to realize that the British annexation of 
Nigeria was only a part of a wider European scramble for Africa and so some of the motives 
for Britain's annexation of Nigeria may have been a response to other factors not necessarily 
having anything to do with Anglo-Nigerian relations. It is therefore appropriate to discuss 
the wider European motives for the scramble for, and partition of Africa. They are derived 
from, but go much further than the Leninist theory. They were sometimes inter-related, and 
are briefly examined below. 
5.3.1.1 Economic Considerations 
Economic considerations, as discussed above in section 5.3.1, undoubtedly influenced 
the European coloniza(ion programme. Steady trade had been carried on with the African 
coast for at least four centuries before the scramble officially began, and initially at any rate, 
European traders may have genuinely believed in the mid-nineteenth century that with their 
capital and superior technological expertise, they could help increase the productivity of die 
African primary producer. As mentioned earlier the value of British exports to tropical Africa 
already averaged f2.3 million per annurn in the 1860s, but by the 1870s, European explorers 
into the interior of Africa were returning to their merchant sponsors with real or imagined 
tales of vast fertile lands with millions of potential customers. This partly accounted for 
French and German interest in competing with Britain for the expected vast rewards to be 
reaped from investing in Africa. In South Africa, Britain had major economic inierests to 
147 
defend as it had by 1900 already invested up to E200 million in the Rand gold mines. Equally 
important was Britain's determination not to let South Africa fall-into French or German 
hands as this would have made them individually rich enough to challenge Britain's 
supremacy in the region which Britain did not want. South Africa's export trade, worth E52.2 
million in 1897, accounted for 75% of all sub-saharan Africa's external trade'. 
5.3.1.2 National Prestige 
By 1900, Britain had become the most active imperialist nation. Within Nigeria, it 
conquered the Sokoto Caliphate, the Benin Empire, and a host of emirates and kingdoms, and 
incorporated them into the protectorate of Nigeria". Lord Frederick Lugard, the British 
Colonial General, first in Uganda, and then British High Conunissioner and (later still) 
Governor of Nigeria between 1900 and 1918, published "The Dual Mandate In British 
Tropical Africa" in 1922 in which he wrote in defence of colonialism: 
I "We hold these puntries because it is the lgenius of our race to colonise, to 
trade and to govern" 
and re-stated the intention of the colonial goverment not to relinq-uish power"12. The 
perceived arrogance with which Britain had continually proclaimed its supremacy since ý the 
abolition of the slave trade angered other European countries, in particular those, such as 
Portugal, that believed they had longer ties with Africa than Britain had. 
Portugal, for instance, had been left behind in the'European industrial revolution of 
211 Munro (1976: 82-83). 
2bi See further Hallet (1974: 288-292); Sanderson (1985: 141). 
21 Lugard ([ 1922] 1977: 20). 
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the mid-nineteenth century partly because of its reluctance to let go of the abolished 
transatlantic slave trade as a vehicle of development. Its economy"-wa$ therefore not as 
technologically developed as those of its European rivals when the scramble began but it felt 
that its "historical claims" on Africa had not been recognised by the early partitioners. It 
responded to this by arbitrarily annexing large* parts of Southern Africa, which merely 
created further burdens on an already struggling economy. It literally had nothing 
economically to offer it colonies. 
Italy was a newly industrializing country at the start of the scramble in the 1880s. It 
already had close economic ties and further prospects, with Tunisia to whom it was relatively 
geographically close. However, Italy conceded Tunisia to France in 1881 while it acquired 
parts of Ethiopia and Somalia which held no economic prospects for Italy, and merely proved 
a heavy burden on the Italian economy. Italy ended up having a heavy military but little 
economic presence in its colonies. However, it was the Italian government's view that Italy 
would look like a great power if it acquired African territorieS263. 
Germany's expahsionist policy in Africa seems to have been mainly driven by dismay 
at British paramountcy in Africa. The German government described it ih 1884 as "an affront 
to our national self-esteem"", and from 1895 until the start of World War I, Germany 
unsuccessfully argued for the repartition of Africa. In the meantime, it acquired what it could 
find and ended up with a curious mix of portions of West-Central Africa, East Africa, and 
South-Western Africa. 
For most of the nineteenth century, France felt slighted by British supremacy on the 
African coasts and continuously tried to tilt the balance of power in its own favour with little 
211 Sanderson (1985: 107). 
21 Sanderson (1985: 109). 
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success. France had already lost out to Britain in North Africa, particularly for the control 
of Egypt, but was determined to become the dominant power in- th, e West and thereby 
confirm its world power status. By 1882, France was rapidly annexing parts of West Africa 
and had established a formal protectorate in Porto Novo (present-day Republic of Benin) to 
the west of Lagos with plans to extend this eastward to Cameroon and westward to the Gold 
Coast (present-day Ghana)" - moves that were opposed by Britain. For these, and other 
trivial territorial differences of no great economic consequence, Britain and France were 
perilously close to going to war in 1898. 
In the event, France avoided a coastal confrontation with Britain by advancing instead 
to the Northern regions of West Africa such as Niger and Mali via Senegal. Britain did not 
respond to this for it had by then abandoned any hopes of reviving the now largely extinct 
trans-saharan trade, but it held on to the importAnt coastal regions of present-day Ghana and 
Nigeria which offered safe harbour, relatively friendly rulers, and a high population density, 
which potentially signified ample trading oppqFtunities. 
5.3.1.3 Domestic European Pofitics 
At least in Germany and Italy, it appears as if there was a deliberate move by the 
ruling parties of the 1870s and 1880s to be seen to be influential in world politics in order 
to gain votes at home. African territorial acquisition was, used to advance the image of the 
ruling Social Democratic Party in Germany as a party of statesmen while in Italy, it was 
hoped that the Italian populace would become less excited by the grandeur of being an empire 
to concentrate on internal divisions. 
21 Hopkins (1973: 162); cf. Sanderson (1985: 124). 
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From the 1890s onwards, the British political propaganda used to justify its continued 
colonization of Nigeria, largely consisted of annual colonial reports, -q! id other like treatises, 
especially those of Lord Frederick Lugard, Nigeria's colonial Governor at the turn of the 
twentieth century, in which it was continually stressed that Nigeria was a country of two 
kinds of people - the slave raiders and the enslaved,. and the British government was winning 
the war against the slave raiders. It was the duty of the British government to occupy Nigeria 
in order to crush the illegitimate slave trade, and stay on in order to ensure that it did not 
reappear266. 
It was also important to be seen to be actively involved in the administration of the 
African interior, and in that way helping to improve the quality of life in those areas. It was 
this argument that the Gladstone Government adopted in 1893 to counter the Labour Party's 
charge that the general effects of European policy in Africa had been "wholly evil"". 
Other factors which certainly existed, but in seemingly reduced importance, included 
the spread of christianity which usually, but not always followed British occupation. For 
instance, christianity was selectively imposed on the Nigerian population with the moslern 
North largely being left alone. Also France's aggressive policy in West Africa encouraged 
its soldiers stationed in the region to continually seek new territories to acquire as a means 
of earning rapid promotion in the French Army. This may explain the eagerness of French 
soldiers to conquer and colonise the semi-desert regions of Mauritania, Mali and Niger which 
held no significant economic prospects for France, after being kept out of the Ghanaian and 
Nigerian coasts by Britain. 
211 Lovejoy & Hogendorn (1993: 199). cf. Slienton (1986: 22). 
20 See Lugard ([1922]1977: 18). 
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5.3.2 Trade In Early Colonial Nigeria 
The plethora of motives for the partition of Africa necessarily affected the economic 
policies of the colonialists once the partition was over. As will be shown later, the colonies 
eventually came to exist mainly to supply Europe's raw material needs. The African 
countries that enjoyed any benefits whatsoever from colonialism were those that had plentiful 
natural resources to supply European manufacturers. These countries included South Africa, 
Ghana, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire). Only belated and often limited efforts 
were made to develop the manufacturing sector in Africa. For decades, it was believed 
mutually beneficial for Africa to supply Europe's raw material needs and import the finished 
products. 
This was roughly the position that Nigeria was in, and it is in this light that trade in 
Nigeria will be considered in the early colonial period. 
j 
5.3.2.1 Local Trade 
At the start of the twentieth century, the British government was firmly in control of 
Nigeria and agriculture was the mainstay of the local economy. The products which were 
mainly produced for local consumption, and therefore almost solely traded in locally included 
kolanut, an important local commodity, rootcrops like cassava and yams; and cereals like 
rice, maize, millet, guinea-corn and beans-. 
At about this time, the colonial government began to orchestrate agricultural 
production in Nigeria by offering extra incentives to farmers to produce "cash crops", that 
is those agricultural products destined for export. At first, local foodstuff production did not 
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really suffer because in most places, cash and food crops could be grown side-by-side. Cocoa 
harvesting, for instance did not begin until at least five years aftd-r -the lanting season, and 
in the meantime, farmers grew, harvested and sold yams, cocoyams and cassava on the same 
land. Furthermore, the colonial government developed roads, rail-links and improved water 
transport systems around the cash crop producing. areas of Kano, Calabar and Lagos, which 
was taken advantage of by local food producers and traders in the development of local trade. 
In Western Nigeria for instance, the mean distance from farms to any of the new main 
transport lines had been reduced to less than five miles at the eve of World War 1268 , and 
the railways were themselves being given significant competition by an emerging local road 
transportation industry269 . All of these made the farmers become exposed to the volume and 
types of products that the colonial government was purchasing from farmers as a whole, and 
developed their awareness of "commercial farming", with the result that they began to juggle 
their harvests between food and cash crops, depending on whichever appeared to be more 
profitable in any given sýason. At C 
Apart from selliug food products to one andther, some other indigenous entrepreneurs 
were involved in small scale mining of gold, tin and diamonds on a-level which did not 
require expensive or complex prospecting"', but more Nigerians concentrated on small 
scale retail trading for export, leaving wholesaling and large scale retailing to European 
merchants since local traders lacked the capital or transportation means to engage in large 
scale trading. 
The "new" era of legitimate commerce created a new series of entrepreneurial 
2ý1 Ektindare (1973: 198). 
21' Milewski (1981: 114). 
270 Hopkins (1973: 210). 
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opportunities which existing, and a new generation of traders, significantly made up of ex- 
slaves were able to exploit. Most traders operated as agents or middlem'Z: n, -purchasing locally 
produced cash crops for onward re-sale to the European merchants on the coasts who would 
then transport them to the European manufacturing industrieS271. In addition, they 
purchased manufactured goods from the Europeins on the coast for resale in the interior. 
Anthony Hopkins (1973: 205-206) writes thus of the role of middlemen in this 
irade 
" [TIe middlemen]... were highly competitive and generally efficient channels of 
collection and distribution. The idea of direct trade with the producers, though 
appealing at a time when expatriate firms were trying to cut their costs, was an 
economic fantasy. In a situation where producers and consumers were both numerous 
and scattered, abolishing the middlemen would have meant reducing the size of the 
market". 
Up to about 1910, middlemen usually operated on "trust", which was a form of credit 
extension by which a European merchant would entrust his products such as gunpowder, 
rum, toys or cotton goods to -a middleman for a'period sometimes as long as two years, 
during which time the middleman would attempt t! o exchange the imported goods for the 
desired local produce, which could be timber or palm produce"'. 
From about 1910, the British West African currency became more widely accepted 
in Nigeria, and the middlemen began to be paid a fixed amount of money per transaction. 
The trading arrangements suited middlemen. They operated with small capital 
2" A few middlemen such as the ex-slaves Nana Olon 
' 
ut of Itsekiriland, Jaja of Opobo, 
and Richard Blaize, a Sierra Leonian who made his fortune as a Lagos trader, became rich 
and powerful enough in the late nineteenth century to threaten the monopoly influence of 
European middlemen on the coasts, and make (largely unsuccessful) attempts to engage in 
direct exporting to European (mainly British) firms. The stories of Blaize, and in particular, 
Ja ja, are well documented in several texts. See for instance Gertzel (1962) and Hopkins 
(1973). That of Nana Olomu, as well as the very successful careers of two Eastern Nigerian 
female entrepreneurs of the same period, Onut Oklvei and Mini Ofitfit may be found in 
Nwabughuogu (1982) and LLoyd (1963). 
2. '2 Ektindare (1973: 89-90). 
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injections, and their profit margins were usually small, but by the 1920s, they had become 
powerful as the links between the primary producers of goods and thp European produce 
buyers, and were fiercely protective of their markets. Some of them were able to 
unscrupulously offer ignorant farmers small cash advances to buy up an entire year's, or 
several years' harvest which they resold on the co4st to waiting Europeans at substantial 
profits. Indebtedness to middlemen was rife, and in several cases, the middlemen became the 
de-facto farm owners. This state of affairs was however relatively short-lived. Increased 
British penetration of Nigeria, and the effect of the global depression from 1929 was 
constantly eroding the influence of the middlemeiP. By the early 1930s, most of the 
remaining middlemen had been effectively reduced to the level of petty-traders who relied 
mainly on their bicycles for transporting goods in a two-way trade between the coast and the 
interior2". 
5.3.2.2 Foreign Trade 
By 1902, there were two major fiscal factors limiting Nigerians' access to the colonial 
administration's preferred pattern of foreign trade. 
First there was no generally accepted currency, and secondly, there were only two 
commercial Banks, neither of which had any tangible dealings with Nigerians. The colonial 
government took several steps to alleviate this. 
In 1902, the colonial government proclaimed fixed sterling values for manillas and 
Maria Theresa Dollars, and banned their importation into Nigeria, in order to maintain their 
211 See ftirther, section 5.4 in this chapter. 
2" Nwabuglitiogu (1982: 375). 
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value, and force the local people, who preferred the barter trade system to trade with 
If money". It proved to be a failure, as the people still appeared to preferj. ýfbrmal savings and 
loans methods, so in 1908, the colonial government introduced a new coinage consisting of 
a penny and 1/10 of a penny, with holes in the centre, so the people could string the coins 
together in the same way that they strung the more popular cowries. This eventually became 
widely accepte&75. By 1912, a West African currency board had been established in 
London which took over the British West African monetary policy until the region's 
independence in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Secondly, at the turn of the early twentieth century, there was no banking law in 
Nigeria. Banking was not popular with the local traders because of an innate suspicion of the 
banking system, plus a specific suspicion of the all-powerful British Bank of West Africa 
(BBWA) which had acquired two of the first three indigenous commercial banks to be 
I 
established in Nigeria, while the third had gone into voluntary liquidation. The expatriate 
banks (BBWA and Barclays Bank) were not willing*to extend credit facilities to local traders 
and so, indigenous patronage of banking qid. - . noi pick up until the establishment of the 
National Bank, of Nigeria in 1933. Even then, not much is known about the exact nature of 
the individual banks' influence on Nigerian foreign trade because of the non-availability of 
banking records for that period. 
Nigerian farmers were encouraged to grow those primary products which were 
required in the British manufacturing industry. Although there were several of these 
products, the main ones were cocoa, cotton, palm-produce, rubber and groundnuts. Over a 
period of time (certainly by the start of World War I in 1914), Nigerian farmers became 
locked into. the production of these products as British demand for them grew. 
2" Miracle (1971: 400-401). cf. Ekundare (1973: 188) 
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Up to about 1900, palm oil had remained the most important cash crop in Nigeria, 
accounting for about 75% of total exports, but the discovery of palm oil substitutes in the 
U. S. A., and of palm kernels in Nigeria, reduced Nigeria's dependency on p alm oil exports. 
Germany now purchased about 70% of Nigeria's palm kernels, while Britain took advantage 
of the low international demand for palm oil to purchase almost all of Nigeria's palm oil at 
rock-bottom prices. Britain also purchased about 90% of Nigeria's cotton and cocoa, 
although cocoa was not yet a major commodity, having first been exported only in 1886. It 
did not become the leading export commodity until after World War I. Livestock was another 
substantial export of Northern Nigeria but its sale was usually on the cross-border routes 
within West and Central Africa. 
Britain also dominated imports into Nigeria, accounting for about 75%-80% of 
Nigeria's total imports in the years around 1900276 . The chief imports were processed 
cotton goods, which Nigeria had earlier exported to Britain in its raw form. Nigeria also 
imported several other goods, among which were salt, books, mirrors, iron, steel and cement 
from Britain. Other impprts included quantities. of ýpirits from Germany; wine and rum from 
Belgium, Holland and Portugal; tobacco and lamp oil from the USA; And cowrie shells from 
Mozambique and Zaire. Since the 1880s, Hausa merchants had also been importing kolanuts 
into Nigeria from Ghana by way of steamships, although by the mid-1920s, kola was being 
planted in Northern Nigeria, eventually supplanting importS2". Trade was by no means 
limited to these products and countries, but the above list does represent Nigeria's major 
import trade partners in the early twentieth century, and the main products which Nigeria 
purchased from those countries. 
2" See further Ek-undare (1973: 96-97). 
21' Hopkins (1973: 248). 
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This export - import pattern continued until 1914, although by then, Britain had also 
become the largest purchaser of Nigerian gold, tin and groundnuts. Groundnut in particular 
had become the main export of Northern Nigeria in order to satisfy Hicreased European 
demand for margarine (into which groundnuts; were made). It was greatly aided by the 
opening of the Kano-Lagos rail line in 1912. The effect of the easier transportation brought 
about by the rail line was such that groundnut export increased astonishingly from 2,518 
tonnes in 1912 to 19,228 tonnes in 1913, being the first year the rail line was available to 
move the nutS278. It grew to even larger quantities in subsequent years, but in the 
meantime, the advent of World War I in 1914 changed the entire trading scenario in Nigeria. 
Initially, trade boomed. Nigerian exports by volume were growing, and although trade 
had ceased with Gennany because of the war, this was cushioned by increased trading with 
France, the U. S. A., and especially Britain. The colonial government's income, which was 
mostly in form of customs revenues, was not immediately affected. 
As the war dragAed on, the central gov 
' 
ernment in London increasingly saw Nigeria 
as a country whose resources, controlled "properly", could contribute significantly to the war 
effort. Therefore, in 1917, Britain banned the export of palm oil from Nigeria to any country 
other than Britain, and furthermore levied aU duty on palm kernels exported from Nigeria 
to countries outside the British Empire. The motive behind this was so that Britain would not 
only control the world's palm produce market, it would also limit the capability of the rest 
of the world to manufacture an explosive called glycerine, for which palm oil was a central 
ingredient. In addition, it would give Britain the world's largest raw material base from 
which to improve its competitiveness against Holland, Germany and the USA for the world's 
2" Slienton (1986: 76). 
158 
booming margarine market. Although the export restrictions were lifted at the end of the war 
in 1918, they were re-introduced only two years later in order to ra-igý, ýadgitional revenue for 
the colonial goveriunent. 
Britain was also influential in deciding which, and how imports got into Nigeria. For 
instance, in 1919, the importation of spirits from Germany was banned. This had constituted 
50% of Nigeria's imports from Germany. It may have been an example of post-war 
economic action against Germany although the official reason was that drinking less spirits 
would enable the local farmers concentrate better on crop production! Later, when Japan 
began to emerge as a leading exporter of consumer goods to Africa, Britain reacted in 1932 
by imposing import quotas in its African colonies on popular consumer goods like textiles, 
shirts, singlets, cement, paint, and galvanised iron sheets. The quotas, and the goods they 
applied to, were designed in such a way as to exclude Japan, which was offering competitive 
goods at lower prices because of the availability of cheaper labour in Japan. 
By the mid-1920s, the post-war boom had given way to a depression, which continued 
in varying degrees into', the 1930s, but at its -ifiCeption in 1920-21, it led to a chain of events 
in Nigerian commerce, the effects of which are arguably still being felt in present times. 
These events were in the form of marketing institutions, and may be roughly broken into the 
following: 
(i) The Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
(ii) The Buying Agreements 
(iii) The Commodity Marketing Boards 
In the next section, I will attempt to present these three 
institutions as continuous events of the later colonial period in Nigerian trade history. 
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5.4 Trade In The Later Colonial Period (1910-1960) t 
As towns and populations grew at the beginning of the twentieth century, so did 
demand for local produce, particularly foodstuffs. The new specialization in expanded export 
production, particularly in fast-emerging commerbial centres like Onitsha and Aba, in Eastern 
Nigeria, led to complex linkages in production and transportation which transformed 
subsistence goods into commodities. At this time, the leading commercial concern in Nigeria 
was the Royal Niger Company. During the 1919-20 boom, it greatly increased its cotton and 
oilseeds purchase in Northern Nigeria and financed these purchases with short-term 
commercial credit. When the depression commenced early in 1920, there was a resultant 
credit squeeze. The Royal Niger Company could not pay off its loans because of its unsold 
accumulated wares and was acquired by Lever Brothers, a rival company which also 
purchased oilseeds but used them in manufacturing soap: 
Lever Brothers ýyas now the largest Nigbrian commercial concern, although the Niger 
Company continued to1rade under its own name. Lever Brothers' main Nigerian rival then 
became the African and Eastern Trade Corporation (AETC), an arnalgarnation of independent 
trading firms founded in 1919. By 1927, the oilseed market was once again threatened by 
the renewed depression of that year. The AETC could not pay any dividends in 1928, and 
in order to stay afloat, it was merged with the Niger Company (under Lever control) to form 
the United Africa Company (UAC), which became one of the world's largest suppliers of 
oilseeds, and remains one of the largest companies in Nigeria to date, with dominant interests 
in many aspects of local and foreign trade2". It is presently involved in industrial 
manu factu ring, large scale agricultural production and processing, as well as importing, 
2" Pedler (1978). cf. Slienton (1986: 83-91); Fieldliouse (1978: 345-379). 
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exporting, wholesaling and retailing of consumer products. 
The 1920s depression continued into, and became worse in the"I'Ms. Pushed by local 
middlemen and European produce buyers to whom they now owed vast sums of money, the 
indigenous farmers increased their production output which in turn increased export volumes. 
However, in the ongoing depression, the farmers' returns continued to fall in absolute terms 
for most of the period. For instance, in 1928,49,000 tonnes of cocoa were exported at a 
value of E2.42 million But in 1934, although the export volumes were increased to 78,000 
tonnes of cocoa, the value fell to E1.29 million. This situation was fairly typical of the rest 
of Nigeria's cash crops during the depression years"O. 
In 1927, the now longstanding uncertainty in cocoa, and other commodity prices led 
the UAC and Cadbury to lead other European finns into what were called "Buying 
Agreements" in Western Nigeria, by which European firms were to dictate in advance to 
indigenous farmers the quantities of cocoa they would purchase, and the amounts they would 
pay for them over a per. jod of time. The price§*set were designed to guarantee profits to the 
European traders againk any envisaged falls in world prices. This however meant that the 
primary producers usually had very low prices offered for their produýts. Different buying 
agreements were set for about ten years thereafter, until in 1937 the farmers fought back by 
suspending cocoa sales to UAC and the other European firms, and boycotting European 
imported goods281. A commission of enquiry was set up in London in 1938, which declared 
the buying agreements as undesirable and in its place suggested a statutory body to 
211 See further S. Martin (1989); Ek-undare (1973: 205). 
211 This period (and the world war II years) also saw the first sustained rise and 
circulation of nationalist literature in West Africa, typified initially by the writings of Diagne, 
Casely-Hayford, and Macaulay, and later by the more radical views of, in particular, 
Azik, iwe, Nkrumah, Awolowo and Senglior. 
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impartially supervise the sale of cocoa. The start of World War II in 1939 delayed the 
implementation of this recommendation. 
Once again, trade with Germany ceased, joined this time by Japan. In addition, there 
were severe shipping shortages. In effect, world trade was severely curtailed. Soon after the 
war started, the British government bought the entire 1939-40 cocoa, oil seeds and palm oil 
harvest at reduced prices and transferred all the products to the newly set-up West African 
Produce Control Board (WAPCB) with instructions to sell them wherever practicable at 
current world market prices. The WAPCB was also charged with achieving stable prices in 
British West African cash crops. 
On the imports side, Britain introduced import licensing in order to control the type 
and volume of products entering Nigeria, and in addition introduced currency legislations 
which were designed to safeguard the position-of the pound sterling in the country. 
The formal establishment of the WAPCB in 1942 went a long way in stabilising, and 
thus preventing a possiblq- collapse of the Nigerian export trade during World War II because 
it guaranteed the primary producers a set price, albeit a relatively low one, for years at a 
timeand thus protected them from short-term fluctuations in world prices. The operating idea 
was for the WAPCB to accumulate trading surpluses if it sold the produce on the world 
market for more than it paid the indigenous farmers, and to subsidise deficits if it sold the 
produce for less than it paid for it. But in the event, the prices paid to local fanners were so 
low that between 1942 and 1960, the marketing board only ever had to subsidise prices in 
respect of one product, palm oil, in 1953 and 1954. 
By 1947, four separate commodity marketing boards had been created out of die old 
WAPCB. The boards had responsibility for cocoa, palm-produce, groundnuts and cotton. At 
the end of World War II, there was a sustained trade boom, wi, icii errectively ended the 
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lingering recession from the 1920s". The British government also devalued the pound 
sterling to make British products more competitive in international markets. This in turn had 
a positive effect on Nigerian exports, whose volumes and values soared. The four marketing 
boards, which by then were still paying farmers pre-1945 commodity prices, acquired 
enormous reserves at the expense of the primary producers, whose per unit incomes did not 
once increase between 1947 and 1954. In that period, the marketing boards accumulated a 
total in excess of E100 million"81. In that same period, Nigeria earned less from its regular 
principal income sources, that is, export duties (; E56.7 million) and import duties (E93.5 
million). But in attaining the E100 million mark, the commodity marketing boards had, in 
the immediate post-war years sometimes withheld up to 40% of international, market prices 
from the local producers. From 1953, a regional produce sales tax, and export duties were 
also charged on to the farmers, pushing the potential income withheld from the farmers to 
I 
as high as 66% on occasions. The marketing board surpluses were mostly held as 
stabilization reserves in form of commonwealth securities in London and were earmarked to 
be spent on an intensivcý economic development programme which the colonial government 
had planned from 1945 in readiness for granting political independence to Nigeria. 
The constitutional changes in Nigeria in 1954 resulted in the creation of three 
regions: - tile Western, Eastern and Northern regions. The assets of the four commodity 
marketing boards were transferred to the regional marketing boards in proportion to the 
contribution of each region to the trading surplus enjoyed by the old marketing boards. 
Although the new regions were withholding less of the farmers' earnings in "stabilization 
212. See further Hopkins (1973: 185). 
21' flelleiner (1977: 90). The figure stood at E238 million shortly after independence in 
1961 (Akeredolti-Ale 1976: 108). cf. Hopkins (1973: 265-267). 
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schemes", they were earning more in absolute terms from export duties and sales taxes 
because of increased productivity brought about by the introductioriof., fertilizers, and had 
enough to begin acting as supplementary banks to the regional governments. The farmers 
were producing more than they ever did but were not reaping the kinds of rewards they 
expected, and this period, that is post-1954, 'more than any other before then, saw 
disillusioned fariners beginning to invest parts of their earnings in training their children in 
vocations that would take them away from the farms. Even the farmers of the time began to 
abandon fanning and take up politics, trade, labour or clerical worPl. Some of them 
retired from active farming and rented out their farms to migrant workers. This was therefore 
the period in which real agricultural production, especially in Western Nigeria entered a 
period of gradual, but steady decline, although it was not immediately apparent in Nigeria's 
export earnings. 
5.5 Trade In The Early Post-Colonial Period (1960-1975). 
Between the end of world war II and the time Nigeria obtained political independence 
from Britain in 1960, a number of industries sprang up in the country. The earliest industries 
to emerge in Nigeria from about 1950 to the mid-1960s included food canning at Ibadan; 
boat building at Opobo, Makurdi and Epe; textile at Kano, Lagos, Kaduna and several other 
locations; cement at Nkalagu; tobacco at Ibadan, Port-Harcourt and Zaria; And petroleum 
Afarn and Oloibiri. There were oflier mining industries concerning gold, tin and colurnbite 
in the Ile-Ife, Ileslia and Jos areas, as well as industries in soap, margarine, plastic, and beer 
manufacturing dotted around the country. There was already an indication of the potential 
211 S. Martin (1989: 86). 
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of crude oil to contribute significantly to Nigeria's finances in the future. In the independence 
year, a total of 6.4 million barrels of oil were produced in Nigeria, and were mostly 
exported2". 
On the local front, trade continued in much the same kinds of foodstuff as had been 
traded in for much of the century, but increasing industrialization meant that a much wider 
variety of goods were available to be traded in locally. There was especially a growing local 
market for previously unavailable consumer goods, some of which were referred to above, 
although by then a trade in some of these products was already being engaged in across the 
West African borders as far west as Senegal, and to the east of Nigeria in Cameroun, simply 
because a demand existed for the manufactured goods in those places, and not necessarily 
because of over-supply, or insufficient demand in Nigeria. 
Political independence for Nigeria in 1960 immediately altered the scope of import 
trading in the country. Earlier in 1952, Britain had placed fresh restrictions on Japanese, 
American and Canadian imports into British 'col6nies, *including Nigeria, initially to 
,I. C 
strengthen the devalued pound sterling in world trading and improve Britain's trading position 
in its colonies. But the restrictions also served from about 1958 to protect a few Nigerian 
industries like canned fruits, clothes and beer, and other businesses in road haulage, 
construction and entertainment from cheaper foreign competition in the 1950s"'. However, 
by the end of 1960 (the independence year), there was an almost total liberalization of 
imports and Japan's competitively priced products appeared to be the main beneficiaries since 
the penchant then was for imported radios, televisions, and garments which the Japanese 
could supply more cheaply than its competitors. The total value of imports for 1960-1961 
285 Ektindare (1973: 298). 
211 See Hopkins (1973: 273) for some specific illustrations of these. 
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therefore soared by more than E24 million over the preceding period to E215.9 million while 
exports increased by a more modest E5 million to E169.6 million287-,,.., 
In the export market, Britain's dominance of the purchase of Nigerian products began 
to be challenged, shortly before Nigeria obtained political independence, by the USA, France 
and the Netherlands. For instance, by 1960, the proportion of Nigerian cocoa purchased by 
Britain had fallen ftom virtually 100% at the start of the twentieth century to 27%, while that 
of the USA and the Netherlands had increased from negligible amounts to 22%, and 20% 
respectively, in the same period. Italy and the Netherlands also became significant 
challengers to the dominance of Britain in the purchase of Nigerian groundnuts. In the early 
1960s, Nigeria also began to export timber, bananas and beniseed in significant quantities. 
Free trade continued to prevail in Nigeria for about two years after independence, but 
from 1962 onwards, Nigeria began its steady -evolution into the inward-oriented country it 
was to become. At the time, 68% of all large-scale industries were foreign-owned, 3% was 
privately owned by ýigerians, and the rest belonged to the federal and regional 
governments*"'. Nationalists' suspicion of Briiain's continuing post-economic influence on 
Nigeria resulted in a sustained political pressure which eventually forced the government to 
promulgate the Immigration Act of 1963 which restricted the number of foreign employees 
that a foreign entrepreneur could employ. This initially slowed down foreign trade, but it 
began to pick up in about 1965, only to become slowed again by two military coups in 1966, 
and a civil war from 1967-70, during which there were severe import restrictions in force. 
Local trade, particularly in agro-allied products, also suffered badly as the war destroyed a 
number of produce lands, some of which have never been farmed again. In addition, the 
2111 Ekundare (1973: 330). 
211 Fieldliouse (1986: 152-153). 
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Nigerian federal government imposed full economic sanctions against the breakaway eastern 
region, which also undermined local trade. By the time the war-time rq§trictions were lifted 
in 1970, severe, and in some cases, irreparable damage had been done to'the resources, 
morale and confidence of Nigerian crop farmers and such other entrepreneurs. The 
uncertainty of the 1960s therefore had a negative effect on Nigerian trade generally. The 
foreign capital in the economy was only being maintained by an international interest in the 
emerging oil industry. 
In the period immediately after the civil war, Nigeria still had an essentially agro- 
based economy. More than 70% of the labour force was employed in agriculture and about 
75 % of all agricultural products were internally consumed, and by implication, traded in 
locally. The rest were exported, mainly to Western Europe and the USA, and these earned 
between 60 %-75 % of Nigeria's foreign exchange revenue in and around the civil war years, 
that is 1965-1972. In this period, Nigeria was the world's biggest exporter of columbite and 
groundnuts, accounting for up to 95% and 36% of world trade in these products, 
respectively. Nigeria alsp exported 20% of the. wdrld's cocoa supply; 18% of the world's 
cotton seeds supply; 11% of the world's vegetable oil supply and 5% of the world's tin 
289 supply . 
The face of post-colonial Nigerian trade began to undergo its most drastic change in 
1971 when Nigeria, somewhat reluctantly, joined the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). The cartel adopted a uniform pricing strategy, and when the energy crises 
occurred in 1973, oil prices, which had been rising steadily since 1970, suddenly jumped 
from US$5.21 per barrel in July 1973 to US$22.60 per barrel by December 19732. 
211 Ektind-are (1973: 15-17). 
2"1 Turner (1978: 184). 
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Nigeria began to produce more oil at these higher prices to satisfy the growing international 
demand for oil. By 1974, despite the establishment of the Nigerian Export Promotion Council 
(NEPQ to boost other areas of Nigerian exporting, oil exports Were already"hecounting for 
90% of Nigeria's export eamings. 
5.6 The Present Times (1975 To Date). 
During the 1970s oil boom, Nigeria appeared to lose interest in, and virtually halted 
the production of every other mineral and agricultural product, and presently, although 
Nigeria's oil export revenue- has fallen from its peak of US$26.73 billion in 1980 to a low 
of about US$7 billion in 198711, and an estimated US$10.5 billion in 199511, the impact 
of oil has been such that in the thirty years to 1995, despite increased mechanization, cocoa 
production fell from 300, OGO tonnes per annum to, 135,000 tonnes per annuniý91; and tin 
production from 11,000 tonnes per annum to less than'100 t6nnes per annum. Exports of tin, 
bauxite, columbite, livestock and some of Nigeria's. other "traditional" exports have become 
sporadic and monetarily insignificant due to insufficient international demand, falling world 
prices, inadequate investments to enable the products remain internationally competitive, and 
an increasingly complacent economy as oil prices soared in the 1970s. 
On the import side, Nigerian trade has moved from being almost totally liberalized 
2"1 Financial Times (London) 16/3/92, section 3, p. 3 . 
2"1 Financial Times (London) 26/5/95, s. ection 3, p. 2 . 
2'3 About half of this, including small amounts of processed cocoa, is exported annually, 
earning about US$100 million per annum, (since 1993), and making it, although at a mere 
1.2%, the nation's second highest export earner. See further Financial Times (London) 
1/4/93, section 3, p. 9; Tell 23/10/95: 36-37; West Arrica 22/5 - 28/5/95: 807 . 
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in 1960 to being increasingly inward-oriented ever since. The effect of the 1963 Immigration 
Act has already been mentioned above in section 5.5 .A further in4igenization act - the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree - was promulgated in 1972 (there was a yet later one 
in 1977) largely to further the Nigerian private ownership cause. The assembly of a large 
number of domestic appliances, including televisiqn sets, radios, tape recorders (and so 
forth), the blending and bottling of alcoholic beverages, newspaper publishing, road haulage, 
the manufacturing of certain garments, and certain other enterprises were reserved for 
exclusive Nigerian ownership". In 1978, several products which were fonnerly produced 
locally but were now being imported were prohibited from being further imported by the 
Obasanjo administrationý" in order to stimulate local production. These products included 
certain luxury goods, textiles, cigarettes and foodstuff like maize and live poultry. Even so, 
by 1984, Nigeria was spending US$2 billion per annum on food imports alone mainly from 
the USA, the Netherlands, Britain, Malaysia ana Indonesia 296. In the 1986 and 1987 
budgets, the banned list Vas extended to include wheat, rice, vegetable oil, stockfish and 
palm oil. 
Successive Nigerian governments, especially those since the Buhari administratiorP 
have tried to stimulate local trade in these banned products and related goods. This has 
mainly taken the form of subsidising the local manufacture of banned imports and promoting 
291 The 1977 decree has since beenamended in a 1989 decree. Under it, there is only one 
schedule of forty businesses reserved for exclusive Nigerian ownership. Foreigners can now 
own 100% of new, unscheduled businesses with the exception of banking, insurance, mining 
and petroleum. There were further relaxations in the 1995 budget. 
2'15 1976-1979. 
2'16 Financial Times, London 16/3/92, section 3, p. 5 . 
2" 1983-1985. 
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the export potential of Nigeria's traditional (that is, pre-oil) exports - agricultural produce 
and industrial raw materials, such as cocoa and rubber, respectively, aý. well as the products 
of its much-maligned steel industry, expected, when established in the mid-1970s, to 
spearhead Nigeria's renewed dash for industrialization. 
This process is at the heart of the structural ýdjustment programme (SAP), begun in 
1986. On the social front, the SAP has resulted in public demonstrations and short, sporadic 
and largely unco-ordinated riots. Economically, the results are mixed. For instance, maize 
importation was banned in 1986. That has helped stimulate local production which is now 
estimated at about 2.5 million tonnes per annum, and comfortably meets the national maize 
demand. However, rice import prohibition which has helped push annual local production 
to about 600,000 tonnes (since 1991), up from 100,000 in 1983, still does not fully meet the 
local rice demand, besides which locally produced rice costs 30 % more (af 1992 prices) than 
it does on the international market. This has led to rice smuggling into Nigeria the volume 
of which is estimated at 1.50,000 tonnes per ann UM298 . Likewise, palm oil production 
has 
also increased from its 4960s high of 300,000. tohnes to 1991 levels of 700,000 tonnes, 
although no export takes place as yet because local demand alone is estimated at around 
900,000 tonnes per annum. There is consequently a smuggled trade in an estimated 100,000 
tonnes of Malaysian and Indonesian palm oil to plug the market short-fall. 
Curiously, products in which Nigeria has no "comparative advantage 11299 , and should 
by definition be importing, are also on the banned lists. An example of this is wheat, which 
is not well suited, climatically, for large-scale production in Nigeria. Prior to the 1987 
291 See FOS (1993) which contains details on other trends in food production and trade. 
cf. Financial Times (London) 16/3/92, section 3, p. 10 . 
299 within the meaning of 117 as discussed in chapter 2. 
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import ban, Nigeria imported 1.5 million tonnes annually from the USA. It was expected that 
the import ban would boost annual local production to about 300j000 tonnes, which would 
then be supplemented by production of maize as wheat substitute. However, local production 
has only ranged between 30,000 - 50,000 tonnes per annum. since 1987, with a trade in 
smuggled wheat estimated to involve up to 550,000 tonnes every year. Most of the wheat is 
purchased from across the borders in Cameroun and the Republic of Benin where wheat 
imports exceed local demand. 
Trade with the rest of Africa has never, since 1960, been formally actively developed. 
Even in the case of oil, exports to other African countries account for less than 8% of 
Nigeria's gross exports, compared with the USA (51 %) and Western Europe (34 %)31. 
Imports from other African countries barely constitute 1% of Nigeria's recorded gross 
imports. Within this, trade with the West African sub-region remains an enigma. Exports to 
the sub-region account, according'to official recordý, for 71.5 % of all African exports, while 
regional imports account for 7.6% of all African imports"'. 
In 1975, after almost a decade of drawn-ouf- negotiations, and under the patronage and 
encouragement of the governments of Togo, Ivory Coast and Nigeria, fifteen heads of West 
African governments (later rising to sixteen) signed the ECOWAS treaty in Lagos'12. At 
its inception, the ECOWAS was intended as a crucial vehicle for the stimulation of renewed 
3`1 Fedeml Office of Statistics (1993). 
3111 The figures for 1992, being the latest published figures as at August 1994,, were 
N9.88 billion, and N460 million, respectively (FOS 1993: 80). 
302 See Map 2. The member countries, in alphabetical order, are Benin, Burkina-Faso, 
Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Gambia, Gliana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Lcone and Togo. Tile treaty was signed 
on 28/5/1975. 
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industrialization in the sub-region. Article 2 of the treaty'01 reads: 
"It shall be the aim of the community to promote co-operation and development in 
all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields -o&jpdustry, transport, 
telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and 
financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purposes of raising the 
standard of living of its peoples... " 
The same article goes on to say that for these purposes, the ECOWAS shall ensure, among 
member states, the elimination of customs duties and other restrictions on the movements of 
goods and persons, the harmonization of agricultural, monetary, economic and such other 
policies including the development of a common commercial policy towards third countries. 
Despite various statements expressing a commitment to trade liberalization following 
the signing of the treaty, a formal Trade Liberalization Scheme (TLS)11 was not in fact 
agreed until June 1989, and even this has since suffered from implementation problems. The 
community's progressive development into a full customs union was expected to have been 
completed by 1990", but this has proven to be unattainable. In fact, for several reasons, 
many of them administrative, ECOWAS was soorf to lose the initiative in its objective of 
regional integration. However, with the advent of the Babangida administration" in 
Nigeria in 1985, the country took on a leading role in the attempted revitalization of an 
303 The treaty is reproduced in Nwachukwu (1991: 137-253). It was revised and re-ratifiled 
in Abuja, Nigeria in 1993. The new version retains most provisions of the original, while 
expanding others, and introducing some new ones, such as the proposed monetary union (cf. 
West Africa [no. 4050,22/5 - 28/5/95, p. 782], and Iyolia [1984: 31-37] for an analysis of 
the potential benefits of ECOWAS as a customs union). 
I'll Under the scheme, as approved in the Nigerian budget of 1991, twenty five products 
originating from any of the member states, including live animals, raw textile fibres, cereals, 
coffee, tea, vegetables, tobacco, some minerals (including crude oil, bitumen and crude 
fertilizers), and others, are to enjoy a 25% annual reduction of import duty until a zero rate 
is reached in the fourth year of operation of the scheme. 
I'll Article 12, ECOWAS Treaty, Lagos, 1975. 
3()6 1985-1993. 
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apparently tired ECOWAS. It provided a new secretariat and has since chaired the body on 
more occasions, and provided more of the running costs, than any other country in the 
region. The economic objectives of ECOWAS are once again at the forefront of 
intergovernmental discussions so much so that in the re-ratified version of the ECOWAS 
treaty, the trade objectives have undergone more. reworking than any other provisions of the 
original treaty. 
Nevertheless, several producers and traders across the region, have, especially since 
the 1980s, become increasingly involved in wholesale and retail trading across West Africa. 
How much of this is attributable to ECOWAS activities or initiatives is debatable. In any 
case, most of the trade is regarded as "unofficial", and so, no - appreciable records are 
kepOO'. But the continued existence of the trade demonstrates the existence of a market. 
Furthermore, since about 1990, overall agricultural production appears to have been steadily 
increasing in Nigeria, and limited exports of cocoa and some other "cash" products have 
begun in relatively small quantities across the borders to other West and Central African 
countries, although sorpe of this is illegal. The saýne applies to manufactured goods, where 
smuggled products are in direct competition with legal exports 101. _These 
products are 
mainly soap, beer and other beverages, household furniture, crafts, records, textiles, plastics, 
and other basic consumer goods. A great number of traders, including several thousand petty 
traders who mostly operate informally, are inyolved in this trade. The traders mostly use land 
routes, although some shipping and air carriage does take place. This cross-border trade is 
the main focus of this study, and is explored further, mainly in chapters 7 -and 8. 
3111 Officially, formal intra-ECOWAS trade was estimated at 4.4% of the region's total 
trade in the mid-1980s (1yolia 1987: 37), and is thought to be declining as a proportion of the 
region's overall trade (ECOWAS 1989: 14). 
308 Eleazu (1989: 27); Financial Times (London) 16/3/92, section 3, p. 5 . 
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5.7 Conclusion 
I have tried, by presenting the main body of this chapter as a-histoncal document, to 
show that the philosophy of trade and what Ekundare (1973: 383) calls "competitive 
capitalism" has been entrenched in Nig6rian entrepreneurship for several centuries. I 
subdivided the years after 1860 into relatively short periods primarily to demonstrate the fact 
that despite Nigeria's exposure to regular international trade for more than twelve centuries, 
the colonization of Nigeria (in particular the first thirty years), and the discovery of oil (in 
particular the 1970s oil boom) have probably had more effect in shaping Nigeria's present- 
day foreign trade patterns and practices than centuries of the trans-saharan and intra-regional 
trade. I have tried to show, in each of the time periods, how entrepreneurs have responded 
to changing socio-economic conditions, and indeed in certain cases, precipitate those 
situations. 
It was necessary to discuss the reasons behindi European occupation of Africa in order 
to substantiate my statement that colonization involved more than the mere perceived 
economic attractions of Africa. 
This leads one to ask to what extent colonization has influenced subsequent Nigerian 
economic development. That the British colonial government ruled over Nigeria in the period 
that saw Nigeria operate commercially as little more than an extension of the British 
economy is not in question. But if, as historical evidence tells us, the colonialists were 
content to let die existing economic philosophy continue (witha direction of the flow of trade 
towards Britain), is the colonization effect on the "LDC" status of present-day Nigeria not 
being over-stated? Academics disagree on the degree of influence that European colonization 
has had on Africa's economic development. They however seem to be agreed on the fact that 
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European colonies in Africa have not attained the level of development which the colonial 
governments envisaged in the 1950s and 1960s, when several African countries were being 
granted political independence, although many of those expectations ar&ably had doubtful 
foundations. 
The divisions appear to be based as much on academic, as they are on ideological 
differences. There is an essentially right-wing or conservative argument to the effect that 
colonization in fact provided the foundations for the growth of Africa. If Africans had been 
left to continue the trans-saharan trade, and other intra-regional trading arrangements 
uninterrupted, they would not have come into contact with European capital or technology 
which has actually helped develop Africa. It goes on to say that Africa does in fact possess 
comparative advantage in producing raw agricultural and mineral resources, and it was 
colonization which maximised the exploitation of Africa's main assets - land, labour and 
climate. Because of the political nature of Africa in the nineteenth century, it was necessary 
for Europe to impose colonial rule on Africa as comparable economic growth could not have 
been effected any other-'way. The present state of Africa's relative underdevelopment is then 
attributed by the right-wing school to the di sruptive effects of two world wars, and the long 
periods of economic depression in between, which affected the whole world 309 
Certain historians sympathetic to the African cause have dismissed such views as 
"racist clap-trap""', and seem instead to favour an essentiallY left-wing argument (which 
is generally adopted by marxist-oriented academics) that as colonies of Europe, African 
countries were manipulated into becoming nothing more than peripheral extensions of the 
"" See ftirther Myint (1980); Hallet (1974). 
11" Zeleza (1993: 13). 
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international capitalist economy"'. 
Since the 1970s, a third, somewhat median school of thought h2s arisen which asserts 
that neither political nor economic forces of colonialism proved strong enough to change 
Africans' enterprise instincts. The central argument here is that following the colonial period, 
Africans essentially remained peasant producers ývho got lured into the attractions of foreign 
capitalism, but did not thereby relinquish their indigenous economic background. They 
retained the choice to do so, and as they have not, their relative state of underdevelopment 
must be down to them, and not colonizationý 12 . 
Whatever the case may be, it would appear that there is a direct link between the 
erstwhile, and present-day (export) trading patterns, and in particular, for the purposes of this 
study, between the intra-regional trade of old, and the present-day cross-border trade. Then, 
as now, price imbalances, various protectionist practices, and even accidents of history 
created entrepreneurial opportunities which producers and traders alike were able to exploit. 
It was as much the case in West Africa as it was in eastern and southern Africa"'. In 
C 
Nigeria's case, from initially sporadic coastal. ex ort trading, through a more settled trans- 
saharan trade and the second coming of European coastal traders which laid much of the 
foundations for present-day trading patterns, the indigenous trading system has had to 
continually adapt to a changing world system. In all these cases, intra-regional West African 
trade was neither destroyed nor even diminished in importance. In fact, in certain periods 
such as the mid-nineteenth century, it seemed to become even more important as the 
premium on products like slaves and kolanut rose. This is mirrored by present-day economic 
"I See ftirther Rodney (1972); Obasi (1989); Wallerstein (1973). 
312 See further Fieldliouse (1978; 1986). 
313 See Sanderson (1985), Zeleza (1993). 
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realities which, as shown in sections 5.6 & 5.7, are once again forcing the region to look to 
itself in the search for new marketing and development opportunities. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. "-.. 
6.1 Introduction: Data Collection In Social Research. 
The main aims of the study were outlined in chapter 1. Between chapters 2 and 5, 
four disciplinary approaches to explaining the behaviour of the cross-border traders were 
examined. Each approach has been found to have important contributions to make to the 
understanding of entrepreneurial behaviour within the context of the cross-border trade. 
Together, they suggest some questions: 
* Who are the cross-border traders? 
* What do they trade in? 
* How do they carry out their trade / What facilitates the trade? 
* Are their trading processes entrepreneurial? 
. * How do they contribute to development processes? 
* Do these processes affect orthodox theory? 'If so, how? 
And such other questions. Simultaneously, certain limitations of eaclý approach to explain 
entrepreneurial behaviour within the given setting have also been apparent. This comes as 
no surprise, given the multi-facetedness of life itself. Afterall, "reality is an unbroken 
totality, a seamless robe, and is not compartmentalized into social and economic 
sPlieres""'. 
The central reason for these limitations, particularly in the case of trade and 
entrepreneurship models, would appear tobe the relative unfamiliarity of theorists with the 
314 Nafziger (1988: 128). 
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process of indigenous trade and indigenous entrepreneurship. This may, in turn, be due to 
the ahistorical approach they tend to take. Obviously, by their very nature, this is much less 
of a problem with the development and historical perspectives. &It-the overly macro 
approach of several development theorists, as argued in chapter 3, is liable to result in 
incorrect understanding of micro-processes, while historical perspectives, which can be 
fundamentally important as a means to an end, would appear to be much less so as an end 
in themselves. 
What I believe the foregoing have done, from an analytic point of view, is expose the 
fact that very little is known about the subject matter, while at the same time pointing us in 
the direction to take in achieving the understanding we seek. However, at this stage, given 
the extent (or lack of it) of existing knowledge on the subject matter, it is important to make 
attaining this understanding our first major undertaking. It would, for this same reason, be 
inappropriate to impose too rigid, a conceptual framework on its study. In a relatively new 
area of study, the gaining of well-grounded insights, into the phenomenon under study seems 
to me to be of paramount importance, and one"must be mindful of not falling into the traps 
of ethnocentricity. 
With these in mind, the present chapter proposes to see how the aims of the study 
were operationalized in terms of the fieldwork. 
The indispensable part of any form of social research is the collection (or creation) 
of data. What however counts as data in any given study is any material that researchers 
perceive as necessary for the furtherance or achievement of their research objectives. This 
is not an overly broad statement (as a methodological purist might think) when one considers 
that "data" has been held to include materials as diverse as demographic statistics, housing 
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plans, folk customs, art, and imaginative literature"'. 
The data collection process in this study is summarized 6elowin fig. 6.1. 
315 Stone (1977), cited in Ackroyd & Hughes (1992: 27). In David McClelland's 
seminal publication, The Achieving Society (1961), tile "data" relied on by the author and his 
associates included folk tales, childrens' tales, various statistical analyses, psychological tests, 
interviews, archaeological evidence, and so forth. 
180 
Fig. 6.1 THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
Nature Of Trade 
Recorded Patterns And 
Extent Of Trade, 
i. e. broad assessment 
from official records 
I.. 
Observed Patt6, mls 
Of Trade' 
Mechanics Of 
Trade And Role 
Of Entrepreneurs 
Case Studies Of Survey Of Export- 
Cross-Border Oriented 
Trade Activities Manufacturers 
And Traders 
Environmental Issues 
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Interviews With 
Policy Planners; 
Business Community 
Implications 
or Trade 
ComPare To 
Official 
Records 
Social research is far too wide in its coverage for one method of data collection to 
suffice in all situations. This, in my opinion, affects some of the more spurious arguments 
on the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research methods, 'm particular those 
of choice of method. While there are certainly important differences between both styles (as 
is well documented in the literature)'16 , and certain methodologists advocate certain 
methods because those are the only ones they are familiar WiO17, it nevertheless seems 
perfectly normal to me that a researcher in any given study may adopt either or both 
approaches"'. 
The techniques discussed below in sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 have all been employed 
in this study. Different methods have different strengths, and they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. As Denzin says: 
"No single method is free from flaws - no single method will adequately handle all 
the problems of causal analysis ... no single method will yield all the data necessary for a theory's test""'. 
Each method ought to be exploited for its strehgths in the light of the research 
problem. 
The emphasis in this study" is on flexibility and inventiveness. This is not to be 
misconstrued as sloppiness of method. Pearson's point in this area is well taken. In arguing 
3 11 A full discussion of this issue is available from a number of sources, including 
Silverman (1985); Harnmersley (1989); Bryman (1984; 1988) and Marsh (in Bulmer [ed. ] 
1984). See also further discussions of individual methods in Mitchell (1983); Long & van 
der Ploeg (1988; 1989); Halfpenny (1979). 
31' H. W Smith (1975: 272 [cited in Ackroyd & Hughes 1992: 162]). 
318 cf. Bryman (1984); Gadourek (1976). 
319 Denzin (1970: 3). 
321) . as is the case in the actor-oriented paradigm, discussed below in section 6.4 . 
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that being in the right place at the right time is just as important in field-work as skill and 
technique, he writes that 
"There can be few if any hard-and-fast rules for the successful conduct of 
ethnographic research, other than a commitment to the maintenance, sustenance, and 
adequacy of one's information-base and the veracity of one's attempts to render this 
accessible to a wider audience""'. 
This is not as simple as it is presented, as the specific techniques employed with 
respect to this study illustrate. The main point of undertaking research is to contribute to 
knowledge in a certain discipline or area, and a given research project may have one or more 
research problems. It is the specific research problem that ought to determine which approach 
or strategy will best serve it. There ought not to be a rigid pre-selection of the techniques of 
data collection before the research process itself is begun. What is necessary in all cases is 
an awareness, first of the research problem, and secondly of the issues involved in working 
within each of the traditional research strategies. -The strategy ought always to follow the 
research problem, and not the other way round. Furthermore, specific data collection 
C 
techniques, such as qu6stionnaires or observations, need not be tied to specific research 
strategies. To do that would be to effectivel y deny the dynamism of the environment one is 
studying, and the initiative which researchers must (at least from time to time) demonstrate, 
especially when one is in the field. Unfortunately, however, as Bulmer (1984: 5-6) notes, 
"research methods are sometimes taught as if they were a set of skills, rather like 
those of cookery or Yehicle maintenance... This is a misleading way of presenting 
research methods, which should always be Yiewed in the context of the problems and 
theories which they are used to illuminate". 
A hybrid strategy may well be the most effective way to approach certain research 
121 Pearson (1993: ix). 
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issues. It is quite often employed by researchers, in particular by social researchers 322 . 
Indeed, the present study adopts such a strategy. Although the in--dept4. interviews and such 
other techniques on which reliance have been placed in this study may be styled 
"qualitative", I nevertheless felt it necessary to undertake some statistical ("quantitative") 
surveys to address certain issues in some parts of-the study where, to my mind, an awareness 
of the frequency of certain events (as opposed to their "meaning" cf. Van Maanen 1983: 9) 
was deemed necessary for the purposes Of MY Study. I will illustrate this with the following 
account: 
At a stage during my field research, I wanted to find out whether the sales of a firin 
I was studying was mainly to traders or to end users, as the firm itself did not seem sure. 
I therefore conducted a short, structured interview with all the firm's customers that came 
in over a period of two days -which indicated that the firm's customers were mainly re- 
sellers'2'. This complemented, rather than detracted, from my main observation-based study 
of the firm. 
Data, does not exist in isolation. It needs* to be constructed. According to Bateson 
. 
(1984: 15), the proper construction of data ought to be based on the following four factors: 
(i) The social world about which knowledge is sought 
(ii) The respondents from whom data are obtained 
322 Wallis' (1977) study of the Church of Scientology for instance involved using a 
questionnaire, conducting formal interviews, and some direct observation during a brief 
training period. cf. Robson (1993: 54-55) for illustrations of research projects that employed 
multiple strategies in studies concerning, respectively, stress in the workplace, and the 
treatment of kidney dialysis patients; And Yin (1989) on die versatility of the case study 
method, as lie discusses how it can be used to fulfil various research purposes. 
`23 This illustrates the process described by Casley & Lury as the "ad hoc" survey. The 
niethod is examined in some detail in Casley & Lury (1981: 54-56). 
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(iii) The researcher himself 
The researcher's intended audience. 
It is therefore sometimes suggested that perhaps a multi-method approach to the study 
of single subjects will lead to a fuller understanding of that subject. This proposal is however 
based, not so much on flexibility, as on totality of approach. One such proposal, referred to 
by Denzin (1970), one of its proponents as "triangulation", requires that for the construction 
of data 
"empirical events must be examined from the vantage provided by as many methods 
as possible"324 . 
Although not without its own methodological problems", triangulation, if merely 
for its fullness, boasts the potential to produce more valid data. Present trends however 
indicate that its costs, both in material and professional terms, makes it more likely that it 
is not an approach that will be practised widely. The present emphasis would appear instead 
to be on a more flexible application of "conventional" methods such as observations and 
surveys, whose cornerstone is the researche? s 'freedom, . unlike previously, to use these 
methods in conjunction with one another to shed light on the research-problem, as he sees 
fit326. 
321 Denzin (1970: 3). 
325 cf. Ackroyd & Hughes (1992: 172-173); Brewer & Hunter (1989: 82-83). 
12' Bulmer [ed. ] (1984); Long & Long [eds. ] (1992), Wallis (1977); Robson (1993). 
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6.2 Techniques Of Data Collection. 
As mentioned earlier in section 6.1, several individual data collection techniques have 
been used in this study. In this section, the major individual techniques employed will be 
briefly examined under the general headings of primary and secondary data collection 
techniques. 
6.2.1 Primary Data Collection Techniques. 
Data may be described as "primary" when it has been obtained by the researcher first 
hand ftom a sample population. The major primary data collection techniques employed in 
this study, described below, are questionnaireý, interviews, and observations. 
6.2.1.1 Questionnaires 
These are among the most widely applied techniques of social research. I used them 
in my study mainly to indicate broad demographic profiles of the kinds of firms and owner- 
managers covered in my field-study. My questionnaires were self-completion ones. However, 
owing to the relative underdevelopment of the Nigerian postal service, I personally had to 
distribute and collect each form, rather than have them posted. 
The major advantages of using questionnaires would appear to include, among ofliers, 
having a potentially wide geographical coverage; standardizing questions (to eliminate 
internal bias), and guaranteeing respondents' anonymity (thereby increasing the chances of 
obtaining truthrul answers). Piloting can also be done in order to obtain the most effective 
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wording and targeting of the questionnaire. 
There are further advantages in administering the questionnaiýes personally, the way 
I did. For instance, I was able to explain the objectives of the survey to the apparent 
satisfaction of the respondents, and provide such other help as was required of mO27; I 
mostly met the respondents at their work-places,. thereby eliminating the problem (as stated 
in Moser & Kalton 1971: 258) of the respondent not being around when the surveyor, as it 
were, calls. 
This being a self-completion questionnaire, respondents are given time to consider 
their opinions before giving them, which can be particularly beneficial when they have to 
remember dates, figures or mentally weigh their attitudes. Finally, especially in cases where 
there is relatively little contact between the surveyor and the respondent, some respondents 
are more willing to answer personal questions and provide more critical comments on a self- 
completion questionnaire, away from the gaze of the surveyor"'. 
The questionnaire method of data collection is not without its disadvantages: A major 
one being its inflexibility. One ordinarily cannot piobe an ambiguous or reticent answer once 
the questionnaire is filled in and returned. Yet intuition suggests that on most issues, some 
people will have stronger or weightier opinions that others, 
-none 
more so than in questions 
of attitude. As Ackroyd & Hughes (1992: 165) express it, 
327 cf. Ognibene (1970: 18). This fact is reflected in the response rates achieved by the 
study. Tile pilot survey in January 1994 achieved a 100% response rate. While die actual 
study can lay no such claims, I should mention that the overall response rate of 56.11% 
which it does achieve, could have been higher but for the socio-political tension in Nigeria, 
which has been simmering since June 1993, and escalated at various points during 1994, 
making it impossible to reach some respondents for the return of the questionnaires. A 
summary of the crises' impact on the field-study is provided in section 1.7 above. 
'21 Moser & Kalton (1971: 258); Hoinville et al (1978: 125). 
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flunless we let [respondents] speak for themselves, and go to considerable lengths 
when doing so, we will always distort the way they actually think. By the use of 
questionnaires in particular, we may be foisting on respondents attitudes on subjects 
about which they have very little concern, or tying -their answers to specific 
11329 alternatives on subjects where their opinions are very subtle'ihdeed 
This particular issue has however been dealt with here by the backing up of each 
completed questionnaire, at the point of reception, by a face-to-face interview structured 
around the questions asked in the questionnaire, during which any apparent ambiguities were 
discussed 130 . This exercise has also elhninated the need to discard any questionnaires 
because of response error. 
A further disadvantage is the time a questionnaire survey of the sort that I conducted 
can take. Not only are they subjected, as are all self-completion questionnaire surveys, to the 
time lags that can occur while one waits for an "acceptable response ratet? 331 to be reached, 
in my own case, I had to personally hand out each questionnaire, answer all attendant 
questions that each respondent had for me, and fol, low-up the progress of each questionnaire 
by personal visits. Doing this by telephone was. larg. ply impossible as the telephone is not yet 
a commonly available (and efficiently run) s6rvice in Nigeria. These certainly slowed the 
process. However, many of the follow-up v- isits, even when not actually producing the 
questionnaires, produced several insightful conversations useful for thE development of the 
ethnography and so were ultimately not a waste of time. 
Other disadvantages of the questionnaire method have to do with a lack of knowledge 
121 Brackets mine. cf. Reisman (1958: 360) "coverage and comparability [of 
questionnaires] mean that the same questions will be asked of those who are virtually "know 
nothings" and those who could write a book on each theme". 
1311 See Appendices Dii and Eii for a schedule of the interviews. 
"I According to McNeil (1990: 40-41), this would be a response rate of at least 30% - 
40%. In fact, this study achieved an overall response rate of 56.11 %. How this was done 
is explained in section 6.5 below. 
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about the respondent's circumstances at the time of answering the questions which could have 
affected the quality of the answers supplied"', or even whethqý it was the intended 
respondent that actually filled in the questionnaire"'. Various authors have suggested ways 
in which the design and layout of the questionnaire can be manipulated to minimize such 
effects"'. Others, like Ackroyd & Hughes (1ý992)... argue from a more philosophical 
standpoint, to the effect, first that data emanating from surveys ought to be viewed as 
indicative, and not definitive evidence, and secondly, that in order to be viewed more as the 
latter, they ought, where possible, to be supplemented with other kinds of data, especially 
about the social life (or "life world") under investigation. However, while it might be safe 
to assume that all researchers are keen to eliminate sub-standard research, it is unlikely that 
researchers inherently favouring the survey method will be willing to accept this 
recommendation, which appears to call into question the use of the method as a whole. 
Nevertheless, this has been done here, although in this case, it is the survey which has been 
used to supplement the other methods on whic *h 
greater reliance has been placed. Bateson's 
(1984) recommendation that psychologists be moie involved in studies aimed at discovering 
conditions which are more likely to elicit reliable data from respondents may be more 
welcome in theory, but of course carrying this out in practice, in the light of what is known 
332 1 have in mind here Agnew & Pyke's point that "on a questionnaire, we only have 
to move the pencil a few inches to shift our scores from being a bigot to being a 
humanitarian". This sounds rather dramatic, but the point remains that based on a 
questionnaire response, respondents may end up being classified as something they are not 
simply because they, and the questionnaire designer have attached different meanings to a 
question wording, with no opportunity for clarification. 
333 Hoinville et al (1978: 126-127) contains examples of such instances. 
311 See for instance Billet (1991: 66-80); Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 119-121); Robson 
(1993: 243-250); Marsh (1984: 97-98). 
335 cf. Bateson (1984) 
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about some of the limitations of the questionnaire method, and surveys in general, would be 
a difficult exercise indeed. 
6.2.1.2 Interviews. 
A research interview is one in which a researcher asks a respondent questions 
concerning issues relevant to the research. Some writers have proclaimed it the "best 
method" of data collectiorP. This might be a contentious assertion but it certainly is one 
of the most important sources of case study infonnatioOl, finding particular application 
with sociologists. It would appear to be best employed when a considered opinion is sought 
in response to a question or when a particular response needs further clarification. As 
Burgess (1982: 107) puts it: 
"[The interview provides an]... opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to 
uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to serve vivid, 
accurate, inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience" 
It is this ability to probp for new insights that distffiguishes interviews from, say, open-ended 
questionnaires. 
In an oft-quoted paper, Benny & Hughes (1984) have stated that two underlying 
assumptions characterize the interview. The first is the "Fiction or convention" of equality 
of the interviewer and the respondent, at least for the duration of the interview. By this they 
mean that any apparent inequalities, such as in age,. status, or intelligence, must be 
minimized. Interviewers are not enjoined to act ignorant, but rather to demonstrate just 
336 cf. Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 72). 
-'-" Yin (1989: 88) 
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enough knowledge to direct ilic interview"'. Rcspondents ought to bc allowed to fi-ccly 
state their views without "delli, "I, contradiction, competition or other luarassment'13-19. 
The second assumption is that of' "Comparability" in which the authors argue that a 
single interview, by itself has no nicaning, unless viewed in the context of other interviews 
in which similar issues have been discussed. Thisjt ought to be said, is not necessarily the 
case in all interviews, however, in certain interviews, it is necessary to view inforniation 
obtained as social variables, as opposed to details about the respondent. It would 
subsequently be necessary to focus on those aspects which are generalizable across a range 
of interviews"O. 
There are various types of interviews, often classified according to the degree of 
standardization of the format and content of the questions asked. The four types of interviews 
adopted here, in decreasing order of standardization, are structured, semi-structured, focused, 
and unstructured interviews. At vqrious. times during my fieldwork, I found it useful to adopt 
each of these techniques. 
In a structured interview, the interviewer is permitted little room to vary the format 
or content of the interview from one respondent to another. This is so it cannot be said that 
responses have been affected by the framing of the question. This technique is commonly 
employed in statistical surveys, but not as much in field research. Having said that, I adopted 
it myself in an ad-hoc survey of buyers from one of my case subjectS311. I used that method 
338 cf. Burgess (1982: 107). 
339 Benny & Hughes (1984: 219-220). 
340 Cf. Jones (1985: 107). 
341 See appendix A, case 4. The interview schedule referred to here is contained in 
appendix F. 
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at the time because I only needed to indicate a fact, not probe an opinion, and it Nvas 
relatively cheap to set up, required a minimum of time and effort, and did not significantly 
distract from my main observation-based study of the rirm. 
A send-structured inteiview arguably covers die widest area between the two extremes 
of the structured and unstructured interview. Here, the interviewer is likely to be following 
a set list of questions but is free to probe beyond them as long as he feels necessary. How 
deep die probing is, and how long it goes on for depends on how willing the respondent is 
for these to occur. I adopted this method in my interviews with public officials and members 
of the OPS, most of which tended to be formal and pre-arranged. I also adopted it on a 
number of occasions with the principal subjects of my case studies, in particular for the 
formal interviews which I conducted with them, usually in their own homes. 
Thefocused interview shares many ýimilarities with both toe unstructured, and the 
A 
semi-structured interview. For irlstance, like the unstructured interview, it may adopt a 
conversational modO"; And like the semi-structured interview, it may involve interviewing 
from a set pool of questions"'. The focused interview differs mainly in the amount of 
control exercised by the interviewer. The respondent is left with plenty of freedom to move 
the discussion as suits his desires. 
Burgess (1984) provides an apt illustration with respect to interviewing a group of 
school children: 
"Before each interview began, I explained that I had an "agenda" of topics that I 
wanted to cover. However, I indicated that there was no requirement for us to cover 
all my topics and themes in one session nor to cover these topics in a particular 
342 Merton & Kendal (1951). 
"I Yin (1989ý'-`----.. 
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order"344 . 
sometimes applied this method in the field whenever I unexpectedly came across an 
informant. This generally applied to "unofficial" border persoilliel, some hawkers and other 
traders, and in particulars traders and officials outside Nigeria. I also used the metliod to 
acconipany my questionnaires. 
The imsti-tictured inteMew has been described as "conversations with a purpose""'. 
It is particularly favoured by eflinographers, and a large part of its appeal is that it can be 
conducted as an ordinary, infornial conversation", although this is not always necessarily 
so 347 . This 
is a method that I employed with Yirtually eyery informant that I encountered 
at one time or anotlier during my field-study. It was a particularly useful tool for my case 
studies when interviewing my principal respondents' subordinates, (occasionally) family 
members and other associates, as well asborder officials. 
.1 
The questions in an unstru. ctured interview generally are descriptive, as part of its 
purpose is to assist respondents explore their own beliefs"'. It is however more than a 
mere conversation. Directing such a "conversation as interview" while introducing 
ethnographic elements requires rigorous preparation and a high level of alertness on the part 
of the interviewer who, sometimes, would need to generate both questions and answers from 
respondents, or be aware when a respondent has provided these 349. This is an iMportant 
Burgess (1984: 107). 
341 Burgess (1984: 102). 
346 Spradley (1979); MacGaffey (198ý). 
341 Hanunersley & Atkinson (1983). 
341 Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 74) 
349 
cf. Spradley (19L79.84). 
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aspect that is likely to confront scycral etlinographers early on in the field. After my principal 
custonis informant first introduced me to her colicagues in their offices at the 
Nigerian/Beninoise border at Idi-Iroko, getting to know them well enougli to hold 
"conversations as interviews" was a slow process indeed. They have a very low reputation 
with cross-border travellers generally, a fact of which they are well aware. They flierefore 
tend to be quite defensive in answering questions about their jobs, or even their perceptions 
of their own roles in the trade. Because they soon got used to my visits, I was eventually 
able to do some initially discreet observation. Most of the information they did give was 
either unwittingly supplied or as a result of interviews started by chance. On an occasion for 
instance, following the usual small talk, an officer remarked that he would be doing no 
"favours", on that day, for people importing vehicles into Nigeria. This provoked a reaction 
from two other officers, and what followed'Was a debate that provided insights into their 
perceptions of their jobs, and their day-to-day dealings with cross-border traders. 
There are some problems with the interview method, many of which centre around 
the validity or reliability of the data obtained from it. 
was aware, in carrying out my interviews that certain respondents like to "suss out" 
the interviewer, and this, at least in the initial instance, may affect the quality of their 
response. They may refrain from fully speaking their mind, or otherwise expressing their 
opinioný11. McClelland's (1965: 89-92) study on achievement motivation indicated that 
people cannot be trusted to be entirely forthcoming about what their motives are. What I did 
to minimize this with each of my case respondents in particular, since I conducted multiple 
interviews with them, was to sometimes seek clarification for views earlier expressed. Some 
other times, I would merely rephrase certain questions previously asked in order to establish 
351 Whyte (194*: 1,04)ý Easterby-Smith (1991: 76-77). 
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the reliability of' the view expressed. I would say to a respondent, words to the elTect of' 
"You said [this] the last time. Can you please explain further what you meant? ". People 
generally seemed happy with this approach, as it showed fluat their views and opinions were 
being taken seriously. 
It is important that the respondent is "broadly" representative of a category of 
persons. I tried to deal witli this by selecting my case respondents from my survey 
population, representing every category of respondent. 
Being Yoruba from Western Nigeria, my understanding of the language and culture 
was enormously advantageous for the conduct of the interviews, and indeed various other 
aspects of the study"'. I mostly conducted my interviews in Yoruba, English and Pidgin 
English. These are by no means an exhaustive list of languages spoken throughout South- 
Western Nigeria (or in Ghana, Togo or Benin Republic, for that Matter) but remarkably, 
most people involved in commerce right across all these places have learnt one or more of 
these languages, in particular Pidgin English, as a second language'52. I only occasionally 
needed to use interpreters, and this tended to be restricted to particular situations in Togo and 
Benin Republic. As time went on, I learnt to hold "discussions" with traders, border 
personnel, and other people on the ground, and request "interviews" with academics, the 
OPS, and public officials. I expunged the word "customer" from my questionnaires and 
learnt to interpret it in context after realizing at the piloting stage that traders freely use the 
351 cf. Deutscher (1984: 233-234). 
352 Having said that, the Yorubas are the largest ethnic group in South-Westem 
Nigeria, and there are significant numbers of Yoruba communities right across West Africa, 
particularly in Ghana and the Republic of Benin. Pidgin English has virtually evolved into 
a language by itself, based essentially on the English language but also incorporating words 
and phrases or a recontextualization of such from Yoruba, Hausa and Ibo, as well as other 
words created for tlý'bxclusive purposes of the language. 
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word to represent not only buyers, but their suppliers as Nvell, and this can occur in the same 
sentence. 
The interview is, in conclusion, not the perfect method, but to my mind (having 
benefitted from various data collection techniques), its ability to maximize die richness of 
data constitutes a "large and significant gain" over unalloyed quantification for the purposes 
of this stud y353 
6.2.2 Secondary Data Collection Techniques. 
Data is defined for the purposes of this study as "secondary" when it lias not been 
obtained first-hand by the researcher but is already in existence at the time he comes to use 
them. It would normally have been producýd for use other than. th'e researcher's. They 
sometimes have the advantage of having. been produced from a census of the entire 
population or from large samples well beyond the resources of the individual researcher. 
One may also choose to carry out a further analysis of an existing data set for the 
purpose of reaching an additional, or different conclusion from the original report. This 
process is sometimes referred to as "secondary analysis 1354 . 
The most obvious examples of secondary data in this study are the publications 
referred to at various points in the study on areas such as export behaviour theories, patterns 
of Nigeria's external trade, entrepreneurship theories, research methods, and so forth. 
Because each of these areas is so wide in itself, attention has been primarily paid to them, 
only in so far as they directly affect this study. Reliance has also been had on other pre- 
353 Ackroyd & Hughes (1992: 119). 
354 Bulmer (1984,134); Robson (1993: 282). 
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existing Sources including newspaper reports, niaps, iicNvs magazines, and an internal report 
from one the case subjeCtS353. 
In referring to statistical records froin Nigcria, particularly on patterns of external 
trade, I have relied mainly on die following: 
(i) The Federal Office Of Statistics Review Of The Nigerian Economy 1992 (1993). 
(ii) The Annual Abstract Of Statistics (1991 edition). 
These were the latest and most comprehensive data on the Nigerian economy, 
published by the Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, as at August 1994. 
The relative dearth of statistical records is a point referred to elsewhere in this 
stud y356. Indeed, it is one of the reasons why more studies of this nature need to be carried 
out in Nigeria. 
6.3 Towards A Reflexive Ethnography. 
I commenced my study with a positivist frame of mind. In the early days of preparing 
to leaye for the field, my main concern was whether I would be able to obtain enough "data" 
to carry out my analysis. I worried considerably over this, and studied various research 
techniques texts. 
I had my first major doubts about this approach even before I left for the field when, 
turning to the literature on West African trade history and related issues, I realized that the 
various local actors that the study would touch on had more complex relationships with one 
355 that is, case 6. 
356 See section 1.1 . Ajakaiye (1985: 267-268) illustrates some of the difficulties of 
obtaining compreliqlsive, or up-to-date secondary statistical data in Nigeria. cf. MacGaffey 
(1987: 7-8) for similar experiences in Zaire. 
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another than a casual glance might suggest. Amidst their expressed unity of' puipose 
(development of external trade), there is such diversity of action by the local actors that 
cannot be adequately represented or discussed in questionnaires. This was ultimately borne 
out in the field. I attempted to fill the gaps, as it were, with my focused interviews, but I Nvas 
always conscious of a need to see the arena as the traders themselves saw it, and to actually 
see the traders do the diings they said they did. 
The literature eventually led me to various anthropology-based approaches, which 
seemed to me to be capable of providing the kind of insight that I sought. I then committed 
myself to an actor-oriented approach to the field-study, but in fact remained quite unaware 
of the epistemological difficulties that this would present. 
On getting to the field, I began to ask myself why, if as most of the actors said, they 
were doing their best to develop the trade"(or', at least their bit of it),,. did they think- the other 
actors were such saboteurs? Why. for instance (following my eýxploratory interviews), did 
cross-border traders seem so inherently suspicious of the government's every trade policy? 
Why did they take such risks with their finances, health and even personal liberty? How did 
they physically carry on the trade anyway? What made them continue to pursue this trade 
inspite of seemingly overwhelming environmental odds? Why were they so dismissive of the 
trading activities of the "organized private sector" (OPS)? I felt that in order to provide 
answers for questions like these, I needed to see the social arena as the traders themselves 
saw it. It was imperative to enter the lifeworlds of these actors at the basic everyday level 
in order to get a clear picture of the daily struggles, decisions and negotiations which their 
existence entail. It would have been easier, but far less revealing, to seek explanations in 
terms of personality types or "strictly" rational arguments, because this would have meant 
glossing over the complexities of the situation. 
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Each of' tile local actors has a Contrasting view of* the "reality" ortiie sociai arena. 
I will briefly illustrate this with the following: The eross-border traders For instance tend to 
see themselves as oppressed by government agents, and envied by the OPS; The government 
believes it strikes the right balance between issuinP I populist trade policies, and complying 
with the particulars of the world bank-supported SAP; while the OPS is of the view that the 
government is not doing enough to provide industries Nvith necessary infrastructural support, 
and that local traders, and cross-border traders in particular, siphon its potential export 
"profits". It wants a market economy of the kind run in Western Europe and the USA, so 
long as these are liberally spiced with doses of government subsidy and import protection. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that notions of structural adjustment, state assistance, external 
trade, entrepreneurship, and so forth, are differently constructed by each of these groups. 
Being allowed into the local actors' lifeworlds, although ultimately fruitful, was not 
easily attained. As previously mentioned, seven businesses are featured in my ethnography. 
These include one NINE (case 7), one family-owned medium-scale manufacturing firm (case 
6), two other owner-managed manufacturing (cases 4& 5) and three trading firms (cases I- 
3). The development of my ethnography was dependent on my ability to develop relationships 
with certain key informants without whom access to other local actors would have been 
considerably more difficult. 
For instance, I initially met the chief executive of the MNE quite by accident in a 
social setting after several unsuccessful attempts to proceed through official channels. I was 
thereafter granted unfettered access to the company's offices, factories and personnel. On 
another occasion, after several fruitless trips to Oshodi market in Lagos, I found out I was 
not making any significant progress with the traders because I had not obtained "clearance" 
from the Iyaloja (market womens' leader) who was greatly influential in the market, a fact 
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of which I had not been aware, and which is not an official requirement. This I eventually 
did however, and once I was able to demonstrate this to the rest of the traders, as well as 
show that I was not from the police or the local council, they freely talked. In fact, many of 
thern seenied to relish our meetings. Quite unexpectedly, sorne of thern were willing to talk 
in some detail about their finances, although in several cases it took up to two monflis for 
us to get that far. 
A typical day started at about 6 ami because traders have such early starts to the day. 
I would nomially spend the first two or three hours attending to the statistical survey that I 
was carrying out. Thereafter, it was on to the government departments or parastatals, banks, 
and such other bodies for scheduled interviews or to obtain secondary data. I would then split 
the rest of die day between two or three "informant" individuals and/or firms. I would also 
spend the evenings after tea-time with informants, although these Were not necessarily in a 
working environment. I frequently worked seven day weeks, although Sundays were spent 
more relaxedly conducting (mostly taped) interviews at informants' homes 
I have no doubt that I impacted on my informants' lifeworlds, and that they did on 
mine. I know I directly, though often unwittingly, affected the decision making process of 
some of my informants on occasions, just as I know I was heavily dependent on them for 
gaining certain insights into the cross-border trade. I may have thought I was the one 
enroling them into my ethnographic project, but there is no doubt that I was more or less 
enroled into theirs as well, and this mutual enrolment helped shape my ethnographic text. 
357 While I did in fact have days 'like the preceding account depicts, it is more 
accurately described as a composite of field experiences that I routinely had while in Nigeria, 
as certain days were unavoidably different. Sometimes, for instance, I travelled to the border 
posts, or even beyond; sometimes interviews or particular events overran or were cancelled. 
occasionally, I was ill or took the odd fatigue-induced weekend break from the field. The 
political tension irL., Nigeria, especially in July and August 1994, sometimes affected 
previously laid plans. 
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This is NvIly I lenn my ethnography "retlexive"--', l, and I am of' the opinion that the 
accessing of . each others' lifeworlds by the researcher and researched iniluciices the research 
process beyond the actual field study and analysis stage. 
Back from the field, I was forced to start to diink of die mass of inforination I had 
obtained in analytical form, for instance, producing a working model of the cross-border 
trade from my experiences and die accounts of various local actors that I had interacted with 
for a period of eight months. I wondered how ethical I was to have "allowed" personal 
experiences in the field to impact on my ethnographic analysis and found reassurance in the 
literature on interpretiye fonns of understanding. Preyious accounts of ethnographic projects 
such as those of the various contributors to Hobbs & May ([eds. ) 1993), and others, such as 
Caplan (in Oakley & Calloway [eds. ] 1992), Rapport (1991) as well as the social construction 
ideas of Shutz (1967), Strauss (1978), Steier (1991), Denzin (1989), 4nd others, comfortingly 
reassured me that my field trip ha. d been a useful exercise. Frederick Steier, in particular, 
argues persuasively that social research be looked upon as a "translation process" for field 
experiences, and Norman Denzin continues in the same vein with arguments about the 
analytic strengths of what he calls "interpretative interactionism"I", a six-step process of 
social analysis which starts with framing the research question, and then proceeds to the 
deconstruction, capture, bracketing, construction and contextualization of various field 
experiences, from which generalizations, themes or hypotheses may be built up. 
Cohen (1992) takes the point about reflexivity of ethnographic studies slightly further 
in his article about nineteen years of fieldwork done in the Shetlands. He argues that 
358 as opposed to, say, "critical" which appears to me to be more suited to action 
research in the sense that such an ethnographic approach seeks to change the field or cultural 
setting which it describes. See further Thomas (1993). 
359 closely relaiýd,. fbr most practical purposes, to symbolic interactionism. 
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continuous extrancous experiences as well -'Is eth, 1091-11pliers' memories unavoidably colour 
the analysis and writing-up of our fieldnotes, but that this is a natural process, and not 
"bias". He ternis this process " post-field work fieldwork". In his view, 
"It is in the nature of anthropological analysis and writing that our 
headnotes"O continue to develop and to construct our informants long after we have 
11361 
ceased to observe and consult them 
No matter how immersed we become in the lifeworlds of our informants, it is our 
duty as researchers, whether or not in practice we are able to fully detach ourselves from our 
field experienceS362 to stand back and reflect upon our experiences and information, and 
provide a conceptual analysis for our audience. In this way, we help shape a less ethnocentric 
idea of field "reality". The resulting ethnographic text, to quote Hans Seur, "... is more than 
an interpretative perfonnance. It is the product of analytical work which is expressed in its 
thematic organization into chapters and sections and through the construction of the 
argument. It does not only describe a set of relationships, it also intends to say something, 
to provide illumination on aspects of -social life that -belong to a reality which the 
ethnographer has had the opportunity to be part of, but which afterall is not his own""'. 
360 defined for our purposes here as. reconstructions from memory of field events or 
experiences. 
361 Cohen (1992: 345). cf. Oakley (1992: 17); Davis (1984: 304). 
362 
as wonder Stebbins (1991) and Gallmeier (1991). 
363 Seur (1992: 79)" - 
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6.4 The Actor-Oriented Paradigm. 
As a research philosophy, the actor-oriented approach is more phenomenolop ., 
ical (that 
is, proceeding from a world view that "reality" is socially constructed)" than positivist 
(that is, proceeding from a world view that reality is external and objective)"', although 
is it recognised that in practice, elements of both philosophies are often adopted". 
Although not fully presented in theory form as a research approach until relatively 
recently, die actor-oriented paradigm, along with others, has been in employment as a 
counterpoint to structural (that is, externally focused) analysis since the 1970S367. 
Therefore, it is by no means a novel idea 368 . Certainly, researchers from several 
disciplines, including interestingly enough, some from economics, dissatisfied with the 
dominant theories of underdevelopment, ' haye been advocating fqr such an approach in 
economic development studies since thq hey-day of these structuralist approaches in the 
1960S369. 
An actor-oriented approach is not to be conftised with action-research. While the latter 
may be said to provide a methodology for the design and implementation of action 
364 Shutz (1967). cf. Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 24). 
115 Aiken (1956); Marsh (1984). cf. Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 22). 
366 Halfpenny (1979); Wallis (1977). cf. Robson (1993: 18-20); Easterby-Smith et al 
(1991: 25). 
367 see Long (1977b); Ortiz (1973); Gfddens (1987: 73-108). 
368 Mitchell's (1983) discussion of the useftilness of "social situations" (situational 
analysis) and the extended case study method for purposes of theoretical analysis, for instance 
has strong actor-oriented connotations. 
369 See further ftill-(1263a); Long (1968); Moennan (1968); Mitchell (1969). 
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programmes usually ainied at ameliorating certain social ills or disadvantag 370 zes , the 
former, more broadly, provides a useffil conceptual framework For the analysis of' societ,, 11 
issues, possibilities of change, and possible strategies foraction. According to Norman Long, 
"it is concerned primarily With social analysis, not with the design or management of new 
intervention programmes 
071 
. 
He says further 
"The essence of an actor-oriented approach is that its concepts are grounded in the 
everyday life experiences and understandings of men and women, be they peasants, 
entrepreneurs, government bureaucrats or researchers""'. 
Such an approach, I believe, recognizes the "multiple realities" in any given 
enviromnent which is necessary for us to be able to understand just how different social 
actors, with seemingly incompatible world views interpret various patterns of social change 
and economic indicators, and how throughý a series of negotiations and accommodation, these 
actors all end up contributing to their communities' economic development, albeit by playing 
separate and distinct roles. The actor-6riented approach, being interested in the daily 
struggles of human existence, will not necessarily count the beliefs, experiences and 
expectations that actors bring to conversations, interviews and other parts of the research as 
"bias" against them. In the main, it merely wishes them to be truthftilly recorded. Afterall, 
these are the very things that shape their life-worlds. 
311 As Winter (1987: 88) put it, "Action research... has as its central feature the use of 
changes in practice as a way of inducing improvement in the practice itself, the situation in 
which it occurs, the rationale of the work, 4nd in the understanding of all these". It is normal 
practice for this form of research to include the active participation of the research in every 
stage of the study from the research proposal and design to the implementation of its 
recommendations. cf Whyte [ed. ] 1991; Clarke 1976. 
Long (1992c: 271). 
372 Long (1992a: 5ý. "- - 
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In carrying out nly fieldwork, I did find the actor-oriented approach to research 
practice to be time consuming, and there is always the possibility that one may accumulate 
a series of unnecessary or unwanted data through which painstaking analysis may be required 
to extract releyant data"'. Some other times, I obtained information, the sociological 
significance of which did not dawn on me until much later when I was able to interpret it in 
the wider context of my ethnographic text"'. On the positive side however, it ainis, first, 
to avoid the empiricist (or positivist) trap of believing that one can simply describe the 
"reality" of social life, and secondly, to reveal the interplay between strategic action and 
social meaning"'. The results are data, rich in content, and providing an insight valued 
particularly by policy planners and implementors, which conventional surveys are not always 
able to provide. 
373 Hans Seur's restudy of the social responses to agricultural change in a rural Zambian 
community for instance involved persuading some local actors to comment on his (Le Seur's) 
findings and analyses, and drawing upon these to operationalize later aspects of the study 
(Seur 1992: 124-127). 1 had somewhat similar experiences in the sense that after each cross- 
border trip I made for instance, I would present a picture of the mechanics of the cross- 
border trade to the "informant" trader that I had made the trip with (and sometimes to others 
as well), and discuss the technicalities of the trade with them. It helped for a fuller 
understanding of the events around me, an4 also helped me to look out for particular events 
or activities in subsequent trips. Specific methodological limitations of an actor-oriented 
approach to the study of entrepreneurship are discussed in chapter 4 of this study. 
374 cf. Oakley (1992: 17) "we cannot write down knowledge at the time of experiencing 
it". 
115 Long (199 
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6.4.1 Participant Observation. 
gof This is the method on which reliance has largely been placed for the Patheriq 
primary data in this study. As the central aini of this study has to do with describing, for 
analytical purposes, the actions and behaviour of cross-border traders, a natural and obvious 
technique of obtaining "data" for interpretation and analysis is to watch what they do. 
However, as Sliutz (1967) points out, the observational field of the social scientist has a 
specific relevance and meaning (what we call the "social reality" or "life-world") to tile 
persons living, or otherwise acting in it. This of course accords with actor perspectives which 
view the social world as involving subjective meanings and experiences constructed by 
participants in social situations. Participant observation is thus a pre-eminent tool of the 
actor-oriented approach. The meanings of the experiences of the observed are explained 
through the experiences of the observer. It is the interpretation of these "meanings and 
experiences" that provides the first-hand data we seek, and this can only be achieved through 
participating with the actors involved. 
The participant observer's role is not one of bland or idle watching. In fact it is 
anything but. In participant observation, unlike other methods, the observer, not some 
external object, is the research instrument, and as Lincoln & Guba (1985: 195) wam "an 
extensive background of training and exposure" is required to be undertaken by the 
researcher even before the field observation commences. Participant observation measures 
its validity in terms of access gained to the informant's knowledge and experiences. It seeks 
to understand not only what appears to be tfie more extraordinary features of the phenomenon 
under study, but also the seemingly mundane parts of it, which in any case, is frequently 
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where the most revealing bits or research information are to be found"'. 
Once in the field, the participant observer should aim to establish some role within 
the group. This goes beyond illere physical presence. It -also involves entry into the 
"symbolic" world of the observed through their use of language and non-verbal 
communication, and so fortl, 311 . The observation should ideally, by a "logic of discovery" 
result in theory formulation or tqstingl". Where it is t heory building, such theories must 
be well grounded in concrete human realities"'. Participant observation is then useful as 
a flexible, open-ended method which is able to respond to different, as well as changes in 
field events and persons, as is normal in human interaction. 
Howard Becker (1969: 245) aptly sunnises the participant observer's field tasks as 
follows: 
"The participant observer gathers data'by participating in thý daily life of the group 
.I or organization he studies. He watches the people he is studying to see what situations 
they ordinarily meet and how theý behave in them. He enters into conversation with 
some or all of the participants in these situations apd discovers their interpretations 
of the events lie has observed". 
A rudimentary analysis of data may take place simultaneously with the gathering of 
data. This, in my experience, is mainly to help shape future developments of the study. 
The participant observer is unlikely to be freely given access to most lifeworlds. It 
usually has to be earned, and it is not unusual for the researcher to be put through all 
manners of difficult situations, and even then access is not a certainty380. In my own case, 
376 cf Silverman (1993: 30). 
377 cf. Robson (1993: 194-195). 
"I Jorgensen (1989). 
379 Glaser & Strauss (1967). 
380 as Lee's (199 ) experiences in Northern Ireland demonstrate. 
207 
I endured all manners ofteasing, gawking, intensive querying about tily motivcs, and other 
tests, before being granted audience, particularly by public officials. But this diminished 
solliewhat as the study progressed. I quickly became used to signing multiple forms and 
waiting for long periods in order to see and talk to certain people, usually, senior public and , 
OPS officials. I tried to keep this to a minimurn by scheduling interviews witli such actors 
at the start of the day when luncli, prayers, and previously forgotten appointments were less 
likely to interfere with the my talking with theiii. Access was generally easier witli people 
on the ground, and even more so when I got tired of explaining what a doctoral thesis meant, 
and simply said I was writing a book about diem. 
Some of the most repeated criticisms of the participant observation method have to 
do with the fact that the researcher, merely by being present at the setting affects the 
behaviour of the observed; And that the rdseaýrcher's social characteristics cannot only affect 
the level of access lie is given but his interprqtation of the material obtained. These particular 
issues do not seem to me to be peculiar to participant observation. It seems to me that any 
form of organizational research, or any research project employing the use of detailed 
interviews is potentially at risk from these same things. Particularly, with representativeness, 
it needs to be said that with the exception of an actual census, the representativeness of most 
other samples can be questioned to some degree, as opinion polls and "market research""' 
data have illustrated in the past. 
The participant observation method has also been criticized for its non-objectivity, and 
lack of generalizability. However, participant observation counts its subjectivity as a strength, 
181 Kotler (1988: 380) contains a list of marketing blunders following a period of 
Olmarket research" cf,, Elvy (1982: 30-37). 
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and does not pretend to be anything else". In iii), view, sio ic in c yi ib I tera tionism and such 
other social constructionist (or life-world) models most closely associated witli participant 
observation require an interpretative approach to their understanding. As constructed realities 
tend to vary from group to group, the methodology for their understanding ought to be 
flexible enough to accommodate these shifts. The participant observation method does this, 
lience its "subjectivity". However, to insist on "blind" objectivity in these situations is to put 
the researcher in the unsatisfactory position of having to analyze life-worlds that he probably 
does not understand. 
Participant observation does not claim universal applicability either. It may offer the 
most complete information about concrete social eventS383 , but it is obviously not very 
practical for documenting most kinds of frequency data. 
In this study, participant observation has enabled me by NKatching, listening, asking 
.. I 
and participating to see why and how cross-border traders take certain decisions. It is what 
made it possible to see how they negotiatd with other local actors in order to maintain a form 
of stability in the market place. 
Participant observation may take any of several forms in the field, each determined 
by the levels of participation and covertness. The classic theoretical categorization of field 
observation, in increasing levels of participation, as stated by Gold (1969)", are as follows: - 
complete observer, participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant, and complete 
Adler & Adler (1987); Jules-Rosette (1975). 
383 McCall & Simmons (1969: 341). 
314 This categqrization was itself adopted from earlier work done at the University of 
Chicago by a researchlearn of which Raymond Gold had been a member. 
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participan i$. s. 
For this study, I adopted, principally, although not exclusively, a participant-a-s- 
observer approacl, 386. For example, while travelling wifli any or my case subjects, I would 
alternate between being a part ic ipant-as-observer, and a complete observer, depending on the 
situation. In order to get a chance to talk to currency traffickers inside and outside Nigeria, 
it was necessary to become a '. 1complete participant". Access would have been denied 
otherwise. 
6.4.1.1 Complete Participant. 
The complete participant role involve. s the observer concealing the fact of the 
observation, acting as naturally as possible., and seeking to becoýn ea full member of the 
group. It has been used to study aspeb ts Oif deviancy and criminology"'. Ricken (1969) 
contains an account of a study emploýing. this technique in which he, and two other 
colleagues"' infiltrated an apocalyptic group. Justification for the researchers' covertness 
was sought in the fact that they did not want to affect the behaviour of the group members 
they were studying. 
"I Variations of these themes exist in various texts although they refer, essentially, to 
the same phenomena. See for example Adler & Adler (1987); Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 96- 
101); Robson (1993: 196-198); Schwartz & Schwartz (1969: 96-100). 
386 that is, more participant than observer. Further explanations are provided in section 
6.4.1.2, below. 
"I Adler & Adler (1987). 
"I The other colleagues in the well-known study are Leon Festinger and Stanley 
Schacter. A full accQunt of the study has been published as men'Prophesy Fails (1956) 
Minneapolis, Universiiý'of Minnesota Press. 
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This tecliniqueappears to be becoming an increasingly rare method ofdata collection. 
It is no wonder, given the amount of criticism it endures both for its ethical implications and 
technical limitation. 
On the ethical side, tile critics do not mince words. The covertness of the approach 
is deenied improper. Kirby & McKenna (1989: 78) put it plainly thus: "Research from a 
covert or manipulative perspective. is not generally acceptable". In Robson's (1993: 196) view, 
it is "indefensible". In Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 98), the authors recall a previous study in 
which one of them (Richard Thorpe) had adopted a complete participant role, later 
developing misgivings about "deceiving" his research subjects who had also become his 
friends. The authors do not report however how this affected the data collection and analysis. 
Even Gold (1969: 34) finds it "difficult to justify", although in realit , it is difficult to see Y 
how else such a closed organization could haye been researched. 
On the technical side the Ricken study itself provides an illustration. Ricken (and 
colleagues) had stated that they adopted the c9mplete participant role so as not to influence 
the "conviction or commitment" of their research subjects but admitted that the method failed 
to achieve this particular "unrealistic goal""'. In the course of the study, they felt that they 
actually ended up enhancing the morale of the group, one of them even being asked to lead 
a group meeting. 
Secondly, the complete observer role prevents the observer from applying some other 
tactics that "naturally" accompany field observation. For instance, the covertness of the role 
will prevent the researcher from carrying out formal or extended interviews or even from 
following spontaneous leads with a line of "conversations as interviews" without a serious 
risk of revealing his identity. 
119 Ricken (196942'Y. 
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Finally, there is a risk that the researcher becomes so immersed in the role of 
complete participant that lie "goes native" (that is, loses tile research perspeetive ol'being, in 
the field) and finds it impossible to analyze or report his findings; Or the observer may 
become so fixated with concealing his identity that lie is unable to adequately carry out his 
pretended role. Gold (1969) recommends breaks from the field so researcliers can have a 
period of introspection and analysis in order to counter these. 
Not all researchers however share the view that going native is a hinderance. In Jules- 
Rosette's (1975) study of religious conversions (she was herself converted and baptized), and 
Hayano's (1982) study of poker players (he turned "professional"), both authors felt that 
"going native" was in fact fundamental to the success of their studies; Hayano (1982: 155) 
stating categorically that only "full, complete, long-term immersion, even communion" could 
help him interpret the life-world of the proý7ssional poker player, 'although for a time, he 
reported feeling more comfortablc at a dardiable than in the classroom, or indeed, any other 
place; A feeling that only began to dimifiish. when at the end of the fieldwork, he withdrew 
fmally from the setting. 
6.4.1.2 Participant-as-Observer. 
As mentioned earlier, this was my principal field observation technique. I used it 
because it was the method that naturally presented itself to me. It was not exactly pre- 
0 
selected although I wa§ quite aware, going into the field, that I would need to use some form 
of participant observation whilst I was there. 
This technique demands the fact that the observer is an observer for research purposes 
be made clear at the.. start. This frees the researcher not only to observe, but also to converse 
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with informants, asking them to explain various aspects of'what is going oil. He is also free 
to move around the organization or group being studied, as the unfolding data dictateS3'-X). 
In order to perform these tasks successfullY, it is i'llperative that the researeher 
obtains the trust, at the very least, of key members of the observed group. This takes 
time". In one of the firms I studied (case 4) the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) had 
permitted me to carry out my observations in his finn but seemed personally reluctant to 
answer nly questions himself. The effect of this, I felt, was beginning to trickle down to the 
rest of the staff. By chance, lie mentioned one day in passing that he had been on a "work 
for yourself programme" (WFyp)392 Some years earlier. It was when I said in reply that 
I was somewhat familiar with the programme, that, from my point of view, we had our first 
"real" discussion, and I was able to build a rapport with him. Access became much easier 
after that conversation. The firm's factory and offices were in the same building so without 
great difficulty, I was able to witness. the production process, meetings with suppliers, 
interview workers informally, help carry, out sales to their buyers, interview the CEO and 
his wife (the Deputy CEO) both formally and informally a number of times, and so forth. 
When, about six weeks later, I needed to carry out a mini-survey of the firm's customers, 
I was given every clerical assistance. 
Although this method allows an observer to gather virtually as much data as he wants 
to, there remains the danger, as in complete participation, of losing one's research 
390 cf. Burgess (1984: 82-83). The application of this method is virtually the norm in 
action research. See Cole (1991) for an account of its application. 
391 Illustrations of these may be gleaned from Appendix A, cases 1-3, in this study. 
11 An entrepreneurial development programme devised in Durham University, and run 
in conjunction with'(in.. ]ýigeria) the National Bank For Conu-nerce And Industry (NBCI). 
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perspective and as a result, becoming biased-19-1, or as Gold (1969) reiterates, of' going 
native. This nlay occur if the observer over- identi ties with the informant, perhaps through 
personal friendship. I was certainly made aware of this during my fieldwork. To a manager 
in one of the firms I was studying (case 5), 1 once suggested in conversation the hiring of 
a french language graduate to be internally trained for management, in order to counter a 
relatively small organizational problem the firm was facing. This apparently went down well 
widi thd CEO, and thus began a process in which a few of the managers would routinely ask 
me what I would do in their situations. I had to be conscious of a need to remain non- 
committal in such conversations with them. A key informant (case 1) enrolled me into 
helping her pick out-a line of men's clothing on trips to Cotonou in the Republic of Benin, 
when she decided to expand into that market.. She also regularly sought my opinion on 
whether to exchange her Naira notes for ýFA`4 or some other"currency on the black 
market in Lagos, or some other place outside Nigeria, and on possible ways of extending her 
trade beyond West Africa. On some of tfiese. occasions, I'realized I was being pushed into 
becoming more of a participant than I was willing to be. Yet, I did not want to upset or 
antagonize a key informant whose trust I had finally seemingly earned. So, in her case, I 
would occasionally offer an opinion when asked. 
My way of dealing with the threat of a loss of my research perspective, which the 
above events invariably represented, was not so much to periodically withdraw from the field 
(cf. Gold 1969)" but to constantly remind myself of my purpose and responsibilities in 
393 Burgess (1982; 1984). 
191 The Conununante Financiere Africaine (CFA [pronounced "cepha"] franc, aka 
Franc CFA or FCFA) is the currency of Francophone West African countries. 
395 1 did occasiQnally disengage from the field, but did this more out of fatigue than 
actual realization that ýf Would help with any introspection that I might wish to do. 
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the field, and to beaware, in nly thinking, ofthe dangers of "going native". Although I came 
to generally empathize with my case subjects, I took great care to retain my objectivity. I had 
to be conscious of a need to remain non-conlillittal in my conversations with them, and to 
instead direct them towards the achievement of my own objectives. 
6.4.1.3 Observer-as-Partici pant. 
This technique is similar to the participant-as-observer role to the extent that the 
observer's status as an observer is made clear at the outset, ostensibly in order to gain die 
attendant advantages. It also boasts the advantage of very little danger of the observer going 
native'91. However, two main features of this method tend to work against its overall 
effectiveness as a field research tool. 
First, because of the relative brevity of the field relationship between the observer and 
the observed, the observer is unlikely to have obtained* the trust of the observed to any 
appreciable degree, and thus gain access, or even if he has, to be sufficiently immersed in 
the life-world of the observed to be able to adequately understand and interpret their 
meanings and experiences. As Benny & Hughes (1984: 223) express it: 
"Anthropologists have long realized - if not always clearly - that the transitory 
interview held with respondents who do not share their view of the encounter is an 
unreliable source of information in itself. It is not until they have been in the society 
long enough to fit into one of its better defined roles that they can tap a valid 
communication system and hear the kind of messages that the others in the culture 
hear" 
Secondly, and following from the first, most of the observation that then takes place 
Adler & Adle (1987: 47-48); Burgess (1984: 82). 
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is tornial and briei"97 . There is a real risk therelbre, of' a misunderstanding in recording 
or interpreting, the information supplied, if such a method is used to study a, socially 
constructed reality. It therefore seenis to me to be most useful, not so much as an end in 
itself but as support for other techniques. I used this method for instance to obtain additional 
information, or gain additional understanding of my principal case respondents dirough their 
employees, associates or relatives. Some of the interviews I conducted with officials of 
certain parastatals, and perhaps more so with those of certain trade associations, would also 
fall into this category. 
6.4.1.4 Complete Observer 
This involves observation by the iesearcher without any social interaction with the 
observed, sometimes because they are unaware they are being observed, or that they are 
informants. Even where such observation is overt, it may displease the informants. 
The method may initially sound uncomfortably voyeuristic but it can be a useful 
research tool if employed as I did for instance, as a prelude to the "real research". Once I 
began to ascertain my central field locations, I visited the places on my own, taking a general 
look at the places, the things, the people, the activities, but not paying particular attention 
to any one person or thing. It was a kind of personal introductory tour. 
However, when used as a technique in itself, one runs the methodological risk of 
potential ethnocentrism. The observer may witness events and not understand why they have 
occurred; He may overhear a word and not have the opportunity to clarify any nuances or 
391 Gold (1969: 36) refers to the observer-as-participant role as that "used in studies 
involving one-visit infdrviews". 
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words said; A combination ol'events may release a train ol'questions in his mind which the 
method does not permit him to ask. In all these cases, without interacting with the observed, 
the observer seenis likely to undertake a flawed analysis and arrive at incorrect conclusions. 
6.5 Application Of Techniques. 
At various points in the study, I have attempted to explain how and why particular 
field activities were carried out. In this section, I aim to briefly show how particular 
techniques have been applied. The activities are represented by fig. 6.2 below. 
I. 
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Fig. 6.2 THE APPLICATION OF FIELD TE CHNIQUES. 
The "actual field activities" section in fig. 6.2 above is in turn represented by fig. 
6.1, shown earlier. 
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6.5.1 Initial Consultation 
The , Iilii at this stage was to obtain initial information on the kinds of businesses and 
products involved in the trade. The consultation phase in fact spilled over into the piloting 
stage and in effect then lasted about six weeks. The activities can be subdivided into 
to structured" and "unstructured" consultation. 
6.5.1.1 Structured Consultation 
was introduced to a lady who was an occasional cross-border trader. It was from 
her that I first began to get a picture of the trade. I talked to her as much about the trade as 
how to act around the traders, potential taboo subjects, and so forth. Other lines of initial 
enquiries led me through the Centre for Management Development (CMD) and the Centre 
for Industrial Research and Development (CIRD) of the Obafemi Awolowo University to the 
Lagos state branch of the National Association Of Small Scale Industries (NASSI), partly 
through whom I initiated the survey of manufacturing firms in this study. 
6.5.1.2 Unstructured Consultation 
concentrated my initial enquiries on Ketu Market, more for convenience reasons (it 
was the nearest major market to my residence) than for any position it might have as a cross- 
border trade centre. Introduced to several traders by a local leader, I talked on a number of 
occasions with them and with other local people. My aim at this point was to establish a 
comprehensive list of the largest cross-border trade centres in the Lagos area. These, 
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invariably, were the markets. As the case 7 CEO told nie on a IlUmber ofoccasions, "it is 
[in the markets that] the battle for market share is being Fought". Kinsey (1988: 22) 
, nises that 
"the Nigerian collective nia I-ecoj, , rkets remain at the heart of the economy, 
I-epresenting an effectiye adaptation of the needs and facilities of the people to die 
environmental setting of the land". 
Some of the markets haye eyolyed specialisnis in certain products - such as Alaba 
International Market for electrical/electronic products, Balogun market for textiles, Ok-e-Arin 
market for "provisions", and so forth. Most of the markets in Lagos can count on drawing 
continuous patronage from a radius of up to twenty five miles"', and a few, including 
some of the ones used in the present study, have true international patronage. 
I finally came up with nine locations. They are - Alaba Intemational Market, Mushin, 
Ikeja, Osliodi, Tejuosho, Oke-Arin, Apongbon, Iddo, and Balogun giarkets. I also confirined I 
that the geographical spread of this study covers three official land border crossings into the 
Republic of Benin - Serne (in Lagos state), and Idi-Iroko And Imeko (both in Ogun state). 
6.5.2 Pilot Studies. 
t 
My activities here can also be subdivided into two parts. First, I surveyed twenty 
randomly selected traders from a section of Ketu market, referred to above, where mostly 
building materials were sold; And in addition carried out formal semi-structured interviews 
with two of them. I also randomly selected for survey six manufacturing firms in a relatively 
new industrial/residential area, Shangisha, Lagos. These were a baker, a shoe manufacturer, 
an auto mechanic and three cement block makers. I had a 100 % response rate at this stage. 
311 Kinsey (1988). 
220 
The pilot studies were useful in other ways. Going- by the responses I had, and 
discussions therefrom, I was able to relline the questionnaires. I was able to reformulate and 
rearrange some of the questions, for instance, asking "personal" questions at the end, rather 
than -at the beginning of the questionnaire. Prior to the pilot surveys, I had not expected to 
include questions about turnover in the final version of the questionnaire, knowing how 
notoriously reticent traders (in particular those in the informal sector) are supposed to be in 
discussing their personal finances. But the responses were favourable, and it gave me further 
confidence to raise the matter in my subsequent interviews. 
Secondly, I conducted some "pilot" observations, which in fact continued 
intermittently throughout the field study. Initially, I used it as a kind of familiarization tour 
of die nine markets and other locations. 
, 
It 
, 
finally settled intoperiodic visits to the 
commercial motor-park's at Oke-Arin, Mushin and Mile 2 (in Lagos) and Sango-Otta (in 
Ogun state). 
6.5.3 The Questionnaires 
There were two sets of questionnaires - one each for manufacturing firms and for 
traders. The manufacturers' questionnaire (Appendix Di)99 was primarily designed to 
obtain preliminary demographic information and the businesses and their owner-managers. 
It was divided into six sections and contained sixty four questions. The questions had to do 
with the firm's ownership status, product lines, transfer/transportation of goods, turnover, 
export orientation (and activities) and their perception of the ECOWAS market as well as of 
the goverment's policies pertaining to their business. 
399 See Fig. 6.3 b"'F'2r modular representation of the questionnaire. 
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e 
The traders' questionnaire (Appendix Ei)"" covers much the same issues, but was 
designed slightly differently to reflect the activities of the traders. In this case, there Nvere 
forty five questions, grouped into four sections. 
400 See Fig. 6.4 "i-a-modular representation of the questionnaire. 
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Fig. 6.3 QUESTIONNAIRE MODEL FOR SURVEY OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
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The quest ionnaires contained both open-ended and closed questions with the hatter 
outnumbering the Former by about two to one. 
At the point of collecting each questionnaire, I conducted formal, focused, face-to- 
face interviews that generally lasted about forty five minutes (see Appendices Dii & Eii). The 
questions I asked at this point were mainly to clear up any apparent ambiguities and seek 
further clarification of certain responses. For instance, in response to die question on 
turnover (Appendix Di, Q7; Appendix Ei, Q8), respondents were furtlier asked, as 
corresponding questions on Appendices Dii & Eii indicate, for their opinions on how much 
of it was actually due to unit sales, and how much to other factors. It became an effective 
platfonn for discussing interest and exchange rates, loans, bank's and so forth. At the end of 
each interview, I tried to arrange further meetings, and where successful, these took place 
as semi-structured or unstructured interviews. 
6.5.3.1 Sample Population Selection. - 
It is trite knowledge in Nigeria that relatively few businesses belong to the so-called 
"modem" sector. It turned out in the pilot study for instance, that none of the twenty six 
respondents was registered with the Lagos state chapters of the traditional OPS umbrella 
bodies of: 
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Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN)"", 
(ii) National Association of Small Scale Industries (NASSI)IIII, and 
(iii) Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Indusay (LCCI)403. 
Only four of the respondents (15.38%) were registered under the Companies Decree, 
or the Registration of Business Names Act. However, seventeen of the traders (85%) were 
officially licensed to operate in Ketu market by Yirtue of paying rent and oflier local charges 
to the local government council but for definitional purposes, they would be classed in the 
"infonnal" sector. 
There is thus no real or explicit sampling frame, and sampling here has to be 
purposive'14. I decided against explicit quota sampling at this stage because of the greater 
risk of bias introduced, in the absence of prior research, by the aýsumptions about which 
specific characteristics should be. considered in developing quotas. Although purposive 
sampling also relies on the researcher's prior theoretical and empirical understanding of the 
population being studied, it is more concerned with a sample population which is 
101 The MAN has a national membership list running into "thousands", as I was 
informed at the MAN headquatres, but it was not available for sale or any kind of viewing, 
except for association business. I was however granted interviews for the research, and they 
were helpful in other ways. 
401 Lagos NASSI claimed to have an unpublished register of members (not available 
for perusal) which was in the process of being collated into a formal directory. That was 
however being held up by a comprehensive membership drive going on, which was expected 
to last throughout 1994. 
403The LCCI does publish a slightly outdated directory of members which is not, in 
any case, of much statistical use in relation to observable evidence. It is a "national" 
directory of just 1200 entries which also includes Accountants, Hotels, Caterers, Health 
clinics, Newspapers, and others not directly part of the population being sought. 
404 as opposed to probability sampling. cf. Kinsey (1988: 100-101); Robson (1993: 140- 
142). 
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illeoreticaily, tliougli not necessarily statistically significant. Because of thesc, and the sizc 
of the sample, I decided on a Form of stratified sampling (described below) which does not 
aspire to the same levels of statistical general izabil ity as a large scale statistical survey 
employing probability sampling"'. 
6.5.3.1.1 Manufacturers. 
With die help of the officials of Lagos NASSI, and CIRD, I established that the 
largest industrial estates in and around Lagos are Agbara (technically a part of Ogun state), 
Ikeja, Ilupeju, Isolo, and Matori industrial estates. I then sought to distribute the 
questionnaires as follows: 
Twelve questionnaires randomly distributed to firms in each of these estates, 
(ii) Ten to firms randomly picked from the original enterprise district of Lagos, 
that is, along the twelve mile stretch of Ikorodu Road on Lagos mainland, and 
(iii) Ten to firms in the border town of Idi-Iroko. 
Both Seme and Imeko were excluded from the manufacturers' survey because 
although there are significant amounts of commercial activities going on there, they have no 
industries as such. Seme is a border post, and not a residential town, while, for residential 
purposes, Imeko is little more than a transit village dominated by a massive customs 
presence. 
101 See further., Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 122-125); Robson (1993: 135-140); Brewer 
& Hunter (1989: 11i-4--Q). 
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There were eighty questionnaires inall, witlia response rate oi'67.5%. Some Further 
element of bias was unavoidable as I was unable to even get beyond the security guards in 
some firms. From this sample, a further eight were randomly approached, and -all indicated 
a willingness to partake in furdier, more in-depth studies. Using dimensional sampling, an 
extension of the quota sampling idea", I selected four of these for my case studies. 
6.5.3.1.2 Traders. 
Of the five locations earlier selected in Lagos, dimensional sampling was used to 
select the following five - Oke-Arin, Alaba International Market, Tejuosho, Osliodi, and 
Apongbon marketS411. I sought to distribute the questionnaires as follows: 
(i) fifteen questionnaires randomly distributed in each of the five markets, as well as 
(ii) six, eight, and ten questionnaires randomly distributed in the border communities of 
Imek-o, Seme, and Idi-Iroko, respectively. This roughly reflects their positions, relative to 
one another, as entry/exit points into/out of Nigeria. 
Ninety nine questionnaires were distributed in all to traders, with a response rate of 
47.47 %. From this sample, twelve out of fifteen randomly selected owner-managers indicated 
a willingness to partake in further studies. From these, I selected six, and eventually did my 
in-depth studies on three of them. 
406Robson (1993: 141) aptly describes it as follows - "The various dimensions thought 
to be of importance in a survey (perhaps established by pilot work) are incorporated into the 
sampling procedure in such a way that at least one representative of every combination of 
these factors or dimensions is included. 
407 Oke-Arin and Alaba were pre-selected because they enjoy a reputation as the largest 
cross-border tradý'&entrqs_fbr consumable, and non-consumable goods, respectively. 
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6.5.4 The Case Studies. 
Multiple case-studies have been employed in this study, more for analytic than 
statistical generalization. I relied, as earlier mentioned, mainly on interviews and 
observations for their construction. 
6.5.4.1 Interviews. 
Apart from the focused interviews that accompanied the questionnaires, of which the 
case subjects had all been respondents, there were in-depth interviews carried out with all 
the case subjects. In all cases, there were two or three formal, semi-structured interviews, 
lasting anything from about half an hour to. about three hours, as well as a number of I 
unstructured interviews. There were mo. re individual interviews in the larger finns. In case 
7 for instance, I conducted formal interviews with four senior managers, two middle-level 
managers and two drivers. I also conducted informal interviews with them all, and with other 
personnel. 
I conducted other interviews at the CMD, NBCI, LCCI, Lagos NASSI, MAN 
(National), MAN (Ikeja Branch), the Lagos office of the Centre for Industrial Research and 
Development of the Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigerian Export Promotion Council 
(NEPC), Nigerian Employers' Consultative Association (NECA), Nigerian Textiles 
Manufacturers' Association, Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), Nigerian Customs 
Services (NCS), Nigeria Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and 
Agriculture (NACCIMA), ECOBANK ltd, The Nigerian Export - Import Bank (NENIM), 
The Guardian Press, National Union of Road and Transport Workers (NURTW), Federal 
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ot'fice of' Statistics (FOS), Lagos State Ministry of' Trade and the University of* Ugos 
(UNILAG). There were some additional hitcrviews and secondary data obtained from the 
lbadan regional office of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Community Bank, Eleyele, 
Ibadan, and the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) office at the 
University of lbadan. 
The focus of the interviews varied from academic perspectives on the trade, public 
policy, the role of the banking sector, perceiYed mechanics and contributions of the trade, 
export orientation of Nigerian manufacturers, efficacy of existing distribution channels, and 
so forth. 
6.5.4.2 Observations. 
Most of my participant obýervatjon -activities were with owner-managers, and also 
sometimes, with their employees, assistants or associates. In the two most formally-managed 
firms however (cases 6& 7), 1 tended to spend more time with the sales teams and managers 
than the CEOs. 
6.6 Conclusion. 
As stated at the beginning of the chapter, the focus on this study has been on 
flexibility and inventiveness. I have discussed what, in my own experience, have been the 
advantages and disadvantages of each technique in order to highlight the fact that given the 
nature of the study, each technique has, in fact, been exploited for its strengths. 
A fairly conventional initial approach was shown to successively give way to an 
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increasingly actor-oriented one, in the ligglit of my field experiences vis-a-vis tile I-ese,, Il-cil 
problem. In doing this, I have also tried to show how participant observation grew to become 
perhaps the principal technique employed in the study. It must howeyer be stressed that the 
participant observation method was not employed as a replacement for the conventional 
survey and interview methods, but as an additional method, used for the insights it could 
provide. 
In the next two chapters, I will report on the findings of the questionnaire surveys and 
the particular insights on the cross-border provided by the anthropological approaches to the 
collection of primary data. 
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CHAPTER SEVE N 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS (1): 
A RE PORT ON THE SURVE YS. 
7.1 Introduction. 
This chapter is presented in two parts. The first part focuses on presenting the 
findings of the questionnaire surveys, and the interviews which were employed as back-up 
for clarification purposes. I concentrate here on providing mainly demographic information 
on the trade and its -principal actors - the manufacturers and traders. Certain other issues to 
do with the trade are examined in chapter§ 8 and 9. As mentioned earlier in chapter six, two 
sets of surveys were carried out - one each in samples of manufacLing and trading firms. 
In the surveys, the findings are presented under the following four themes, representing 
releyant sections of the questionnaires. The themes are listed below: 
Theme 1: A Profile of the Respondents and their Businesses. 
Theme 2: Trading Activities. 
Theme 3: The ECOWAS Effect. 
Theme 4: The Role of Government. 
A number of sub-issues are considered under each theme. The responses of each 
sample group to each of the themes are examined in order to highlight specific findings. 
The second part contains a listing of the seven firms that have been the subject of 
more in-depth study. -A summary of each of the cases is presented in appendix A, although 
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relevant reflerences to each of' them are made throughout the study. 
7.2 Data Analysis 
7.2.1 Theme 1: A Prorile Of The Respondents And Their Businesses 
As noted earlier in chapter 6, there were fifty four respondents to questionnaire 1 (for 
the manufacturers) and forty seyen to questionnaire 2 (for the traders). 
A high number of the respondents were actual owner managers. This was the case 
with forty eight (88.9%) of the manufacturers and thirty nine (82.9%) of the traders. The 
rest were employed managers. In more than 90% of the case in export-oriented firms in both 
questionnaires, the respondent was eithef, solely or jointly responsible for decision making 
in export/import trade matters, as. in ot4er, more routine matters. 
82.5 % of all respondents to questionnaire 1 (the manufacturers' survey) were however 
male, indicating, not a bias in the survey itself, but more of a confirmation of an observable 
dominance of men in the field. On the other hand, 80.2% of all respondents to questionnaire 
2 (the traders' survey) were female, again indicating a predominance of women in this 
field". Although a vast majority of the traders are female, most of the other actors in the 
cross-border trade, who the traders invariably see as adversaries, tend to be male - these 
include customs personnel, the armed forces, civil servants, drivers, carriers, and the like. 
In an essentially male-dominated society, the traders' efforts to sustain the trade (explored 
11 This proportion is a little lower than has been traditionally assumed (see for example 
West Africa No. 3796,28/5 - 3/6/90). The figure above may then also be interpreted as 
being indicative of observable evidence that more males are entering the field, especially the 
cross-border side 
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further in chapter 8), given the proportion of females involved are all the more remarkable. 
Majority of the respondents to both quest ionnaires, in almost equal proportions 
(51.9% of questionnaii-e I respondents, and 53.2% of questionnaii-e 2 respondents), are sole 
proprietors"'. Apart from 9.3% of the respondents to questionnaire 1, all the businesses 
were either partnerships, sole proprietorships, or private limited companies, Nvith the latter 
two accounting for an average of 79% of all businesses. Given the preponderance of informal 
sector activity, this is not a surprising finding. Perhaps just as interesting is the fact that with 
several respondents, the decision to operate the business as a sole proprietorship is a 
calculated one, as opposed to one taken out of ignorance, a sole proprietorship being 
generally equated with personal control, which most of the entrepreneurs appear to desire. 
For similar reasons, most of the firms are not formally registered under the Registration of 
Business Names Act, or the Companies bec`riee, although most pay, a variety of local rates 
and levies towards things like cleaning, ' security as well as more general "development" 
levies, which they tend to equate with formal registration. 
There does not appear to be a high incidence of owner managers giving up their 
businesses inspite of the considerable environmental difficulties they operate under, as 81.5 % 
of the manufacturers, and 85.1 % of the traders in the survey have had their businesses for 
five years or more. Even over a ten year period, the figure only drops off to 50 % and 44.7 % 
of the respondents, respectively. There ought, however, to be a note of caution here. Apart 
from the entrepreneurs' own managerial qualities, one pertinent reason which may explain 
the apparent longevity (or high survival rates) of businesses in the sample is that some of the 
409 The proportion of sole proprietorships would almost certainly be greater than is 
recorded here but for certain, mostly female owner-managers who label their businesses as 
being partnerships with husbands who, it later transpired, in fact have little, if anything, to 
do with the running-of, 14e said businesses. 
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entrepreneurs are able to cease one business operation ill favour of' another Without 
necessarily counting the previous business as -a non-surviving onell". 
One also tends to find that, especially in cases where the owners do not personally 
manage the businesses (at least not on a full-time basis) but employ managers for this 
purpose, the owners have other jobs, usually, as middle or senior-level public servants. 
Furthermore, female owner-managers who list their ownership status as partnerships also 
tend to be spouses of such public servants. 
Many of the smaller-sized firms are family-run businesses. This is not an uncommon 
development in LDCs". However, even though several entrepreneurs are in turn' the 
children of entrepreneurs, there is a very low incidence of children joining the family 
business, or continuing it, as it were, after the parents' demise. The children invariably 
choose to establish their own bus . iness, ev&n Iýhough this tends to be in a similar line to their 
parents' business. Part of the reaýon fqr this may be that the parents do not retire early 
enough for their control-seeking offspring. Even so, what tends to happen on the parents' (or 
at any rate, the fathers') demise is that the business stock is shared as part of the inheritance. 
Rarely is the business continued into a second generation as a family owned and run 
business, the way case 6 is. 
410 It may not be as visibly pronounced in the case of traders, even though they are 
generally able to switch, almost at will, between different suppliers and product lines when 
sales or margins drop off. Manufacturers, to a lesser extent, do the same. A follow-up 
interview of a questionnaire 1 respondent (the owner/manager of shoe manufacturing firm), 
who had reported his shoe manufacturing business as being in existence for 9 years revealed 
that the owner-manager had previously made bags and crafts on the same premises and the 
same equipment. That venture failed in 1991, and the plant was shut down and the staff laid 
off. After about six months, there was a fresh capital injection with which some workers 
were hired, and the production equipment was refurbished and adapted, this time to make 
shoes, shoe soles and shoe laces. It was that business that was in existence at the time of the 
survey in 1994. 
411 Nafziger (1§ . 88).,., 
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The relatively low levels oNechnological inputs in most aspects oi'tlie trade generally 
means that the ventures tend to be labour intensive. It is therefore not surprising that 
although most ventures tend to be small or even artisanal, only a tiny proportion of them 
(about 6-7% in both surveYs) in fact employ just the owner-manager, although this 
employment tends to be informal, and so registration documents, in most cases where they 
exist, tend to record the owner-manager as being the firm's sole employee. Most of the 
respondents claiming to be their firm's sole employees in fact make informal use, as other 
indigenous entrepreneurs also tend to do, of (mainly) kinship labour which is for the most 
part unpaid""'. Interestingly, the generality of firms, even where they are seeking growth 
in terms of operating profit, do not seem to also seek growth in terms of employment, stock 
held or firm capitalization. 
About 25 % of the respondents in both surveys employ betwee 'n one and 
three persons. 
The highest distribution of firms. in the employment category however was to be found 
amongst manufacturing firms employing, between six and fifteen (40.8 %) and trading firms 
employing between six and ten (31.9%). Having said that, there was a concentration of such 
firms among the trading firms located in Oke-Arin and Alaba markets, arguably the leading 
markets in their sectors, and manufacturing firms located in industrial estates, as opposed to 
other locations. The employees tend not to have any real responsibility in the running of the 
firms as the entrepreneurs are usually their own de facto head of personnel, marketing, 
412 The case 1 summary in appendix A provides an apt illustration of such incidence of 
the use of unpaid, informal labour. This, as well as the incidence of female owner-managers 
described above, who may, or may not be actual partners with their spouses illustrate the sort 
of relationships I stated earlier in chapter 3 as "differentiated" and "undifferentiated" 
relationships exiseffig-io. ajoosely dualist structure. 
236 
accounts, and even, as I witnessed on a Few occasions, security". A significant proportion 
of employees also tend to be, in reality, apprentices learning, specific skills of the trade from 
the owner-mana-ger"'. It is common, also, for apprentices to be related in some way to the 
owner-manager", especially in the case of the traders, 53.2% of whom claim to employ 
relatives. 
The owner-m-anagers tend to see their main functions in terms of business genemtion 
and purchasing. Actual sales tend to be left to senior assistants and apprentices after a 
suitable training period. In the absence of a widely available or reliable telecommunication 
system, the indigenous entrepreneur's chief functions mean he usually has to physically travel 
in order to purchase his wares, pursue leads, generate sales, and so forth. They also 
generally do not have adequate storage space, therefore what ought to be routine functions 
like opening up, closing up, lunch breaks, 'and, so forth, become signýficant issues for a busy 
j 
entrepreneur who invariably has to have. employees, if only to cover these rather mundane 
areas of the business for him, or risk potential losses. As one trader told me when I asked 
her exactly what her sole shop assistant did, if, as she said, he was not a formal apprentice 
'I... at least he's learning something by watching me... (After further thought) I need 
someone here. I may want to go out. What if I hear that supplies have just arrived 
from the factory and I want to go and see what they've brought, I wouldn't want to 
close my shop for that reason. And yet, if I don't hurry along, there will only be 
remnants left for me to buy... Besides, who will buy my lunch? Look, the boy has 
413 An illustration may be found in appendix A, case 4, where in a firm of 14 employees, 
only the CEO, and his wife, the DCEO, appear to have any managerial responsibilities. A 
more extreme example is that of case 5, where the C/MD presides over most matters in a 
firm regularly employing at least 300 pers7ons, despite the fact that the company has 14 
designated managers. 
414 
see cases 2&3. 
415 The apprentice system is further examined in chapter 8. See also appendix A, case 
2, in this study. 
237 
114to a lot to do herejare, and lie can also sell a bit now... 
7.2.2 Theme 2: Trading Activities 
Traders, as one would expect, generally are rather more adventurous than 
manufacturers in their choices of products sold. Manufacturers generally are limited to selling 
only those goods that they can make. One imagines ftirther that the smaller a manufacturing 
concern is, and the less access to modern process technology it has, the more restricted such 
a firm is going to be in terms of the products that it can make and therefore sell. 
Even so, due to a combination of the desperate nature of the economy and society in 
general, as well as the dynamism of the entrepreneurs themselves, virtually all products are 
bona fide trading goods on the cross-border trade routes. There arq however some "core" 
goods. Many of these goods have already been referred to at various points in this study, 
particularly in sections 1.3 and 5.6 .I will -return to this issue in chapters 8 and 9, but suffice 
to say at this point that the trade is dominated by consumer goods of relatively low 
technological inputs of which food, textile and household products appear to be-the dominant 
ones. Petro-chemical and pharmaceutical products are also traded in significant numbers, 
although the trade in these products are so regulated that a great deal of the private sector 
involvement in them, particularly in petro-chemical products tends to be overtly illegal. 
What observable evidence has further shown is that manufacturing firms in Nigeria 
tend not to be particularly strong in the formal marketing area"'. This is reflected in their 
416 Taped interview 13/4/94. Brackets mine. The word jare, in this context, is used as 
an expression of irritation or perplexity. 
417 This is not necessarily intended as a criticism. The merits or otherwise of the traders' 
formal marketing mitho4. are beyond the scope of this study. 
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responses to the open-ended questions to do with their marketing, strategy. Their answers 
generally concerned having attractive shop displays, and very limited offering of credit 
facilities to buyers. Formal advertising is almost never done, except perhaps in the case of 
some of the larger-sized firms, a few of whom, like case 7, have a considerable presence in 
the mass-media. Some of the larger sized finus, especially, also rely on market feedback to 
guide their production process or strategy, but by and large, the production process occurs 
the other way round - manufacturers decide on a product to make (guided almost solely by 
production, as opposed to marketing factors), they begin production and then offer the goods 
for sale to traders. In questionnaire I for instance, where manufacturers were asked to list 
up to three reasons why they selected particular product lines, the highest single stated factor 
considered by them, at 53.7%, was that production materials were easy or cheap to obtain. 
Marketing-related factors (such as compkition analysis) seem to have been a significant 
factor with only about 10% of the respondents. Traders also speak in much the same 
pragmatic terms, but, as noted above, are more readily able to discontinue unprofitable lines 
and chase up potentially profitable ones, which is why it is perfectly pormal to case 2 for her 
to trade simultaneously in breakfast cereals and used cars. 
Not only do traders tend to be more adventurous than manufacturers in their choice 
of products sold, they also tend to be more adventurous in their choice of locations in which 
to sell their products. As mentioned earlier, manufacturers tend to over-emphasize the 
production aspect of their overall marketing strategy, sometimes in the belief that wherever 
they choose to market their products, they will always sell as much as they can produce, but 
sometimes also from having their "strategy" dictated by the uncertainties that dominate the 
domestic environment. These are the primary factors that also inform their exporting 
strategy. Thus whilp virtually 100% of the respondents are aware of probable markets for 
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their products outside Nigeria, relatively only 34% oftraders elaim to be directly involved 
ill export trade, and the figure falls to 22% aniong the manufacturers"'. 
It is not however that indigenous entrepreneurs are oblivious to the benefits of' 
international trade. Oil the contrary, when tile non-export oriented manufacturers were asked 
to list tile reasons why they have concentrated their sales within Nigeria, only one respondent 
(0.02%) clainied not to be interested in foreign trade, and a inere 14.3% felt that foreign 
trade was not profitable enough. The most stated reason was in fact a lack of opportunity, 
listed by 47.6% of the respondents, followed closely by a perception of foreign trade as 
being too risky, which was given by 38.1% of the respondents"'. This may also explain 
why manufacturers who do get involved in foreign trade are more inclined to generate export 
sales via the satisfaction of unsolicited foreign orders"', while traders tend to actively seek 
foreign sales. The two most-listed reasom were explained during interview sessions with 
manufacturing firm managers generally p mean a reluctance to compete directly with the 
traders who were frequently the manufacturers' own distributors and who, in any case, are 
regarded by manufacturers as having a better understanding of the intricacies of foreign 
trade, and moreso, the cross-border trade, the mechanics of which is the central issue in the 
next chapter. 
However, those that do get involved in foreign trade seem to be making a success of 
it as attested to by the 66.7 % and 8.3 % of export-oriented manufacturers who classify their 
418 However, 61.9 % of the non export-oriented firms claim to be either actively thinking 
about it, or to be already involved in the process of getting involved in the trade. 
419 Some respondents interpreted "risk" in terms of official or underworld harassment, 
rather than the more conventional meaning of the chance of failure of the business operation 
itself, as interpreted by a majority of the respondents. 
420 illustrated foeeKagpple in appendix A, case 7. 
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foreign sales as eitlicr expanding or stable, respectively. A total or 25% and 62.5% or 
export-oriwited traders make respectively similar claims. One explanation for manufacturers 
enjoying greater rises in sales may be found in the predominance of unsolicited orders in 
their export sales, which may be rising, especially from other African countries, as it 
becomes increasingly unaffordable for African firms to do regular business with their 
erstwhile traditional business partners in Western Europe and North America. In absolute 
terms, their turnover, even allowing for inflation, is encouraging. Most of the export-oriented 
respondents (including all export-oriented manufacturers) reported annual turnovers in excess 
of N1 million for each of the years 1991 to 1993. A few of them (no traders, but an annual 
average of 3.7% of manufacturers over the period) even broke the N20 million mark. 
Having said that, export sales generally tend to be regarded as an addition to local 
sales, as opposed to being the firms' primiiry sales focus. Hence 50% of the export-oriented 
manufacturers in the survey actually make no more than 20% of their overall turnover in 
export sales, and the same is true of 56: 3% of the traders. Republic of Benin, Togo and 
Ghana are their most popular export markets, although most export-oriented manufacturers 
and traders alike have a wide coverage of West Africa. Ivory Coast, Senegal and Gambia are 
considered particularly good places to do business - traders are quick to compare them with 
Europe - and were it not for the distance of those countries from Nigeria, they would 
probably be used by even more traders. For indigenous entrepreneurs, West African markets 
are definitely regarded as growing markets. Traders are also active in Arab countries where 
opportunities provided by islamic pilgrimages are exploited to the full - even by non-muslim. 
traders. Beyond that, Western Europe, the USA, Canada, and South East Asia, in particular, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan are popular trading partners, although on these latter routes, there 
would seem to be-far more importing than exporting taking place. When asked why the 
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preference For these routes, they are generally described as the most profitable by both 
manufacturers and traders. Also mentioned in significant numbers were reasons ot'proximity 
(mostly by traders dealing regularly with Western Europe) and the fact that there is less 
corruption and/or bureaucracy in some of these places than in Nigeria. 
This is however not to say that indigenous entrepreneurs consider foreign trade a 
trouble-free undertaking, although -admittedly, several of their stated trading problems abroad 
tend to have local backgrounds. Chief among these is the availability of foreign exchange to 
pay for imports and to finance other transactions abroad, mentioned by 58.3% of 
manufacturers and 81.3% of traders, perhaps evidencing the greater difficulty that traders 
have, relative to manufacturers, of obtaining foreign exchange via official channels. It is 
therefore not surprising on the whole that informal/unauthorised foreign exchange supply 
thrives as much as it does. 
Monetary policy in Nigeria. has undergone significant changes in each of the last five 
years to 1996, including extreme movements from deregulation to regulation, the value of 
the Naira, the process of auctioning available funds, including deciding which of the funds 
are to be allocated to each industrial sector, and so forth. Although these are policies internal 
to Nigeria, such is Nigeria's influence on regional economics that the impact on many of 
Nigeria's West African neighbours, particularly in terms of the cross-border trade, is 
significant. What then tends to happen is that each year, there is a general lull in commercial 
activity just before the end of the year, extending in some degree to all kinds of non-oil 
foreign trade, while entrepreneurs wait to see in what direction monetary policy will go when 
the new budget is announced, normally in January. Similar impacts on regional trade may 
be attributed to the level of bureaucracy in Nigeria, which is a major operational problem 
for 25 % of manufacturers and 28.3 % of traders. 
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Outside the country, entrepreneurs claim to have a Further problem Nvith a lack of' 
credibility of Nigerian businessmen (identified by 33.3 % ofmanufacturing respondents), and 
overseas) partners' lack of faith in the Nigerian economy as a whole (identified by 25% of' 
manufacturing respondents), both of which are largely evidenced, in their opinion, by the 
reluctance of overseas financial institutions to grant thein any kind of credit. They flierefore 
usually have to try and arrange their finances locally, which, as is discussed furtlier in 
chapter 8, invariably means on die parallel market. It becomes a vicious cycle. Other listed 
problems concern routine banking problems (33.3%), official corruption -a running theme 
throughout the study (33.3 %), tariff levels (8.3 %), and language (8.3 %) among their trading 
problem areas. 
Traders also list official corruption (or harassment by public officials [43.8 %])421, 
and many of the sentiments expressed 
by their manufacturing counterparts among their 
trading problem areas"'. In addition, export-oriented traders have problems with the 
unstable political environment (especially in West Africa [17.4%]), transportation problems 
(17.4%), unscrupulous foreign sales agents, and so forth. Some of these issues are addressed 
further in chapter 9. 
Strategies for the physical transfer of goods depend on whether the transfer is within, 
or outside Nigeria. None of the respondents claimed to make deliveries within Nigeria 
through the mail, once again underlining the relative underdevelopment of the Nigerian postal 
421 In both this, and the manufacturers' figures on the same subject referred to above, the 
figures would have been higher but for entrepreneurs who no longer consider paying bribes 
operational problems once they are able to dome to some form of "arrangement" with actors 
who might otherwise have formally demanded a bribe, or make such other demand on them. 
422 It is interesting however that no trader lists difficulties with tariffs as an operational 
problem. One explanation for this may be sought in the fact that as they almost always 
operate (all or some-of the time) informally, tariff levels are not really a factor in the running 
of their businesses. 
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system. Occasionally, priyate delivery companies are used, but this tends to be For specific 
transactions, such as exclialiging formal contracts, making payments (these are usually made 
in cash), and the like. 
The single most popular method of selling within the country is direct to consurners. 
85.1 % of traders, and 42.9 % of manufacturers use this method. In spite of this, it ought to 
be noted that rarely are goods transferred straight from manufacturers to end-users. There 
are usually multiple channels of distribution between one and die other, as previously 
mentioned in chapter 2. Essentially, most producers will sell their products to whoever will 
buy them. In practice, the most common sell-on route for manufacturers tends to be to 
wholesalers, as is done by 76.2% of the. m, or to retailers (71.4 %)423 . Either way, these are 
people who will sell on the product without ad , 
ding any "technical'. value. A product may 
sometimes be exchanged between up to four different sets of tra&rs before the end user 
finally buys it. To illustrate this further, ý 5 1'. 1% of the traders in the survey claim to obtain 
a majority of their supplies from other trAders, as opposed to 42.9% who obtain a majority 
of theirs direct from manufacturers. But most trader respondents have obtained supplies from 
either traders or manufacturers at one time or the other. Furthermore, 59.6% of the traders 
claim to sell their products on to other retailers and 21.3 % to designated wholesalers. What 
tends to happen is that several "wholesalers" (including case 2& case 3 for example) 
also do some retailing, although it is not a function to which they fully lend themselves. 
When one adds to these the 25 % of traders who sell their products via salaried or 
commissioned agents, the indications are of a dominant position occupied by local traders in 
the entire distribution process, and a rather cyclical journey undertaken by goods between 
421 During the course of the field study, I put a similar question to the customers of case 
4 (see appendix F),., and found that 72.2% of the firms's customers also sold on their 
purchases to persons 6tber than end-users. 
244 
the producers and the end-users, with further indications that customers may consequently 
be paying more than they might have paid under a different system. 
Outside Nigeria, and especially in the cross-border trade, the situation is a little 
different. All export-oriented manufacturers report that they sell direct to the public outside 
Nigeria (compared to the 42.9% reported earlier for the same method within Nigeria), 
although it is not die only method they use. The reason for this is because many firnis, 
especially SSEs, will respond to individual orders from outside Nigeria for two main reasons 
- one being that they can sometimes charge a premium, and the other 
being that they are 
sometimes paid in hard currency, which in many regards, not least the declining value of the 
Naira vis-a-vis most hard currency, is like being paid a premium. On the other hand, only 
14.3 % of export-oriented traders in the survey sell directly to the public outside Nigeria, and 
these tend to be those that fall into the cat6gorY described above for manufacturers. Traders 
tend to sell their goods to other týaders, in the various markets that they ply across West 
Africa, or to informal agents, where the. traders are dealing with, say, Western Europe. 
Hence the responses of exporting traders reveal that 50% of them sell a majority of their 
goods to other retailers, 37.5% to wholesalers, and 25% (presumably those engaged in 
overseas trade) sell via salaried or commissioned agents. 
All the export-oriented manufacturers use both formal and informal agents outside 
Nigeria. They also sell to wholesalers (66.7%) and retailers (50%). The main difference 
between them and traders in this respect is that while traders tend to have to go out to chase 
up their markets, particularly in the cross-border routes, it tends to be other way round for 
manufacturers. 
The actual process of goods carriage in the cross-border trade is examined in chapter 
8. 
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7.2.3 Theme 3: The ECOWAS Effect 
A mention of the formation, objectives, and development of the ECOWAS has been 
previously made in chapter 5. It was noted in that chapter that although there has been a 
resurgence of efforts (or at least treaties and agreements) by West African govcrmiicnts, die 
implementation of various agreements (I am particularly concerned here with trade 
agreements) reached since 1980 have not been as expected. Entrepreneurs on die ground have 
also been generally sceptical about the operation of the various agreements, especially the 
ECOBANK, and the West African Clearing House (WACH), designed to make monetary 
transfers and other transactions in the region easier, and the TLS, designed to ultimately 
reduce tariffs on the transfer of a number of goods within the regionto zero. It has however 
emerged from several interviews that a number of the entrepreneuri are in fact ignorant of 
what the various agreements mean; in addition to their scepticism as to their work-ability. 
There is, in any case, a sharp dMsion of attitude's to the proposed West African 
common market by the two groups of respondents, with manufacturers generally being rather 
more positive than the traders about it. While every one of the manufacturing respondents 
claims to be aware of the aspirations of the ECOWAS to establish a West African common 
market, a third of them were not aware of any existing law, guideline or directive along this 
line, which did, or could affect their businesses. Traders generally pleaded ignorance to both 
of these issues, most of them derisively dismissing the goverm-nents' plans. 
According to the indigenous manufacturing entrepreneurs, they would normally expect 
information and updates on the common market to come from the federal or state ministries 
of trade and industries, the Nigerian (or individual states') chamber of commerce, and the 
MAN. Yet, only 0.9%9,0.7%, and 14.8% of them, respectively, claim to have received any 
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kind ofcorresponducc on (lie matter from (lie bodies, It also transpired in the interviews that 
most of these we"e not dedicated pieces of information but promotional literature to do with 
the West African Clearing House (WACH) and ECOBANK. It would appear that NASSIand 
NACCIMA, through their regular bulletins on new development and trading opportunities 
have been rather more active in this area, at least as far as their members are concerned. 
None of the respondents tl 
I 
iinks the single market, whenever it comes into being, will 
mean the end of its business. In fact, on the contrary, a massive 92.6% of them claim to be 
ready for whatever changes the single market brings, although the feeling about what it 
actually means is rather less clear-cut, with 48.1 % believing it offers them more customers, 
as opposed to 40.8% who interpret it as increasing the competition. 
What is more clear is the fact that the entrepreneurs generally have a "bottom line" 
attitude, which is that ECOWAS aspiratiOns concern them if it means less harassment, less 
road blocks, less bribery and such other matters which are the reality of their day-to-day 
business. Otherwise they mostly claim to remain unaffected by the ECOWAS ideal. 
7.2.4 Theme 4: The Role Of Government 
That the governments of LDCs have an important role in their own economic 
development has long been a conclusion of acadeMiCS414 . However, the fact that 
government policies and other state regulations do not diffuse into the population at large is 
not entirely a surprise in a society like Nigeria", given its size, the availability and 
424 See Petrof (1980: 55-56). 
425 See Kurer -(1996) for a discussion of the political foundations that tend to result in the 
failure of economic 
a&ýelopment policies in developing countries. 
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rcliability ol'ill. 'Iss-collllllullic, -itioii instruments. the "patron-client" eillect, and other, largely 
socio-political reasons. It affects not onlY enterprise development, but most facets of Nigerian 
life. 
The historically tense government-business relationship is one that has been referred 
to at various points in this thesis. The feeling of being in an unending game with government 
agencies is one that is ingrained i. n most businesses, especially informal and/or small ones, 
even from formation. It has thus been a surprising finding, given the fact of entrepreneurs' 
general distrust of government, that traders recognise the good in any government policy that 
concerns them. What has shown itself to be the problem, is not so much that the traders feel 
the schemes are no good for them, but an expressed scepticism that goyernment is able to 
sustain the implementation of the schemes, and that they (entrepreneurs) in the meantime 
would have been sucked into the formal system where they wouLd'be forced to pay much j 
higher taxes, for what they regard as no returns by way of benefits from the state. 
So, although most respondents (92.6 %) claim to be* aware of one government scheme 
or the other that could possibly assist their businesses, only about half of these (48%) say 
they actually benefit from any of these schemes. The number would, in fact, be much lower 
but for some owner-managers who interpret their mere membership of certain (even 
informal) associations and societies as "benefitting" from government schemes. Interestingly, 
some beneficiaries from some of the assistance schemes do not do so out of choice, many 
of them seeing the schemes as ill-advised and others tending to see the schemes as 
government's ploys to elicit more tax. When asked why they were partaking of the schemes, 
the general response was that it was on the off-chance of gaining access to hard currency 
credit. It is no surprise therefore, that of the respondents who think there is more the 
government can--do, --. 
for them, 96% would like to see improved access to capital, 
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,e dcnionstrating, what a 
big problem entrepreneurs have, not just with the forcign exell,, Illp 
auction system, but with routine banking matters such as bank withdrawals and deposits, a 
single transaction of which can sometimes take several hours. 50% would like to see lower 
income or corporate tax level, although rather surprisingly, a number of respondents in both 
surveys did not know for certain, flicir exact tax liabilities. 44% would like improvements 
in public utilities. This concerns basic things like electricity and water supply, as well as 
telecommunications, transportation and the like. These are major problems for most 
businesses, and for those who can afford it, privately supplied electricity, water and so forth 
are not a luxury but an essential part of their business. Some of the larger-sized firms 
(including case 7, and certain other firms that I observed, particularly in Agbara Industrial 
Estate, near Lagos) do not even bother to be connected to public water and electricity supply 
systems. Some of them go as far as buildinig their own access roadý, * Other suggested areas 
of improvement by the manufacturing respondents are in the collection of import tariffs and 
the administration of the trade TLS. 
7.3 Entrepreneurship In The Cross-Border Trade. 
This discussion, though introduced here, forms the core of the discussion in chapter 
8, and concludes in chapter 9. For the purposes of this chapter however, fig. 7.1, below, is 
a general representation of the role of the indigenous entrepreneurs (nos. 1-4 in the diagram) 
in the transfer of goods to both local and overseas end users (nos. 6& 7). 
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Fig. 7.1 THE INDIGENOUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP ROLE IN THE CROSS-BORDER 
TRADE 
. Cross-border trade routes 
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An examination oi' the diagram immediately throws up the centralitY ol' the local 
export-oriented trader (no. 2) to the whole process of goods transfer. lie is both a supplier 
to, and a buyer from the local manufacturer, through whom lie supplies other traders and 
end-users both locally (no. 6) and abroad (no. 7)116. Many local producers, particularly of 
agricultural produce such as cocoa, and craftsmen such as those who specialize in gannent- 
making and niade-to-measure furniture usually lack the ability, resources or even more 
frequently, the relevant information necessary to market the products in lucrative overseas 
markets; And here the export traders, with superior information at their disposal, are able 
to exhibit a distinct advantage. Many of them provide goods or reach markets that even even 
large firms cannot or will not reach. 
It is quite common to find that the expgrt-oriented trader is also a local distributor 
(no. 3 )427. 
The local trader (no. 4) is also a key part of the set-up. Apart from his important role 
in the distribution of goods to local end-fisers (no. 6) which was referred to in chapter 2, he 
also acts as an important provider of information to export-oriented traders about exploitable 
opportunities, frequently linking up local producers and export-oriented traders himself428. 
With the survey revealing as many as 85.7% of non-export oriented traders to be so due to 
information-related factors, the potential for local traders to profit from being information 
providers is enonnous. 
The manufacturer (no. 1), as expected, fulfils the traditional role of supplier to various 
426 Cases 1-3 in appendix A, variously illustrate this function. 
427 
see for instance cases 2&3. 
428 case 2, who.. occasionally supplies made to order garments to overseas customers, 
mainly in the U. K, Sometimes employs this method. 
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traders, and, as illustrated especially in the case of* the sniallcr-sizcd nianufficturcrs, flicy arc 
becoming increasingly, though Seemingly warily, directly involved in the cross-border 
trade"'. 
It ought to be noted that although fig 7.1 describes the general role of the core actors 
in the cross-border trade, there are sometimes occasional deviations from the standard set-up 
not adequately represented in fig. 7.1 . For instance, several local distributors (no. 3) also act 
as retailers (or local traders, see no. 4). Such is the situation with case 3 who, as is shown 
in appendix A, will just as easily sell to a passing customer interested in a single unit, as she 
will to an international customer interested in several hundred units. A few traders are in fact 
able to successfully _pombine 
functions 2,3, and 4. Furthermore, case 6 is a manufacturer 
(no. 1) that sells, on one day of the week, direct to local end-users (po. 6) primarily to boost 
its revenue and buttress its Public image. Th. is is however very mu& of an exception to the 
general rule. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In summary, the survey reveals the following about the survey's respondents. 
Cross-border trading enterprises, like other indigenous business enterprises, are most 
likely to be run by the persons who actually established them. In a manufacturing firm, this 
is most likely to be a male while it would be a female for a trading firm. In all cases, the 
firm is most likely to be a sole proprietorship and to operate in the informal sector. 
Manufacturing firms are most likely to employ between one and fifteen persons, while 
trading firms will normally employ up to ten persons, some of whom will be apprentices 
429 
see for instance, 
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related to the employer. Trading firms Nvill, in addition, tend to make extensive use of' 
informal labour sources. Many of the surveyed firins have no apparent desire, and certainly 
no strategic plans, to grow significantly beyond their current operational IeN, els. 
Trading firms tend to be far better able to exploit export trading opportunities, 
although both traders and manufacturers tend to face similar operational problenis - 
corruption, over-bureaucratization and foreign exchange availability being die most common. 
Most of the entrepreneurs' perceived problems wifli the state tend to stem, not so 
much from a disregard for die state's initiatives, but from a scepticism that the state is able 
to implement its own plans. 
7.5 The Case Respondents - An Introduction"' 
Case 1 is a specialist crosp-border trader, albeit on a very small scale. She is a 
relative newcomer to the business. The products she sells are normally purchased in the 
Republic of Benin for sale in Nigeria. 
Case 2 is a much more experienced trader involved in both local and foreign trade. 
She regularly buys and sells both ways although the balance of her trade is more tilted 
towards purchasing outside Nigeria and selling within. 
Case 3 is also involved in a two-way overseas trading system. Her involvement in the 
cross-border trade however is mostly as a supplier of household goods to various customers 
who come to her Lagos base from all over West Africa. 
Case 4 is a small, relatively young, and moderately successftil establishment involved 
in the manufacture of various plastic goods. These are mostly sold within Nigeria although 
430 fUll case suýnýriqLs_are contained in appendix A. 
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the firm has recently taken calculated steps Which lia, ve turned it into a limited exporter to 
certain West African countries. 
Although managed more like a sole proprietorship, Case 5 is in fact a large multi- 
focused firm, being involved in the farming, production and trading of a number of goods. 
It has been involved in export trade since its inception, and in fact only developed its cross- 
border outlets after the success of its initial overseas ventures. 
Case 6 is a medium-sized, family-owned manufacturing concern. It is only nominally 
an export-oriented firm although its products are a mainstay of the cross-border trade. 
The products manufactured by case 7 are also among the most popularly traded goods 
in the cross-border trade, although the firm itself is officially not export-oriented. The firm 
is the publicly-owned Nigerian ann of a Multinational Enterprise. 
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CHAPTE R EIGHT 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS (11) 
THE MECHANICS OF THE CROSS-BORDER TRADE"'. 
8.1 The Trade Routes, Actors And Activities. 
There are, as I indicated in chapter 6, three main border points out of Nigeria in the 
study area. They are, in arguably declining order of importance, Idi-Iroko (in Ogun state), 
Serne (in Lagos state), and Imeko (also in Ogun state). 
The three areas share certain characteristics, such as relatively small sizes, a largely 
migrant (and mobile) local population, and a''considerable customs. presence. However, as 
.:. I 
will be explained, the range and volume. of trade vary somewhat between these locations. In 
particular, these locations, like certain other border routes and locations, have evolved 
specialisms for certain types of goods and services. So, while one may find a little bit of 
everything on most cross-border routes, generally, traders understand the specializations, and 
will normally choose to conduct a particular transaction where they feel the best returns are 
obtainable. It is with this in mind, as well as for reasons of convenience, that I examine, in 
turn, each of the three locations. 
431 Unless otherwise specified, all prices and exchange rates referred to in this chapter 
were those in operation as at July 1994, and should therefore be considered subject to the 
views on inflation expressed in chapter 1. It should also be noted that in January 1995, five 
months after the completion of my field study, the CFA Franc was officially devalued by 
50%. 1 shall return to this point in section 8.1.2 below. The net effect of this on the trade 
should however bý kea in perspective as the traders had always employed a more "realistic" 
exchange rate for the dA, and indeed for other currency. 
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8.1.1 Idi-Iroko. 
Idi-Iroko lies about sixty miles north-west of Oshodi market in Lagos, wilicli also 
serves as the principal motor-park serving commercial vehicles at the Lagos end of tile Lagos 
- Idi-Iroko route. It is however seldom possible to cover the distance in under two hours by 
road, such is the bustle and congestion in and around Oshodi market. The driver of a van 
into which fourteen passengers have squeezed themselves onto eleven seats would nomially 
charge N20 for a through ride to Idi-Iroko. 
The next town north of Lagos along the Lagos - Abeok-uta expressway, and which 
serves as a kind of gateway to Idi-Iroko is Sango-Otta, some twenty five miles from Oshodi. 
go-Otta are residential Lagos, however, never really comes to an end., All the way to San 
7, 
buildings with Lagos addresses, street-tradýrs,. ýsmall scale manufactuiers (usually of building 
materials), larger-sized trading firms '(usually of vehicles and foodstuff), and other 
enterprises. This leg of the journey is a ýisual testimony *to the enterprising nature of the 
people of Lagos. 
Sango-Otta is a town that singularly owes its development in recent years to 
commerce, particularly that which may be described as resulting from demand for cheap land 
and labour by Lagos-based firms. It is, by Nigerian standards, easily accessible from Lagos. 
Several large firms like Sona Breweries, Nigerian Distilleries, Nigerian Bottling Company 
(Cocacola), Nestle, Honda, Nigerian Sewing Machines, and so forth have their fanns and 
factories there. There is also a thriving transportation sector in the town, in particular, the 
shuttle services into Lagos and Idi-Iroko. 
The thirty five-odd miles between Sango-Otta and Idi-Iroko provides the first real 
impression of being-Aýýa from the bustle of Lagos. There is a rich rain forest all the way 
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save for tile six or seven villages that dot tile road. Tile most prominent ofthese are Ajilete 
and Owode. They are, respectively, about twenty and ten miles from the Nigeria/Republic 
of Benin border. These towns have evolved a specialism in the informal exporting of 
foodcrops, especially yams, maize and vegetables to other West African countries. A great 
number of the townswomen are involved in this trade. After die men have harvested the 
crops and loaded the lorries, women are to be found in their dozens, accompanying die 
lorries on the short but risky ride into Igolo, die town situated in the Benin Republic, but 
separated from Idi-Iroko in Nigeria by a six foot-high fence, or Ifonyin (Ifahin), some ten 
miles north of Igolo. There the women will stay all day or longer, in die town's central 
market, as is necessary to sell their wares. With the money so made, they will usually buy 
rice, livestock (especially ftozen poultry) and Nigeriap-made "provisions", which can 
sometimes be considerably cheaper in Igol6/Ifonyin than in the Idi-Iroko/Sango-Otta or even 
Lagos area. These products are sclected because they can be fairly easily sold off to the 
many bukas (cafes) or more upmarket- hotels and conference centres in Sango-Otta, 
Abeokuta, and the surrounding areas, which are constantly in need of such products. Some 
of the women have their "customers", to whom they regularly sell. The arrangement also 
suits the buyers. The Was for instance, which are traditionally small establishments, usually 
seating between six and twenty persons at a time, do not norinally have specific storage space 
for stocked-up supplies. Many of them purchase their supplies on a daily basis, which are, 
as far as possible, used up on the day of purchase. They are therefore happy for the market 
women to turn up daily with fresh supplies. In the specific case of the frozen poultry, the 
relatively small but constant supply lines also means they do not have to worry about 
privately generating the electricity required to properly store them, publicly generated 
electricity supply being, at the best of times, far from regular. The market women will 
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generally retain a "balance" to take home to their families, which will serve as family 
spending nioncy. 
An overtlY illegal industry has also evolved in Owode, and to a lesser extent, in some 
of the smaller towns and villages along the Sango-Otta - Idi-Iroko road. It services die trade 
in motor Yehicles. Some motor Yehicle traders in Nigeria prefer to import their products into 
Cotonou in the neighbouring Benin Republic radier than Lagos because they find it generally 
easier or cheaper to clear their products at the Cotonou port, not least because they pay much 
less in bribes there. Cars which are purchased in the Benin Republic or cleared at die 
Cotonou port, are driven to Owode (and environs) where fake temporary registration and 
number plates are fairly easily obtainable. This is apparently so less attention is drawn to the 
vehicle while it is being transported to its Nigerian buyer. Workshops have been set up for 
this purpose and for about N500, plates and papers can be produced in about an hour"'. 
Some of these workshops emploý up to twelve workers and apprentices. A few of them 
combine this function with standard automobile services. Several rest houses have also, since 
about 1991/92, sprouted up in the area, apparently to cater for the "importers" who are 
having their papers "organized". 
Idi-Iroko itself is very much a transit town. It is small, although it has a busy look 
about it. Most of it can be covered on foot. There is however a constant flow of heavy goods 
vehicles (HGVs) plying the town's only major highway. There is what appears to be an 
unusually high number of Was in the town, most of which are situated right beside, or close 
to the highway. According to some of the ýraders, there are not many permanent residences 
in the town, that is, most of the traders prefer to rent modest apartments in the town, and 
An equivalýfit-izjdustry, mostly for vehicles purchased or stolen from Nigeria, exists 
in Ifonyin, in the Benin ICepublic. 
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build more grandiosc houses in their hometowns. Customs and immigration officials 
constitute another large rented property bloc. 
Trading is by far the most common commercial activity in the town with building 
materials, beer, wines and spirits, petroleum products, pharmaceuticals and vehicle parts 
being the most popular goods for sale. These are complemented by light manufactures (such 
as cement blocks, garments, bread, saw-milling, and so forth) and some fanning. The traders 
informed me that most of their customers are from neighbouring countries, and 
comparatively not much from Nigeria. This is so because most of the fastest-selling products 
are manufactured in and around Lagos, or have been imported there from overseas. Even 
those products manufactured in plants in and around Sango-Otta tend to. be distributed from 
bases in Lagos. The Idi-Iroko traders therefore do most of their purchasing from Lagos, 
same as many other Nigerian traders, and there is not much incentive for Nigerian traders, 
except for those on a micro or cottage level to obtain their supplies from Idi-Iroko. Their 
customers tend to be dealers, contractors and other bulk-purchasing individuals from West 
African countries as far away as Ivory Coast or Gambia who are wary of a trip into Lagos 
or who may not be buying in quantities that warrant travelling as far as Lagos or have simply 
been persuaded from making the extra journey by the Idi-Iroko traders. 
Sometimes, particularly for small quantities of bulky purchases, a Nigerian customs 
official is "hired" as a paid guide, hand and interpreter by a visiting trader. It is also the duty 
of the customs official to see the trader safely across the Nigerian/Benin border after the 
purchase has been made. I witnessed a number of such activities. A lady customs informant 
told me after one such instance that the customs men involved would each have been paid 
N200. 
Some of the--goqds sold by the border traders on the Nigerian side originate from 
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other African cOuntries and are in turn sometimes resold to other traders and individuals from 
these same countries. This involves products like kolanuts and salt from Sudan, costume 
jewellery from Ivory Coast, and also textiles and accessories from the Republic of Benin. It 
happens both ways because sometimes, products like rice, fertilizer and flour get imported 
or smuggled into Nigeria through Cameroun or the Republic of Benin, only to be sold off 
in a single transaction to a distributor from one of the West Coast countries from whom 
smaller Nigerian retailers now purchase for reimportation into Nigeria. Situations such as 
these ensure that there are constant frenzied activities along West African borders, albeit 
sometimes without a set Pattem. 
Hundreds, and quite possibly, thousands of people are involved in the hawking of all 
sorts of goods on both sides of the border.. From the Nigerian side, the most popular product 
"exported" this way appears to be bread, particularly the variety ýopularly, but somewhat 
curiously, referred to as "Ghana 
ýped*al Butter Bread". Other popularly hawked Nigerian 
goods are fruits, fish, hair and beauty products and home-made soaps. From the Beninoise 
side come apples, rice, fowls, flour and assorted snacks. The hawkers cross from one 
country to another largely ignored by border personnel. Several of the hawkers are in fact 
not fully aware of the fact that they are regularly cris-crossing between two countries. Most 
of their trade is done in Naira, although at a special rate of NO. 1: CFA1 (that is Naira to 
CFA franc), certain transactions in CFA do take place". 
I was always struck by the sheer numbers of HGVs crossing, or preparing to cross 
into, or out of Nigeria. Arriving at the border one morning, I counted sixteen such vehicles 
waiting to enter Nigeria, and twenty eight preparing to leave, all stacked full of goods 
433 The official rate of exchange for most of the duration of the field work was NO. 04 
CFA1, although the ih-arket transactions that I witnessed were invariably conducted using the 
"parallel" rate which averaged NO. 09 : CFA1 for the period. 
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sometimes rising as high as twelve to fifteen Feet from the base ofthe trailers. Although most 
of the drivers claimed not to be really aware of the contents of their cargoes, I noticed that 
a large portion of the goods leaving Nigeria seemed to be processed foods and beverages, 
and in particular, I noticed the products (or at any rate, the pack-aging) of Cadbury- 
Schweppes, Eleganza, Nestle, Lisabi Mills, Unilever, Nigerian Distilleries, and others. There 
were also several plastic products., beddings and boxes that indicated plates and other glass 
products. 
There is an overbearing "settlement" (bribery) culture at die border whereby virtually 
as many customs, immigration, police or military personnel as traders, and in particular, 
HGV drivers come_into contact with have to be bribed ("settled"). I once spoke, over a 
period of two days, with three such drivers waiting . to enter Nigeria. who explained that it is 
usually easier to leave Nigeria than it is to enter because there weri more people to "settle" 
going in than coming out. One of the drivers claimed to have been at the border for three 
days awaiting the arrival of his Oga (boss) fKom Lagos to* settle the border officials so that 
he could continue his journey. He was not worried, he explained, when I asked him if it was 
unusual for him to wait so long for his boss. He had once had to wait for almost two weeks. 
It was all part of the job. The only problem with his situation, according to him, was that 
they were frequently raided at night by armed bandits who he suspected to be Kelebes" 
by day. Trailer drivers have however learnt to organize themselves into vigilante groups to 
thwart such moves. 
None of the drivers seemed certain how much their bosses paid in egunje (bribes), 
411 Kelebe means "small person" in Yoruba. It is the derisory term by which touts, 
informally employed to carry out checkpoint duties by duty officers while the duty officers 
themselves sit in the-shade, are referred to by the public. In recent times however, it has also 
been used to refer to 
ý1'1*ldnds of touts involved in various legs of the cross-border trade. 
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but guessed it could be up to N50,000. My customs acquaintance in fact said it could be up 
to three or four times as much depending on the value ofthe products being taken in or out 
of Nigeria, and that anything up to a hundred border personnel could share in this windfiall 
depending, usually, on the "generosity" of the higliest-ranking officer involved in the racket. 
All three drivers claimed their final destination to be Oke-Arin market in Lagos, 
although at other times I met HGV drivers who were headed for Iddo market in Ugos, Ojoo 
market in Madan, and other markets in Ilorin, Benin-City and parts of Eastern Nigeria. 
Vehicles such as theirs were usually to be found containing fifty kilograrnme bags of rice, 
and also textiles, flour, stockfish and kolanuts. They would normally have set out variously 
from different West African countries as well as Sudan. 
8.1.2 Seme. 
I travelled by road through Seme-to the Republic of Benin (and beyond) on several 
occasions both by public and private transportation, although public transportation may be 
said to provide a truer view of the travelling conditions of cross-border traders. 
For those travelling by public transportation, the likeliest departure point is the Mile 
2 terminus on the Lagos - Badagry expressway. Here, one may board a Seme-bound taxi for 
N60, or as rather more travellers from Mile 2 tend to do, wait by the road-side for a passing 
private car or mini-cab which will make the same drop for N20. Such a car will however 
pack six passengers as opposed to the more usual four. Apart from his human cargo, it is 
common practise for commercial drivers to smuggle small quantities of petrol (usually four- 
litre containers per trip) and other petroleum products into the Republic of Benin where 
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petroleum products are five tinies more expensive than in Nigeri 1131 . Therc are also other 
termini at Mushin, Alaba and Oke-Arin markets in Ugos, but these tend to be for traders 
prepared to pay the full fare, or traders journeying right through the Republic of Benin into 
Togo and beyond. It costs, for instance, N1,200 for a ride from Oke-Arin market to Abidjan 
in the Ivory Coast. 
The journey from Mile 2 to Seine takes about seventy minutes. A Seine-bound taxi 
will normally stop on the Nigerian side of the border. Seme, unlike Idi-Iroko and Igolo, is 
not a residential area, but merely a border post. Over the years however, a market has also 
evolved there which extends from die Nigerian side to the Beninoise side of the border, and 
the activities that taýe place here are markedly similar to those that take place at the Idi- 
Iroko/Igolo border. Apart from everything e' Ise, I noticed on sever; jI occasions that a great 
number of imported used vehicles (in parti. dular luxury models -dike the Mercedes-Benz 
series) are for sale on the Beninoige side of'the border. There is also a sizeable presence of 
informal currency dealers. 
Even so, a senior customs officer at Seme was still informing me in a mid-1994 
interview that the volume of trade across the border was in fact only just picking up again 
after having undergone a drastic reduction following not only the traditional post-christmas 
lull, but also the 50% devaluation of the CFA Franc in January 1994, which is the official 
currency of nine ECOWAS member-states. The value of the CFA Franc is tied to that of the 
French Franc. For forty eight years to 1994, the rate was fixed at 50: 1436 (that is, CFA to 
435ThiS was prior to the government's announcement of an increase in the pump price 
of petrol from N13 per gallon to N44 per gallon, ostensibly to discourage this kind of 
activity. 
436 See, among others, In Defence Of The Franc Zone in West Africa 6/12 - 12/12/93, 
pp. 2198 - 2200, Nýhiebjraces the influence of the CFA - French franc relationship on the 
regional economy. 
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French Franc), prompting clics ot'ovei-valuation of' the currency 1rom other NNlc, -,; t Aftican 
governments and overseas investors. In January 1994, the rate was increased to 75: 1 . 
The devaluation was initially bad for business because it upset the existing , pattern of 
trade, which is usually that Nigerian manufactures are exported to other West African 
countries, while (mostly) banned goods such as certain components used to make other 
products, certain food items such as rice or wheat, -and certain luxury goods are imported 
into Nigeria. But when the devaluation occurred, it obviously affected the value of Nigeria's 
exports. With the Nigerian government also announcing in its annual budget around die same 
time, a new fixed-exchange rate for the Naira of N22: US$I (the informal value at the time 
was approximately -N45: US$1), and purporting to outlaw the informal currency trade 
(unusually, the enabling decree was not. passed for several months after the ministerial 
announcement), it made for a period of uncevainty while the trader's waited to see how the 
new system would operate. The new dispensation was expected to make it easier for 
commercial concerns in all sectors to finance their projects, and in particular, to obtain 
foreign exchange. Both traders and producers, especially those in the informal sector, had 
feared that with new funds poured into the economy at these cheaper rates, they would be 
stuck with over-priced stock and raw materials, a high cost of capital, and would lose the 
initiative in export trading to the OPS. In the event, the effect of the new rates did not filter 
through the economy as expected. Not a single trader of the hundreds that I spoke to had 
been able to purchase foreign exchange at the new fixed-rates, and according to the informal 
currency traders, within a month, they were back in business. 
There is a walk through the border-crossing at Seme to the motor-park on the 
Beninoise side where, for around CFA300, taxis are available for the twenty five minute ride 
to Cotonou, the capital. of the Benin Republic, and the country's commercial nerve centre. 
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One of the first things to catch the eye in the Benin Republic is the manner in which Wel is 
sold. There are not Inally filling stations in the entire country and Fuel is not readily available 
ill most of them. However, every few hundred metres or so along the highways are several 
petrol "retailers", or hawkers. The seller is typically feniale and has no more than five litres 
of petrol to sell at any one time. The driver of a vehicle I once travelled in had to stop and 
purchase two litres off a hawker-He later said that most of tile displayed petrol come from 
Nigeria, and are usually sold by Nigerian military personnel to Beninoise dealers at Seme. 
They would then resell in small quantities to the hawkers who in turn sell to motorists. A 
litre of petrol so obtained sells for CFA150, he added. 
Cotonou's leading markets are Topa, Misebo and DantokTa markets. They are very 
busy markets indeed. Topa market is essentially a brocade, jewellery and currency centre, 
specializing in (but not limited to) various West African currency. athd is therefore generally 
the first port of call for Nigerian traders coming into Cotonou, and also sometimes for other 
West African traders heading for Nigeria.. The traders'in this market disclosed that the 
majority of their goods for sale are imported from Ivory Coast and France, with others 
coming from places like Romania and Italy. 
A much larger and busier market than Topa is Misebo market. Buyers and sellers 
from all over West and Central Africa congregate here everyday for concerted haggling and 
trade. Misebo is a huge shopping district where virtually every common shopping item, from 
foodstuff to household goods, clothes, electrical items, different kinds of machinery, building 
materials and so forth, can be found. There are literally thousands of shopping outlets in 
Misebo. Many of the sellers in the market are Lebanese, Indian and Pakistani, referred to 
by Nigerian traders as Wora". They tend to deal mainly in upmarket textile materials, and 
they, like most 'ff-tbý other traders that I spoke to, state that majority of their sales are to 
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bulk-purchasing Nigerians. Frencli-made products are mostly in evidence, although the 
traders claini to also import goods from Switzerland, Austria and Ivory Coast. Not a great 
deal seenis to be actually made in the Benin Republic itself. 
Dantokpa market is often described as more of a dumping ground for various used 
manufactured products from Europe. Several electrical/electronic items, as Nvell as other 
household goods such as refrigerators, washing machines, cookers and such other goods can 
be found here, most of them second-hand. There is also some "kora" presence here. 
The Koras claim to have learnt to "deal" with Nigerians. Many of them speak a 
smattering of Yoruba and pidgin English, and they work hard at cultivating personal 
relationships with them. The average Nigerian shopper tends to be perceived as wealthy but 
tight-fisted. They are seen as aggressive and curining hagglers. Somd Koras are quite willing 
to do business in the Nigerian currency at th6 special rate of NO. 1 to CFAL 
8.1.3 Imeko. 
The third major border post covered in this study is at Imeko. It is a smaller town 
than Idi-Iroko, and is about a hundred miles north of Lagos which, as a border town, exists 
very much in the shadow of Idi-Iroko and Seme. 
There are two main routes to the town through Aiyetoro and Abeokuta, but the roads 
that lead there are almost unmotorable. The forty miles between Abeokuta/Aiyetoro and 
Imeko, though not unusually heavy in traffic, can take more than two hours to travel, and 
are almost totally avoided by commercial vehicles. Odd by their presence however are the 
sizeable numbers of fuel stations present particularly on the stretch of road between Abeokuta 
and Imeko. There is'-a-N20 charge between Lagos and Abeokuta or Aiyetoro, and another 
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N20 I*or those vehicles that do ply the route between thesc towns and Inicko. Cross-border 
traders do not generally use the Inieko route, and there are hardly any checkpoints oil it. 
There is not a lot of commercial activity in Inieko town itself. Although there are 
several large farms in and around the town, most traders tend to be those that display small 
amounts of foodstuff on stalls in front of their homes. What is instead striking about the town 
is the rather large customs presence it has. There are several dozen customs officers to be 
found at any time in the precinct of the customs compound which is about the biggest in die 
town. 
The impression I got on my early visits to die town was that there was not a lot of 
work for the customs officers to do. Compared to Seme or Idi-Iroko, only a few vehicles, 
and hardly any hawkers or other traders on foot pass through the town. Most of those that 
do are generally headed for "Paraku" (a local name for hinterland, -Benin Republic). Their 
wares are mostly light manufactures like soaps, detergent and beverages from Nigeria. There 
did not seem to be much by way of return traffic. But that was before I learnt from a male 
customs informant at Imeko that a lot of the business that goes through Imeko occurs at night 
and is illegal. It mostly involves lorry-loads of petroleum products and crops such as cocoa 
and cotton. Products like vehicle spare parts, used tyres, wheat, palm-oil and several 
industrial products are among the most common imports. These activities occur with the 
collusion of the customs personnel who will sometimes also arrange armed "escorts" for 
certain vehicles travelling in or out of Nigeria. I took my informant's advice and posed as 
a prospective transporter in order to obtain various confirmations of these activities. 
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8.2 ilow Entrepreneurs Become Involved In The Trade. 
How entrepreneurs become inyolyed in the cross-border trade sceins to be broadly 
dependent on the ayailability of information ayailable to the entrepreneur in question, It 
would appear in most cases that those traders who become involved in the cross-border trade 
take a conscious decision to dq so having considered to the best of their ability the 
consequences of doing so. An indication of this may be found in responses to the traders' 
survey where more than 50% of die respondents indicated that they act generally of their own 
impulsion and to fulfil their own ambitions. The impression created however is that traders 
tend to have a more limited, or narrow view of the future of their business when trading 
commences, but they are able to seize exporti * ng opportunities wkenever 
they arise. The 
manufacturing firms tend to consider the exporting issue much eirlier in the firm's life, 
although whether these opportunities are taken up is quite another matter. Illustrations of 
these with respect to starting a cross-border business may be. gleaned from some of the case 
studies. 
To become a trained full-time trader may take several years' apprenticeship"', but 
being a largely informal process, it is not an absolute requirement. Case 3 for instance is a 
trained secretary/personal assistant who got into trading quite by accidenOI8 - she had only 
taken it up initially as something to occupy her free time in-between jobs, while she looked 
for a secretarial appointment, while case 2 had two years' part-time, and four years' full-time 
apprenticeship, albeit with her own parents. Both her parents were seasoned and respected 
traders who also had other apprentices sent to them (mostly) by relatives from all over the 
Oyeneye (1981). 
438 See Appendix A, -case 3 for more details. 
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old Western region. In case I's case, she had nine years' part-time, but unbroken training, 
iticluding spells as a hawker, alongside her primary and seeonclary sehooling. She did not 
quite finish the latter before becoming a trader in her own right. 
The infornial training which a lot of the trading population tends to receive however, 
by its nature of the tutoring of specific tasks, may be said to be geared towards the learning 
and development of routinized methods. Because it is usually taught by an indigenous 
entrepreneur in a particular trade to his apprentices in that trade, it is arguable first that such 
skills are not usable to improve the production system on which the trade depends, and that 
on the whole, what it in fact encourages, is not innovative behaviour but competency skills, 
and this may be die thinking behind the modernist advocacy of Kilby (1969; 1971) and others 
concerning the education of would-be ent , 
repTeneurs, referred to in-chapter 3. 
Although the level of formal education among indigenous entrepreneurs tends to be 
relatively low, this is not to class them as untrained. I have argued elsewhere"', not only 
that the precise links between fonnal education and entrepreneurship are not so clear-cut, but 
also that specifically within the context of indigenous entrepreneurship, the widely-practised 
informal apprenticeship system probably bears more direct relevance to the perseverance of 
certain trades than formal western-style education"O. I pointed out further that trading 
apprentices, in any case, are likely to have simultaneously received formal primary education 
and part-time informal coaching before going on to full-time apprenticeship. This is certainly 
the case with most of the traders who own shops in the major markets that I spoke to, 
whether or not they are cross-border traders, and it is the case with cases I-3. 
Marris & Somerset (1971) have suggested in their study of Kenyan entrepreneurship 
431 Fadahunsi (1996). 
"0 cf. Fafunwa (1974: 34-48); Nafziger (1988: 146-147). 
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that Formal education seenis to be signil . icantly related to successful indigenous 
entrepreneurship only when tile business in question is of a relatively high technical 
sophistication, or when the entrepreneur in question lias professionally (Formally) trained 
subordinates". This explanation appears to be true of sonle of the more formalized ease 
respondents. 
In the case of the C/MD at case 5, although it was working alongside his parents on 
the family farm tI hat fuelled his desire, as a child, to establish his own business"', it was 
in fact while studying Business Administration in an American university that lie finally 
decided on the specific venture that he would engage in (computer supplies), and how lie was 
going to set about it. What he specifically credits his university education for, is having given 
him an ability and a confidence, at the time, to sell himself and his ideas eloquently via the 
various business plans he was required toprdpare while he searched. for the necessary funds 
j 
to set up his business. 
The same may be said of the CEO at case 4 who in fact finished studying and got a 
job in a Lagos bank with no real intention of setting up a business someday. The idea for his 
I 
business only came to him from working, on behalf of the bank, on a programme to advance 
capital to prospective indigenous entrepreneurs. 
It is most uncommon to find a cross-border trader who has not previously had 
experience, as it were, as a "conventional" trader. This was the case with most of the traders 
I spoke to in the field, and the traders who make up cases 1 to 3 also provide illustrations 
of this. 
Case I for instance had been in full-time "conventional" trade for six years before 
441 cf. Tiffin & Osothnehin (1988), cited in Ray (1988: 10-11). 
See AppendfixýAcase 5 for more details. 
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Even dien, sli it 01 soll deciding to spechilize in cross-border trading, c wei IIc trial ruils witli 
her mother who was familiar with the various routes although she was not a cross-border 
trader herself. It was only after this that she decided to take it up. As at the time my 
observation period with her commenced, she had been in full-time cross-border trading for 
seven months. 
Although both owner-managers in cases 2&3 are involved in cross-border trading, 
case 3 did not actually set out to be a cross-border trader, setting up in Oke-Arin market 
merely because it was a well patronised market, but well before its metamorphosis into a 
leading cross-border trade centre, although having found herself amid the trade, she has 
aggressively developed her interests in it. Unlike the generality of cross-border traders, she 
does not personally engage in cross-border traVelling, mainly becabse on the cross-border 
routes, she does no importing. She only expbrts. To support thii, she spent several years 
securing distributorships with several leading manufacturing firms, and so does not actually 
need to travel to obtain the goods that. she sells, and she happens to be based in a market 
which is recognized as the leader in the distribution of the "provisions" that she sells. 
Manufacturers' representatives and their customers from all over West Africa, frequently 
converge on the market, so her marketing activities need not be directed to attracting 
prospective customers to the market, but to her shop once they get there. This is reflected 
in her marketing strategy, as the case 3 summary illustrates. 
Case 2 however regularly makes the cross-border trips in which she mostly trades in 
textiles. She became involved in it in 1982 after five years as a Ugos-focused trader in order 
to broaden her supply base to cope with her growing business. Until then she had purchased 
most of her stock of from her trader parents in Ibadan. As her business grew, she found that 
purchasing the majorhy. Qf her stock from her parents could no longer keep her shop stocked 
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in the'nianner she Nvislied, nor did it make lier as price-conipetitive as she would have liked. 
Slic initially took to accompanying her mother oil the laticr's trips to Iscyin and Shaki 
(about 200 miles north of Lagos) to purchase aso-oke (embroidered cotton), ank-ara 
(patterned cotton) and adire (dyed cotton) so she could buy greater quantities of those 
materials direct from the makers. Howeyer, she hated the journey because of the bad roads 
and rickety buses that plied them.. She was frequently sick on the buses and sometime fell 
off her seat altogether, even though her modier as well as her assistant seemed to manage 
just fine. She would not send either of the two assistants she had at the time on their own, 
at the time, because she felt they were not yet experienced enough to undertake the journey 
on their own. 
More importantly, market demand, reflpcting fashion trends,, had for about a year 
previously, been noticeably shifting froiý adire and ank-ara to silk and a type of linen 
referred to locally as wonyosi. Althoughthese materials were available for sale in Lagos, it 
was common knowledge in the trading cdmmpnity that the'dealers imported variants of the 
materials from different parts of the world, especially Asia and the middle cast. Some 
variants also came from different parts of Africa, notably Guinea, Senegal and the Republic 
of Benin. In November 1982, case 2 made her first trip to Cotonou to purchase some stock 
for sale the following christmas, and has regularly made that, and other cross-border trips 
ever since. 
Although not, perhaps as quickly, or to as great an extent as their trading 
counterparts, some manufacturing firms are also able to respond to changes in the market 
place. Case 4s tentative involvement in the cross-border trading of some of its products for 
instance was in direct response to a perceived apathy on the part of Nigerians to purchase 
leisure products in significant numbers - It had not been originally a part of the firm's agenda, 
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but ne ve rthe less commenccd ill the second year ofthe firm's operation, ill spite ol'the CEO's 
personal reluctance to engage in export trading. As For case 5, it was always tile ilitelitioll 
of the C/MD to export his products globally even before even before lie began to make them. 
The cross-border trade was a venture tile firm became involved in as an addition to its other 
exporting activities around the world. 
8.3 Transporting Goods Across Borders. 
It is arguably in this fleld that traders have consistently outperformed manufacturers, 
so much so that in die cross-border trade, manufacturers generally are seemingly unwilling 
or unable to themselves engage in that specific function as part of their production process, 
either to complement or compete with the traders. I have already cited, in illustration of this, 
the example of case 6 and the distribution of its pre-packed food products in chapter 2. While 
the larger export-oriented firms have bqen trying to get. their products exported to rich 
western countries, many traders, including some of the firms' own appointed distributors 
have been developing a specialism in the more realistically exploitable cross-border trade. 
It has got to the point where for the moment at least, it makes economic and logistical sense 
for manufacturers to export to cross-border markets via indigenous entrepreneurs. 
There appears to be four principal means by which goods physically cross borders 
between Nigeria and the Benin Republic. I will discuss them in groups of two, headed 
broadly under "conventional" and "unconventional" methods. 
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8.3.1 Conventional Methods 
First, it is in fact quite common, contrary to popular belief, for goods to be 
transported in what may be described as a conventional manner. By this, I inean for example 
that firm "A" in Nigeria orders goods from firin "B" in another West African country such 
as Ghana, and firm "B" either then delivers the goods to firm "A" with its own vehicles, or 
commissions a transporter to do so. The payment of bribes when employing this means is 
however accepted as an inevitability. The method is more commonly employed by modern 
sector and larger-sized firms. Botli case 4 and case 5 regularly employed this method during 
the course of the field-study. While case 4 would normally commission delivery agents to 
transport their cross-border orders, case 5 hav6 delivery vehicles of their own. I made two 
such trips with the firm in May and June 1994. Both journeys, apart from several instances 
of bribe demands and offerings along the way at several checkpoints", were largely 
uneventful. One was a delivery of computer hardware to a firm in Cotonou, and the other 
was a delivery of processed cotton to a Togolese finn in'Lome. Each of the trips was 
completed within the day. Crossing between Ghana and Togo, as mentioned earlier in chapter 
was always a tense affair. 
Alternatively, some traders will simply cross the border as they should - either 
carrying their purchases as they walk across the border, or in some form of transportation. 
But not many traders will do this as it leaves them vulnerable to all sorts of extortionist 
practises at the borders. 
totalling in each case, more than N20,000. 
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8.3.2 Unconventional Methods 
It is more usual, particularly in the case of smaller-sized trading firnis to attempt 
various Forms of concealment when transporting goods, hence their blanket labelling as 
"sillugglers". They insist however that this is more of a reaction to the various forms of 
extortion they experience when in transit, than a desire to avoid the payment of legitimate 
duties. However, such is the nonnality of the process of concealment to the traders that most 
of those that I spoke to only had vague ideas of what "legitimate duties" actually were. The 
extent to which a trader will go in concealing his purchases from border personnel seems to 
depend to a large extent on the relative wealth or status of the trader in question. 
Case 2 for instance, usually travels, in her chauffeur-drivem Peugeot 504 estate, 
accompanied by a trader friend. On each journey, she purchases enoAgh materials to fill most 
of the unused space in the vehible. She does not therefore even attempt to hide her 
purchas&" and is quite resigned to having to pay out bribes at each one of the checkToints 
that she encounters on her way back into Nigeria, and even sometimes on her way out. She 
reserves a wad of N50 notes for this purpose on her journeys. 
Probably the most common method employed by Nigerian cross-border traders, and 
in particular by artisanal and other small scale trading firms who do not have, or choose not 
to use their own vehicles for their trips is the practice whereby a trader transports in the first 
instance, the goods he has purchased to the Beninoise end of the border where he hands them 
over to one or more of the several touts (also known as kelebe) who operate as independent 
carriers along the borders. On the Nigerian/Beninoise border, where they are present in their 
444 except for the odd occasion when she purchases accessories, and this is because in the 
past, border persofifiel. have relieved her of such goods, rather than the more usual monetary 
bribes. 
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greatest numbers, they have "statiolls" 11 shol't distance from either end ol' tlic border post, 
although they are mostly to be found on the Beninoise end. The kelebe will then cany the 
trader's bags (or such other container) containing the goods while the trader casually walks 
across the border to the make-shift inotor-park on the Nigerian side"'. Customs and 
immigration officers of both countries pretend to look the other way when these occur. Once 
across, tile bags are handed back to the trader who then pays, depending on the size of each 
bag, about N10 per bag to the kelebe. If necessary, the k-elebe will "sub-contract" out to 
another tout to help carry the bags in the crossing, which must be completed on a single 
journey, otherwise the trader will need to pay bribes to die border personnel each time he 
returns. Case I and her friends routinely use this method. 
The trader - kelebe relationship is necessarily based on an element of trust as a kelebe 
can very easily make away with a naive trader's goods. Some traders therefore choose to 
-1 1 
walk beside their chosen kelebe during the crossing. There can however be further risks 
attached to doing this because sometimes, while the carrier is allowed to cross the border 
unchallenged, an unfortunate trader (linked to the carrier) might find himself detained and 
bribes taken from him. During this time, the carrier has an even better opportunity to escape 
with, the goods. In case I's case therefore, what she does is let her kelebe go across ahead 
of her while she mingles in a group of walkers not far behind him. She uses any one of a 
pool of three carriers with whom she had no problems on any of our trips. Most regular 
traders have, over the course of their travels, settled on particular kelebes who they will use 
to the exclusion of all others, and will rather take the time to locate them in their "station" 
441 Some traders will, for a substantially higher sum (see for instance section 8.1.1 
above), rather hire a border official for this purpose. Although this is probably more reliable 
in practice, it can-bp rather cumbersome to arrange and so happens far less frequently than 
kelebe hiring. 
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: 11-ca, settle I. or the first one they see. The kelebesare also impressively able to constitute 
themselves quite quickly into an impromptu body to seek retribution against foul-play by, or 
, igainst one of their number. It is therefore unusual to hear of cases of carriers absconding 
with traders' goods. It was Ade, one of such carriers, who informed me that each of the 
"recognised" kelebes that works die area has to pay N50 at the end of eveiy working day to 
a designated point-man in the iminigmtion office. In return, they are not harassed, but unco- 
operative carriers (and other "kelebes", widiin the meaning explained in chapter 6) are 
routinely locked up, sometimes for several days at a time for their "offenses". Ade also 
informed me that lie lives not too far away in Badagry, and because he works about twelve 
hours daily, he personally has no trouble meeting his daily quota of payments, which may 
explain why lie sees nothing wrong or irregular with making such payments. In one particular 
"peak period", I counted close to a hufidred people who could be in Ade's profession, 
although several drivers that I put ! his to tended to estimate the figure in the thousands. The 
kelebes come from all over West Africa -so that even Bantu and Ewe people from Senegal 
and Sierra Leone can find their kinsmen on the border with whom they tend to feel safer. 
This, as Ade says, is however not a problem, because there are always enough "clients" to 
go round. Another kelebe (Kehinde) claimed to have been shown the ropes by an uncle. He 
never went beyond primary school because he always wanted to be in this "business", make 
lots of money and retire early. He seems to be on his way. As he said' 
"I was born and bred in this area, I'm a son of the soil... I make enough money to 
eat well and I have a (Peugeot) 504. Soon I will build my house... I have already 
bought a piece of land in Ijanikin (near Lagos)"441. 
The fourth method is one that seems to be a lesser-used alternative to the third method 
described above. It is more commonly employed by traders who trade beyond the Benin 
Taped interv`fdwý 11/7/94. Brackets mine. 
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Republic and so have to cross more than one national boundary With the logistic problenis 
that this entails. It is also used by "cottage" and other small scale Nigerian traders in the 
Benin Republic who make heavy, or bulky purchases that need transporting into Nigeria. It 
involves handing over goods purchased, say in Cotonou or Lorne, to a specialist commercial 
driver who, for a fee, is expected to deliver intact a trader's goods at an appointed time and 
place in Nigeria, usually a residence in Lagos the day after die goods are handed over. The 
trader then boards a bus, or drives back to his Nigerian base in relative peace, to await the 
delivery of his goods. 
Such a transaction is obviously built on trust, since there is no fornial right of 
restitution as such for a trader whose goods are not delivered because of the inforniality of 
the arrangement. To reduce the risk of foul play by the driver, such arrangements will 
ordinarily only follow the personal recominendation of someone whp is usually a kin of the 
driver, and acts rather like a guarantor for the safe delivery of the goods. 
The drivers assume all the risk of getting the goods into Nigeria. This invariably 
involves, according to some of them, paying bribes to join armed convoys when possible, 
creative driving on occasions to avoid robbers and checkpoints, sometimes because they are 
not easily differentiable, and so forth. They mostly drive at night. Unless a driver thereafter 
wishes to retire from the business altogether, there does not seem to be much of an incentive 
to deliberately not deliver a trader's goods. According to case 1 and other traders, word-of- 
mouth spreads very quickly about unreliable drivers, and they are simply avoided by other 
traders. The drivers are usually therefore quite prepared to go to extra-ordinary lengths to 
ensure safe delivery of goods in their care. 
Although several traders claimed to have used this method, I only actually saw it 
being used once, Qp my very first cross-border trip with case 1, who, for this purpose, 
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generally relies Oil tile services of' a driver who is tile father ot'a trader fi-ictid of' hers. 
The forcgoing is not to say that traditional pctty smuggling docs not tvinain. Sucral 
residents of die various border communities think nothing of going across the border to buy 
or sell items, either for their own use or for trade. Traders are however increasingly less 
likely to engage in bush smuggling, preferring to engage in the kinds of acts of concealment 
described earlier in this subsection. Those that continue to engage in petty smuggling have 
however evolved an unlikely alliance with Okada 447 riders, who will usually transport the 
petty trader (or smuggler) and his wares, which must be small enough to be transportable on 
the motorcycle through the border post, or just as commonly, through the several bush patlis 
beyond the immediate vicinity of the border-post. 
8.4 Entrepreneurs' Other Exporting Activities 
For several Nigerian manufactureis, their aspiration is to export their products to rich 
western countries where they can earn hard currency, but several barriers mitigate against 
this in the form of high tariffs, quality control measures and such other regulations. These 
aspirations therefore remain largely unfulfilled. There remains steady, if diminished, 
exporting of Nigeria's traditional exports of cocoa, timber and the like, but these are mostly 
mineral resources as opposed to manufactured goods. 
Occasionally, there are local press reports of firms exporting software technology to 
the USA, or made-to-measure furniture to Canada, and so forth, but these are very much the 
exception. Certain bottlers of local beers and palm. wine can also claim a measure of 
447 "Okada", the name of a popular local airline, is also now the affectionate term used 
to describe comrfiercjýl motor-cycles. The same vehicles are referred to as "Bebe" in the 
Benin Republic. 
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continued success in exporting mainly to the UX and the USA. 
However, cross-border traders have also bee" MOVirig into this overseas trade, and 
initial indications are that they are doing so with some success. 
Their numbers would seem to be relatively few - they are more likely to be from the 
upper eclielon of already successful cross-border traders - but even so, they follow what 
seenis to be the Nigerian entrepreneurial instinct of operating informally. Case 3 for instance, 
who may be described as operating predominantly in die formal sector, does virtually all her 
overseas trading informally. International traders are also more likely to be found importing 
products for sale in Nigeria, as opposed to exporting them. 
It has already been indicated in chapter 7 that food and textile products are important 
constituents of the overseas trade. To this list can be added used vehicles, including new and 
used vehicle parts. It is hardly surprising that trade in imported uqed vehicles has risen to 
such magnitudes when productiop in the country's vehicle assembly plants has become 
sporadic and prices beyond the reach of most private buyers'41. 
I shall presently return to this point. 
Many traders speak of exporting foodstuff, "provisions", and fabrics to customers in 
locations in parts of North Africa, the Middle East and Western Europe. For some of them, 
the money made is used to pay for the relatively small quantities of beverages, computer 
hardware and accessories, beauty and other household products they tend to import from the 
USA or Western Europe, or the hard currency, where such is earned, is quite simply sold 
on the Lagos black market for high Naira returns.. 
441 To have an idea of the sort of price increases being referred to here, a new Peugeot 
504 which cost just under N15,000 in 1984 sold for just over N750,000 in 1994. Average 
wages just about doubled in the same period. Starting prices for small-to- medium used 
Tokunbo (as most-imported products are referred to) cars in Nigeria were about N75,000, 
for the duration of th-b-fieldwork. 
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Their methods are quite simple. They may ship, or more commonly, airfi-eight, or 
liand over sniall quantities of their exports to Europe or Anierica-bound friends, rclativcs or 
paid agents who Will, on arrival, either hand the goods to named contacts, or themselves sclI 
the goods directly to buyers introduced to them by their overseas contacts. Thcsc buyers will, 
in turn, sell them, mainly to afro-caribbcan shops or other interested retailers, from where 
end-users are finally able to buy them. Both case 2 and case 3 are involved in a two-way 
overseas trade of this nature, although the trading pattern is heavily tilted towards importing 
into, as against exporting froin Nigeria. 
Case 1 does no overseas exporting but is extremely keen to begin an import trade in 
western style clothes as soon as the opportunity arises. Case 3 exports locally-made beauty 
products and popular local provision brands to. Britain and Germany. She also sells other 
light Nigerian-made products such as spoAges, chewing sticks, and, occasionally, processed 
foods. She usually airfreights modest quantities of these goods in the names of her two sons 
who live in Britain. They then arrange their onward distribution in London. She admits to 
making up to ; E5000 per annum this way, although the sum is probably greater than this. 
Case 2 is also involved in a modest export trade which, according to her, normally 
earns her a net sum of more than E2000 per annum. She mostly exports Guinea brocade and 
adire materials, either uncut, or sewn into casual style clothing. She sells up to fifty units 
of the sewn materials every year, sending only a few of them at a time as part of the luggage 
of various agents, to be sold on commission basis. She also sells hand-made shoes, sandals 
and other accessories, and will occasionally accept individual orders to produce and deliver 
sewn, ceremonial outfits. Case 2 explains that there is no shortage of people going to, or 
coming from London and Cairo (her usual export destinations) who, for a fee, are willing 
to act as couriers for. these products. She herself has up to four such "agents" in her regular 
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cillploy. She sometimes sends lier exports as unaccompanied air cargo in the name of' an 
agent, but avoids this as much as possible because of the substantial aniounts she has to pay 
in bribes. 
Although more and more traders are beginning to take up overseas export trade, tile 
more likely scenario is still for traders to import products into Nigeria for sale there. Here, 
one is more likely to find evidence of formalized methods being employed, although 
observable evidence still indicates a general tendency to lean towards informal mediods. Case 
2 estimates that she obtains about 50% of all her supplies from Saudi Arabia and only about 
10 % from within Nigeria. The rest are obtained via the cross-border trade and from Western 
Europe. 
Importing on the Saudi route is the cornerstone of case 2s overseas trade. She usually 
teams up with up to six other traders at a time and they contribute poney into an informal 
cooperative. She may contribute up to N200,000 per trip, although usual contributions are 
only about half that. They then search for a reliable trader- who is willing to undertake a trip 
to Saudi Arabia on their behalf. Sometimes, it is one of the traders' assistants. They put up 
the trader's airfare and arrange accommodation as well. In return, they present the travelling 
trader with a list describing in precise details the kinds of goods they require. Arriving at a 
list is a complex process involving a series of meetings during which the traders attempt as 
much as possible to harmonize their requirements, which will enable the traveller to purchase 
larger quantities of fewer kinds of materials, and reduce unit costs to each contributing 
trader. The preferred purchases are usually upmarket fabrics (lace, silk, jacquard) and 
accessories. 
The travelling trader is expected to link up with the traders' contacts in various Saudi 
towns who would, ýssist in obtaining the traders' exact requirements. The traveller is usually 
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goile For about three weeks, although oil oile occasion, we Nvere at the airport to inect a 
trader who had been gone for over two nionths. 
On the day of the traveller's return (usually Sundays), we would spend all afternoon 
at the airport in the company of other market traders who were also there for the same or 
other traders. It is normal practice for the traders to transport their Saudi purchases as excess 
cargo on the same flight that they are on, and not by some other cheaper means, such as 
unaccompanied air cargo, for instance. This way, additional customs complications are 
avoided, and die purchases can be shared before quarrels develop over alleged malpractice. 
The first such trader I accompanied case 2 to meet at the Murtala Mohammed Airport in 
Lagos arrived with eight large trunk boxes of materials, while the second arrived with six. 
The traders will then immediately go in a conyoy to a pre-arranged rendezvous where the 
goods are shared according to the initial cogtributions. The trunlý-boxes are also sold and 
their proceeds shared as well. 
Case 2 engages in this arrangemeht about five or six times a year. She maintains that 
in her trade, the Saudi imports invariably work out cheaper and better and says only the 
sheer difficulty of arranging each trip's logistics prevents her from employing this means 
more often. 
She is also trying to expand her supply base. In April 1994, she flew to Banjul in 
Gambia to be interviewed by a textile manufacturer whose Nigerian distributor she had 
previously applied to become, but was unsuccessful. A similar trip to Lome two months later 
looked more promising, but had not been followed-up by the end of my period of 
observation. 
Case 3 is also more of an importer than an exporter on the overseas route. Most of 
the money she makes from her modest exports is ploughed into a used car importation 
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business begun in partnership with her British-based son in 1993. The remainder is made up 
by the son who travels, usually to Germany or Belgium, where lie purchascs the cars and 
arranges their shipment to Nigeria. At the Nigerian end, case 3 enlists the lielp of a close 
relation who is stationed at the Tin Can Island Port in Lagos to obtain the vehicles with 
mininium fuss and maximum speed. Tile two shipments that took place during die period of 
observation were for a total of five vehicles, expected to gross about N1 million. She also 
imports popular brand-name breakfast cereals, pasta sauces and preserves like Marmalade 
and honey from Britain, but this arm of her business is by no means steady as it is dependent 
on her ability to raise the necessary funds (that is, sterling) on the black market, which she 
would only do when-she feels the rates are relatively favourable. This means she sometimes 
misses deadlines to meet particular shipments, but accepts this as a necessary price. In June 
1994 she concluded arrangements to import different provisions including fresh fruit juices, 
artificial sweeteners and tonic wines from Argentina, with the Argentine firm agreeing to be 
paid in Naira"9. Delivery had not yet taken-place when the field study ended, but case 3 
was estimating that the arrangement would cost her about N250,000 annually, in the first 
instance. She was also hoping to eventually replace her existing British suppliers with her 
new Argentine ones since the latter had Nigerian offices and personnel, and were also willing 
to be paid in Naira. 
Several firms are involved in importing automobile engines which local engineers and 
mechanics use in the assembly of private mass-transit buses which, compared to the state-run 
transport services, dominate the lucrative transportation sector. The vehicle parts are essential 
for what is presently a rudimentary but nonetheless fast-growing vehicle assembly industry. 
449 A firm like 
* 
this will invariably use the Naira to purchase and export other products 
ftorn Nigeria such 1ý-Cocoa or timber for sale in Argentina or elsewhere. This is how the 
money is usually recouped. 
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Although partly state-owned assemblers in the modern sector like Peugeot Automobile 
(Nigeria) Limited [PAN] and Volkswagen Of Nigeria [VON] remain in operation, the real 
growth is to be found in the operations of the privately-owned assembly plants operating in 
the Epe area of Lagos State, and also in the Onitslia and Aba areas in Eastern Nigeria. With 
production in firms like VON falling from an early 1980s high of 5,000 units per annum to 
present levels of less than 100 upits per armuni, the opportunity exists for firnis that can 
adapt local technology to fill die production gaps"'. This has so far not worked for family- 
type vehicles, but there is something of a boom in the assembly of commercial vehicles and 
attendant parts. The same situation exists in die assembly of power generators due to the 
erratic nature of publicly-supplied power. The importation of the engines for the two products 
are essential, and from that point on, the assemblers can usually knock together a body and 
other fittings that go with it. 
Components necessary for-the assembly and repairs of most audio-visual equipment 
and other domestic electrical/electronic liroducts are also ' opular imports. These goods are p 
produced mainly for local consumption. An increasing number of people are also involved 
in the importation of new and used information technology equipment (including both new 
and used parts of these). 
450 Perhaps this; -. 4s well as the normal process of change and development, may be said 
to account for the curreht-growth in this area of the market. 
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8.5 Major Constraints Of The Trade 
I have previously recorded that one of the most notable things about the cross-border 
trade is that it takes place amid considerable constraints. Without a doubt, some of these are 
caused by tile traders themselves. Some of their expressed problerns, such as pilfering of 
stock by employees, account books that do not add up, and so forth, are things that can be 
reduced by more professional management practices. But the most severe constraints on the 
development of the trade appear to be externally inflicted, and as shown in chapter 7, are 
wide-ranging. The same chapter also reveals that the most repeated trading constraints are 
associated with illegality, (related to this) officials' harassment of traders, and the 
availability, or otherwise, of foreign exchange. The issue of illegality in the trading 
enviromnent is one that penneates the entire thesis. I will return to, -it in section 8.6 below, A 
and focus, for now, the discussion in this subsection on the two issues of harassment and 
foreign exchange scarcity. 
8.5.1 State Officials' Harassment Of Traders 
One of the most serious impediments to the development of the cross-border trade is 
the constant harassment of cross-border traders by various law enforcement agents. For many 
traders, it is a way of life. Not many traders can remember a time when they did not have 
to endure some form of harassment. 
"Harassment" here may take many forms. There are those that take place by law 
enforcement agents pursuant to official duties and those that are unauthorised. In the former 
category are inclujded instances such as happened to case 2, one of whose shops was 
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suilim, arily pulled down by Lagos state environmental health officials as an "illegal" structure 
despite the fact that the stall had been erected and let by the local councill-". It is the latter 
type of harassment which however appears potentially more damaging. It concerns the 
various law enforcement activities on the various border posts, as well as the various 
clieckpoints on the cross-border trade routes. While I was unable to actually confirm which 
of the checkpoints were authorised ones, their sheer numbers, locations and the activities that 
took place in most of them seemed to indicate that not all the checkpoints, and certainly not 
the activities were authorised. 
At various times on various trips between Nigeria and the Benin Republic, I counted 
between nine and fifteen checkpoints on the Idi-Iroko route, and between four and six on the 
Seme route. The only checking that takes place on the Imeko routeis on the border itself. 
There were generally about five or six chqckpoints; on the rnaiý highway between the 
Beninoise end of the Nigeria/Benih border and the Benin/Togo border to the west. 
Among the Nigerian checkpoints, there would generally be one army, and one 
customs checkToint. The rest are usually manned by the police. When driving on my own, 
would usually be waived on in about half of these checkpoints, but travelling in the 
company of any of my informants (more often than not in commercial transportation) meant 
that we were stopped at virtually every checkpoint - some were within two or three hundred 
metres of one another - and searched in most of them. These searches are usually prelude 
to a demand for bribes. The procedure does not vary much. The searching officer would 
demand one document after another until there was one which the driver was unable to 
451 See appendix A, *&ase 2 for further details. 
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prodUCe452. Then would follow the bribe demand, in lieu of arrest. Several drivers would 
avoid this situation by following a "wey yourpapers? / wetin you carty? " demand with an 
aniount. of nioney tucked inside the document being lianded over. 
Most of these actiyities are also present in other West African countries, although 
perhaps due to their lesser numbers, one detects a less aggressive countenance from 
roadblock personnel outside Nigeria. 
These checkpoints and other border practices invariably slow down journey times and 
add unnecessary costs to traders which are simply passed on to consumers. Yet constant 
travelling is an inevitable feature of the cross-border trade. In an enviromnent where 
telecommunication services are notoriously unreliable and underdeveloped, it is normal 
practice for traders to constantly travel from place to place, even when merely carrying out 
enquiries and not actual transactions. 
At a checkToint, one might initially be confronted by Kelebes. They are to be found 
in most checkpoints, especially in those manned by the Police. The Kelebes would stop and 
search the vehicle, demand relevant registration papers and (especially from commercial 
vehicle drivers) bribes. The attention of the officers on duty need only be drawn to drivers 
perceived as "difficult". 
Individuals and vehicles crossing the border into both Nigeria and the Republic of 
Benin are routinely charged an unofficial "crossing fee". At the Idi-Iroko/Igolo border post, 
the amount is negotiable although from people crossing on foot who look like they might be 
on some sort of business trip, the border officials and their Kelebes usually try to extort at 
least N10 (or CFA 100) from passport holders, and N20 (or CFA 200) from non-passport 
452 On one occasion, a demand for a road worthiness certificate was followed by a 
curious demand for'ib'e- vehicle's fire extinguisher and the driver's birth certificate. 
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holders. For people Crossing ill Vellicles, the negotiations are earnest, and there is really no 
upper finlit as such. For people refusing to accede to these demands, the iiiiiiinium 
consequence is an indefinite delay, with possible loss of earnings. However, traders, 
especially, recognise the futility of such a countenance, and such incidents are firmly in the 
minority. 
Going across the Idi-Iroko border was for me, not a problem as early on in the field, 
I had made the acquaintance of a customs official who frequently escorted me back and 
fbrtlý53. This informant explained that officially, their duties are essentially the same as 
those of their counterparts at the air and seaports. However, my rather cautious talks with 
her and her colleagues about corruption on the borders showed their pre-occupation with their 
unofficial revenue collection activities. This they generally blamed on "poor" pay and 
"harsh" working conditions. 
Although largely similar arrangements obtain at the Seme crossing, things are rather 
more regimented there. The officials also collect N10 and N20 bribes from foot-crossing 
passport, and non-passport holders, respectively. On two separate occasions, I refused to pay 
the bribe at the Beninoise end before crossing into Nigeria, insisting as in Idi-Iroko/Igolo that 
would rather go through the official process, and on each occasion, I was promptly frog- 
marched into an office and detained there with other people, mostly drivers, who were in a 
similar situation. Eventually, the drivers would have to pay more or less the sums demanded 
from them. So did I. 
453 occasionally, I would make the crossing on my own, and when I had the chance, 
insist on following the official procedure for border crossing. On one occasion, in signing 
a register of travellers for that day, I saw that mine was only the fourth name registered as 
travelling out of Nigeria on a day when I had personally seen no less than twenty passenger 
vehicles, as well as dozens of hawkers and other people go back and forth between the two 
countries on foot. 
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Firms in (lie modern sector, in pa"ticull'I", the 11101-e cotiventionally managged ones like 
case 7 and case 6 also suffer from an additional Forin of harassment by state officials. 
Managers from both companies claimed that severe pressures are sometimes brought to bear 
on them to hire distributors at times when the firnis do not need them. Instances were 
recalled where wives and relatives of senior government officers are asked, not just to be 
made distributors, but to be given large allocations of products for distributorship. The 
management of both firms feel obliged to carry out these favours in order to remain in the 
good books of the government of the day. Sometimes, distributorships have had to be 
withdrawn immediately after the person whose influence resulted in the allocation of the 
distributorship has left power. 
8.5.2 Foreign Exchange-Related Problems.., 
The foreign exchange situation is a nightmarish- one for several Nigerian firms 
engaged in international trade. There is not only a problem of availability, but of value, as 
the Naira has been undergoing an unrelenting loss of value since the SAP began in 1986. A 
typical scenario may be illustrated through a purchasing problem faced by case 6 early in 
1994. The firm ordered a quantity of preservatives from another Nigerian firm, an order that 
came about because case 6 had been unable to purchase the foreign exchange needed to order 
this direct from its European suppliers. The supplier firm is an importer and exporter of 
commodities which normally purchases its own foreign exchange in the parallel market. 
When case 6's order was put through, it was to cost N22,000. In the four weeks it took for 
delivery to be made, the government had issued new foreign exchange regulations relieving 
bureaux de change. q. f their powers to sell foreign exchange. Rather than accede to this, the 
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burcaux closed shop and began lobbying the government to revert to the old system. The 
ensuing foreign exchange shortage resulted in a pattern of depreciation of the Maira in the 
parallel market, and just before delivery was due, the supplier informed case 6 that the price 
had risen to N32,340. The delivery date itself fell in the middle of the first of several fuel 
shortages that occurred during the fieldwork. This delayed delivery by a further three days, 
and as an enraged sales director informed me, caused the price to further increase to 
N35,000. Even inulti-billion Naira businesses like case 7 are not immune from the 
uncertainties surrounding the Naira. It is this (coupled with the country's perennial political 
uncertainties) that dissuades most firms from engaging in any long-terni strategic planning. 
It is commoitto think of problems associated with Naira exchangeability as affecting 
it only vis-a-vis hard currencies such as American dollars, or Pqunds Sterling. But the 
problem goes beyond this. The most widely-p$ed indigenous curren6ies in the West African 
cross-border trade are the CFA franc, Naira and Cedi. Yet, observable evidence indicates 
that non of these currencies are easily interchangeable, or even available in official channels, 
although it appears to be less of a problem among francophone West African countries. They 
belong to the West African Monetary Union (W,, kMU)454, which means they have a 
common currency (the CFA franc) which is tied to the french franc and there is free transfer 
of funds between them. It is not the case with the rest of West Africa where the 
establishment of the WACH has yet to eliminate the problem of regional monetary 
transfer4l' so much so that the ECOWAS estimates that 60% of all the monetary transfers 
454 WAMU's members are Benin, Bourkina-Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal 
and Togo. 
411 FOS (1993). 
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concerning formal regional trade is donc informallyll". Observable evideticc indicates 
further that this might be inore of , in issue in Nigeria than in otlicr West African countries, 
the banks of which tend to take dic availability of Naira seriously. The reverse is not quite 
the case in Nigeria, where the U. S dollar and some Western European currency are the only 
ones of particular interest. On a few occasions, I walked into rive targeted banks in Ilupeju 
Estate, Lagos, four of whorn displayed rates of sale of Cedis and CFA, and none of whorn 
had any for sale. Unsurprisingly then, traders routinely use the black market. The first time 
I asked case I whether she had made any previous attempts to purchase CFA francs through 
the banks, she said no, but could not think why. Other traders clahn to haye been preyiously 
able to exchange various West African currencies at the bureaux de change before their mode 
of operation was changed in the budget of January 1994 457 
Apart from her involvement in the Weýt African cross-bordei trade, case 3 also does 
steady export - import trade with Britain, ' Germany and latterly, Argentina. While she is paid 
mostly in Naira, when she has to pay her slqppliers, she purchases sterling and American 
dollars from currency traffickers, dozens of whom are situated within a few hundred yards 
of her Oke-Arin market base. She believes trying to obtain foreign exchange at the official 
rate is a waste of time and refuses to even try. However, the extra charges of the black 
market are mostly passed on to the buyer. 
Case 2 gave up trying to make foreign exchange transactions through the banks in 
1989 after more than two years of trying unsuccessfully. In 1993, following the further 
deregulation of the foreign exchange market by the Babangida administration the previous 
"' ECOWAS (1989: 15). 
This situafion,. ýas been previously referred to in chapter 6. It was subsequently 
partially reversed in the'1995 budget, five months after the end of the field study. 
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year, she became a backer for a bureau de change situated along Agege Motor Road, near 
her Oshodi outlet, and did all her foreign exchange transactions througý it. It however closed 
down early in 1.994 as a result of the Abacha administration's new regulations on the powers 
of bureaux de change. She then reverted to the black market. She does not feel she has a 
choice, although she realizes that ultimately, the buyer bears the extra costs. Her attitude is 
fairly typical of what traders generally feel. As she says: 
"Tell them (the government) we are only harming ourselves with this exchange rate 
wahala (fuss). As for me, whether the rate is fifty or a hundred to one (that is, Dollar 
- Naira parallel market exchange rate), I don't care. I will buy whatever I can afford, 
and I will not sell at a loss. I won't even sell on credit... My children and I must eat. 
I also have wards in my care who must eat and be clothed. No government can tell 
me not to earn a living; Not when I don't owe them a kobo, nor have I stolen from 
vt458 any of their forefathers... 
As the foregoing indicates, for many traders, the solutions to their financial 
difficulties, especially those to do with foreip exchange supply, are frequently to be found 
in the informal sector. Cases 2&3 have both demonstrated a willingness to step away from 
the black market if it is to their advantage, but ave reverted to it when problems have arisen 
with the state-funded foreign exchange market. -The frequent shortages in the state FEM are 
astonishingly virtually unknown in the informal sector. This was- evident in a most 
remarkable demonstration of strength- in-depth during a month-long strike by Lagos bank 
workers between July and August 1994, when money supply was essentially down to the 
traffickers. One such trafficker, Ibrahim, who trades out of Tejuosho market, casually 
informed me more than two weeks into the strike referred to above, that lie had the authority 
to "cliange" up to NI million on the spot in seven listed currencies, including U. S dollars, 
French francs, Deutch marks, and Pounds sterling. Greater amounts could be done, but 
would necessitate a visit to a shadowy "brother at Bristol [hotel] " on Lagos Island. His actual 
Taped interview 2/6/94 (brackets mine). 
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brother, Mohammed, also in the trade, referred on a number of occasions to the top dealers 
based at Kaduna in Northern Nigeria, if there was a really large transaction to be made, such 
as amounts of U. S$1 million and above (his example). 
One can only begin to wonder at the relative smoothness with which this parallel 
market runs, the fact that it has never appeared. unduly stretched, and most significantly, I 
believe, the fact that it has been able (in 1995) to force the Federal Goverment to revise its 
foreign exchange policy in order to bring it in line with what obtains in the parallel market 
after the former's glaring failure to contain the latter. 
Case 7 constantly needs foreign exchange in order to procure new, or maintain existing 
equipment and other materials. As it is not involved in the direct exporting of its products, 
it is not a substantial foreign exchange earner. It therefore relies for its foreign exchange 
requirements, on the government's bi-weekly. auction where there are no guarantees that a 
firm will receive all, or sometimes, even any of its foreign exchange requirements. 
Unlike most firms which can easily obtain hard currency on the black market, albeit 
at a more expensive rýte, the firm's SAM told. 'Me that his firm cannot. A firm of their 
stature, he said, cannot afford to run foul of the law under any circun)stances, and so they 
can only keep trying to make the best possible use of the auction system, however much 
nonsense it makes of their strategic/production planning. 
Case 5 also joins other manufacturers in applying for foreign exchange allocations at 
the state auctions, although given the proportion of its tuýnover earned through exports, the 
firm may well already have significant funds built up abroad, which ought, in theory, to 
make it more immune to the near-standstill in the manufacturing sector which the failure to 
provide enough foreign exchange for sale sometimes brings. The C/MD would however not 
confirm this. But if it were true, it would substantiate the government's claim that its 
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performance in supplying foreign exchange for sale at the auction is always made to look 
worse than it actually is because participating finns tend to apply fdi-more than they actually 
need in the hope of eventually receiving just enough. It is a practice that case 6, and some 
other firms, admit doing. 
8.6 Does "Legal" Trade Exist? 
One of the most expressed themes throughout the discussion in this chapter has been 
the ubiquity of apparently unethical or illegal acts by various actors in the cross-border trade 
(as well as in several other commercial activities). It leads one to ask whether it is in fact 
possible to partake in the Nigerian cross-border trade, or any trade at all in Nigeria, without 
breaking one law or the other. - 
Most managers express a desire to operate within the law but seem resigned to not 
actually achieving this. Iý appears generally that the larger and/or more high-profile a firm 
is, the more confidently the firm expresses its ability to operate entirely within the law. 
Appearances, however, do flatter to deceive because on closer examination, it can be seen 
that even such expressions operate with some inevitable ("practical") limitations, as are 
discussed below, and in any case, such firms, such as case 7 in this study, do so not strictly 
out of choice, as the finn's SAM explained in section 8.4.2 above, and are always counting 
the cost of such adherence. Some firms within the OPS (including cases 6& 7), for instance, 
are able to purchase American dollars through the banks, supposedly at the "official" rate 
of 22: 1 . But they complain that the rates they actually pay the banks, after a series of 
contentious charges, are nearer 40: 1'-". The same applies to interest rates which were 
459 cf. Business Tinlýs (Lagos) 13/6/94, p. 2 . 
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pegged in the 1994 budget at 21 % but which businesses insist actuallY operates at a rate 
nearer 35 %'. Apart from these, managers freely admit to alicr* ha: ýing to pay out vast 
sums in bribes to bank, customs, tax and such other officialS461. Some bankers unofficially 
confirmed this, although there were several more denials and refusals to comment. The 
situation would appear somewhat exacerbated in transactions involving foreign exchange, the 
relative shortage of which increases the "premium" that goes towards obtaining it. These, 
combined with overhead costs, have led some firms in the OPS to conclude that they are not 
able to compete on equal terms with firms in the informal sector. 
Traders, for their own part, generally believe it is impossible to do business in 
Nigeria without going against the spirit of the law, and are fairly dismissive of legislations 
designed to enforce this, such as those to do with business formation or the supply of foreign 
exchange. As I indicated in chapter 1, most of them routinely conduct their affairs with tax 
avoidance more or less taken for granted. In April 1994 for instance, the Lagos state 
government destroyed seyeral market stalls b9lonjing to case 2 and other traders in Oshodi 
market. They were then asked to produce, among other things, three years' income tax 
returns before they could be considered for alternative locations. The-traders did not have 
the required tax documents, but were easily able to bribe certain state officials to produce 
such for them. Acts such as these are considered normal practice, and examples abound. The 
same applies to VAT returns, introduced in September 1993 to take effect from January 
1994. Very few firms outside of those that have direct dealings with the Nigeria Customs 
Service actually implement the VAT regulations. Many of the traders I spoke to in fact 
professed ignorance of the VAT system, and just as curiously, several managers in the OPS 
460 cf. The Guardian (Lagos) 16/3/94, pp. 13,15,17; The News 19/12/94, pp. 12-14. 
" See further The Guardian (Lagos) 24/5/94, p. II. 
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did not actually know the prevailing VAT rate, calling into question whether their firms in 
fact paid the tax. 
In several interviews I conducted, fmns in the formal sector complained about unfair 
competition with informal sector enterprises. What some of the former have therefore 
decided to do is establish informal sector subsidiaries, while for others, it is to support 
government. action to eliminate informal sector competitors, such as legislation prohibiting 
informal foreign exchange supply, and subsequent moves to make foreign exchange available 
only to registered members of MAN 
462 
. 
Observable evidence in this study seems to suggest that it is extremely difficult within 
the prevailing business climate in Nigeria to carry on trade in the country without breaking 
any laws, regulations or basic business "ethics""'. It is recognised however that it is 
beyond the scope of this study to over-general. ise on this issue, given particularly that what 
may be considered ethical or otherwise may vary between locations. Nevertheless, 
considering the almost uqiformly negative vieNy. s expressed, in particular, by traders on issues p 
concerning bureaucratiZatibn and corruptioij in"tride, it is hardly surprising that they choose 
instead to take their chances outside of the system, that is, in the infQrmal sector, dealing 
with the state only when they consider there is no viable alternative. They realize that within 
die system, they are liable for not only the fees and charges prescribed by law, but also those 
dictated by the whims of the state officials they come in contact with. Outside the system, 
they stand a better chance of outwitting the said officials, but the downside is that they can 
virtually pick and choose which legitimate fees and charges to be responsible for, and the 
46-1 See further The Guardian (Lagos) 23/2/94, pp. 15; 17. 
11 And going by what has also been witnessed in other border-posts, markets and oflier 
commercial centres in West Africa, this situation is not peculiar to Nigeria. 
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state suffers financially in the process. In the final analysis, cross-border traders outside the 
official system appear to end up with less interference and overfidad, costs and can then 
seemingly operate at a greater speed than their formal sector counterparts, resulting in 
potentially greater efficiency. In reality though, it is not difficult to conceive of a scenario 
where traders' overall efficiency would be greater if they did not have the state as an 
adversary. So much of their resources are spent trying to outwit the state at the expense of 
developing their businesses that there are no clear winners here. Neither trader nor state is 
in fact able to operate optimally as things remain and improvements in the system are 
necessary. 
8.7 Where Does The Entrepreneurship Lie In This System? 
In arguing, as has been done in the present study, that numerically at least, SSEs 
dominate the informal sýctor, there is an implication that the cross-border trade consists of 
informal traders in tiny establishments (mostly just the owner-manager) with developed 
routines for trading the same type of goods. Once the routine is established, it could be 
argued, there is little innovation or opportunity-seeking involved, or required. The traders 
will tend to protect their system and minimise their risks. An illustration of this may well be 
found in case 1, a trader illustrative of the most common form of cross-border trader, who 
(as is dernonstrated in appendix A), after six years as a conventional trader, showed 
entrepreneurial initiative in the way she left, and sub-let her regular market stall. She 
thereafter learrit to trade across the border with the Republic of Benin, where she minimises 
risks by obtaining orders in advance, and only buying to serve those orders. In this way, she 
established a well-tried routine, and in her first year in the trade, - succeeded in trebling lier 
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income. Among the manufacturing firms, the case 4 owner-manager may also be argued to 
have played safe by establishing in a growing industry, where he identified a nearby market 
as a reliable sales outlet, from where he has sought to expand his market. When opportunities 
arose to export, limited steps were taken to export on well researched cross-border routes. 
While the level of entrepreneurship in the methods of cases I&4 may be debatable 
(and has been addressed; to an extent, in section 1.4), what, in addition, has become 
apparent from the case studies in particular, is that there are other kinds of cross-border 
traders, with possibly stronger entrepreneurial drives, who are constantly on the look-out for 
new profitable products or ventures. As case 2 illustrates, some of them are prepared to 
travel the world in search of new opportunities. The findings further indicate that the higher 
one goes in the echelon of cross-border traders, the more likely one is to come across more 
"Schumpeterian" entrepreneurs, richer and more successful than the average trader, pulling 
the strings, as it were, strategizing the trade as a whole, and accumulating wealth from it by 
so doing. Traders like thpse are also more likely to be found sub-contracting the risks of the 
trade (other than perhaps, financial), and not theniselves operating on a day-to-day basis as 
cross-border traders. Cases 3 (whose cross-border trading activities -cover most of West 
Africa even though she does not herself leave her Lagos shop) &5 (who entered the cross- 
border trade withall the knowledge and experience of a successful international businessman) 
illustrate this point. The policy of non-direct participation of firras like cases 6&7, despite 
their knowledge of the importance of their products to the trade, may also be viewed in this 
way, as a strategic decision designed to protect the sales of their products to their 
distributors, many of whom are engaged in die cross-border trade. The various participants 
in the trade, direct and indirect, are all involved in an on-gOing evolvement of roles or niches 
in the trade, which they are all taking steps to protect. 
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The cases illustrate further that while it takes the mastering of mechanics of trading 
in difficult conditions to succeed in those conditions, it requires -the ability to use the skills 
of others to enhance larger-scale entrepreneurial operations in such conItions. 
8.8 Conclusion 
What this chapter has tried to do is present a composite picture of the cross-border 
trade, focusing on the three trade routes geographically covered in the field-study area. I 
have tried to explain the different specialisms evolved in each area as well as certain 
operational similarities that they share. 
In discussing how entrepreneurs become involved in the trade, I have tried to show 
that the cross-border trade is one that a trader is more likely to graduate into, rather than 
commence with. The centrality of smuggling and'the "kelebe" system to the distribution of 
goods in the trade has been highlighted, but I havýe als'o argued further that conventional 
distribution practices n6vertheless remain. Cross-border traders have also been shown to be 
becoming increasingly involved in more "regular" exporting activities, although in this, as 
in most other things, their involvement is almost always informal. In fact, the theme of 
informality is one that has run not just through the chapter, but through the entire thesis, 
since formal rules and regulations tend not to fully penetrate the system. Admittedly, the 
continued existence of the informal sector is sometimes the reason why the rules and 
regulations do not penetrate. 
Within the distribution system described above is an ordered economic behaviour in 
which many of the participants involved in the trade continually demonstrate their actions to 
be those of opportunity-led business persons whose decisions are more governed by the 
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availability of information and other resources, than by non-economic reasons such as kinship 
obligations or the burdens of bureaucracy. There is a continuous prot: eq, of negotiation and 
accommodation which keeps the "market" in order. Some are involved in the development 
and protection of routinized methods, while others are more "innovative". In all these cases 
however, their decisions are essentially profit-oriented. They are constantly on the lookout 
for new products and/or new markets to sell in or buy from, and competition exists for the 
servicing of any existing markets. 
Another theme that has run the length of the thesis is one of illegality perpetuated 
either by entrepreneurs themselves (mainly in the form of tax avoidance) or by state officials, 
and the effect this has on trade. I have tried to show that in the final analysis, neither state 
nor entrepreneur operates optimally, and this forms the background to the recommendations 
to be made in the next chapter. 
301 
CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARIES, CONCLUSIONS, REFLECTIONS AND 
'RECONEVIENDATIONS. 
9.1 A Review Of The Study. 
The background research to this study revealed several possible themes for study, as 
identified in chapter 1, from which I elected to focus this study on an analysis of the 
mechanics of the cross-border trade engaged in by small scale entrepreneurs in South- 
Western Nigeria. This is partly because although several references are made to the existence 
of the trade, such a study has not'actually been dofie before, and it can serve as a foundation 
for further studies on the topic. Inspiration was drawn'from, among others, Polly Hill's 
advocacy for an alternative analysis of the economic behaviour of indigenous West African 
enterprises to explain what might otherwise sometimes appear as unexplainable or irrational 
behaviour. 
Chapters 2 and 3 essentially consisted of a critical review of the literature on various 
aspects of economic development theories. I argued in chapter 2 that for a number of 
analytical and empirical weaknesses largely centring around the different real-life 
development processes in developed and LDCs, existing export behaviour theories are not 
fully able to explain SME (and sometimes, even larger enterprises) involvement in exporting 
activities in developing countries. A fundamental short-coming of the this set of theories, I 
felt, was the underlying assumption that productivity, status and production factors are 
always equal. However, for several centuries, it has not been so, as development processes 
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in different regions of the world tell us. This formed the background to chapter 3. 
In that chapter, I concentrated on theories, which frofil-different ideological 
viewpoints attempt to grapple with the thorny issue of underdevelopment and the 
transformation of LDCs into more advanced ones. On the one hand are modernization ideas 
which are represented here by Neil Smelser's blegantly constructed "differentiation" and 
"integration" model. These theories posit that development takes place gradually as 
"traditional" social structures are broken down and replaced by "modem" ones. On the other 
hand are dependency ideas, "led", in a sense, by Andre Frank, which see development in 
much the same externalist terms, but conclude that the replacement process leads to a chain 
of domination and appropriation of a large "periphery" of underdeveloped countries by a 
small "core" of advanced countries. Both sets of theories were criticised, among other 
reasons, for over-emphasizing external linkages and for tending to ignore internal processes. 
These allow scholars, in constructing various models, to glide over the complex reality of 
the economic history of. (African) LDCs, with Nigeria as a case in point, often leading to 
incorrect macro-theorisation, and it was arg&d *that both modernization and dependency 
theories in this way reinforce the view on the failure of indigenous- entrepreneurship to 
contribute to the economic development process, especially in the area of export trade. They 
fail to adequately allow for indigenous entrepreneurial behaviour in this field and its overall 
ability to affect the process of social change. 
In chapters 4 and 5, both these issues were considered. Chapter 4 was an examination 
of various theories of entrepreneurship, in each case focusing on the ways in which the 
theories address the issue of differential entrepreneurial behaviour. It is apparent to any 
observer that entrepreneurs do not all act the same with respect to the exploitation of 
opportunities, although it is not an issue which most theorists have directly concerned 
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themselves with. Those that do have the added problem of reconciling set hypotheses to 
future, and potentially dynamic behaviour. 
This is most apparent with economic models. Much economic theory in fact ignores 
the entrepreneur because it is assumed that market forces will always act to optimally match 
resources to opportunities. The economic models that do recognize the need for entrepreneurs 
are sometimes too beclouded by the concept of the rational economic man to adequately 
explain differential entrepreneurial behaviour. As Israel Kirzner concedes: 
"We do not clearly understand how entrepreneurs get their flashes of superior 
foresight. We cannot explain how some men discover what is round the comer before 
others do. We may certainly explain... how men explore for oil by carefully weighing 
alternative ways of spending a limited amount of search resources, but we cannot 
explain how a prescient entrepreneur realizes before others do that a search for oil 
may be rewarding"6. 
Psychological models do profess reasons why entrepreneurs in similar circumstances 
may act differently. The reasons offered (by David McClelland and a host of other writers 
on the subject) are mostly of a personal nature. and centre around the entrepreneur's own 
desire to succeed and wiflingness to assume risk of I 
failure. Ultimately however, many of the 
reasons given appear virtually as deterministic and reductionist as the economic models which 
they criticize because, though engaging, they make many predictive, but largely empirically 
unsubstantiated generalizations about how personality traits affect entrepreneurial behaviour. 
Sociological models of entrepreneurship are largely derived from issues originally 
raised in economic models. However, they are the only ones to explicitly make differential 
entrepreneurial behaviour an issue at the outset. They are also the only ones to closely 
explore the relationship that die entrepreneur has with his environment and with the other 
players therein. The main shortcoming of this approach lies in a rather extremist view of how 
161 Kirzner (1976: 121). 
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the environment impinges on the entrepreneur. On the one hand, the structuralist approaches 
(encompassing the modernization and dependency ideas discussed &a-Flie respectively see I IF) 
either a fundamental lack of ability, or a hierarchical chain of domination and exploitation 
as severely curtailing entrepreneurial choices and ability, while on the other hand, actor- 
oriented perspectives on the same argument tend Co accord indigenous entrepreneurs virtually 
unfettered abilities to make decisions whatever the wider socio-economic issues might be. 
Neither of these views is, in my opinion, correct beyond question, although both correctly 
describe an aspect of the social interpretation of entrepreneurial behaviour. 
From here I moved on, in chapter 5, to an historical examination of patterns of 
indigenous Nigerian trade, paying further attention to export trade and the role that 
indigenous entrepreneurs have played both in the production and distribution process over 
the ages. It was discovered that what Richard Ekundare refers to as the spirit of "competitive 
capitalism" has been a fulcrum of indigenous Nigerian entrepreneurship for several centuries. 
It is a matter 9f interest that manyi 'of the features of pre-colonial commercial 
organization, such as landlords, brokers, -middlemen, in'formal credit, "market days"", 
specialist markets, the family firm, entrepreneurial mobility, long distance trading, and so 
forth have adapted and survived to present times. Present-day cross-border trading is, for 
practical purposes, a continuation of many of these long-standing traditions. Ironically, it was 
with the attainment of political independence in several African countries that most of the 
existing internal barriers to the flow of goods and services- were erected. I argued further that 
although Nigerians have traded among themselves and with foreigners in all that time, the 
background for the current patterns of Nigerian trade ought to be traced mainly to the 
country's colonization (1860-1960), and the discovery of oil (c. 1958). 
4NS or "rotating markets" cf. Hopkins (1973: 251). 
305 
Although references are made to it at various points in the study, the methodology for 
the study was formally considered in chapter 6. In the early part ot that chapter, I attempted 
to make a case for a flexible approach to data collection, arguing that it is the specific 
research problem that ought to determine which research technique or approach will best 
serve it, rather than a pre-conceived idea of a "best" method of data collection. 
In this study, both quantitative and qualitative methods have been employed, and these 
have included both primary and secondary techniques. Initially, these meant questionnaire 
and interview surveys, with further, more substantial interviews to follow. In each case, I 
considered further what had been, in my experience, the strengths and possible weaknesses 
of each technique. However, the more the study progressed, the more I realized, with the 
help of the literature, that in order to attain my objectives, it would in fact be necessary for 
me as a researcher to enter into the "lifeworld" of the cross-border traders, and see the 
environment as the traders themselves see it. The'conventional questionnaire and interview 
method, while adequate for a number of purposes, ýeemýd ultimately incapable of providing 
the depth of insight which it seemed apparent I would need. The methodological approach 
therefore became increasingly "actor-oriented" (as Norman Long and other practitioners call 
an approach which relies principally, though not exclusively, on participant observation. 
This was what opened up what had previously on occasion seemed impenetrable symbols and 
interpretations. 
Chapter 7 provided interesting indications concerning the profiles of indigenous 
entrepreneurs. It was not a surprising finding that most of the surveyed firms are, by 
definition, small. That merely confirms observable evidence. The firms, especially the 
manufacturing ones among them, do not take kindly to that description. It turns out however 
that not only are they sunall, they by and large plan to remain that way. They are also for 
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the most part, although more so for traders than for manufacturers, to be found operating 
infonnally. 
Traders are far less limited in what they sell and are far more likely to attempt some 
form of exporting than their manufacturing counterparts. These exporting activities tend to 
be directed towards either the cross-border trade routes and Westem Europe/USA, with 
middle and far eastern countries also featuring as prominent trading partners. There are 
virtually no long-term strategic management practices, especially in the marketing area, even 
among the larger-sized manufacturing firms, although not all of them think it would be a 
useful tool, even in a more conducive environment. Nevertheless, it was possible to glean 
a division of labour in the market place in which the manufacturing sector essentially 
produces as much as its circumstances allow, and not so much to a set target. 
Manufacturers tend to have little role in the actual transfer of goods to end-users, this usually 
being left to traders. There tends to be no great strategy involved in the selection of 
manufacturers' distributors either. 
Indigenous entrepreneurs are clearly sceptical concerning most initiatives emanating 
from the state, as well as the proposed single West Afri can market, about which there is no 
discernible air of expectancy. Their concerns are firmly on matters of more immediate 
consequence. 
The data analysis continued in chapter 8, and it was here that the benefits of an actor- 
oriented methodology were most visible. Several months spent interacting on a daily basis 
with various direct and indirect participants in the cross-border trade helped, among other 
things, follow the paths of several goods and actors across several countries, and explain 
various ways in which entrepreneurs and other actors deal with one another to create social 
order out of potential chaos. The abuse and incomplete penetration of official rules and 
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regulations (and boundaries) were shown to provide a number of obstacles, as well as 
exploitable opportunities taken up by the entrepreneurs. The imppýtance of the informal 
kelebe system to the transfer of goods in the trade, and the importance of trust in the 
operation of the kelebe system were also highlighted. 
9.2 A Cross-Border Trade Model 
9.2.1 Introduction 
Certain concepts or themes emerge, with respect to entrepreneurship, from the 
discussion of the trade process engaged in, particularly in chapters 7 and 8. These include 
the following: 
The role of trust in indigenous entrepreneurship - which we see especially in C 
informal enterprise. T6 use of kelebes and offier carriers, discussed in chapter 8, is 
particularly illustrative of this. We see also in that chapter, particularly through the 
experiences of case 1, the forms of self-regulation that exist both on the side of the traders 
and of the carriers to maintain order in what is potentially an anarchic situation. 
* The nature (and role) of trainingfor indigenous entrepreneurship, which we see as 
being mostly informal, task-oriented, and not particularly encouraging of innovative 
behaviour. This in itself, is an interesting observation in a profession where success 
singularly demands innovative behaviour. Exactly what role, then, one may ask, does the 
training play in subsequent success of ventures, or is success determined by some other 
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personal or environmental factors? We see also that most trading apprenticeships take place 
alongside fonnal education, although the role of the latter in the training process tends to be 
for the specific acquisition of basic literacy. 
* The nature of infonnal enterprise, and what we notice of it within the context of the 
cross-border trade is that informal entrepreneurship does not always operate within the 
context of the infonnal sector, as case 2 illustrates so clearly, and indeed, neither does 
formal enterprise mean that opportunities that exist informally are not exploited. As I pointed 
out in chapter 8, especially among the traders, an ingredient of success seems to be an ability 
to move freely between the formal and informal sectors. Case 3 is a good example of this. 
Also, while it is common to think of informality as something that exists only on the fringes 
of the economy, perhaps in order to provide supplementary income to salaried workers, firms 
like cases 2 and 5 show that it is almost the norm in Nigerian entrepreneurship to find firms 
in the informal sector do. ing better than mere survival on the economic fringes. Case 5 in 
particular shows how a, small firm, starting. ipforMally, might grow and graduate into the 
formal sector, creating new business links and opportunities in that sector without losing its 
informal networks, inputs, markets, and so forth. 
* Tile role of "sick-ness " or "slackness " in the formal econonly in acting as the 
stressor that stimulates the development of entrepreneurship in tile infonnal sector. Many 
illustrations exist in this regard. Perhaps the most obvious example is that of the trade in 
banned consumer goods, initially identified in chapter 5. The ban on the importation of many 
of the goods (in particular those effected between 1978 and 1986) was not subsequently 
followed, as had been promised, by increased production of locally-made substitutes, and 
traders liave moved to fill the obvious supply gaps. Other traders, as discussed in chapter 8, 
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are moving to fill export gaps in the West African region because for a variety of reasons, 
several local export-oriented manufacturers are themselves wary oNo41g so. 
* The role of traders in increasing the influence of the informal economy, and its 
possible consequential role in transforming theformal economy. An obvious illustration here 
discussed primarily in chapters 7 and 8, is that of the emerging parallel financial system. It 
would appear that presently, the only enterprises in the formal sector covered by the present 
study who do not employ the system are those who, for whatever reason, choose not to, and 
not because they do not have access to it, or their requirements cannot be met. Their 
potential implications for the struggling formal financial sector are self-evident, and are, in 
part, responsible for the central administration's efforts, since 1995, to align formal and 
parallel rates for the transaction of certain businesses. 
This subsection is an attempt to picture hoW these concepts play out in practice. 
C 
9.2.2 The Traders 
Cross-border traders tend to emerge from those group of traders who have previous 
experience as "conventional" traders. Although it is quite conceivable that someone who fails 
at conventional trading might then try his hand at cross-border trading, or even commence 
his trading career at that level, more commonly, one is likely to have attained a measure of 
success as a conventional trader before becoming a cross-border trader. It is in most cases 
a considered decision that traders take. 
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9.2.3 The Goods 
It has been demonstrated in chapters 7 and 8, and to a lesser extent in chapters 1 and 
5, that all manners of goods are traded on the cross-border routes. However, certain goods 
do appear to have taken on precedence in the trdde. 
At the most general level, it would appear that a greater proportion of the traded 
goods originate from locations outside West Africa than from within West Africa. It appears 
further that of the goods that do originate from within West Africa, more are actually made 
in Nigeria than in any other West African country. Nevertheless, apart from minerals, West 
African countries tend to produce a similar range of goods, suggesting an inherent 
competition rather than complementarity in regional trade, and cross-border traders have to 
be creative in the marketing and sale of their products. It would seem, in any case, to be in 
the import/export trade that traders are most able to differentiate their products. The West 
Aftican-made goods tqd to be characterized by relatively low levels of technological inputs. 
They are usually edible consurnables like ihe'so-called "provisions", and other basic 
household items including flasks, batteries, various glass and plastic- products, soaps and 
detergents, crockery, furniture, building materials, and so forth. There is also a considerable 
trade in garments and textile materials. Those that tend to be produced and exported in 
significant numbers from Nigeria tend to come more from what may be termed the lower (or 
more casual) end of the range of fabrics. They are perhaps more easily mass-produced. The 
more upmarket or exclusive the fabric is, the more likely it is that it has been imported into 
Nigeria. Sometimes, such materials are imported direct from middle and far-eastern 
countries, or more realistically for most traders, from francoplione West African countries 
via the cross-border trade. Certain Nigerian-made upmarket or ceremonial fabrics are also 
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exported, but many of these fabrics, such as qj7 or aso-oke, are specialist, labour-intensive 
products. They are usually hand-made or finished, and so are- qistinguished from other, 
machine-made alternatives. Certain markets have also developed speciýlisms in the trading 
and after-sales service of certain products in this class of goods - for instance, Seme and 
Owode-Onirin markets for automobiles and attendant accessories, Ojuelegba and Alaba 
markets for electrical goods, Balogun and Tejuosho markets for various textile materials, and 
so forth. 
Generally speaking, cross-border imports into Nigeria tend to comprise the following: 
9.2.3.1 Plugging Shortfalls In Local Supplies 
This, as one would expect, is the most obvious rationale for trade anywhere. 
Interestingly enough however, this portion of thý cross-border trade is in many respects, 
technically a trade in smuggled goods. Many of the most traded goods in this regard - rice, 
I. I' flour, palm and vegetable oil, wheat, fertilizer, and such other products being the leading 
ones - are "essential goods" which have had their importation into Nigeria prohibited in the 
years since 1986 (in some cases since 1978) with a view to stimulating Nigerian self- 
sufficiency in these products or their substitutes. However, as discussed earlier in chapter 5, 
local production has not quite matched expectations and there is an obvious gap in the market 
which several traders have moved to rill. Many of the goods originate from various parts of 
the world (for instance palm oil from Malaysia; wheat from U. S. A) and are imported into 
other west and central African countries, either by private or government agencies in those 
countries, and sometimes too by Nigerian traders. From these countries, the goods are then 
transported into Nigeria. 
. 312 
By the same token, there is a trade in smuggled exports from Nigeria to plug 
shortfalls in other West African countries. Again there are variou'S'"-goo. ds in this category 
with petro-chemical, pharmaceutical, and basic household products appearing to take a 
leading part in it. 
9.2.3.2 Luxury Goods 
As in most places, a market exists for products of high intrinsic value, and certain 
other products not nonnally considered as essential by the population at large. Generally 
speaking, the goods traded in here tend to include automobiles and automobile parts, various 
electrical/electronic goods, and such other goods. That they are referred to here as luxury 
goods is merely to indicate their relative inaccessibility, in the area of study, to the 
population at large. 
9.2.4 The Informality Of The Trade 
The traders tend to operate in the informal sector, and certainly avoiding tax payment 
is a major reason for this. But as I argued in chapter 1, the tax issue is not that clear-cut, and 
certainly not the sole reason, because traders are not significantly less likely to avoid paying 
income taxes than many other groups of self employed Nigerians. Since most firms tend to 
aim to remain small anyway, and having regard to the nature of the economy as a whole, 
operating informally might well be viewed as a logical way to keep all manners of costs 
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down"'. 
Another reason why they tend to operate informally, in myý'view, ought also to be 
sought in the corruption and over-bureaucratization of the formal sector. It is human nature 
to avoid going where one has been previously burned. Dramatic falls in the purchasing power 
of the Naira and in general living standards, particularly since the 1980s, seem to have 
induced a bribery and patronage culture in most facets of Nigerian life, public or private. It 
is a nightmare process, as I personally witnessed on a number of occasions, to obtain export 
documentation, go through VAT formalities, clear imported goods at the ports, or perform 
such other activities in Nigeria". Some traders in fact claim that it is a more preferable 
(and sometimes cheaper) option to pay bribes than to experience on a continuous basis, the 
Nigerian bureaucratic system. In addition to this, the various forms, approvals, personnel, 
and so forth that a trader, and -moreso, an international trader must go through in Nigeria 
provide ample opportunities for the most astonishingly unethical (or sometimes even overtly 
extortionist) practices. It. comes as no surprise. then that traders tend to side-step the process 
altogether. In physically carrying on interhational trade, certain public officials are 
unavoidable contacts. In the case of the cross-border trade, these include border personnel 
and, judging by their sheer numbers and activities, what one can only conclude are largely 
unauthorised check-points on the cross-border trade routes. The traders have evolved various 
pragmatic mechanisms to accommodate the officials within the ambit of their trade - 
avoidance (where possible) and bribery being the main ones. The decision of many traders 
to operate informally, and of many "modem" sector firms to maintain informal subsidiaries 
11 It might be worth restating here that the aim is not to justify the informal sector, 
but to provide explanations for its existence. 
11 See for instance the Nigerian Business Directory (1993: 43-47) for illustrations of 
the bureaucratic elements of various transactions involving the state in some capacity. 
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may then be construed in fact as a considered one given the actual and potential problems 
associated with the altemative. 
Finally, it ought to be noted that it is by no means common for informal sector firms 
to remain entirely outside the system. Case 2 (primarily informal) and case 3 (primarily 
formal) provide illustrations of how firms, whafever their sectorial orientation, dart in and 
out of both sectors in their search for gain. 
9.2.5 Capital Accumulation In The Trade 
In many cases, concurrent with the decision to operate informally is that to remain 
small, and this tends to be equated with the "pettiness" of the trade"'. This, in turn, tends 
to be the thinking behind views such as expressed by de Soto (1989) or Majumdar (1980) that 
little, if any, capital accumulation takes place in informal enterprise. With regard to the 
cross-border trade, the findings in this study Iýuggest that this story does not end here. 
Although many'petty traders take part in the cross-border trade, it involves more than 
petty trading to a number of participants. Several participants, down t6-some of the touts on 
the border posts, rigorously and resiliently pursue an expansive economic policy which 
sometimes result in significant capital accumulation. It is however difficult to plot a real 
growth path in this area because of the general problems associated with measuring informal 
activity, and other problems to do with the absence or reliability of much published data. 
Nevertheless, what emerges from the study is that the fact that several firms choose to 
remain structurally small appears to be due less to a lack of ambition, and more to a desire 
on the part of their owner-managers, first, to remain one step ahead of an "interfering" 
11 See for instance Nwaclitikwu (1991); Orimalade & Ubogu [eds. ] (1984). 
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government, and secondly, to remain in personal control of a unit that can exploit a market 
for what it is worth and swiftly move on to another market before a-mass of less enterprising 
market "followers" enter the market. 
It does not generally seem to be the case either, as has been suggested that they do 
not make use of the banks"', although several traders in addition use informal savings and 
loans methods, in particular, informal co-operatives, but the amounts involved tend to be a 
fraction of their income, and the reasons for doing it appear to be as much social as they are 
economic. Most of the surveyed manufacturing and trading firms in fact operate bank 
accounts, although they tend not to operate business accounts. 
There is also reinvestment taking place, but perhaps not commonly as is the norni 
(that is reinvestment aimed at some kind of longitudinal growth of the firm). Firms like case 
5 (through an expressed desire to become the largest exporter of cotton products in Nigeria) 
and case 7 (through its efforts to invest more of its earnings in sourcing an increasing amount 
of its supply factors from. within Nigeria) provide illustrations of firms engaged in what may 
be termed conventionak capital accumulation p FactIces. Reinvestment among the smaller and 
indigenous entrepreneurs tends to be somewhat different. Because they want to retain 
personal control of their businesses, many of them will only permit growth up to a certain 
point, at which they will then switch to new businesses, again staffed in a way that enables 
See for instance Roitman (1990); Majumdar (1980). It is perhaps for reasons 
such as this that economists have tended to conclude that savings and investment are 
rare in African entrepreneurship. Hill (1970: 11), in arguing that conventional 
economics is often unable to explain indigenous African enterprise, writes further that 
"the [conventional] economist is so unfamiliar with the forms such savings and 
investment are apt to take that lie does not know where to look for evidence of their 
existence. I have heard UN financial experts seriously argue that the admitted 
unwillingness of individual Ghanaians to buy government securities is evidence of their 
inability to 'save' in any sense of the word". 
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them to retain overall personal control. The "expansion" plans of cases 2,3 & 4, can be 
interpreted in this way. Some of them also have overseas accounts ind--kgood number of the 
entrepreneurs as a whole have invested in plots of land and real estate, which, especially in 
urban Nigeria, are in a state of perpetual boom. I witnessed land price rises well in excess 
of 25 % in the greater Lagos area, during the eight months of my fieldwork. With returns 
more or less guaranteed at these levels, it is hardly surprising that the traditional evidence 
of capital accumulation, such as reinvestment in manufacturing technology or VAT returns, 
is scant on the ground. Until such a time when an environment exists to make manufacturing 
more profitable (and/or less risky), or real estate less profitable, the present disposition, 
though not necessarily desirable, can be expected to continue. It is easy to criticise the 
traders' investment patterns as unproductive for the economy as a whole, but given the 
economic climate they exist in, what they do makes perfect economic sense, to them at any 
rate. 
9.3 Some Suggested Recommendations . 
9.3.1 Theoretical Considerations, Or Areas For Future Research 
It is my hope that in describing the nature of the cross-border trade, I have 
demonstrated not only that there are several activities of practical and analytic interest 
involved or contained in the trade, but also how one might go about researching these 
activities. 
As identified in chapter 1, the question of how great the trade actually is, is an 
important one, and one which will probably have the greatest influence in deciding how 
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prominent an area of study this aspect of entrepreneurship eventually becomes. I shall 
presently return to this point. To this end in any case, perhaps similalf-studies to that engaged 
in here may be replicated in various parts of Nigeria that share land borders with other West 
African countries, and indeed between other African countrieS470. Such studies will need 
to be mindftil of the socio-economic history of the areas of study because there is a wrong 
assumption that "the past is past" and it has no bearing on the future. However, as Anthony 
Hopkins (1988: 23) has rightly noted 
"A historian is not equipped to recommend solutions to present-day problems, but he 
can help ensure that the questions are properly posed". 
This is especially important for studies involved in rethinking the African development 
process. 
The conclusions reached in this, and in other studies will be in a unique position to 
provide an authoritative insight into the indigenous economics of West, and other parts of 
Africa. It is an important foundation upon -which f6rther research questions can be 
fonnulated. 
Theoretically speaking, we do not presently seem to have progressed very far from 
the situation in the early 1970s when Polly Hill observed that 
"Lamentably, there is hardly any non-anthropological, non-statistical material fit for 
the consumption of economists desirous of acquiring a local background... I am 
insisting that if (development) economists would persist with detailed studies in the 
field, they would soon learn to discern a variety of forms of standard economic 
110 Present indications seem to be that tile form of cross-border trading described in 
this study will not be dissimilar (in form) to the kind to be found elsewhere in Africa. 
According to MacGaffey (1991: 119) "In Africa, the circulation of goods and persons 
continues to escape in large part from the controls and laws of the state. Alongside 
official exchanges and the networks ofTnodern transport, an informal commerce, 
always more dynamic than the formal, develops in parallel, taking no account of 
frontiers". 
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behaviour amid the diversity""'. 
The "detailed studies in the field" indicate in the preserit-stu-dy that indigenous 
entrepreneurship in LDCs like Nigeria may have a more significant role in the macro- 
development process than has been previously thought. 
If this were so, then as a matter of analýtic and practical interest, one may ask the 
question whether the cross-border traders are only enhancing the system up to a point, 
beyond which their involvement and control serves more to dampen free trade. In other 
words, is the interface between consumers and producers controlled by traders in such a way 
that they become a limiting factor in the growth of the economy? 
Secondly, if as is also suggested in this study, the evolving informal economy seems 
to be on a path to a possible eventual merger with the formal economy, what is the risk that 
the traders will be displaced as development facilitators, the more the amount of change 
increases, or as their activities increasingly become part of, or linked to the formal economy? 
And what are the likely effects, in the event of this happening, on the economy as a whole? 
Put differently, are thetraders at present appropriately compensated for the value they bring 
to the distribution system? And if they are creating wealth as a result -of their involvement, 
will they continue to grow and benefit from increased trade as the economy grows, or will 
the law of diminishing returns set in? 
Thirdly, a more general question which, in my view, activities such as the cross- 
border trade seem to be asking in die wider area of development economics/sociology, and 
which may also have important policy ramifications, then is this: In view of the fact that the 
cross-border trade is the outlet through which several exporters, who are unable or unwilling 
to exploit formal exporting opportunities, actually sell their goods outside the countrY, does 
471 Hill (1970: 10). Brackets mine. 
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the cross-border trade represent a new direction or orientation in Nigerian development 
thought? By extension, when considered in context of previous resea'rch in indigenous West 
African472 or East African entrepreneurship", does it in fact provide the basis for a new 
model for the development process in Africa, and perhaps other LDCs? 
To take the discussion further, there haýe been various references, throughout the 
thesis, to a significant, and perhaps even dominant role of the informal sector in the cross- 
border trade. The hypothesis put forward in this thesis that entrepreneurs instinctively seek 
to operate in the informal sector is one that would benefit from further study. It would be 
advantageous to provide a broad assessment of its extent. This can onlY be carried out at the 
present time with certain limitations since informal sector activities are by definition, 
umneasured and unrecorded. 
The correlation between social class, entrepreneurship, the informal sector, and the 
development process may also be an area worthy of further study in order to help in the 
understanding, first of )vhy entrepreneurs in pborer countries like Nigeria tend to gravitate 
towards the informal% sector. Secondly, - it may help advance the theory on how 
entrepreneurship enhances the development process in such countries (that is, LDCs), an area 
in which relatively little would seem to have been done since the 1970s. The received 
knowledge in this area that the informal sector is a social system through which the great 
mass of the unemployed and underemployed find creative opportunities"', while no doubt 
correct in a number of cases, is one that does not adequately explain some of the findings 
in the present study that certain entrepreneurs (including some "Schumpeterian" ones) 
112 Hill (1971), Orimalade & Ubogu [eds. ] (1984). 
"I Nl,, icGaffey (1987; 1991), Seur (1992). 
"I See for instance Ray (1988). 
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attaining "success" in their vocation choose to remain in the informal sector, and especially 
that several firms in the "modem" sector maintain informal sector-subsidiaries. Ultimately, 
the question in this area seems to be whether the informal sector is a sYmptom of 
underdevelopment (and therefore to be eradicated) or a positive development mechanism (and 
therefore to be encouraged, or at least tolerated). Successive Nigerian governments would 
appear to have been doing both. 
These are unavoidable questions in the study of the indigenous economics of LDCs 
such as one finds in West Africa, even though the type of fieldwork advocated here may not 
immediately appear attractive. This in itself may be a reason why research in indigenous 
entrepreneurship and the informal economy are not as much as might be desired. However 
as researchers, we must readily show a willingness to grapple with the basic fabric of 
economic life in such places --for this is primarily where the knowledge we seek is to be 
found - and not be put off by the compartmentalization of indigenous life - perhaps into 
lingual, ethnic, religious, occupational (and sq. forth) groups - or the effect that this may have 
on subsequent economic behaviour". 
To this end, the testing of methodologies would also be appropriate. This is one of 
the reasons why a mini-debate has been carried out on the issue of methodology in the 
present study. 
It would seem for instance that even when academics talk of entrepreneurial firms, 
they -are beginning to lose sight of the fact that it is the people in the firms that make them 
entrepreneurial. By this, I mean that perhaps more research ought to be directed at persons 
who run businesses, understanding their histories and personal values, and using them as 
475 as Hill in Ghaila (1963b), and in Nigeria (1971), or Long (1968) in Zanibia 
have shown. 
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units of analysis, as opposed (but not ignoring) the businesses that they establish, in order 
to attain better understanding of the workings of such businesses. If ihe-pýesent study had not 
focused on "the person behind the business", it might not have been possible, for instance, 
to understand the linkage between the cotton and information technology businesses in case 
5, or how some entrepreneurs perceive businessý growth. If it had focused primarily on the 
annual reports, stock or accounting records, and so forth of the firms being studied, or only 
on finns listed in, say, the Nigerian business directory, very different findings would have 
been arrived at, and much of the skills and strategies that drive the cross-border trade would 
have been lost. Even where firm-level analysis is being done, not enough general research 
attention would seem to be paid to self-employed persons without employees such as case 
1, or other entrepreneurs engaged in "unattractive" businesses or sectors of the economy, 
despite their large numbers. 
It has also appeared to me for instance in the present study that in order to carry out 
studies on economic belýaviour in regions such* as West Africa, purely statistical studies may 
in fact be inherently flawed in the sense that they are not always able to ask the "right" 
questions. At this early stage of cross-border trade research, more tbndamental, basic or 
background questions which are well grounded in history require answers before real 
progress can be made. It is important, at this stage at least, to enter into the "lifeworld" of 
those that we seek to study. Only then, perhaps, can we begin to have a proper understanding 
of their reality, and go on to ask, and answer relevant research questions. In my experience, 
these are not issues that can be adequately resolved by pilot surveys, for all their usefulness, 
because pilot surveys are traditionally concerned with procedural matters, and the questions 
I refer to here are of a fundamental nature - the issue which I have made the central aim of 
this study being a prime example. 
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9.3.2 Recommendations For Policy Makers 
Throughout the course of this study, indigenous entrepreneurs demonstrated time and 
again the gulf that exists between their world and that which the government creates for 
them. Most of them (and I would add a good number of the OPS community to this group) 
in fact view it as a sign of weakness or failure on their part if the govenunent is, at any time, 
able to have some direct influence on the conduct of their business. This has, in a sense, 
created a somewhat anarchical existence for several businesses which must be resolved. 
While I am not calling for constant government interf6rence in the running of businesses, it 
is obvious that businesses are not performing optimally in the present disposition and the 
government/business community gulf must be bridged. 
The state must realize this and accep! that small scale enterprise and informal 
enterprise are an integral part of indigenous entrepreneurship in Nigeria. At the present time, 
it is important for their aqvantages to be harnessed. Perhaps in another age, this might not 
be the path to progress, but the reality of presen ý-6Y Nigeria is such that these entrepreneurs 
are the providers of the goods and services that sustain a not insignificant part of the 
population, and it seems capable of doing even more. 
Essentially, the Nigerian government needs to redirect the thrust of its policies for the 
private sector. It is interesting that not even the harassed cross-border traders feel that state 
policies by themselves, as a whole, run contrary to their. interest. It is not so much that the 
traders feel that existing policies are perfect, but rather that their main concerns have more 
to do'with the state's commitment to those policies. This requires the state itself to become 
more entrepreneurial in the manner of the governments of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and 
Singapore, taking in active, -and not mere rhetorical interest in tile success of local SME 
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producers and ensuring the fair implementation of its incentives programme. 
There do not seem to be any inherent socio-psychological fictop.. generalizable to the 
population at large which inhibits entrepreneurship. On the contrary, entrepreneurial 
behaviour is almost rampant among the population. Indigenous entrepreneurs have become 
especially adept at exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities whenever and wherever such arise 
in their environment. Indeed, this is the main reason for their continued survival. 
Furthermore, as chapter 7 indicates, it is fairly commonplace for people to establish small 
businesses with their own capital. The entrepreneurs have themselves alluded to having more 
problems with working capital than with initial capital. Assistance programmes ought to 
reflect this via additional focusing on assistance to businesses that have already been 
established (by way, for instance, on technical advice and credit for extensions) rather than 
the prevailing tendency to concentrate policy on business set-up. 
The way forward, in the short term at least, must therefore lie not so much in 
creating entrepreneurs, but in creating the right stimulus to evoke or encourage response 
from the population of indigenous entrepreneurs in a way that is mutually beneficial to both 
the government and the entrepreneurs. The goverrunent would get the-revenue it deserves, 
and certainly needs, as well as the freeing of resources to catch real offenders, while 
entrepreneurs would trade in an environment free from the additional stresses of having the 
government -as a constant and unnecessary adversary. One imagines such a situation will 
increase the competitiveness of the firnis as a whole. 
Still on a general level, SSEs can best be encouraged by creating a neutral policy 
environment that recognises the potentials of both small and large scale business activity, but 
is not biased in favour of either. The situation, for instance, where the federal goyernment 
made membership of MAN a pre-condition for allocation of foreign exchange under the FEM 
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in 1994 was particularly ill-advised. Similarly, it does not make for a settled market-place 
that the government commits itself to a rhetoric of an export-led indusIrialization programme, 
when its policies are essentially rooted in import-substitution. 
The government must recognise that the vast majority of non-oil commercial activity 
in Nigeria can be grouped under the SSE umbrella, and further still, in the informal sector. 
Many of these firms, as has been discussed, rightly or wrongly do not plan any substantial 
expansion, usually because the owner-managers want to retain personal day to day control 
of the firms. There is however no total absence of growth in many of the small, informal 
firms studies. Perhaps because there are many "organized" small businesses operating 
informally, there is a relatively developed level of self-regulation, as well as strategy and 
competition within the sector. Poverty is a major reason why people operate informally, but 
certainly in the Nigerian case, it is not the only reason. Programmes of assistance ought to 
reflect this. In other words, small businesses have to be nurtured. It is not enough to simply 
assume that firms that - are small and informal merely symptomise Nigeria's relative 
underdevelopment. P revious studies in the -stiil-g'rowing Singaporian economy have shown 
that the informal sector continues to thrive there in spite of the relatively high level of 
urbanisation and economic development that the country has come to attain and vigorous state 
activities to suppress the sector"'. I am not arguing that it is the informal sector which will 
necessarily spearhead Nigeria's (and indeed Africa's) development in the twenty first 
centu ry477 , but various world bank projectionS471 aS well as observable evidence can be 
"I Clammer (1987). 
477 although as discussed earlier in chapter 1, it definitely has an important role to 
play, particularly in the area of employment and in the production of products requiring 
relatively low levels of technological inputs because until wages and general living 
standards rise, demand will normally be for products such as these. 
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read together to indicate that it is not worthwhile, indeed it will be damaging, certainly to 
virtually any sub-saharan African economy which ignores, or attempts-t$Z suppress this sector. 
Yet, such a situation will continue to be the case for as long as the state and indigenous 
enterprises continue to work at such cross-purposes. 
In chapter 1,1 referred to an apparent paradox in Nigeria's recorded patterns of trade, 
compared with observable evidence. The reasons for this are not in themselves hard to find. 
Recorded trade, whether it is with West Africa or anywhere else in the world, is dominated 
by oil, and there is no doubt that it is the single most important commodity in Nigeria's 
foreign trade. It is not surprising then that, according to the figures released by Nigeria's 
Federal Office of Statistics, Nigeria's most important trading partners in West Africa, in 
order of importance, are Ivory Coast (purchasing 53.5% of the value of Nigerian exports, 
and supplying 24.4 % of its imports within thp region), Ghana (26.1 %&3.7 %), Senegal 
(9.7% & 6.7%), and Niger (1.3% & 45.6 %)479. 
It is difficult, at the present time, to comment with any great authority on the actual 
figures involved in the-. Cross-border trade.. However, taking as an example, the value of 
Nigeria's recorded exports and imports from the neighbouring Republic of Benin of N7.8 
million and N3.8 million respectively in 1990480 , even allowing for 
inflation, and 
comparing these with the observed regional exporting activities of firms like cases 4&5, 
and others like them, the recorded values would appear to be a gross underestimate. 
Furthermore, with oil listed as comprising 90% of Nigeria's exports to the region, 
"I See World Bank (1989; 1991; 1995, all cited earlier). cf. Lim (1992: 2-3). 
479 see FOS (1991: Tables 194 & 195 at pp. 233-234), being the latest figures 
available as at August 1994. cf. ECOWAS (1989: 119). 
FOS (1993). 
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non-oil exports are officially limited to alcoholic beverages (0.7%), cotton products (0.7%), 
cocoa (0.3%), and iron and steel (including aluminium) products (0. -2,17R. ). No reference is 
made in these figures to informal exporting activities, where most non-oil exporting is 
concentrated, inspite of various govermnental literature "recognising" their contributionS481. 
The same is the case with the FOS' annual review of the Nigerian economy, which purports 
to explain the state of the economy. My point here is not to celebrate the informal nature of 
much indigenous entrepreneurship, but to question the wisdom of ignoring them in 
quantifying trade activities as a whole. Examples cited in the course of this study show how 
the vast majority of cross-border commercial activities go unrecorded. While I cannot over- 
stress the need for further research in order to fully appreciate its extent, all indications point 
to the fact that it is substantial, in all probability, to a significantly greater degree than is 
acknowledged, and is certainly not to be ignored. It has been suggested in this study that the 
cross-border trade involves considerable capital accumulation, and that this accumulation 
process is similar to that in other sectors in the economy". It is therefore up to the state 
to harness these resources for its own benefit'ýs ývell as that of the traders. One way could 
be for the government to create a conducive commercial environment, and a fon-nula with 
the banks (many of which it owns or controls anyway) which encourages traders and other 
entrepreneurs to open up "business accounts", perhaps at preferential rates, initial tax 
481 see for instance OAU (1982), referred to earlier in chapter 1. See also Dozie & 
Bickersteth (1993). There is a rather vague refetence to "Commodities and Transaction 
[sic] not classified" in the "Exports by Cbmmodity" section of the annually published 
FOS Review of the Nigerian Economy ([under which exports via the cross-border trade 
might conceivably fall] See FOS 1993). This unclassified section is listed as 
contributing 0.7% of Nigeria's exports. Even if this were so, it would only serve to 
reinforce the view that the cross-border trade, which involves the export and import of 
many listed goods, is not officially acknowledged. 
I, '-' that is, traders have bank accounts, invest in their existing businesses or in new 
ones and in landed property. 
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holidays, and such other advantages. This is a policy that, perhaps, can only succeed in the , 
longer term. 
Although the present study has not specifically concerned itself with the actual extent 
of the cross-border trade, further indications are that as far as the cross-border trade is 
concerned, traders in Ghana, Togo and the Republic of Benin, would for instance, appear 
to be larger West African trading partners of Nigeria's than, say, Senegal or Ivory Coast, 
who are listed at the toP of the official figures. Not only this, but several of what would 
appear to be the more dominant class of goods in the cross-border trade do not feature at all 
in the official version of major regional trade goods. Herein lies the root of the paradox of 
Nigeria's trading figures vis-a-vis observable evidence, and the usually-taken easy option is 
to either ignore the trade and its pýrticipants, and pretend they do not exist, or declare them 
illegal and in so doing not have to take them into account. This, however, is not a solution. 
There are several thousand traders, many of whom are successful and employ thousands 
more. To deny their existence with a blanket air of dismissal misrepresents the trading 
environment for both practical and analytiýal: puiposes, makes the environment that more 
difficult for the entrepreneurs, and only serves to perpetuate the illeggl and unprogressive 
elements that no doubt exist in the trade. 
In summary, what is needed is akin to a Nigerian industrial (or commercial) 
"revolution" in which businesses of all sizes and sectors see the future as worth fighting for. 
Before this is dismissed as being overly idealistic, it ought to be remembered that in the 
industrialized world, Gerniany and Japan did it. The fastest growing economies of South 
Korea, Singapore, China, Taiwan, and others like them, are doing it. Closer to home, 
Botswana, Natnibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mali and Ghana are on their way, while 
Zaire, Zambia, Liberia, Cameroun and certainly Nigeria, are not keeping up the pace. The 
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size, resources and potential of Nigeria, coupled with its relatively dominant position in sub- 
saharan Africa's politics and economics, makes it a particularly sorry case. There is no doubt 
that the entrepreneurs I interacted with in Nigeria (and across West Africa) are keen to move 
forward, and that they have the ability to do so. The state must then give them the freedom, 
opportunity and resources to do so. 
It is against the background of the foregoing that the following specific 
recommendations are suggested for the attention of policy planners. 
(i) Census Of Firms 
Remarkably, no one at present seems to have a definite idea of the number of business 
enterprises in Nigeria. In the 1991 edition of Basic Facts On Manufacturing Industry In 
Nigeria in the "Know Nigeria" series, the Federal Ministry of Trade and Industries estimated 
that there are about 2,009 manufacturing concerns in Nigeria. Even if one were to unwisely 
ignore the firms in the informal sector, this' appears to me, in the face of observable 
evidence, to be a gross under-estimate. Observable evidence, in my vie%y, indicates that there 
must be more than this number in the greater Lagos area alone, and almost as many in 
Nigeria's South Eastern and South Central states. There is therefore a need for a census of 
such enterprises and a mechanism for keeping such figures up to date. Such a census needs 
to be official since independent research organisations lack the resources or status to survey 
everybody. These figures and the attendant statistics are better able to help the government 
target more effectively those firms that actually require assistance, as well as determine what 
kind of assistance is required. 
The registration drive embarked on in 1994 by NASSI may go some way in 
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addressing the situation, but without a specific state-backed measure to ease the registration 
process, a voluntary registration drive such as this which seems ultilAately doomed to under- 
achieve. 
(H) Assistance Programmes 
According to the survey in chapter 7, the take-up rate of state assistance by local 
manufacturing firms is low, relative to their awareness of such programmes. There is much 
to be gained in the promotion of state assistance schemes, but this is a medium-term 
objective. In the shorter term, government and other agencies may assist indigenous 
entrepreneurship by concentrating export assistance in the first instance, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector, on those who have already demonstrated an ability or willingness to 
be involved in that field. According to the survey, this will apply to about 30% of existing 
businesses. I. 
The problem he re is not so much that -theý government has never done this, but like 
many other state initiatives, it suffers from ineffective/uncommitted implementation. I have 
cited various illustrations in the course of this study, but here, I will focus on some of those 
aimed specifically at improving non-oil exporting activities. 
The first is the Export Expansion Grant Fund (EEGF), established as part of the SAP 
package in 1986/87. It was designed to provide cash inducements for exporters who have 
exported a minimum of N50,000 worth of manufactured, or serni-manu factu red products. 
The scherne itself is in the spirit of what is proposed above, although this particular 
programme virtually never got off the ground, as it was said soon after its establishment that 
there were not enough funds to support it. 
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The Export Development Fund (EDF) is only marginally more successful. It is 
designed to give financial assistance to exporting companies to cover., ýýpart of their initial 
export-promotion expenses. But because it focuses on activities like seminars, symposia and 
formal training courses, patronage by the industrial sector (much less the informal arm), 
which tends to be more interested in more visibly- practical assistance, is rather poor. Add 
to that, the patronage culture and general over-bureaucratization of public-sector management 
in Nigeria, and it is little wonder that both the EEGF and EDF perfon-n as poorly as they do. 
The same can be said of several others, including NERFUND 483 , and the Export 
Adjustment Fund (AF), designed to assist export-oriented manufacturers supplement 
production costs excercabated by infra-structural deficiencies (such as in water and 
electricity) beyond the control of the firm. Managers claim fund officials are corrupt and 
unsympathetic to their cases. They describe the scheme as "unworkable". 
The Export Credit Guarantee and Insurance Scheme (ECGIS) on the other hand, 
appears to be thriving. It is, perhaps, the moý. t active of all the SAP-induced export trade 
facilitators. It guarantees the loans provided by Nigerian banks, first to export-oriented firms 
for the production of export-bound goods, and secondly, to foreign importers of Nigerian 
products. It also insures Nigerian exporters against non-payment by foreign importers. It is 
a popular scheme, one imagines, because of its immediately beneficial nature, although 
entrepreneurs are still wont to lament the pace at which the ECGIS is administered, while 
the scheme's officials in turn accuse the OPS (its usual cliqnts) of sometimes making dubious 
and frivolous clainis, which stall the operation of the scheme for other beneficiaries. 
10 The National Economic Recovery Fund (NERFUND) was established in 1989 to 
provide relatively long-term loans (5-10 years) for fully-owned Nigerian SMEs engaged 
in manufacturing activities at a rate lower than the prevailing commercial rates. Such 
loans may be disbursed in foreign exchange or its Naira equivalent. I shall presently 
return to the NERFUND issue. 
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(iii) Tax 
The government, needs to take another look at the present taxing system in the country 
for businesses. Apart from addressing, in particular, manufacturers' expressed concerns about 
duplicity of taxes, retroactive tax legislation (now. more or less a feature of each federal 
budget) and so forth, it ought also to invest more in communicating its exact tax requirements 
to the business community, and for this purpose, target indigenous entrepreneurs and other 
tradespeople in markets and other commercial centres up and down the country. This is 
perhaps another objective that can only be fully achieved in the longer term. But if, as the 
FIRD insists, the tax climate is fair, its provisions ought to be better communicated and open 
to examination. 
The goverment needs to recognise and address the fact that it receives, one suspects, 
far less tax than is accruable to it. Tax avoidance is nominally a serious offence in Nigeria, 
although as pointed out a, t. various times in this,. study, it is fairly routinely done not only by 
individuals, but by businesses. Yet, prosecutions ýbr the offence of tax avoidance are not 
common. I believe, from observable evidence that part of the reason for this, certainly in the 
case of businesses, must be found in the extraordinary discretionary powers given to the 
Federal Inland Revenue Department (FIRD) in the administration of tax laws. Specifically, 
it is empowered to determine whether particular transactions are taxable, which gives ample 
opportunities to its officials to turn a blind eye to certain activities that they might otherwise 
have taxed"'. 
"I I did not actually witness this in operation although it was freely suggested, on 
more than one occasion, in the FIRD itself. A similar situation occurs, perhaps even 
more glaringly, in the administration of the VAT, introduced in 1994. A ridiculously 
low number of companies file VAT returns; most of the VAT revenue is in fact 
collected by the NCS at the ports. The Federal Government however seems happy 
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Location Of Businesses 
There ought to be more and better plans for the location of both small and large scale 
enterprises in markets, industrial estates, and the like. In particular, the Isolo and Matori 
industrial estates, as well as Alaba and Balogun markets, all in and around Lagos, 
demonstrate how advantageous specialized locations such as these housing loosely related 
businesses can be for all concerned. Apart from the obvious advantages with town planning, 
such locations also provide increased opportunities for introducing new methods, 
concentrating infrastructures, quality inspection, standards specification, trade marking, 
manpower (apprentice) training and development, dissemination of information, collection 
of statistics and other activities important for modem economic growth. 
(V) Membership Of Trade OrganizationslForeign Exchange Policy 
I 
The governmentought to encourage increased membership of service, trade and other 
business associations, and more importantly, devise a greater role for the associations to play 
in what is afterall, their own destiny. At present, traders, especially, are not convinced there 
are any advantages for them to gain by joining organizations such as these. Even members 
of NASSI, National Association of Textile Exporters, National Association of Plastic 
Manufacturers, and others, say that membership of these bodies is hard to justify as a 
business outlay. The lethargy of NACCIMA and the evidential government bias towards 
enough with the fact that up to N6 billion (more than its initial projections) has been 
collected annually since the inception of tile new tax, something that has been 
trumpeted with each succeeding budget reading, and does not appear to be doing much 
by way of ensuring a more efficient VAT return rate among the indigenous corporate 
community. 
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MAN in matters such as foreign exchange allocation also leaves the vast majority of Nigerian 
manufacturers, being non-members of these bodies, feeling excluded from the official set-up. 
In the particular case of NASSI, its members and officials feel aggrieýe'd at what they 
call unfair treatment by NERFUND, the funds of which NASSI members ought to be leading 
beneficiaries, but NASSI member firms and officers repeatedly told me in interviews that 
they have received little of the NASSI windfall. NERFUND, according to its own officials, 
has disbursed more than $100 million to more than 200 projects since its inception in 1989. 
However, say the small scale industrialists, they tend not to get NERFUND money because 
they are generally unable to meet a particular NERFUND requirement for them to get a 
Participating Bank (PB) in the NERFUND scheme to assume the credit risk on behalf of their 
firms. NERFUND loans are normally channelled to needy SMEs via the PBs, who do the 
actual on-lending"'. 
The regulations decree that the accounts of a PB with the CBN are automatically 
deducted to the tune of any default by a NERFUND beneficiary -a stipulation the banks are 
unsurprisingly not ena(noured with. The ba. nkqrs are not comfortable with the sole 
proprietorship status of most SMEs that tend to come to them for assistance, nor are they 
comfortable with the long-term nature of most loan requirements, because of the volatility 
of the Nigerian economic environment and the perceived inability of SMEs to repay loans. 
Both PBs and industrialists also criticise the stipulation in the NERFUND decree whereby 
"I In order to get this in perspective, it is perhaps worthwhile to note that 
NERFUND is expected to lend the money out to a PB at a rate not exceeding I% 
above NERFUND's cost of borrowing. The PB is in turn expected to charge die SME 
beneficiary a rate not exceeding 4% above the NERFUND rates. But the beneficiaries I 
spoke to invariably reported obtaining the loans at rates of 25-35%. In addition, they 
spoke of having to repay foreign exchange loans in Naira at the prevailing FEM rates, 
which, since 1986, has deteriorated considerably, further increasing the cost of capital 
to the SMEs. 
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the banks also provide the NERFUND beneficiaries with working capital in addition to their 
risk, while NERFUND concentrates on providing fixed capital. Giveý the understandable 
reluctance of PBs to do this, especially with SMEs, the NERFUND ideal becomes lost on 
the very SMEs it was designed to assist. Usually, as the SME owner-managers allege, it is 
only those SMEs who act as fronts for larger-sized. firms, that tend to be successful in their 
loan applications. 
It is also curious that NERFUND's definition of a small scale enterprise is one with 
cost of fixed assets and new investments not exceeding N10 million (about U. S$150,000)486 
while the minimum qualifying project cost, according to NERFUND is U. S$3 million. It is 
no wonder then that ultimately, it is the larger-sized firms with sounder resource bases who, 
in practice, can afford the NERFUND loans. There is an obvious anomaly here which goes 
to the heart of the entire foreign exchange policy. As pointed out at various points, Nigeria 
has oscillated between various regulated and partiaily deregulated exchange rate systems in 
recent years, ostensibly to curb the rising influence of the parallel market. Goldberg's (1995) 
study of parallel foreign, exchange rate markets. exlilains the futility of such an approach. She 
indicates that a regulated exchange rate system, " [even] in the long run... has no effect on the 
exchange rate differential between black and legal markets""'. Using the Russian economy 
as an example of an economy, which like Nigeria, is "in transition", she presents a 
persuasive case for a flexible exchange rate system, arguing further that the extent to which 
this would work, depends on the extent to which the local -central bank, intervenes to control 
the interbank exchange rate. Operating a flexible exchange rate sends "clear and stable 
"' Average 1995 rates, although this amount would have been die equivalent of 
about US$I million at the time of the promulgation of the NERFUND decree in 1989. 
Please note also average 1992-1994 rates referred to in chapter I (section 1.3). 
"' Goldberg (1995: 169). Brackets mine. 
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pricing signals to producers, consumers and investors within the economy... eliminates some 
of the volatility of exchange rates [between formal and informal markets) 11488 which are 
caused when central banks intervene, an act which widens adjustment lags between formal 
and informal markets and result in the volatility referred to. 
Organizations such as NEPC and NACCIMA ought to become less self-congratulatory 
about their supposed role in Nigeria's present exporting climate. In interviews with their 
officials, as well as in speeches and seminar papers I have come across", they are full of 
praise, not only for their own activities, but for the outcomes of those activities - outcomes 
which tend to be disputed by most of the supposed beneficiaries. These bodies, on the 
contrary, appear to be underperforming, and in certain respects, have become rather 
irrelevant to the reality and the needs of large sections of the exporting community, 
especially the smaller-sized members it was mainly set up to assist. The NEPC has, for 
instance, in the past implicitly 'admitted the over-bureaucratization (or at any rate, the 
excessive documentation) of export trading* iný Nigeria. With a ftinctional research 
I. C 
department, it ought io be making viable proposals for alleviating this. The council's 
consultants ought also to be working harder at its relationship with SMEs. They should spend 
more time finding out what individual clients need as opposed to approaching those it does 
come into contact with, with a ready list of what it wants to do for them. The council, with 
seven overseas offices in London, Geneva, Brussels, Warsaw, New York, Jeddah, and 
Abidjan, can help willing market traders with developing overseas marketing contacts. At 
I 
present, though present on paper, such a relationship is virtually non-existent. Even the 
larger, more formalized manufacturing firms, who in reality tend to be the NEPC's main 
'" Goldberg (1995: 184). Brackets mine. 
I" See for instance Itegbe (1992); Ajiboye (1990). 
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clients, will require rather more than the (more or less) annual exhibitions it organises in 
selected overseas cities. 
(vi) Con-uption 
The government ought, also, to examine ways of reducing the scope for official 
corruption among its agents, which, in its various forms, is the single most expressed 
operational difficulty faced locally by Nigerian traders, as discussed in chapter 8. Any 
function which involves the collection of revenue ought to be looked at closely for ways of 
improvement. Several illustrations in this area, as it affects the cross-border trade, have 
already been provided in the course of this study. A further illustration may be found in the 
collection of excise duty which is currently being undertaken by the NCS. It has been alleged 
I 
on a number of occasions that the NCS officials abuse this position to such an extent that not 
only the entrepreneurs themselves", but also independent international agencies'9' are 
calling for this function-to be removed altogqther ftom the ambit of the NCS, and reassigned 
either to private collection agencies or some other official body. At the very least, there 
seems to be a case for increased accountability and greater control mechanism of the revenue 
collection function within the NCS. While I have been astounded by some of the acts of 
corruption perpetrated at Nigeria's (and other West African) borders, according to various 
press reports, it is in Nigeria's ports that the greatest acts of corruption are perpetrated. 
There is no doubt that the widespread practice of corruption, though encouraged in 
part by indigenous entrepreneurs themselves, dernotivates and impoverishes the 
see for instance Financial Guardian (Lagos) 24/5/94, p. 11 . 
4Q1 see for instance Business Times (Lagos) 21/3/94, pp. 1,13 . 
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entrepreneurial population by stripping them of the value that their encleavour add to their 
traded goods. The traders, by their own admission, end up passing the costs, where they can, 
on to consumers, with attendant inflationary consequences. Corruption in the formal sector 
is certainly one reason for the perpetuation of informality in several aspects of the production 
and distributive sectors of the Nigerian economy, and is also a reason why formal sector 
firms perform certain functions or operations informally when they can get away with it. In 
all these cases, the state is caused the loss of revenue and other development resources. 
There are further implications for the population at large 492 , for as noted earlier in chapter 
8, the "egunje" culture is one that appears to have diffused from the commercial arena into 
the population at large. There is an urgent need for the government to get stuck into this 
situation and redress it. 
9.4 Closing Remarks 
To reiterate, whqt this study has set out. to Oo in this under-researched area of West 
African economic behaviour is build a foundation from which future studies can proceed, and 
I hope I have gone some way towards achieving this. 
I have, in part, attempted in the study to show how indigenous entrepreneurs 
contribute to the development process in regions like Nigeria. I have also presented some 
arguments about how their roles can be further augmented. 
Although the data and discussion in the study extends to finus of all sizes, "micro"- 
entrepreneurs are, perhaps, at the heart of die study, to the extent that the core research 
problem in this study may be described as the notion that there is not enough wealth creating 
492 
cf. Kurer (1996: 655-656). 
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indigenous entrepreneurship in Nigeria (and other like LDCs). What there is, it is said, is 
survivalist in nature, and exemplifies the structural underdevelopment of places like Nigeria. 
Indigenous entrepreneurship does not therefore play a significant Fole in economic 
development, and trade statistics back these up. 
The discussion in the early part of the thesis is built around the four "pillars" of trade, 
development, entrepreneurship, and historical perspectives. All four disciplinary approaches, 
despite having important contributions to make in explaining entrepreneurial behaviour of our 
objects of study, provide essentially conflicting explanations and focus points, which is 
understandable, given the differences in definitions, objectives and methodology that each 
discipline tends to employ. Having introduced in section 9.2, certain concepts in 
entrepreneurship that this study introduces or illuminates, it may now be possible to share 
some thoughts as to how the findings feed back into the preceding chapters. 
International Trade Perspectives 
The trade theories examined in chapter 2 are based on the premise that free trade is 
in the best interest of all trading countries. It concerns itself with important questions like 
"why do firms export? ", and is one of the most widely applied of all economic doctrines, 
although the relevant contribution of this study may well be in the area of "how do firms 
export'? ". 
Tile findings in this study question the conceptual framework of several orthodox, 
largely western models which, in the Nigerian case, have tended to over-estimate the 
directness of the link between manufacturers and consumers, not just locally, but overseas 
as well. That link is mostly provided by middlemen who, as illustrated in figure 7.1, and 
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more thoroughly through the experiences of cases 6&7, dominate both the internal and 
external distribution process. Figure 7.1 also shows that export-oriehted. Xpiddlemen maintain 
the most wide-ranging external relations of all the groups of distributors in Nigeria. In fact, 
the figure reveals them as being as widely connected as the actual makers of goods, the main 
difference being that they are able to exploit these Telationships in ways that most distributors 
cannot. 
However, because of the nature of markets that they are best placed to exploit 
(regional), and the fact that Nigeria's "traditional" exports are either closed to them (e. g oil) 
or externally controlled (e. g cocoa), the net effect of is that the incentive of (physical) 
internationalization is lost, both on middlemen, and on primary producers, and the process, 
where it takes place, tends to be ad hoc. This pýovides a substantial exception to the pre- 
planned, incremental internationalization models provided in orthodox theory. 
Development Perspectives 
The modernization and dependency ideas examined in chapter 3 illuminated 
development patterns in LDCs and the socio-economic processes that can evolve from these. 
They explain, inter alia, the unequal trading patterns between countries. The findings 
however challenge, on a number of levels, orthodox models of economic dualism which 
envisage the independent existence of a small, capital i§t/market-oriented (differentiated) 
sector, and a large, subs istence-oriented (undifferentiated) sector. 
First, it appears that there is, in Nigeria, considerably greater interdependence of the 
sectors than orthodox development theory tends to assume. We can glean this from the extent 
or inter-sectoral activity that goes on within both the formal and informal sectors in Nigeria. 
340 
Following from this, it is arguable that in a societies like Nigeria with relatively active 
infonnal sectors, the necessity for a "structural differentiation" ofthe., ýind proposed in the 
classical models of Neil Smelser and Wilbert Moore in order for modernization to occur, 
may be an over-stated concept as there is reduced need, moreso in small scale 
entrepreneurship, for the fonnation of new, specialized social units to sustain the new 
economic activities on which economic development depends. ThirdlY, the argument can be 
more broadly advanced, backed up by several illustrations of linkages and accumulation 
processes (mostly in chapters 3 and 8) that "top - down 'Vinterventionist/externalist methods 
of analyzing change processes tend to be unable to account for local variations or 
heterogeneity in responding to, or creating conditions of change, which more grounded 
studies of micro-processes are better placed to reveal. 
Entrepreneurship Perspectives 
In chapter 4, itwas recognized that- entrepreneurs themselves have a major part to 
play in die development process, and indeed some of the most interestirfg empirical evidence 
came from this chapter. It must however be noted at the same time, that within the context 
of the present study, much entrepreneurship theory is to be found wanting. 
The study is primarily about the actions and behaviour of a number of enterprises, 
many of thern sinall, who in various ways, and to varying degrees of success, pursue an 
expansive economic policy. In the case of the small firms, as is revealed in chapter 7, many 
of them do not seek to expand the size of the business itself beyond a point where they are 
unable to exercise day-to-day control over it. Is this to be interpreted as a weakness or a lack 
of anibition or dynamism on their part? Given the socio-economic environment that they 
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operate in, that is, an environment deficient in infrastructures, where even the most 
formalized companies are unable to carry out any real strategi-ColarTing, I believe it is 
arguable that one of the next best things, in the circumstances, surely is a unit tight enough 
to respond swiftly to change if and when it happens. Many of the traders I interacted with, 
moreso the successful ones, have alluded to precisely this. But it does not stop them from 
seeking out new products or markets, or novel ideas in wealth creation or accumulation. 
However, many of the economic models on entrepreneurship will not even recognize 
the traders' role as entrepreneurial. The same is, to an extent, true of psychological models. 
Under these, cross-border traders will be expected to demonstrate high n ach, high internal 
locus of control and moderate risk-taking propensity, or otherwise fall outside psychological 
conceptual izations of "entrepreneur". Yet, in a place like Nigeria, which has mostly had 
military leaderships since independence in 1960, and where the state has such an uneasy 
relationship with the entrepreneurial population, but is nonetheless present, indeed dominant, 
at the basic everyday level in the life of entrepreneurs, it is difficult to see how the latter can 
have a "high" internal locus of control, or for, thdt matter, be described as "moderate" risk 
takers. 
Entrepreneurial choice/behaviour in the trade is perhaps more adequately explainable 
under sociological models. But even these have to operate under certain analytic limitations 
since sociological models, as shown in chapter 4, tend to accord indigenous entrepreneurs 
too much individual freedom of choice. I nevertheless favour sociological perspectives in 
explaining entrepreneurship in the cross-border trade because of the primacy given to 
environmental variables (a most important factor governing the mechanics of the trade), and 
the identification of entrepreneurship as the ability to manipulate these to one's advantage. 
Both ceonomic, and to a lesser extent, psychological models, are unable to relate 
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entrepreneurship to the wider society in this manner. Within the sociological models, 
explanations on the cross-border trade are perhaps most closely ielate4jo, the transactional 
models of Frederick Barth, which recognise that it is the value attached to a given good at 
a given time and place that creates the "sphere of exchange" which provides the opportunity 
liable to be exploited by an "entrepreneur". 
* Histofical Perspectives 
In chapter 5, an attempt was made to see if, and how indigenous Nigerian 
entrepreneurs have done this through the ages. As summarized in section 9.1, there are some 
"cultural" explanations for the nature of the cross-border trade, at least to the extent that 
particular features such as middlemen, specialist markets, long-distance trading and so forth 
I 
have long histories in indigenous Nigerian entrepreneursýip. 
However, several- theorists have been loathe such incorporate such explanations into 
their arguments, and this lack, or inadequate attention to history has, on occasion, led to 
questionable theorisation. Although I had earlier referred to this -point in examining 
modernization theory in chapter 3,1 then went on in chapter 5 to make an observation that 
the hundred years of British colonial rule along with the discovery of oil in the 1950s, were 
mostly responsible for present-day trading patterns in Nigeria. To what extent, then, has 
colonialism influenced Nigeria's subsequent economic development, especially bearing in 
mind the fact that its economy is both dependent and underdeveloped? 
This, as shown in the conclusion to chapter 5, is a questions on which historians are 
divided. It is not proposed to theorise at any length on the colonial inheritance. That is 
beyond the scope or this study. However, chapter 5 teaches that one must not lose sight or 
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the fact that although Nigeria had carried on international trade prior to colonialism, at the 
time of the country's integration into the world economy, the lev6l--at. which it entered, the 
products with which it entered, and the pace at which it developed in the crucial fonnative 
stages, even right up to 1960 (and many would argue, beyond), were all determined by the 
fact of its colonization to Britain. At the same time, it has been possible to see in the study, 
how entrepreneurs remain entrepreneurially creative and opportunity-seeking in a post- 
colonial dependent economy, entrepreneurship that was shown to pre-date, co-exist, and 
finally post-date colonialism. Based on this joint premise, one must reject the arguments of 
the "right-wing" school on grounds of a distorted interpretation of history. The "left-wing" 
school correctly identifies the peripheral role of Nigeria and other European colonies in the 
19th and 20th century intemational capitalist order, but then fails in the analysis to adequately 
provide explanations for the development of indigenous entrepreneurship during the period. 
I am myself persuaded that the "median" school does this but the analysis on which it is 
based appears somewhat. suspect on the issue of the colonial inheritance. Perhaps because it 
is a relatively recent development which has hýd contributors from various disciplines, 
historians have not themselves tackled the issue of explaining indigenous entrepreneurship 
in "median" school terms. In any case, as Anthony Hopkins (1973: 244) observed more than 
twenty years ago, "no one has attempted to write an economic history of the domestic trade 
of West Africa during the period of colonial rule". Were this to be done, it would give the 
median school a far sounder empirical base than it can currently lay claim to. 
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* The Methodology 
My "hybrid" methodology was presented in chapter 6.1 have favoured an actor- 
oriented approach which, I believe, for the purposes of this study, provides a methodology 
for operational izing deferential entrepreneurial a6tion which also takes a practical view of the 
entrepreneur's enviromnent. In doing the background work on this thesis, including theparly 
fieldwork, I gradually came to realize that so little is known about the subject-matter that to 
impose too rigid a conceptual framework on its study would introduce a very real danger of 
ethnocentrism. The study has therefore taken an inductive route. One of the issues facing the 
thesis then has to do with reconciling the findings with existing frameworks, albeit produced 
by people who, it appears to me, are unfamiliar with the area of study. 
* Data AnalysislFindings 
I 
The findings, although used to illustiate a number of issues throughout the study, are 
primarily discussed in chapters 7 and 8. Some of the issues introduced in chapter 7 are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
The descriptive analysis engaged in, in that chapter, reveals first, that the reality of 
the cross-border trader might itself be considerably removed from the oft-portrayed image, 
and second, that indigenous entrepreneurs may not be quite as inward-looking or lacking in 
dynamism as is often thought. 
There is no doubt that the trade is carried on in an environment of illegality. 
Naturally, it is to be considered morally undesirable. In reality however, illegality is 
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operationalized as an environmental variable, virtually as any other193. Illegality hampers 
the trade for certain entrepreneurs and provides opportunities fbCdtherý, including the arrny 
of intermediaries between the production line and the end-user who make a living out of the 
trade. Export-oriented manufacturers, often severely lacking in information and 
infrastructures, are spared the extra hassle of -marketing their goods to remote foreign 
customers, and left free to develop that end of their businesses at their own pace. 
Capital accumulation does take place, and the market, though informal in significant 
portions, is in many respects (self) regulated. 
Many successful cross-border traders are, without a doubt, part of an emerging bona 
fide entrepreneurial class from the informal sector. They exist in significant numbers, and 
appear, on the whole, to be seeing to the evolution of an alternative economy, co-existing 
with the formal economy, but which may ultimately merge, or supplant it. In many regards, 
cross-border trading offers riskier, but potentially more lucrative business than is locally 
available, and due in pýrt to the level of illqgality that accompanies it, the various cases 
illustrate the fact that the trade offers significant *scope for innovative behaviour. 
* The Recommendations 
The basic premise of the recommendations suggested earlier in this chapter for the 
development of the cross-border trade is that the Nigerian'government needs to work harder 
at promoting and supporting private, even informal enterprise. If the government ignores it 
or tries to suppress it, it will be unable to kill it, and will only end up making the sector's 
493 Fadaliunsi &, Rosa (1996). 
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contributions to economic development smaller, resulting in further waste of scarce 
development resources. An uncommitted or lack-lustre approach to its-4qvelopment will not 
do either. Businesses will not be able to take government policy at face value. This will 
precipitate an already tense government - business relationship and fuel further, the 
entrepreneurial instinct of Nigerians to operate In the informal sector, thus costing the 
government further loss of potential revenue. 
And Finally 
By relying on a great deal of anthropologically-oriented material, this study has 
sought, not only to explain why it is that entrepreneurs take certain decisions, but how they 
come to take such decisions. Such a study can, in my view, be greatly complementary to 
statistical studies that seem to be the norm in present times, not only for explaining the 
nuances behind certain findings of such studies, but also by providing an essential local 
background, and in so doing acting as a very useffil aid to the design of such studies. It also 
leads naturally to what I consider to be the next stage of the researchi- which is to attempt 
to quantify the actual extent of the trade, and its further implications for theories on 
economic development. 
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APPENDIX A 
CASE I 
MISS ADIJA WELSON 
Adija is a bubbly twenty five year old, single, and has been a full-time trader for nine 
years. Prior to that, she combined her high-school studies with some part-time trading. She 
says she never really liked school, and was glad to get out after her son was bom in 1987. 
She has always felt cut out for business. She always wanted to trade, earn lots of money, and 
be her own boss, just as her mother was. As a child of seven or eight, she recalls always 
being eager to go hawking fruits that she had picked herself, in order to raise some pocket- 
money for herself. 
She is the youngest of her mother's three, children (she has two older brothers), 
although her father has teveral other wives and chpdren. Her mother and father are members 
of different royal families in Lagos and Ondo states, respectively. Her mother however raised 
Adija and her brothers away from the expansive set-up where their father resides. Her 
immediate family is thus rather large. She maintains friendly relations with the rest of the 
family although Adija herself does not have a close relationship with her father, and appears 
to have only really developed close relationships with those half-siblings, and their spouses, 
who seem able to contribute to her economic well-being. From them, she gets occasional 
cash gifts, and they also sometimes introduce actual or potential customers from their 
network of friends to her. She would occasionally get thern gifts of silk ties, handkerchiefs, 
scarves, and so forth in return. 
She lives in a tenement building popularly known as "Face Me I Face You". Such 
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buildings usually consist of uniformly sized rooms on either side of a long corridor which 
culminates in the shared areas of the kitchen, bathroom and lavatory. "The rooms may be let 
singly or in batches. Adija and her son occupy two of such rooms. There are ten other rooms 
like hers on her floor, and three floors in all. She likes living there, she says, because 
everyone knows what she does for a living, and rýgularly patronize her. She knows and likes 
her fellow tenants, and she can leave her son, when necessary, to be watched by just about 
any of the other mothers in the building. 
We first met in February 1994 when I interviewed her, along with some other traders, 
at Apongbon market in Lagos Island where Adija used to be a stall holder, although on the 
occasion of the interview in question, she had sub-let the stall, and was in the market on 
other business. She was one of those I later approached to be a case subject. Over the next 
six months, I saw her about three days each Week, apart from July-August at the height of 
the Nigerian political crises, when everyone's movements. was effectively restricted. I mainly 
observed her at work in, her home, where her' living room also serves as a shop of sorts, or 
went around Lagos with her on her business. We had countless discussions, including four 
formal, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. I also met hef* occasionally at her 
mother's - either during muslim festivals"), or more commonly, as a convenient departure 
point for the trips that I accompanied her on. 
Although Adija has been a trader for several years, when I first met her, she had been 
involved in cross-border trading for just seven months. ' She had left her regular stall at 
Apongbon market mainly because she had become tired of the long and physically demanding 
hours, but even more so because of the physically intense competition for prospective buyers' 
"14 Adiia has a christian father and a muslim mother. Her mother brought her up as a 
niuslini, and but she has recently converted to christianity, while retaining her muslim name. 
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attention. Apongbon is generally regarded as the best stocked market in Lagos for imported 
wines and liqueur. Its clientele is mainly trade and upmarket indivi(ýdhls- In Adija's former 
patch of about fifty square metres, there were usually up to about twenty traders invariably 
selling the same products. The moment a vehicle slows down to park anywhere in the 
vicinity, the traders shoot out from their stalls ana shops to the vehicle, all screaming out the 
same products and prices. When the prospective customer is finally able to get out of the car, 
the products that are finally purchased depends on the customer's haggling abilities, and 
which sellers are prepared to drop their asking prices the most. Adija's voice sounds 
permanently half-hoarse, which she says is a legacy of her years at Apongbon. 
Adija says she considered getting involved in the cross-border trade for at least a year 
before she actually did it. She had been impressed with some of her friends who were in the 
trade and appeared better off than she was. She had also travelled by road to some major 
West African markets with her mother as a young girl mainly to buy textile materials in bulk 
for special family occasions. Before embarking on the venture, she spoke, not to her friends 
who were already on the job, but to her mother, an experienced cross-border traveller (but 
only an occasional trader) who advised her to go ahead. She made-two "trial" trips to 
Cotonou and Lome, before deciding to commit her life savings of N4,000 into the project. 
Adija now works mainly from home. Although her hours are, if anything, longer, and 
she still hustles a great deal (especially to obtain payment), she is much happier with her new 
vocation because she is -at last, as she says, a "proper businesswoman". She makes more 
money, she travels, and has cultivated economically important relationships with some of her 
suppliers and customers. She had not initially planned to work from home. She felt forced 
into it when the agreement she negotiated for a shop at Tejuosho market fell through at the 
last minute. But she realizes that ultimately, her home is a risky sales outlet for her and she 
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is working on obtaining another outlet in Tejuosho market. At the moment, her home is open 
to all prospective customers. 
Adija does not travel beyond Cotonou in the Republic of Benin, or Seme, on the 
country's border with Nigeria, and is thus never away from home from more than a day. 
When the lease for her new shop comes through *(expectedly early in 1995), she says it may 
become necessary for her to start obtaining the jewellery she sells from Abidjan in the Ivory 
Coast where she believes most of the stock of her Cotonou suppliers originates, although this 
will mean a change in her current travel arrangements. Usually, she travels three or four 
times a month, but at peak trade periods, such as during the Christmas or Eid-el-Kabir 
seasons, she can make two trips per week. 
Adija operates under a commercial name, but it is unregistered. She recognizes the 
benefits of having a business name for identification purposes, but like so many other traders 
in Lagos, she believes that formal registration such 
- 
as thpt stipulated under the Registration 
of Business Names Act, -or Companies Decrý6, does not advance her business, but merely 
brings with it unwelcotne government interference, and is as such a waste of money. We 
talked about this quite a few times, with me, for argument's sake, gently attempting to make 
a case for the operational advantages of trading under the law. She would listen with apparent 
interest, but remain, unsurprisingly, unconvinced. Her major reason for not registering, as 
with thousands more such enterprises in Nigeria, is the avoidance of tax. 
Adija works alone. She employs no assistants, 'although her mother sometimes 
accompanies her on her travels. She does sometimes makes use of her network of family and 
friends to carry out duties she might have otherwise employed an assistant for. These include 
occasional deliveries, and chasing up payments. In her former business, she had traded in 
imported wines and spirits, as well as popular brand sodas in two and three litre bottles 
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which are something of a novelty in Nigeria. In her current trade however, she trades mainly 
in fashion accessories - jewellery, shoes, handbags, make-up, uncf6iwear and so forth, as 
well as clothes and other textile materials. She only considers herself moderately successful, 
but is very ambitious, and confident about the future. She keeps a simple stock and double 
entry account book which she is proud of, andAich I was finally allowed to take a look at 
more than a month after the study began. It revealed that her turnover had more than trebled 
to over N6,500 per month by March 1994, from just under N2,000 in September 1993, and 
was in fact approaching N9,000 in June 1994, before the political crises escalated the 
following month, adversely affecting most businesses. She had travelled only twice in the 
first half of July, before deciding that it was becoming too expensive and risky a journey. 
In fact, her second trip that month, which I accompanied her on July l1th, was merely to 
stock up her wares in anticipation of what we all expected was going to be grim time for the 
country. It was the only time she purchased goods with the express intention of building up 
stock. In the event, the. prises proved to be as'ýdamaging for business as expected, and Adija 
was unable to make any more trips, or do any substantial trading before I left Nigeria the 
following month. In summary, she recorded a turnover of over N70,000'in the eleven months 
to July 1994, and a net profit of almost N15,000. Significantly though, she grossed more 
than N25,000 in the three months from April to June 1994, and netted profits approaching 
N7,000. 
Adija's trading pattern is straight-forward. She buys in Cotonou or Seme, and sells 
in Lagos. It is hardly ever the other way round. In fact, in six months of observing her, she 
only ever once bought a batch of hand-made leather sandals in Lagos, to be sold to two 
business partners in Cotonou in response to the latters' unsolicited order. Even then, she 
needed convincing. She considered it an exceptional favour and is most reluctant to carry on 
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a two-way trade. She fears that she would be at the mercy of two currencies (Naira and CFA 
Franc) with a reputation for wild fluctuations. Besides, there are ilit-border troubles she 
would have to contend with on both legs of the journey to Cotonou, and she would need a 
trading partner there as well, which will not give her the kind of overall control she desires. 
On travel days, Adija departs her Ebute-Metta home at about 6 a. m, and arrives in 
Cotonou at about 9 a. m. On a quick trip, she might depart for home by 1 p. m, but more 
often than not will stays on till the markets are shut at about 6 p. m. She is very well known 
to the border personnel, especially after having had a few robust exchanges with them over 
their demands for bribes. To them, I was her "brother", and therefore got a bit of the rough 
treatment as well. 
As she makes her way round her suppliers in Cotonou's markets, she is all chann 
with each of them. She is never seemingly in*a hurry (although I knew better) and chats in 
Pidgin English and Yoruba with various traders about their families, new products, politics 
and general market gossip. What she really 'wants to find out in these discussions is what 
kinds and quantities orgoods her competitors: are buying. 
The 
only competitors she knows 
are her friends, and occasionally, they meet in Cotonou, and all act iither coy about their 
purchases. Adija always tries to differentiate her purchases from her competitors' (that is, 
her friends') purchases. She says she is still in the process of discovering her ideal suppliers, 
and has come so far by trial and error. 
Adija only goes on her cross-border trips when 'she has secured enough orders at 
home to guarantee a profit (apart from a single occasion in July 1994). This is why there is 
no set pattern to her trips. She then purchases some extra items, and selling these extra items 
is what occupies her between trips. She does not consider herself a risk taker. She is very 
proud or the fact, for instance, that she did not borrow any money to start tier business, nor 
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has she borrowed any since. She also refuses to centre an entire trip around the purchase of 
goods she has not been specifically requested to obtain. Once, when7l--asked her about this 
she said 
"I am not a fool. Why should I go and spend my money buying something that I am 
not sure of selling for a profit? I am better off not spending it at all. Afterall, if I 
don't spend my money on a maybe-mayýe not project, it will remain in my pocket, 
and I can still use it to feed myself and my son with it. No. I will rather wait until 
I'm sure I've found something worthwhile to buy with my money. Only a mad person 
will go all the way to Cotonou to go and throw her money away. God forbid. 11495 
Whenever Adija is supplying a product which has been pre-ordered, whether or not 
she delivers it to the customer, or it is picked up is purely a matter of convenience for both 
parties, and one that is usually agreed upon before she travels. If the good has not been pre- 
ordered, she literally spreads the word that she has certain items for sale. She contacts 
members of her network who work in schools and offices, she informs certain co-tenants and 
other people she knows to be connected to her customers. If such a good is one of the more 
expensive brocades, such as uncut Jacquard or Satin Lace bales, she tends to take those 
straight to Tejuosho or Oshodi market, where. shd tries to sell them in bulk to retailers who 
would in turn resell them in smaller quantities to members of the public. Goods like these 
. are an occasional 
indulgence on Adija's part as she rarely gets orders for them, but she only 
requires a single sale to realize a handsome profit, and so she sometimes buys them at 
Cotonou and devotes time to selling them in Lagos. During the course of the study, Adija 
also managed to begin selling western-style casual menswear after she took a decision to 
expand her largely female clientele to include more men. Her reasoning was that as it was 
sometimes men who ended up actually paying the bills for her female customers' purchases, 
she might as well try to interest the men themselves in certain products. By the end of the 
4"-' Taped interview 20/4/94 
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field-study, she had developed this part of her business into a steady, though small sales 
outlet, having added a few customers introduced to her by one of 
ý6t--brothers. 
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CASE 2 
ALHAJA SHAKI AMUWO-ODOFIN 
I first struck up conversation with Alha a Amuwo-Odofin in January 1994 at her i 
Oshodi market shop when I went, on a date previously agreed to collect a questionnaire 
which she had earlier agreed to fill in for me. The questionnaire had not been filled. On the 
contrary, she seemed rather suspicious of me and my motives and asked me a series of 
questions designed to establish whether I was a government or police spy, or the like. After 
about a week of similar exchanges, she seemed to have satisfied herself as to my identity and 
motives, and became quite co-operative. She ended up helping to coordinate the part of my 
survey that was carried out in Oshodi market. I carried out my observations for five months 
from February to July 1994.1 would go to either of her shops about three or four days a 
I 
week, and spend about three hours per visit, excepý for those days in which we went out or 
I had interviews to do with her or her assistanits. Those days were usually longer. 
"Alhaja" (as sh8 is popularly known) iý a streetwise woman who, I eventually learnt 
(though not from her), is forty four years old. She is originally from Ibadan (about ninety 
miles north of Lagos), and is the second of six surviving children. She has been married for 
twenty one years and has five children. Her husband married a second wife in 1986, and was 
expected to marry a third by the end of 1994. 
She has been a full-time trader for nineteen yedrs, and comes from a family of 
traders. Both her parents have been trading in textiles, particularly the hand-woven 
ceremonial fabric, aso-oke, as well as hand-made head-ties and baby wrappers for almost 
forty years at lbadan. 
She recalls that she, as well as lier brothers and sisters had to spend time helping their 
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parents at the shop. It was considered a formal apprenticeship and, as such, taken seriously, 
although the boys never really stayed long before some other vocatfýft-was found for them. 
Prospective apprentices were also sent by the extended family to her parents for training, 
who considered it a great honour. 
Alhaja's own apprenticeship commenced when she was about twelve years old. She 
helped out in the shop every afternoon after school, and all day on saturdays, and became 
a full apprentice when, at fourteen, she dropped out of high school. This training went on 
for another four years before she decided to go back and complete her education. By this 
time, she had decided she wanted to be a teacher. She enrolled herself in a "modem" 
[middle) school, ftom where she went on to the Teacher Training College at Sagamu in Ogun 
state. She graduated in 1974, and started to teach in Lagos later that same year. She got 
married the following year, but her husband lbst his job in the firm where he worked only 
a few months after they were married. It became more difficult to make ends meet, and so 
she started to trade on a, stall in front of the h6use they rented in the afternoon after school. 
Her parents, who had hever supported her -go - ing back to school, gave her N200 worth of 
textile materials to start her up in full time trade. Her husband and hefself were able to put 
up another N400, which paid for six months' rent of a shop in Idumota market, as well as 
some more materials to sell. She went straight into the textile trade, purchasing lace and 
some other clothing materials from dealers around Lagos, aso-oke from her parents in 
Ibadan, and accessories like hats, beads, head-ties and so'on from other parts of Madan, as 
well as in Abeokuta and 1jebu-ode, both in Ogun state, for sale in Lagos. To earn extra 
money, her husband would drive her on many of those trips. On the outward journey, he 
would pick up lbadan-bound passengers, and charge roughly half the going rate for 
commercial vehicles. On the return journey, lie would purchase quantities of foodstuff, 
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mainly gaii (cassava), yam flour, yams, beans and vegetables. These he would sell, with his 
wife and two nieces' help, to retailers and Was (cafes) around their-fio-me who would re-sell 
them in single meal quantities (or in the case of the Was, cook and sell) to members of the 
public. 
Alhaja is nowadays still involved in the iextile trade. But now she has three shops, 
where she employs a total of ten assistants, including four nieces. These assistants are all 
referred to as apprentices, and the apprenticeship normally lasts for up to five years before 
what is commonly referred to as their "fteedom" (graduation), an occasion celebrated with 
much pomp. Two of the shops are in Balogun market in Lagos Island, and the third is in 
Oshodi market on the mainland, just three miles from her Ikeja home. This latter shop is 
where she is usually to be found, although she makes unannounced trips to the island shops 
several times a week. The second. Balogun maiket. was only opened in November 1993 in the 
run-up to die christmas shopping season. 
Her combined týrnover was more than'N2 million in 1993, and she seemed confident 
of surpassing that in 1*994. By the end of *the easter 1994 season, total sales had already 
topped NI million, which was her total sales figure for 1991. Her expectations are borne, 
not out of general inflationary tendencies, but because her sales are actually going up. The 
Nigerian fashion industry, as a whole, has appeared rather oblivious of the desperate fortunes 
of the rest of the economy. She also admits to making about ; E2,000 per annurn from an 
occasional involvement in overseas export trade, mostly in tailored Nigerian fabrics. 
Her shops are small, each measuring about twelve square feet, but this is not unusual 
in Lagos where there is not a great deal of land available. 
Her husband (the "Alhaji") is also still in the foodstuff trade. These days however, 
lie purchases truckloads of rice, beans, yams, vegetables and other foodstuffs from Nigeria's 
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middlebeft and northern regions, and transports them to Lagos markets to be resold to market 
traders. 
Alhaja sometimes trades as a wholesaler, and some other times as a retailer, 
depending on what kind of textile materials are being purchased from her. For instance, she 
only retails the ceremonial fabrics aso-oke and ofi, which she still purchases from her parents 
in Ibadan; But she is a registered distributor for some other fabrics with such textile 
manufacturers as Nicherntex, Samaco and Rhema in Lagos. 
She also has what she calls her "corporate customers". These are the firms who ask 
for a mixture of several types of textile materials which is made up into a "clothes hamper" 
to give out as corporate gifts during the christmas season. It is a market that exists for barely 
four weeks in a year, but it is worth a great deal of money, and requires Alhaja to do a great 
deal of personal selling to company directors; and then calling on Alhaji and his friends to 
put in good words for her, wherever possible.. 
She does not aqvertise, and feels it ii'irrelevant in her line of business. She is, it 
seems, increasingly les*s involved in the actual I selling of her products, although she still does 
all the purchasing. 
It is however overseas trade which is now the centre of her business. Despite the fact 
that Alhqja has several useful contacts within Nigeria, and is a registered distributor with 
several rimis, only about 10% of her entire stock is obtained within Nigeria. 
She has been a cross-border trader since 1982, ýnd obtains about 25% of all her 
supplies this way, mostly from suppliers in Cotonou and Lome, but occasionally from as far 
away as Abidjan. Becoming a cross-border trader was a conscious decision that she took 
when she felt that her business had grown to a size and nature thit merited closer ties with 
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the makers of her products'16. She tends to make this trip about once every two months. 
This is a small number compared to that of many other traders, but e ýýh-one of Alhaja's trips 
is a major occasion as she attempts to purchase enough goods to keep three shops going for 
another two months. 
The majority of her supplies however come from Saudi Arabia, where she went on 
the hajj (islamic pilgrimage) in 1987. Before she returned, she purchased some materials to 
sell in her shops, and has traded on the route ever since. Again on this trade route, she 
mostly does purchasing and comparatively little selling. She obtains, by her estimation, over 
50% of all her supplies on the Saudi route. 
I would sometimes drive two of Alhaja's assistants on some of their occasional visits 
to the Murtala Mohammed International Airport, in Lagos, to try and land new business. 
There, they would approach passengers on in-domi. ng flights from other African destinations 
and try to persuade them, speaking pidgin english to. visit Pne of their shops during their stay 
in Lagos. They mostly Ipproached women who', in their opinion, looked like traders, and in 
particular targeted fliglAs from Cameroun and' Ghana. 
After I had witnessed this for the first time, I commented on the-ir knack for picking 
the right people to approach, and one of them said: 
"... it is not difficult really. These market women are easy to spot, although you'll 
never see me dressed like that. Once you can arrive here on time to meet the first 
flight, like we did today, the rest is easy... the first ones you notice are those with 
big pieces of luggage which look empty or nearly empty. It means they have come 
to buy goods, and will probably return in the everiing. Sometimes, they carry those 
jank-ara bags". Not me. And they tend to travel in groups because they are scared 
"16 discussed further in chapter 8 (section 8.2), in this study. 
"I "Jankara" is (lie narne of a Lagos market. It is being used in the context of the quote 
to denote the apparent clicapness of the bag in question. 
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of 'area boys""... 11499 
I asked them if they could tell from appearances alone, as Xlhaja had once said, if 
a passenger was a potential customer of theirs, and they contributed this reply: 
"Oh yes... so if you see them with their expensive shawls draped over a nice dress, 
and maybe even a nice head-tie, and they are then wearing bathroom slippers on their 
feet, from an aeroplane, haba! How maný people do you think can dress that way?... 
although they are not all like that... sometimes they come to you. Afterall aren't we 
all traders? We ought to know one another then... " 
Alhaja also purchases goods from the U. K. and Egypt. Although she does not 
purchase quite as much here as she does from Saudi Arabia or from the cross-border routes, 
these are the only trade routes in which she carries on a two-way trade. The balance is 
however heavily tilted towards importing to, rather than exporting from Nigeria. She had 
known about the existence of the London route for many years before she actually began to 
use it in 1985, after a holiday in London. The'Cairo route followed in 1987 at the same time 
as she began trading on the Saudi route. Now they act as ýuffers when Saudi supplies are for 
any reason not forthcorping. She imports much the same things on these routes as she does 
on the Saudi route. SnIaller quantities of purchases are also made from suppliers, through 
informal agents based in Italy, Austria and Switzerland, although these7are usually arranged 
through her U. K-based suppliers and agents. Alhaja would like to develop her business on 
these routes but wants to see the markets for herself first. So far, she has had an application 
for an Italian visa turned down. 
Her exports are remarkably similar products, that is, textile materials and attendant 
, accessories. She exports Guinea brocade and adire materials, either uncut or sewn into casual 
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adult street urchins 
"' taped interview 7/4/94 
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style clothing as well as hand-made leather suede and alligator skin shoes and sandals. 
Alhaja is a popular figure both in Oshodi and Balogun mari6ls-., She is a protege of 
the Iyaloja (market women's leader) at Oshodi market. She campaigned, side by side the 
Iyaloja, vigorously among the market women in support of their favoured candidates at the 
1991 and 1993 elections. She is therefore regarded as an alagbara (powerful person) within 
the market community. 
Alhaja considers herself a risk taker. She told me: 
"Once upon a time, things were much simpler. But how many years would I have sat 
peddling aso-oke for? How many people are even buying the aso-oke? Yet if you go 
to Oje market (in Ibadan), that's what they're all doing. The world is far more 
advanced these days, and you have to advance with it... But when you have struggled 
to put together N100,000 and you then give it to somebody to go and spend on your 
behalf in a strange country, where you can't see them even if it is your mother's 
child, let me tell you, my brother, you are taking a big risk, or don't you think so?... 
11501 
She maintains that her single biggest trading problem remains the scarcity of foreign 
exchange. She purchases most of her hard currency requirements on the black market, 
1-* 
supplemented by about half of her London earnings. She is generally reluctant to plough back 
her foreign exchange earnings into her trade, preferring, to keep it aside in London for 
"shopping" on her occasional holidays. 
Alliqja's Oshodi market shop was bulldozed by the Lagos state government 
"environmental sanitation task force" soon after easter in April 1994, along with twenty one 
other shops that made up the "railway line shopping complex" part of the market. They were 
adjudged to be "illegal structures". Alhaja is one of the fortunate ones. Although she still had 
not been allocated replacement premises by die local government council at the time of the 
end of the period of observation in July 1994, she, unlike most of the others, at least had two 
-'111 taped interview 28/3/94, brackets mine. 
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other thriving outlets in Lagos. 
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CASE 3 
MRS ADENIKE SOLUADE 
Mrs Soluade is a wealthy fifty three year old business woman who has been operating 
out of the same shop in Oke-Arin market, Lagos Island since 1976. She has been married 
for twenty nine years to a civil engineering contractor. She has four children. 
Her father is a retired railways employee and labour activist while her mother is also 
retired after many years as a school teacher and administrator. Soluade studied secretarial 
administration at the Yaba College of Technology in Lagos, from where she graduated with 
a national diploma, and held various secretarial posts between 1966 and 1975, eventually 
rising to become first, confidential secretary, then personal assistant to the chief executive 
of the oil company where she worked. This* meant spending long hours away from her 
husband and two young children, and it was dissatisfaction with this state of affairs that 
eventually led to her leping paid employment'. When an opportunity arose in 1975 to take 
voluntary redundancy, She took it. 
She initially invested N500, which her husband gave her, in a p&ty trading business, 
for want of something to do, which paid for six months' rent of a stall at Sabo market and 
a few "provisions". She recalls now that at the time, she never felt cut-out for "sitting behind 
any stall" and in fact only intended to continue as a petty trader while she looked for a job 
which offered more convenient working hours than her. lirevious job. She was specifically 
looking for a job as a secretary/typist or receptionist in a school. Her plan was to then take 
the job and find someone to look after the shop and earn some extra money. It took her 
longer than she expected to find die kind of job she wanted, and by the time the job offer 
was actually made, she had made tip my mind to concentrate her energy, and invest more 
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money in her trade. 
In 1976, she move to her present shop in Oke-Arin market. SýZ--put in another N500, 
almost all that was remaining of her redundancy payout. In her early days, she used to buy 
her wares from wholesalers located in Oke-Arin market where she herself was now based, 
or in nearby Tinubu and Idumota markets. She would buy quantities, mostly of powdered and 
condensed milk, sardines, sugar, tea, coffee, chocolate drinks, corned beef, baked beans, 
canned salads, fruit cocktails, and other "provisions". 
Her business grew over the next five years, and her husband became increasingly 
well-known in political circles as Nigeria moved towards its second republic5O2. This 
combination, as well as letters of introduction from her husband's well-connected political 
friends, enabled her to apply to be a distributor for some manufacturing companies, including 
Lever Brothers (Nig) Ltd, where eventually, ýhe was successful. This was in 1980, and she 
was suddenly a major player in Oke-Arin market, the largest "provisions" market in Lagos, 
and the nerve centre of, the West African cro's's border trade in household consurnables. 
Throughout the 1980s, Soluade reduced her range of goods while she worked hard 
on increasing her distributorships, with the result that more than 80% of her turnover in 
recent times have come from wholesale trade. She is a distributor for six leading 
manufacturers of household consurnables, namely, Cadbury-Schweppes, Nigerip Vegetable 
Oil, Cocoa Industries Limited, Unilever, Nestle, and West African Milk Company. She 
operates out of her twelve square feet shop and a garage7warehouse at her Ikoyi home. 
Although Soluade had been a questionnaire respondent back in February 1994, my 
observation period with her was for five months from March until the beginning of August 
1994.1 worked with her in three hour shifts for three or four days each week, until the days 
5112 Oct Ist 1979 - Dee 31st 1983 
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and times became staggered by the political crises which intensified in July 1994. She also 
took me on a tour of the market, during which time, I was introducedlo -the owner-managers 
of some other distributorships and sub-distributorships in the market. I sometimes also went 
with her to her suppliers to obtain or query supplies. Usually though, I stayed in her shop 
with her and two assistants, or went out with th6 other six assistants who were stationed in 
other parts of the market. They worked in teams of two, and their job, essentially, was to 
solicit for business. 
One way they did this was to go into the huge motor park adjoining the market and 
approach drivers of parked motor cars, commuter vans, and especially, the trailers that 
appear to come from, or are bound for various West African destinations. A section of this 
motor park is filled exclusively with commercial vehicles bound mainly for Cotonou, Lome, 
Accra, and Abidjan. This is where the assistants concentrate their efforts, and in the times 
that I spent with them, it was not unusual to find potential buyers as early as 7 a. m, having 
arrived the previous night, waiting to be "found" by sales persons such as the ones I 
sometimes worked with. It was not always necessary to approach the principals directly. 
Sometimes, it sufficed simply to make the acquaintance of the drivers of the conunercial 
vehicles. The drivers would then infonn the sales teams of their businesses in the market, 
and in particular, inform the sales assistants where their principals may be found and what 
they are buying. 
Another way was simply to approach people directly if they thought such people were 
potential bulk purchasers. They would hand out Soluade's business card to interested persons 
and direct them to the shop. Sometimes they would recognize old customers and try to get 
them to make repent purchases. 
In these ways, Soluade carries on steady trade with businessmen and women from all 
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over West Africa, as well as Cameroun and Sudan. She herself does no travelling in 
pursuance of her business, but maintains telephone contacts with sor&-fayoured customers. 
About three quarters of the space in the shop is taken up by cartons of her wares and 
an "office" space she has carved out for herself and her customers. The shop has been 
somewhat extended by a canopy which is attached *to the front of the shop. Under this canopy 
is the stall where she carries on her comparatively modest retail trade. Her two assistants 
usually sit by this stall from where they call out to potential passing customers, and at least 
one of them will always get up to assist Soluade whenever a customer comes into the shop. 
Soluade is pleased with her assistants' collective inputs and puts this down to not employing 
relatives, who she has found in the past to tend to take their wages for granted. She described 
some of her past employee-relatives as incompetent, lazy, and even corrupt. She says she has 
since learnt her lesson and her present team had to go through a rigorous selection process. 
In return, she pays them nearly twice what, in my experience, was the going rate. 
Soluade's business is legitimately regiýtered. She recalls that she only did so to 
comply with her husbaAd's wishes in 1978 wýenhis political career was taking off. These 
days, her business affairs are handled by the same firm, owned by her husband's friend, 
which also handles her husband's affairs. 
She says that since 1991/1992, she has been intensifying her efforts to find regular 
buyers for her products from outside Nigeria to compensate for falling sales in Nigeria; she 
has started to sell products to sub-distributors and retailers on credit, still something of a 
novelty in Nigeria. She purchased a pick-up van in 1993 for the sole use of her assistants. 
In groups of two at a time, they fill up the van with her products and drive from one retailer 
to another, all over Lagos, offering to sell goods to them. She is courting other distributors 
rrom Northern Nigeria with a view to becoming their Lagos supplier, and she has taken her 
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first steps in becoming involved in used car importation from western Europe. 
All of the above have contributed to her turnover leaping fR6in. N4 million in 1992 
to nearly N6 million in 1993. She estimates that about 30% of all her sales are of goods that 
will end up outside Nigeria. She also makes about E5000 per annum. from modest, but steady 
exports of popular local beverages to Britain ana Gennany. 
About half of the money Soluade makes in this way is now ploughed into her new car 
importation business. The remainder is made up by her British-based eldest son who also 
travels to Germany or Belgium where he purchases used cars and arranges their shipment to 
Nigeria. She expects to earn N1 million annuallY from this for the partnership. 
Soluade also imports preservatives like marmalade, jam and honey from Britain, but 
this arm of her business is by no means steady. She told me that in order to pay her British 
suppliers, she has to purchase sterling from one of the dozens of illegal currency traffickers 
situated within a few hundred yards of her shop. She waits until the informal exchange rate 
is "favourable" before ipaking her purchase. This means that she sometimes misses deadlines 
to meet particular shipffients, but she regards this as an unavoidable price. She says she tried 
several times to obtain foreign exchange from banks without success irf the early days of the 
SAP. This became easier, albeit more expensive when full deregulation went ahead early in 
1992 and she was able to purchase foreign exchange as required from bureaux de change. 
But when die foreign exchange regulations were changed yet again with the 1994 budget, the 
bureaux closed down, she subsequently went back in die position of having to purchase her 
foreign exchange requirements in the black markeO". Now she says she will not even 
"I, ' it is perhaps worth noting once again at this juncture that new foreign exchange 
regulations, partially deregulating foreign exchange management in the economy, were 
passed with [lie 1995 budget (following the conclusion of the field study), and consolidated 
in the 1996 budget. 
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bother trying official channels for her foreign exchange needs as she considers it a waste of 
time. 
I once told Soluade that I thought she took incredible risks, bearing in mind the 
uncertainty of the environment she operated in, but she disagreed. She pointed out that even 
when she first started, she was afraid to comriiit her entire redundancy payment to the 
business in case it failed. She said many times she was not "materialist", did not feel a 
compulsive need to make money, and certainly would not commit her money to a project 
whose success she is not convinced of. Having said that, not every venture she has embarked 
on has been a resounding success. In 1988, she was appointed a distributor for Nigerian 
Bottling Company (makers of Cocacola), but she says now that it was not an ideal business 
to operate ftom her Oke-Arin base. It was a venture for which she realized that she needed 
more floor space than she has at Oke-Arin, but she was unwilling to give up her outlet there 
because it is one that she attaches great value to. She did ilot want to set up separate premises 
either just for this purpose as she did not feel she would be able to devote the time necessary 
to manage it properly. 'She finally gave up- the distributorship in 1992. Still, she does not 
really see herself as a risk taker: 
"If I was... I would have left Oke-Arin many years ago where God has been blessing 
me, and gone to one of those shops I've been offered at Surulere (a mostly-smart 
Lagos suburb), or even one thousand and four (residential estate on the exclusive 
Victoria Island, Lagos)... How many people will I go and explain to if it all fails? At 
my age? Won't people say I brought it on myself?... even my husband has been 
saying that what fits me is one of those large supermarkets, but I won't attempt more 
than I can handle. May God continue to protect us here. The few pennies I make at 
this business are enough for me. Isn't it all about feeding and clothing 
oneself?... "" 
"I taped interview 20/6/94, brackets mine 
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CASE 4 
RENA PRODUCTS LIMITED: Mr Uzoma Agoha (6fter-Manager). 
Uzoma Agoha is 38 years old. He has a wife and three children. Straight after he 
obtained a business administration degree from the University of Port-Harcourt in 1981, he 
moved to Lagos, and was employed by the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry 
(NBCI). 
The NBCI is the bank through which the Federal Goverment of Nigeria channels 
loans to SMEs. In furtherance of this function, the bank also runs several workshops and 
programmes designed, among other reasons, to help indigenous entrepreneurs prepare proper 
business plans, improve (formalize) their management practices, make judicious use of any 
grants or loans and generally run their businesses more efficiently. One of such programmes, 
and the one which Agoha himself worked on, was the work-for-yourself progranune 
(WFYP). 
The WFYP whs adapted from a-programme originally developed in Durham 
University, England, and focused on helping would-be entrepreneurs, particularly those 
wishing to engage in manufacturing, start up their businesses. At the end of each programme, 
the trainee-participants would, based on what they learnt on the progranu-ne, present a 
business plan to a panel of assessors, mainly bank evaluators, who would decide whether, 
and to what level the bank would finance the project. Agolia was on such a panel and toured 
the country carrying out this function. 
It was on one of these trips that a long held idea finally crystallized in his mind, and 
lie decided to apply to become a participant himself, rather than an assessor on a particular 
programme in 1990. He presented his business plan at die end of the programme in the name 
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of Rena Products Ltd, a firm he had incorporated earlier in 1989, but which was not carrying 
on any trade at the time. The NBCI eventually agreed to provide a'kft. loan which funded 
65% of the N1.5 million required to start the business. 
Agoha-did not immediately resign his bank appointment although he was actively 
taking steps to start off the business. For the firk year of its operation, his wife served as 
the firm's managing director. After this period, Agoha himself took over as managing 
director & chief executive officer (MD & CEO) while his wife became Deputy CEO 
(DCEO), with main responsibility for the firm's supplies. The firm employs fourteen people 
and manufactures plastics products - mainly household items, educational toys and cosmetic 
jars. 
Turnover has risen, but not uniformly, since operations commenced. In 1991, its first 
full year, turnover was N230,000, rising to N1.1 million in 1992, but falling back to 
N880,000 in 1993. Around N1.5 million was forecast f9r 1994. By selling to anyone who 
walks through its doors. pnd not imposing a minimum order quantity, Rena does a lot of retail 
trade, although towardt the end of 1994, the finn began to take steps to concentrate solely 
on wholesale trade. My ad-hoc survey of May 1994 revealed that 27.8 % of Rena's turnover, 
rather lower than the finn itself thought, can be classified as retail trade. Although unit sales 
have fallen and risen with Rena's turnover, Agoha is particularly proud of his finn's 
utilization of installed machinery. It was 40% in 1991, but is now, at 72%, nearly twice as 
high as the national average. The firni's factory is on the ground floor of the Rena office 
complex. It has two central pieces of machinery working alternate twelve hour shifts from 
nionday through saturday. 
My time with the firm lasted from the end of February to mid-August 1994.1 
assisted in the plant supervisor's off-ice on tuesdays, thursdays and saturdays with stock 
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control duties, and with buyers whenever they came to the office, which was anytime. Rm 
Products is located inside the Lagos Small Scale Industrial Estate, Maori. The estate also 
houses the Lagos state branch offices of the National Association of Small Scale Industrialists 
(NASSI), of which Agoha is an active member. Although Rena is the only plastics 
manufacturer located in the industrial estate, theie are several other plastics manufacturers 
in the Matori area. The CEO told me once that he had himself decided on entering the 
plastics industry mainly because he believed it to be relatively easy to understand and procure 
materials for. It also happened, at the time, to be a fast growing industry. It is still growing, 
but at an apparently slower pace, hence Agoha's efforts, first to secure long term contracts 
for the supply of cosmetic jars to large scale beauty products manufacturers, and secondly, 
to explore means by which his firm can commence the production of plastic domestic water 
reservoirs, which is currently A fast-growing sub-sector in Nigeria. The second matter will 
require a large capital injection and a second site before production can commence. So far, 
the firm has been able, to source its raw irýdterials and machinery entirely from within 
Nigeria. This helped kdep its set-up, and runn, mg, costs relatively low for a firm of its size, 
and was a plus point for the firm when it was still seeking its initial capital from NBCL To 
expand its operations would change this picture, hence the banks' present unease to finance 
die expansion. As at the time the observation period ended in July 1994, nothing had been 
settled, but various negotiations were in progress, particularly with the NBCL 
The firm's operations centre around its founder who, for the time being, apart from 
his duties as CEO, also functions as the de facto general manager, marketing manager, 
accounts manager and public relations officer. Apart from the CEO and his wife, there is 
virtually no other worker in the firm who can be classified as senior staff. The CEO takes 
all major decisions affecting the firm while his wife's main executive duties presently seem 
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to consist of keeping the firm's supply lines open, and trying to reorganize the firm's 
unordered sales system. Presently, there is a simple "first come, first"Served" system which 
has led to some delivery problems. 
The Finn produces almost entirely for a clientele based in the nearby Mushin and 
Oshodi markets. I spoke to several of the firm's'customers in the periods that I was there, 
and most of those who indicated that they would resell the products had come from those two 
markets. Buyers generally pick up their own purchases, but in some instances, Rena will 
arrange to deliver special orders. For instance, the firm does considerable business producing 
plastic crockery on order for special occasions such as weddings and funerals. It offers free 
delivery in these circumstances. These types of orders are usually unsolicited, and there are 
usually no more than one or two of them every month. 
The Rena CEO, unlike the DCEO, is personally unenthusiastic about foreign trade, 
which he describes as "risky", although he recognizes thqt it is an exploitable avenue for his 
firm, and is taking steps in that direction. "He is particularly anxious for the line of 
"educational toys" to be an international succes's because he designed all of them himself. He 
told me lie would get a great deal of personal satisfaction out of that. - 
According to the CEO, he would much rather prefer to concentrate his selling efforts 
on the Nigerian market, but he has felt compelled to look to foreign markets because of the 
continuing weakening of the Nigerian economy which has occasioned Nigerian consumers' 
seeming apathy towards leisure and/or luxury purchas6s like childrens' toys. He finds 
overseas marketing risky because he believes he does not have as much information as he 
should to compete effectively in it (such as trade journals, databases, information about new 
product developments and prices, and so forth), although he considers himself a risk-taker 
because, otherwise, as lie said, lie would not have left his good job at the bank, with all his 
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perks to set up his business. 
Although the DCEO, in particular, has been attending trade fii`ts, throughout Nigeria 
and West Africa with an eye to exporting since 1992, Rena Products only began to take 
definitive steps early in 1994 to internationalize its operations. These, so far, are limited to 
the ECOWAS market. There are no immediate plýns to take it beyond. The CEO himself led 
the firm to a series of trade fairs in Nigeria, the Republic of Benin, Ghana, Sierra-Leone and 
Ivory coast between November 1993 and February 1994 where the firm exhibited its line of 
educational toys, especially the "Renablock" series which consists of a range of toys from 
a variation of the popular lego kids' blocks, to plastic dolls, and also a version of the rubik's 
cube. These generated a great deal of interest and led to some export sales in 1994, although 
not as much as had been hoped. 
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CASE 5 
JIMSINA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED: Mr Adebayo Salaw-u'*10-wner-Manager). 
Adebayo Salawu is the Chairman/Managing Director (C/MD)of Jimsina International, 
a business group with interests in informatiod technology, manufacturing, farming and 
commodity trading. Although 10% of the shares are registered in his wife's name, this is in 
fact merely aesthetic. She takes no part in running the business, and so, Mr Salawu is to all 
intents, the sole owner of the firm. He is a very successftil businessman, and his is a classic 
rags to riches tale. 
He was born into a humble home of farmers in Okaka, near Iseyin (about 200 miles 
north of Lagos) where he was required to combine his studies with helping out his parents 
on the farm. He says however that he was never given the impression that his work on the 
I 
fann was an apprenticeship, unlike with his siblings. It. was always recognized within the 
family that lie would st4y on in school. He wýs a bright student, an ability which, after his 
studies in Nigeria, a1scP won him a scholarship that took him to Oklahoma State University, 
where lie graduated in business studies. He further obtained an MBA before returning to 
Nigeria in 1987 with a strong desire to be successful in business. 
Influenced by his parents, who ran their own farms in an otherwise largely migrant 
farming community, Salawu had always wanted to be his own boss. But he did not enjoy the 
toiling on the farms and had therefore made up his mind at a young age that lie was going 
to be instead like sonle of the businessmen who arrived in cars to purchase his parents' 
produce. 
Salawu had been impressed during his studies in America by what he calls the 
"economici of* capitalism", and even more so by computer technology, which, was now 
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apparent to him as still being in its earliest stages in Nigeria. The technology and market 
could only grow, and he wanted to have been established in it when 
I ii'ý, "tarted to. He targeted 
computer sales/service, and computerized secretarial services. He incorporated Jimsina 
International in New York City, and on his return to Nigeria, he prepared a business plan, 
which he presented at several banks, along ýdth a loan application. His plans were 
commended, but loan applications turned down for lack of collateral. In the meantime, he 
took on employment as a bank administrator. He was eventually able to obtain his loan 
requirement of N1.3 million in 1989 from Ultimate Finance Company, a private financial 
organization in Lagos, with which he incorporated and commenced the operations of Jimsina 
International in Lagos. At its inception, the firm employed, apart from the C/MD, a 
secretary, a part-time accountant, and a lawyer on retainership. 
Jimsina International has been involved*in export trading from its very beginning, and 
only developed a home market after its successes ab. road.. When I asked him why he appears 
to have gone against the grain in the internýflonalization process, he replied that he had 
simply gone where he 6elieved the rewards to be greatest at the time, and he did not believe 
it to be so unusual, afterall, firms specifically established to take part in the Import/Export 
trade abound in Lagos. 
The firm's initial business was the importation of computers (including software 
packages), raw cotton fibre and a host of exotic household items such as automatic garage 
door openers. A few months after incorporation, Jimsina extended its business to include the 
exportation of various agricultural produce, especially cocoa and coffee, using the C/MD's 
family's extensive connections among the farming communities of Iseyin and environs in Oyo 
state, as well as some other areas of Ondo state. The firm's increasing difficulties in 
obtaining foreign exchange on the government-run foreign exchange market (FE-M) needed 
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to import cotton fibre led the firm to commence the production of its own raw cotton fibre 
on a 2,000 acre farm (Sinafann [Nig] Ltd), and eventually proc'elsing the cotton fibre 
(SinaCott [Nig] Ltd) both for export and for sale to leading Nigerian textile manufacturers 
like Nichemtex, Globespin, Spintex mills, and others. Sinafarm currently produces in excess 
of 5,000 tonnes of raw cotton per annum, whicfi now reportedly makes it one of Nigeria's 
largest producer and exporter of raw cotton. 
Jimsina International has grown, in five years, into a conglomerate with an asset base 
of N10 million, and a 1993 record turnover of N601 milliodO5. Unlike most of the other 
firms that I had contacts with, khose turnover increases were due mainly to inflation and not 
unit sales, Jimsina was actually achieving impressive growth in unit sales year after year, 
which has unavoidably been made to look even more impressive by Nigeria's high inflation 
rate. Prior to the political turmoil that engulfed Nigeria for much of 1994, the firm was 
confident enough to predict a 40% sales growth for that year. Although the crises will have 
almost certainly made that target unattainabld, * the firm is obviously still growing. 
Salawu now ovhis five firms which cah be regarded as part of the Jimsina Group. It 
is run in an informal "holding company - subsidiary" manner, with Jiffisina International as 
the holding company, although each of the firms is independently incorporated. 
Apart from Sinafarm and SinaCott, the Jimsina Group (so to speak) also includes 
Sina706 Oil, which is involved in the distribution and selling of fuel and petroleum products. 
-105 Some of this turnover has been calculated from a straight conversion of the firm's 
foreign exchange earnings, calculated at deregulated 1993 rates of N50: $I. I was never able 
to confirm the exact proportion of JimSina's earnings that was paid for in foreign exchange, 
but it was generally estimated to be about 60% (that is about the equivalent of $3.5 million). 
With tile official rates becoming fixed from 1994 at N22: US$I, one would expect that 
Jimsina's overall (Naira) turnover for 1994 would fall, seeing as the firm is most likely to 
use the official rates to convert its overseas earnings for repatriation purposes, even if only 
to reduce its corporate tax liability. 
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All three concerns are located in and around the C/MD's hometown of Okaka, partly , 
according to him, because land and labour are easily and cheapiy-avgilable, and partly 
because of his desire "to ... make my village look like Lagos"". The Jimsina International 
office, where the C/MD himself is based is in Lagos. It also houses the firm's business 
centre, as well as its computer sales and servide division, and computer training centre. 
Jimsina International (New York) is staffed by a solitary manager whose job mainly involves 
initiating new business and co-ordinating funds transfer. The latest addition to the group is 
SinaSpin International limited. Its factory/office is in the high-brow Agbara Industrial estate 
in Ogun state. In this factory, the firm will spin and process cotton mainly for export. It was 
expected to have gone into production by the end of 1994. 
I studied die activities of Jimsina for four and a half months between March and July, 
1994.1 was in the off-ice almost everyday for about two to three hours, and generally assisted 
in the sales and legal departments. Three times Imet the C/MD at his Ogudu home for 
formal, unstructured inferviews, but more often around his offices for, usually, informal 
chats. 
Despite the size that the Jimsina Group has grown into, Adesina Salawu sits firraly 
-it the top of the corporate tree. He takes all major decisions in Jimsina International as well 
as in the four other members of the Group from his Lagos office, although he pays 
occasional visits to all the firins' sites. All the firms' divisions and offices have General 
Managers who run their day to day affairs. It is in overseas trade matters that the C/MD 
most exhibits a hands-on npproach. Jimsina International effectively operates the exporting 
side of the business for all the firnis in the group. 
There are thirty managerial staff, who oversee about three hundred other staff, a 
51", Taped interview 15/5/94 
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number that rises to over one thousand at peak harvesting periods. It is a team that appears 
to place more of a premium on diligence and compliance over inkfativP. It is a relatively 
young management team, the C/MD having personally recruited many of them straight from 
University or Polytechnic. The Management team seems terribly impressed with its boss, and 
some of the managers' comments bordered on hero-worship. All fourteen that I spoke to 
generally said they were most impressed by the C/MD's energy and enthusiasm. They were 
happy with their pay and genuinely felt the company belonged to them. 
The C/MD himself says he works hard at reminding his managers how invaluable 
their contribution is to the firm's success. He has no immediate plans for the firm to go 
public. 
Jimsina's initial involvement in overseas trade was with the USA. Then followed 
Canada, Britain, and some Asian countries. -The firm has only done steady exporting to 
ECOWAS countries, as well as Cameroun since 1993. This is however on a comparatively 
small scale. There are qo plans as yet to expafid the trade to the rest of Africa, although the 
firm would be able to Ineet any order that doe: s arise from there, even at this time, as one 
of the export managers said. 
The C/MD once explained that the fin-n had attempted to make inroads into the West 
African market back in 1990, but had been frustrated by high custom tariffs, the language 
barrier and most importantly, by the inability of many potential customers in these countries 
to pay for their purchases in hard currency. He had therefore decided at the time that they 
would concentrate on the markets which could. However, early in 1993, the firm attended 
trade fairs in Dakar, Senegal and Abidjan, Iyory Coast through the C/MD's personal french 
contacts. These proved successful and led to a steady, but still somewhatad-hoc involvement . 
in cross-border exports to ECOWAS countries. 
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The firm has also made exploratory visits to Ghana, Guinea and Cameroun where 
there are potentially lucrative markets for raw and processed cotton. 'Although the firms still 
faces, in varying degrees, the same problems it did in 1990, it is currently mainly concerned 
with real and perceived transportation hazards, attributed mainly to customs personnel, armed 
robbers and bad roads. 
Towards the end of my observational period in July 1994, the finn began to consider 
selling off some of its trucks and switching over to shipping its West African exports, as it 
did most of its other exports. However, at that time, the Nigerian Ports employees were in 
the middle of a two month strike action, so no trial runs could be made. The fmn was also 
having trouble negotiating a financial arrangement with the Nigerian National Shipping Line 
(the national shipping carrier) that did not include advance payment for shipments in hard 
currency. 
Altogether, the firm finds it more straightforward and more rewarding to deal directly 
with Europe, America, and the Far East, and'so tends to focus more on those markets. 
Salawu is marriM with three children. Although he has achieved much, he is still only 
39. He describes himself as "a proud capitalist". He works from 7 a. ih till about 9 p. m on 
most days, for six days, although as often as practicable, he interrupts his days to say the 
five islamic daily prayers. He is nominally off on sundays. On this day, he may play tennis 
or squash in the afternoons. He closely follows international business news via newspapers 
like the European, and the London Financial Times, and more especially on die satellite T. V 
network which lie has installed at home and in his offices. 
Although the CIMD admits that lie took a risk in setting up Jimsina International, lie 
argues that setting tip , my business whatsoever is risky, especially bearing in mind Nigeria's 
economic climate. The country's weak, economy, and official corniption, more than his own 
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ability, were in fact his biggest worries once the loan needed to set up his business had been 
approved. But beyond this, he says he avoids taking risks as niuch as possible, and 
"certainly" does not see himself as a risk-taker over and above that which anyone in business 
undertakes. 
He says his days of doing business purelý for the rewards are over. He has as much 
interest in providing employment and contributing to the development of his home 
community and his country. He also said that after all the frustrations and disappointments 
he has had in selling cotton to West African markets, he ought to just simply ignore the 
market. But he believes many firms in these markets are being "over exploited" by the 
European and Asian finns that they deal with. He "knows" he can produce cotton that is at 
least of equal quality, for a lower price, and therefore feels that it is his "duty" to continue 
to do so. He recognises his finn as a market*leader, particularly in cotton production, and 
he feels this places a certain social responsibility gn hiM. 
Jimsina International was established 4i a time when the Nigerian economy was still 
reeling from the initial ýhocks brought about by the commencement of the government's SAP 
in 1986, and its exports are growing at a time when the economy as a whole appears to be 
suffering from under-investment which industrialists, Salawu included, generally tend to 
attribute to the government's inability to provide, on occasions, only about 15% of the 
amount demanded by industry at the government's bi-weekly foreign exchange auctions. 
Salawu is typically bullish about his continuing success. According to him, 
"for you to succeed in your business endeavour, you need to look deep. Put your 
imaginative foresight into motion, exploit every available opportunity, work and 
conquer with the guts of the lion. Nigeria has the largest black population and the 
largest market in Africa. So if you can't sell or make a business impact here, you 
can't sell anywhere... Good management is indispensable. You need to learn from 
experienced people with your own individualistic determination. Carry all your staff 
along and let them have a sense of belonging... Be a realist, as it is easy to get 
carried away by emotions. Be persistent and don't get bogged down by unfavourable 
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comments. And whatever your condition, never lose hope" 507. 
SW Taped interview 3/7/94 
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CASE 6 
LISABI MILLS (NIGERIA) LIMITED. 
Lisabi Mills is one of the oldest surviving indigenous manufacturing firms in Nigeria. 
It processes and manufactures foods and beveiages. Although it is no longer among the 
country's largest firms, it nevertheless remains successful. It makes many successful product 
lines, and one of its products, "Gold's custard" is the leading brand in the Nigerian custard 
market. 
The firm was formally incorporated in October 1939, although its proprietor is said 
to have been in active production for up to five years before actual incorporation. The firm 
remains a private limited company with no immediate plans to go public. In fact, it is in 
many respects, very much a family business. The shares are all held within the family. The 
widow of the original proprietor, while no longer, activq in the firm's affairs, remains the 
board chairman and managing director, whild her son and daughter respectively occupy the 
two all-important direclorships of corporate affairs and sales. They joined the firm straight 
after their degrees in 1974 and 1975 respectively. They are the oneg who really run the 
company, and their children are expected to continue to do so after them. 
The firm's business back in its early years was the processing of millet (Egusi). 
Essentially, the firm purchased harvested millet in bulk from farmers in many parts of 
western Nigeria. Its milling machines were then employdd to break individual millet shells 
and grind the millet so gathered into a powdered form in which theY could be cooked. 
Individual millets are only about an inch in diameter, and manually breaking off their shells 
in preparation for grinding is a process which then, as now, was a regular chore in most 
homes, but it is a long and tedious process. It is not unusual for a family to spend several 
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days breaking millet shells that would be ground and cooked for a single meal. The venture 
became a success, and the success was repeated when advancing technology enabled the firm, 
after World War II, to branch out into the processing of gari (cassava rnýal) and elubo (yam 
flour), both of which are staple foods in many parts of Nigeria. The firm eventually moved 
out of millet processing in order to increase its processing capacity for gari and elubo. There 
were not many competitors in Lisabi's early years, and although still relatively a small firm, 
it was successful enough to have had its first experience of exporting by the early 1960s, 
servicing a mainly Nigerian student clientele in the London and Liverpool areas in the U. K. 
The Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970 very badly affected the firm's activities, as 
it did most firms that depended upon farms for their raw materials. The period after the war 
saw a different market place where Lisabi virtually had to start from scratch like other new 
entrants to the market, and it is from this new beginning that it has developed into the 
business that it now is. 
I made initial contacts with Lisabi Mills in Januaiy 1994 through the sales manager. 
This proved to be most'useful as he is the one who deals with distributors on a daily basis. 
He is their initial contact in Lisabi Mills regarding any transaction with the firm and was able 
to bring in several of their distributors and subdistributors into the study at an early stage. 
Shortly afterwards, I was introduced to the sales director by a social acquaintance, and the 
director was the one who then arranged unlimited access to die firm's plants and offices. 
She, as a prominent member, indeed ex-official of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria 
(MAN), also made several useful introductions which helped the course of interviews with 
the OPS in the Lagos area. I remained with die firm, in the sales department, through to the 
end of June 1994, going into the firm almost everyday, usually for up to about three hours, 
although the tinies varied. I tried to be in every tuesday and thursday in the morning period, 
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which are distributors' collection days. Mondays were good for wandering around the firm 
itself to see the production process (as the plants and offices are conveniqntly located on the "i 
same premises) and chat to middle/junior level staff as the day was usually taken up by 
various committee meetings for the senior staff. Things invariably slowed down throughout 
the firm on most afternoons, and was thus the best time to get the attention of the sales 
manager and director for interviews. I therefore mostly juggled my times in the firm between 
those days and times. 
Lisabi Mills currently employs 151 personnel, but this number is increased during the 
harvesting season when extra hands are needed at the company farm near Abeokuta, Ogun 
state. The firm still processes cassava and yam flour, to which it has added com flour 
processing. It is also now a manufacturer of chocolate drinks, oatmeal (Pawa, wheat-o and 
muesli), custard in three different flavours (vanilla, Banana and chocolate), and since 1992, 
snacks and babyfoods. 
Its turnover incrqased every year for th6 seven years to 1993, achieving a N48 million 
turnover, and profits of N10 million in that y6r. These were expected to rise by up to 20% 
during 1994. The sales director however explained that this was largely due to inflationary 
trends. Overall unit sales have actually dropped in each of the last three years. 
Lisabi Mills' national spread, in tenns of its network of distributors, has been steadily 
shrinking over the last seven to ten years. It is increasingly looking like a Lagos-focused 
firm. Tile management blames this on the increasingly unstable business environment created 
by the federal government's foreign trade policies, particularly those to do with the 
importation of certain materials, and foreign exchange regulations. These affect production 
costs, and the firni now produces at about 38% of installed capacity. It is also an essentially 
ad-hoe production, and by extension, distribution systern. Their foreign exchange 
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requirements, which are obtained at the federal government's bi-weekly auctions, tend to 
come in fits, with a knock-on effect on production. They quite simp'l'y"Produce what they can, 
when they can, and although allocation papers are prepared for their distributors, most of the 
firm's sales takes place on a first come, first served basis. The firm even does a limited 
amount of retailing on its premises direct from its factory in an effort to boost sales. 
In my time with the firm, there were periods when the factory staff were idle because 
they were awaiting necessary materials from suppliers, who were in turn holding on to the 
supplies while they awaited payment by Lisabi Mills, who in turn were unable to pay because 
their allocation of foreign exchange had not yet come through. There were also times in 
which the factory staff would be working desperately to finish a production run while an 
anny of distributors literally waited outside the door to take delivery of the goods as they 
came off the line. Sometimes, I would ob9erve the sales manager explaining to angry 
distributors why they must purchase certain less. popular products, like the cereals for 
instance, "for the good., of the company", even' though the distributors did not require them. 
They would haggle back and forth until an a: gr6eable compromise was reached. The decrease 
in supply of the popular Gold custard to non-compliant distributors is, at times like this, 
usually held as a subtle threat when all else fails. 
Lisabi's problems with adequately servicing the national market has resulted in an 
over-reliance on die Lagos area market. The management does not accept that over-relying 
on the Lagos market contributed to the firni's inability 'to adequately service the national 
market in the first place, but admits the growing dependency anyway. According to the 
director of corporate affairs, more than 50% of the firm's annual turnover is made from sales 
to the "minor" distributors in the Lagos area. About 20% is made up of sales to other 
"minor" distributors and supermarket chains (such as A. G Leventis, and the United Trading 
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Company [UTC]) in the rest of the country, while medium/large scale dealers/distributors 
7 purchase the rest. Most of these latter fmns, such as G. B. Olivant, an'd. JQhn Holt (Ltd. ) are 
based in Lagos. It is from there that the goods make their way around the country. "Minor" 
distributors are so-called because they are mostly owner-managed sole proprietorships 
operating out of a single outlet. 
Interestingly, 65 % of Lisabi's so-called minor distributors are concentrated in Oke- 
Arin market in Lagos island, and while Lisabi is trying to develop other outlets in Lagos, 
it recognizes the importance of Oke-Arin as the leading "provisions" market in the country, 
and places a great premium on maintaining its share of the market there. But the firm is 
unlikely to be able to develop other substantial sales outlets in Lagos for as long as it does 
not actively seek to develop its sales outlets but instead relies on merely processing 
applications from enterprises acting on their own initiative. 
Not only does the Ifirm ultimately rely on its minor distributors to get its products to 
end users in Nigeria, it, also appears content -to rely on them to get its products to buyers 
outside Nigeria as well. ', Lisabi does not have an export department, or a manager specifically 
in charge of this market. It does list three distributors in its register of -distributors as being 
in charge of the overseas market. All three are thought to service the London market. The 
firm does not, in practice, have an export policy, although the firm's own notes on policy 
and strategy contain the following extracts: 
"... We view ECOWAS, Europe (EEC) and the'USA as separate export markets 
requiring varied and unique policies and approach. While work continues on the 
development of an export policy proper, we sliall continue to service the export 
market through local distributors. The distributors will be afforded all necessary 
support, until such a time as we establish our own export network""' 
Lisabi Mills is however, in spite of the rhetoric, at best a passive exporter. In spite 
"'I Lisabi Nfills MCA Policy and Strategy Update (1992: 4) 
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of statements expressing a wish to take a more active role in exporting ("... a well defined 
export policy, with us at its distribution nerve centre... "), in practice, "it. seems content to sell 
its products to its distributors, and let the goods make their own ways abroad by whatever 
means possible. Once, when I informed the sales manager that I had actually seen several 
Lisabi products in British and American shops, fie replied that he was aware their products 
were being exported by several minor distributors, and that the fkm would continue to look 
the other way until such a time as it deemed fit to formally join the process. 
Lisabi is similarly not directly involved in the cross-border trading in its products. 
Lagos is the centre of this trade, and it is mostly done from, as usual, Oke-Arin market, and 
also from Mushin, Jankara, Iddo, Alade markets, with a host of other markets serving as 
smaller depots. In these markets, traders from all over West Africa converge on the so-called 
minor distributors, and it is from these distributors that the foreign traders actually make 
their purchases. The Lisabi distributors who are involved in this trade say they sell more 
goods this way than if they actually tried to phyMcally transport the goods themselves to, say, 
Togo, themselves. They also say they have-been able to substantially increase their volume 
of trade in this manner since Lisabi introduced credit sales to some ofthem in 1992. 
The firm is, according to the sales manager, not sufficiently informed of the 
modalities of the West African cross-border trade to become directly involved in it. The 
market place is rather unpredictable, and this would make any planning impossible, 
particularly concerning pricing and delivery. They therefore consider it expedient, for the 
foreseeable ftiture, to leave this arm of marketing in the hands of those who can deal with 
it, that is, the market traders. They also do not wish to antagonize their distributors by 
appearing to compete with them for the ECOWAS market. 
nicir goal, "when the market permits it", is to be able, someday, to sell their 
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products in Western Europe and other wealthy countries which will earn them hard currency. 
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CASE 7 
NESTLE (NIGERIA) PLC. 
Nestle (Nig) PLC began operating in Nigeria in 1961, and is today one of Nigeria's 
most successful firms. It makes some of the nation's best known beverages (Nescafe, Nescao, 
Milo); babyfoods (Nutrend, Cerelac); breakfast cereals (Golden Mom); sweets (Choco-Milo); 
the Maggi series of seasonings, and various flavours of noodles. Although since the 
indegenization decrees of 1972 and 1977, Nestle has had 60% Nigerian ownership (more 
than 8,000 Nigerian shareholders), it still operates in many regards as the Nigerian arm of 
the Swiss-based multinational. The latter apparently wields considerable influence in the 
running of the Nigerian Nesde. 
It is run in a tight, professional manner; as one would expect with a firm of that size 
and tradition, wifli a board of directors, a myriad of national and regional sales managers and 
representatives, adminisption managers, accountants, and so forth. It employs more than 
one thousand people, ahd its turnover, which -has* enjoyed tremendous increases in recent 
years, attained a record N1.03 billion in 1993. In 1986, the turnover had been a 
comparatively modest N96.1 million. This figure however, according to the National Sales 
Manager (NSM), merely reflects the hyper inflationary trends in the Nigerian economy 
because unit sales had more or less stagnated in the previous three to four years. 
Nestle remains prominent in the minds of Nigerians as a result of its series of 
television and radio commercials which advertise its many products, usually one at a time. 
It also has a high profile involvement in the sponsorship of sporting personalities and events 
nationwide, as well as television programmes and other televised, events. 
The company's head office is situated in Ilupeju industrial estate in Lagos, which also 
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doubles as the Lagos area distribution centre. The firin has got two factory sites located in 
Sango-Otta, and the high-brow Agbara industrial estate, both in Ogun""Mate. Nestle's original 
product lines of Nescafe and Maggi stock cubes were simply an adoption of its parent 
company's products, but over the years, the Nigerian subsidiary has developed several new 
products. In April 1994, during the course of the field-study, the finn launched its latest 
product - the Maggi Noodles, with much fanfare. 
My period of observation lasted from February to August 1994, and in this period, 
I was attached to the Lagos area sales office, and in particular to a veteran sales 
representative. I went in to the head, and Lagos area offices nearly everyday for varying 
lengths of time. The sales representative and I made several sales and distribution trips to his 
regular beat of Oke-Arin market, as well as some large distributorships and supermarket 
chains on Lagos Island. For the month of April 1994, we also added Mushin and Alade 
markets, as well as Surulere based supermarkets to our. beat in order to cover for another 
team broken up by holijay and illness. In addition, I visited the firm's factories at Agbara 
and Sango-Otta. 
Nestle's factories run twenty four-hour production shifts and the-firm has distribution 
centres all over Nigeria. It also maintains several farms managed through its subsidiary, 
Agro-Development (Nigeria) Limited, from which it obtains some of its raw materials. Since 
1985, its Sorghum and Soya Beans farm has expanded from fifty hectares to more than eight 
hundred, underlying the firm's new strategy emphasizing the local sourcing of raw materials. 
Nestle now obtains more than 50% of its Sorghum requirements for the manufacture of 
Nuti-end and Cerelac from its farms, and purchases the rest from small scale farmers to 
whom it supplies seeds, fertilizer and technical advice. Most of its new products such as 
Nutrend and Nescao now have up to 80% local sourcing. The firm sub-contracts die 
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manufacture of some of its packaging materials to other Nigerian manufacturers. For its 
overseas supplies, such as certain chemicals and machine spare partsý, -it! i first port of call is 
the Nestle headquarters in Switzerland. The parent company may either sell the required part 
to Nestle (Nigeria), or refer it to a specific place to make the purchase. For instance, when 
in 1992, Nestle (Nigeria) approached the parent cdmpany about its need for coffee beans with 
which to make nescafe, it was instead directed to import the finished product from the 
Ivorien subsidiary. 
Nestle's largest market is the Lagos market. It has more than two hundred distributors 
and subdistributors in the Lagos area alone. They can be found in virtually all the major 
markets in Lagos - Ikeja, Mushin, Oke-Arin, Oshodi and others. Some are supermarket 
chains - U. T. C, A. G Leventis, Bisket, Dominoes, and some are professional distributors - 
John Holt, G. B Ollivant, Al-WaJun, and so on. In February 1994, the firm held an "open 
day" for about five hundred of its distributors nationwide, in which the latter were invited 
to Lagos on an all-expepses paid trip to hold frank discussions with the management on all 
that they felt was right and wrong with the company, especially its distribution system. The 
problems most aired did not have to do with the distribution process per se, but with the fact 
and timing of price increases on the one hand, and wanting the firm to take a more decisive 
role in enforcing its recommended retail prices, and so discourage unfair competition. 
The company's policy is to allocate individual sales persons or teams to a particular 
geographical area over a long period of time, and take advantage of the familiarity that this 
brings. For instance, the sales representative that I was attached to had been with the firm 
for sixteen years and was only in his third beat. He was in his sixth year on his current beat, 
and had been in the one before that for eight years. The traders I spoke to claimed to enjoy 
a more efficient service from Nestle than from most other manufacturers. Despite the large 
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number of distributors that Nestle already has, there are always several hundred more 
applying or re-applying to become distributors. It can be difficult, a6oor4ing to the SAM to 
keep a strict control on the numbers of distributors that the firm has. 
Nestle (Nigeria) does not yet do any considerable direct selling outside Nigeria. Until 
1993, it was not even a strategy that the firm wds inclined to pursue at all, and the main 
reason, according to the NSM was that there was no incentive to do this as Nestle was 
already present in all parts of the world. There was nothing that Nestle (Nigeria) would want 
to export that could not be found in the local markets. 
However, Nestle (Nigeria) is significantly larger than most of the other African 
subsidiaries, and fairly regularly, there are instructions from the parent firm to make up 
production shortfalls in those subsidiaries. I noticed on my travels that several of the most 
popular beverages on urban market stalls in many parts of West Africa were made by Nestle 
(Nigeria). Some of its other products, especially its seasonings and babyfoods are also 
mainstays of the cross-bprder trade. The CEO admits as much, and says that this is why, 
since 1993, talks have been held with the parent Nestle, as Well as the subsidiaries in Ghana 
and the Ivory coast on how the intra-regional distribution of all Nestle? s products in West 
Africa can be best managed. 
In spite of these talks, Nestle (Nigeria) is decidedly reluctant to pursue an export 
policy. According to the SAM, it will be an expensive and complex situation which is not 
even guaranteed to significantly increase die firm's sales. There is no assurance that the firin 
will sell enough units abroad to justify the investment which such a move would need. In the 
NSNI's opinion, the firm is already selling roughly as much as it produces to its distributors 
in Nigeria, and so has no need to export. The CEO argues further that Nestle is aware, in 
any case, that many of its distributors all over Nigeria are actively involved in the exporting 
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of its products. Cameroun, for instance, is serviced by dealers in Cross river state; Towns 
in Sokoto, Kano, Katsina and Bomu states service the Niger Repuýliý, --, Sýdan and the Chad 
Republic, while Lagos and Idi-Iroko are very important centres for the distribution of the 
firm's products across west Africa. Some of Nestle's market trader distributors that I spoke 
to not only confirmed their involvement in cross-border exporting of Nestle products, but 
described in addition how they were exporting some of these products to more seemingly 
unusual destinations like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Western Europe. 
My conversations with Nestle's senior managers brought out two major themes 
concerning the firm's trading difficulties. One has to do with the Nigerian political 
envirorunent. Three of Nigeria's four govermnents of the last ten years have gone into power 
via military coups. Even the present government has existed amidst rumour of coups and 
counter coups. Each of the governments has invariably overturned the trade policies of its 
predecessor. The uncertainties and turnarounds that have dominated Nigerian politics and 
economics, particularly &ce 1992/93 have made any sort of planning virtually-impossible 
for die firm. Because bf these, obtaining foreign bank credit is almost impossible now, 
according to the CEO. The senior managers that I spoke to are in no doubt that they are in 
a risky business. 
The second theme, leading from the first, has to do with obtaining foreign exchange. 
This is necessary in order to procure certain raw materials and machine parts. At the time 
of the fieldwork in 1994, firins could (once again) only. purchase foreign exchange in an 
auction systern, and there were no longer any guarantees that any firm will receive all, or 
sometimes, even any of its foreign exchange requirements. Unlike most firms which can 
easily obtain foreign exchange on the black market, albeit at a much more expensive rate, 
the SAM told me his firm cannot. A firm of their stature, lie said, cannot afford to take the 
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risk of running foul of the law under any circumstances, and so they can oiýy keep trying 
to purchase their needs from the government's auction, however rfiuchnonsense it makes of 
their strategic/production planning. 
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APPENDIX B 
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION FROM UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING. 
Director: Professor Michael Scott 
Scottish Amicable Professor of Entrepreneurial Studies 
SCOTTISH ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION 
UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING 
STIRLING. SCOTLAND FK9 4LA 
TELEPHONE: (0786) 473171 
SEF FAX: 0766 450201 
DIRECT LINE NUMBER: 
TO WHOM rr MAY CONCUR 
This letter confirms that Mr Akin Fadahunsi is studying at the University of Stirling for his doctorate (PhD) 
in Small Business Studies. 
He is studying the exporting behaviour and practice of small firms and traders between Nigeria and its 
African neighbours. lie will be in Africa collecting information for his study from January to December 
1994. 
Your help wHl be very much appreciated. 
Yours sincerely 
pjýý 
Dr Peter Rosa 
Director of Postgraciuitc-4esearch Studies 
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APPENDIX C 
RESPONDENTS' INSTRUCTIONS NOTE. 
Dear Respondent, 
* The questionnaire begins on the following page. 
* Each question has clear instructions indicating the type of response required. 
* Please answer all questions as far as possible. Ifyou are unable to answer any question, 
or you feel it is inapplicable to your situation, please skip the question and move on to 
subsequent questions. 
* You do not need to putyour name on this questionnaire, andyour answers will be treated 
in the strictest confidence. 
* There are no correct answers to the questions asked. What counts is your opinion, given 
in the light of your personal eiperience. This- will be greatly appreciated. 
Thank you for your help. 
Akin Fadahunsi 
December 1993. 
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APPENDIX Di: 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NIANUFACTURING FIRMS. 
SECTION A: NATURE, OF THE FIRM. 
1. Approximately how many years has your firm been carrying on business? 
Years 
2. What is the ownership status of your firm? 
Please tick one box only. 
Sole Proprietorship 1 
Partnership 2 
Private-Limited Company 3 
Public-Limited Company 4 
Cooperative 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below: 
3. How many people are presently employed iii the eirm, including yourself? 
N 
4. Please write down your firm's main products (maximum 10). 
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5. Why have you selected these product lines? 
Please tick applicable boxes (maximum 3). 
Little or no competition I 
Government backing/encouragement 2 
Previous association or employment 
in similar or related activity 3 
Higher prof-it margins 4 
Existence of similar businesses in 
neighbourhood 5 
No difficulty in securing marketing 
or technical knowhow 6 
Raw materials/resources are easy/cheap 
to obtain 7 
Other 8 
If you ticked box 8, please specify below. 
6. What are your firm's main activities? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Manufacturing 1 
Farming 2 
Transportation 3 
Packaging 4 
Wholesaling/Distributorship 5 
Retailing 6 
Other 7 
If you ticked box 7, please specify below: 
7. Please indicate below the range of your firm's gross annual turnover for the years 1991 
to 1993. 
1991 1992 1993 
NI million or less 1 1 .I NI million - N5 million 2 2 2 
N5 million - NIO million 3 3 3 
NIO million - N20 million 4 4 4 
N20 million - N50 million 5 5 5 
N50 million - MOO million 6 6 6 
MOO million or more 7 7 7 
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8. Why have you selected your present location? 
Please tick applicable boxes (maximum 3). 
Advice of Family/Relatives/Friends 1 
Availability of Und or Premises in the location 2 
Nearness to Suppliers/Raw Materials 3 
Nearness to Customers 4 
Nearness to Hometown or Place of Residence - 5 
Existence of similar Units in the neighbourhood 6 
Non Existence of similar Units in the neighbourhood 7 
Good Infrastructural Facilities 
(eg Transport, Electricity, Water) 8 
Government Recommendation/Encouragement 9 
Other 10 
If you ticked box 10, please specify below: 
9. Is your finn directly selling products outside Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes 1 Go to Question 20 
No 2 Go to Question 10 
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SECTION B: MARKETING ACTIVITIES WITHIN NIGERIA. 
Please note that Questions 10 - 19 relate ONLY to firms that ans*eT-ed "No" to Question 9. 
If your firm directly sells products outside Nigeria (i. e. you answered"'Yes" to Question 
9), please ignore section "B", and move straight to Question 20 in section "C". 
10. Why have you concentrated your efforts solely on selling your products within Nigeria? 
Please tick applicable boxes (maximum 3). 
No interest in foreign trade 1 
Foreign trade not profitable enough 2 
Too expensiye/difficult to start-up or 
compete in foreign trade 3 
Lack of opportunity 4 
Not enough understanding of the demands 
of foreign trade 5 
Foreign trade too risky/unpredictable 6 
Other 7 
if you ticked box 7, please specify the reason(s) below. 
How would you describe the sales of your firm's products over the period 1991 to 1993? 
Please tick one box only. 
Expanding 1.1 
Stable 2, 
Declining 3 
Don't Know 4 
12. How do you usually sell your products? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Direct to the public (in shop/store/stall etc) 1 
Mail order 2 
Via salaried or commissioned sales agents 3 
To wlioles-alers/dealers/distributors 4 
To retailers 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
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13. How are your products physically transferred from you to your buyers? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
By mail 1 
Our firm's vehicles: No charge to buyer 2 
Our firm's vehicles: Charged to buyer 3 
Buyer picks up or arranges delivery 4 
Independent transport/delivery agents: We pay 5 
Independent transport/delivery agents: Buyer pays 6 
Other 7 
If you ticked box 7, please specify below. 
14. Please state briefly your usual methods of establishing sales outlets. 
15. Who are your main suppliers? 
Please tick applicable boxes. - 
Self 1 
Government parastatals 2 
Manufacturers 3 
Wholesalers/Distributors 4 
Small firms 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
16. Who, physically goes out to purchase/obtain supplies for your firm? 
Please tick one box only. 
You, alone 1 
You, in association with others 2 
Some other person(s) within the firm 3 
No one 4 
If you ticked box 3, please state the person(s)l position(s) within the firm. 
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17. Please state briefly, your finn's usual methods of establishing supply contacts. 
18. Please state briefly what you have found to be your firm's main trading problems. 
19. Is your finn thinking of, or already in the process of commencing direct sales outside 
Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes, we are thinking about it I 
Yes, we are already in the process 2 
No 3 
SECTION C: EXPORý ACTIVITIES. 
Please note that Questions 20 - 48 relate ONLY to firms that answered "Yes" to Question 
9. If your firin does not directly sell products outside Nigeria (i. e. you answered "No" 
to Question 9, and you have answered Questions 10 - 19), please ignore section "C" and 
move straight to Question 49 in section I'D". 
20. Which of your products does your firm directly sell outside Nigeria (maximum 5)? 
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21. The information below relates to the products you identified in Question 20, and how 
your firm obtains and markets them. 
Please tick the boxes that are applicable to your firm. 
Sales: 
My firm directly sells products: - 
Yes No 
within Nigeria 1 2 
to parts of West Africa 1 2 
to East/South/Central/North Africa 1 2 
outside Africa 1 2 
Purchases: 
My firm directly buys products: - 
within Nigeria 1 2 
from parts of West Africa 1 2 
From East/South. /Central/North Africa 1 2 
From outside Africa 1 2 
22. How would you describe your sales (of the products identified in ()uestion 4) over the 
period 1991 to 1993, within Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
Expanding 1 
Stable 2 
Declining 3 
Don't know 4 
23. How would you desbribe your sales (of the products identified in ()uestion 20) over the 
period 1991 to 1993, optside Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
Expanding I 
Stable 2 
Declining 3 
Don't know 4 
24. How do you usually sell your products within Nigeria? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Direct to the public (in shop/store/stall etc) I 
Mail order 2 
Via salaried or cornmissioned sales agents 3 
To wliolesalers/Dealers/Distributors 4 
To retailers 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
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25. How do you usually sell your products outside Nigeria? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Direct to the public (in shop/store/stall etc) 1 
Mail order 2 
Via salaried or commissioned sales agents 3 
To wholesalers/Dealers/Distributors 4 
To retailers 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
26. How are your products physically transferred from you to your buyers? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
By mail 1 
Our firm's vehicles: No charge to buyer 2 
Our firm's vehicles: Charged to buyer 3 
Buyer picks up or arranges delivery 4 
Independent transport/delivery agents: We pay 5 
Independent transport/delivery. agents: Buyer. pays 6 
Other .7 
If you ticked box 7, please specify below. 
27. Please state briefly your firm's usual methods of establishing sales outlets within Nigeria? 
28. Please state briefly your firm's usual methods of establishing sales outlets outside 
Nigeria? 
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29. Do you receive unsolicited orders from outside Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes 1 Go to Question 30 
No 2 Go to Question 34 
30. If yes, do you fulfill these orders? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes 1 Go to Question 32 
Sometimes 2 Go to Question 31 
No 3 Go to Question 31 
31. Please state briefly why you don't fulfill these orders. 
32. Please estimate the average number of unsolicited orders you received per year from 
1991 to 1993. 
33. Please estimate the average annual value of these orders in Naira. 
N 
34. In what other waysp apart from fulfilling urisol icited orders, does your firm sell products 
outside Nigeria? 
35. Please estimate the average number of orders you have fulfilled, in these other ways, per 
year from 1991 to 1993. 
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36. Who are your main suppliers in Nigeria? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Self 1 
Government parastatals 2 
Manufacturers 3 
Wholesalers/Distributors 4 
Small firms 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
37. Who are your main suppliers outside Nigeria? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Self 1 
Government parastatals 2 
Manufacturers 3 
Wholesalers/Distributors 4 
Small firms 5 
Other 6 
if you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
38. Who, physically goes out to purchase/obtain supplies for your finn? I Please tick one box only. 
You, alone 1 
You, in association with others 2 
Some other person(s) within the firm 3 
No one 4 
if You ticked box 3, please state the person(s)l position(s) within the firm. 
39. Please state briefly your usual methods of establishing supply contacts within Nigeria. 
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40. Please state briefly your usual methods of establishing supply contacts outside Nigeria. 
41. Who takes decisions concerning export actiXities within the firm? 
Please tick one box only. 
You, alone 1 
You, in association with others 2 
Some other person within the firm 3 
If you ticked box 3, please state the person(s)l position(s) within the firm. 
42. Which countries do you trade with outside Nigeria? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Republic of Benin 1 
Togo 2 
Ghana 3 
Ivory Coast 4 
The rest of West Africa 5 
East/South. /Central/North Africa 6 
The rest of the world 7 
If you ticked box 5,61 'or 7, please state the country(ies). 
43. Please state briefly why you trade with these countries to the excCusion of others. 
44. Wliat have you found to be your firm's main trading problems within Nigeria? 
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45. What have you found to be your firm's main trading problems outside Nigeria? 
46. Please indicate briefly how you cope with, or minimize the effects of these problems. 
47. Approximately what percentage of your gross annual turnover (identified in Question 7) 
is made up of sales outside Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
20% or less 1 
21% -35% 2 
36% -50% 3 
51% -65% 4 
66% or more 5 
48. Please indicate the-'ýpproximate % of your sales outside Nigeria that is earned in the 
following countries. 
Rep. of Benin 20% or less 21-35% 36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
Togo 20% or less 21-35% 36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
Ghana 20% or less 21-35% 36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
Ivory Coast 20% or less 21-35% 36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
Rest of West Africa 
20% or less 21-35% 36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
East/South/Centm, I/North Africa 
20% or less 21-35% 36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
Rest of the World 
20% or less 21-35% 36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
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SECTION D: THE ECOWAS EFFECT. 
49. Are you aware of the aspirations of the Economic Community- Qý West African States 
(ECOWAS) to establish a single West African market. 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes 1 Go to question 50 
No 2 Go to question 52 
50. Are you aware of any current ECOWAS guidelines/directives for the proposed single 
market which will affect your business? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Unsure 3 
51. Which of the following organizations have sent you advice about the proposed West 
African single market? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria (M. A. N) 1 
Federal/State Ministry of Trade and Industries 2 
West African Chamber of Commerce 3 
Nigerian/Lagos State Chamber of Commerce 4 
Your Local Government Authority --5 
No one 6 
Other 7 
If you ticked box 7, please specify below: 
52. Will the commencement of a West African single market have an effect on your 
business. 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes, and we are prepared for it I Go to question 53 
Yes, but we are not prepared for it 2 Go to question 53 
No 3 Go to question 54 
Don't know 4 Go to question 54 
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53. What kind of effect? 
Please tick one box only. 
Increase the competition 1 
Offer more opportunities/customers 2 
Both 3 
Unsure 4 
Other 5 
If you ticked box 5, please specify below: 
54. Wily do you think it will not/may not affect you? 
55. Do you plan to continue your present business after the West African single market 
comes into being? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes I 
No 2 
Don't know 3 
SECTION E: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT. 
56. Are you aware of any Federal or Lagos State government schemes promoting or 
assisting businesses like yours? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes I Go to question 57 
No 2 Go to question 59 
57. If yes, please state them (maximum 3). 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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I 
58. Are you benefitting from any of these schemes? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes 1 
No 2 
59. Do you think there is any more the government can do to assist firms like yours? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes 1 Go to question 60 
No 2 Go to question 61 
60. If yes, in which areas do you feel the need for more assistance (maximum 2)? 
(a) 
(b) 
SECTION F: PERSONAL INFORMATION. 
61. Please state the name and present address of your firm. 
62. What is your position within the firm? 
Please tick one box only. 
Owner/Partner I 
Founder 2 
Manager 3 
Supervisor 4 
Professional 5 
63. Please state your sex. 
Male I 
Female 2 
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64. Please give a brief account of a routine working week in your finn. 
Thank you for your help. 
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APPENDIX Dii 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE TO ACCOMPANY MANUFACTURERS' 
QUESTIONNAIRE. 
The numbers and questions listed below refer to the corresponding numbers and questions 
in the questionnaire. 
1. Has the firm always carried on this business? 
- What was it doing before? 
2. Is the business part of a larger enterprise? Is it an independent company in a group of 
companies, or is it a unit within a company? 
4. - (Categorize into industrial sectors) 
7. Turnover going up or down? 
- Is increase/decrease in turnover due to increased/decreased unit sales or Naira exchange 
rate? 
- If both, how much weight would you give to each factor? 
8. (Type of location) 
* Industrial Estate 
* Residential Estate 
* "Commercial CentreT 
* Airport Vicinity 
* Seaport Vicinity 
* Railway/Bus Station 
* Border Town/Village 
Section B/C (general) 
- Awareness of / Strategies for dealing with competition 
- How do you antic ipate/respond to price changes in the market? Do you influence / Have 
you influenced such before? Please give examples. 
- Internationalization strategy: give story behind (try to ask leading questions with export 
behaviour theories in mind. 
- How do you keep abreast of international developments in your field'? Do you think you 
are sufficiently well informed? 
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12. Probe: 
e. g. Whose shop? 
- Have you tried and discarded any other systems? If yes, namc them. ' 
- Are you aware of other methods being used by other people? How ihfluenced are you by 
these? 
14. How important are network relationships in developing these? 
- Do you use any? which? 
- Are palms greased? 
15. How important are network relationships in developing these sources? 
- Do you use any? Which? 
- Are palms greased? 
17. 
- What is your level of personal involvement? 
- How important are network relationships in developing these? 
- Do you use any? which? 
- Are palms greased? 
18. (Are systems of management making it impossible/difficult to exploit opportunities 
outside Nigeria? ) 
- Encourage respondent to open up. Suggest possible problems, 
if necessary, with 
government, banks, religion, competition, infrastructures, bureaucrats e. t. c) 
19. - If No, is there something that would make you consider foreign trade? What? 
- If yes, how so? (Le exactly what are you dPing/have you done/do you propose to 
do? ) 
21. Probe: 
% 
- Where exactly? 
- Have you sought and discarded other outlets within (or outside) Africa? 
- What advantages do outlets outside Nigeria (or Africa) have? 
23. Do you have more success outside Africa, than within? Do you know why? 
24. Probe: 
e. g Whose shop? 
- Have you tried and discarded other methods? Name them. 
- Do you know of any other methods, perhaps as practisqd by other firms? To what extent 
are you influenced by these? 
25. Probe: 
e. g Whose shop? 
- Have you tried and discarded other methods? name them, 
- Do you know of any other methods, perhaps as practised by other firms? To what extent 
are you influenced by these? 
- What are the practical differences between transfer of goods to buyers in Nigeria, and those 
beyond'? 
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27. How important to your sales are network relationships? 
- What sort do you use? 
- Are palms greased? 
28. How important to your sales are network relationships? 
- What sort do you use? 
- Are palms greased? 
- What are the practical differences between this function in, and outside Nigeria? 
29. Which countries do these orders come from? 
- Why do you think they wanted your firm 
31. Anything to do with their country of origin (specific political or such other 
consideration)? 
34. e. g use of networks 
36. Probe: 
- Company names 
- Use of networks 
37. Probe: 
- Company names 
- Use of networks: Does this work as well outside Nigeria, as within? 
- Do you have more success within Africa than outside? Why do you think this is so? 
43. Probe: 
- Are there specific so6io-political or person'al reasons (or is it due more to ignorance, 
previous indoctrinatiorý management style e. t.; c)' 
44. Encourage respondent to open up. Suggest possible problems with-bureaucracy, banks, 
competition, own staff, infrastructures, religion, politics e. t. c. 
45. Encourage respondent to open up. Possible problems - international politics, trade 
barriers, unfriendly/corrupt customs, and those in Q44, above. 
48. Probe. 
- Boxes 5,6 & 7: 
Exactly where? 
- Pattern of increase/decrease 
- Result of strategic initiative? 
- Are there specific plans to increase any country's contribution? 
49. What understanding do you have of ECOWAS? 
- Do you think it is a good idea? 
Do you think it is work-ing/will work-? 
Why/wIly [lot? 
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62. (Establish whether respondent is owner and/or manager) 
- Did you have role model as a child / Do you still have one ? Who? 
- What is your attitude to risk taking 
*in life? 
*in business? 
- How much tinie do you spend daily at work? 
- What is the firm's capitalization? 
64. Any issues which this questionnaire has not addressed which would be beneficial? 
- When I interview policy makers, what issues would you like me to raise witli diem? 
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APPE, NDIX Ei 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TRADING FIRMS 
SECTION A: NATURE OF THE BUSINESS. 
1. Approximately how many years has your finn been carrying on business? 
Years. 
2. What is the ownership status of your business? 
Please tick one box only. 
Sole proprietorship I 
Partnership 2 
Co-operative 3 
Private-Limited Company 4 
Other 5 
If you ticked box 5, please specify below. 
3. How many people are presently employed in your business, including yourself? 
4. Apart from yourself, does the business employ any other members of your family? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes 1 Go to Question 5 
No 2 Go to Question 6 
5. If Yes, please state die number below. 
6. Please write down the goods you sell (maximum 10). 
451 
7. What are the main activities in your business? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Manufacturing I 
Farming 2 
Transportation 3 
Wholesaling/Distributorship 4 
Pack-aging 5 
Retailing 6 
Other 7 
If you ticked box 7, please specify below. 
8. Please indicate below the range of your gross annual sales for the years 1991 to 1993. 
1991 1992 1993 
Nlmillion or less 1 1 1 
NImillion - N5 million 2 2 2 
N5 million - NIO million 3 3 3 
N10 million - N20 million 4 4 4 
N20 million - N50 million 5 5 5 
N50 million or more 6. 6 6 
SECTION B: TRADING ACTIVITIES. 
9. Which of your goods do you directly sell outside Nigeria (maximum 5)? 
10. How would you describe your sales (of the goods identified in Ouestion ýQ over the 
period 1991 to 1993, within Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
Expanding I 
Stable 2 
Declining 3 
Don't Know 4 
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11. How would you describe your s: iles (of the goods identified in Question 9) over tile 
period 1991 to 1993, outside Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
ExPanding I 
Stable 2 
Declining 3 
Don't Know 4 
12. How do you usually sell your goods within Nigeria? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Direct to die public (in shop/store/stall etc) I 
Mail Order 2 
Via salaried or commissioned sales agents 3 
To wliolesalers/dealers/distributors 4 
To retailers 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
13. How do you usually sell your goods putside Nigeria? 
Plme tigk applicable boxes. 
Direct to the public (in shop/store/stall etc) I 
Mail Order 2 
Via salaried or commissioned sales agents 3 
To wholesalers/Dealers/Distributors 4 
To retailers 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
14. How are your goods physically transferred from you to your buyers? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
By mail I 
Our firm's vehicles: No charge to buyer 2 
Our firm's vehicles: Charged to buyer 3 
Buyer picks up or arranges delivery 4 
Independent transport/delivery agents: We pay 5 
Independent transport/delivery agents: Buyer pays 6 
Other 7 
If you ticked box 7, please specify below. 
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15. Please state briefly your usual methods ofestablishing sales outlets within Nigeria. 
16. Please state briefly your usual methods of establishing sales outlets outside Nigeria. 
17. Do you receive unsolicited orders from outside Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes I Go to Question 18 
No 2 Go to Question 22 
18. If yes, do you fulfil these orders? 
Please tick one box only. 
Yes 1 Go to Question 20 
Sometimes 2 Go to Question 19 
No 3 Go to Question 19 
19. Please state briefly why you don't fulf-il these orders. 
20. Please estimate the average number of unsolicited orders you received per year from 
1991 to 1993. 
21. Please estimate the average annual value of such orders in Naira. 
N 
22. In what other ways, apart from fulfilling unsolicited orders, do you sell goods outside 
Nigeria? 
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23. Please estimale (lie average number of* orders you have Fulfilled, in these ways, per ye. 11. 
1'rom 1991 to 1993. 
24. Who are ), our main suppliers in Nigeria? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Self I 
Government Parastatals 2 
Manufacturers 3 
Wlioles-, ilers/Dealers/Distributors 4 
Small firms 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
25. Who are your main suppliers outside Nigeria? 
Please tick applica6le boxes. 
Self 1 
Government Parastatals 2 
Manufacturers 3 
Who] esa lers/Deal ers/D istributors 4 
Small firms 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
26. Who, physically goes out to buy/obtain supplies for your business? 
Please tick one box only. 
You, alone 1 
You, in association with others 2 
Some other person(s) within the business 3 
If you ticked box 3, please state the person(s)l position(s) in the firm. 
27. Overall, how many suppliers do you have? 
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28. Please state briefly your usual methods destablishing supply contacts within Nigeria. 
29. Picase state briefly your usual methods of establishing supply contacts outside Nigeria. 
30. Who takes decisions concerning your trading activities outside Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
You, alone 1 
You, in association with others 2 
Some other person/persons within the business. 3 
If you ticked box 3, please state the perSon(s)l position(s) in the"firm. 
31. Which countries do you trade-with butside Nigeria? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Republic of Benin 1 
Togo 2 
Ghana 3 
Ivory Coast 4 
The rest of West Africa 5 
East/South/Central/North Africa 6 
The rest of the world 7 
If you have ticked box 5,6, or 7, please list the countries below. 
32. Please state briefly why you trade with these countries to the exclusion of others. 
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33. What have you found to be your main trading problems within Nigeria? 
34. What have You found to be your main trading problems outside Nigeria? 
35. How do you cope with, or minimize die effects of these problems? 
36. Approximately what percentage of your. gross annual sales (Wýtified in Question 8) is 
earned outside Nigeria? 
Please tick one box only. 
20% or less 1 
21% -35% 2 
36% -50% 3 
51% -65% 4 
66% or more 5 
37. Please indicate the proportion of your sales outside Nigeria that is earned in the following 
countries? 
Please tick applicable boxes. 
Rep. of Benin 
Togo 
Ghana 
Ivory Coast 
Rest of West Africa 
20 % or less 21-35 % 
20 % or less 21-35 % 
20 % or less 21-35 % 
20 % or less 21-35 % 
36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
20% or less 21-35 % 
East/SouthICentral/North Africa 
20% or less 21-35% 
36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
Rest of the world 
--.., ýO% or less 21-35% 36-50% 51-65% 66%+ 
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SECTION C: PERSONAL INFORMATION. 
38. Wivit remons inithilly nuide you interested in ,i business c, -Ireer 
Please tick applicable boxes (Maximum 3). 
Fulfilling the ambition of self/spouse I 
Securing self-employment 2 
Making Money 3 
Continuing the family business 4 
Gaining social stature/prestige 5 
Other 6 
If you ticked box 6, please specify below. 
39. What was most instrumental in steering you to your present business? 
Please tick one box only. 
Dissatisfaction with previous Job/Occupation I 
Unemployment -2 
Desire to make use of professional/technical skills 3 
Desire to invest/make use of available funds. 4 
Spotting a market opportunity 5 
Government campaign/encouragement 16 
Other 7 
If you ticked box 7, please specity below. 
40. What factors do you think have helped you develop/succeed in this business? 
Please tick applicable boxes (maximum 3). 
Self-belief/determination I 
Previous association or employment in a 
similar line of activity 2 
Money or property inherited, acquired or 
belonging to self or spouse 3 
Luck 4 
Advice or influence of family/friends/relatives 5 
Formal training or apprenticeship 6 
Government programmes/encouragement 7 
Other 8 
If you ticked box 8, please specify below. 
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41. Please state below, your last job or occupation prior to this present one. 
42. What is your position within this firm? 
Please tick one box only. 
Owner/partner I 
Founder 2 
Manager 3 
Supervisor 4 
Professional 5 
43. Please state your sex. 
Male I 
Female 2 
44. Please state the name and present address of your firm. 
45. Please give a brief account of a routine working week in your business. 
Thank you for your help. 
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APPE NDIX Eii 
INTERVIEWSCIIEDULE TO ACCOMPANY TRADERS' QUESTIONNAIRE. 
The numbers and questions below refer to the corresponding numbers and questions in the 
questionnaire. 
1. Has the firin always carried on this business? What was it doing before? 
5. Which family members, and how did they come to be involved in the business? 
- Level of involvement of kin 
- Kins' dernogn, phic inforrnation 
- How does respondent single out particular sibling and affinal relationships for 
consolidation? 
6. Why have you selected these product lines? 
8. Turnover going up or down? Is increase/decrease in turnover dueý to increased/decreased 
unit sales or inflation? If both, how much weight would you give t1o each factor? 
Seelion B (general). 
- Awareness of/Strategies for dealing with competition . 
- How do you antic ipate/respond to price changes in the market? Do you influence/Have You 
influenced such before? Please give an instance. 
- Membership of any social clubs. Do any of respondent's partners/associates belong to these 
clubs? Are business relationships developed in this way? 
- Find out any social events in their lives - births, deaths, marriages e. t. c, and watch out for 
links with, or implications for their businesses, e. g, do associates attend, are these taken as 
opportunities to build or cement business networks? 
- Internationalization strategy: let respondent tell story (let any questions reflect literature on 
export behaviour theories). 
- How do you keep abreast of international developments in your field? Do you think you 
are sufficiently well informed? 
12-13. Probe: 
e. g, Whose shop? 
- Have you, maybe, tried and discarded other systems? If yes, name them 
- Are you aware of other methods being used by other people? How influenced are you by 
these? 
13. What are the practical differences between selling in, and outside Nigeria? 
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14. What are the practical differences between the trawsrer of goods to customers within, and 
outside Nigeria? 
15-16. How important to your sales are network relationships? What sort do you use? Arce 
palms greased? 
16. What arc the practical differences between this function within, and outside Nigeria? 
17. Which countries do these orders conic from? Why do you think they wanted you in 
particular? 
24-25. Probe: 
- Suppliers' actual names 
- Use of networks: Does this work as well outside Nigeria, as within? 
- Do You have more success outside Africa than within? Why do you think this is so? 
33. Encourage respondent to open up (suggest, if necessary, possible problems with banks, 
competition, own staff, competition, religion, politics e. t. c). 
34. Encourage respondent to open up (suggest, if necessary, possible problems with 
international politics, trade barriers, as well as those listed in Q33, above). 
38-42. i-1. 
- How much did you start the business withT 
- How do you run your company (Le what kind of management structure do you have)? 
- How much time do you spend daily at work? 
- Did you have a role model as a child, or do you still have one? Who? 
- What is your attitude to risk-taking 
*in life 
*in business 
Q40 indicates "preliminary" locus of control measurement) 
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APPE NDIX F 
RENA PRODUCTS AIINI-SURVEY: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE. 
1. Are you a regular customer licre? 
Yes I 
No 2 
2. How long have you been buying from Rena Products? 
Less than 6 montlis 1 
6 montlis -1 year 2 
1 year -3 years 3 
3. What do you usually buy? (Maximum 3) 
4. Please indicate what you do with your purchase from Rena. 
Do you 
buy them for personal use I 
resell them 2 
both 3 
otlier 4 
If you picked box 3, please indicate in what proportions - 
If you picked box 4, please specify what you do with the purchases 
5. Who physically goes out to buy/obtain supplies for your business? 
You, alone 1 
You, in association with others 2 
Some other person(s) within the business 3 
If you picked box 3, please state the person(s)' position(s) in the finn 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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6. What is your position within the firm 
Owner/Partner 
Founder 2 
Manager 3 
Supervisor 4 
Professional 5 
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